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Abstract  
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ASSET BUILDING BY SMALLHOLDER COFFEE PRODUCERS  
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M.Sc. University of Massachusetts-Amherst, 
Ph.D. University of London-School of Oriental and African Studies 
 
 
Since the mid-2000s, value chain development has dominated discussions on how to 
reduce rural poverty through more direct and intensive engagement with the private 
sector. Value chain development approaches (VCDAs) aim to strengthen the linkages 
between poor households and one or more downstream chain actors. However, the 
poverty impacts of VCDAs remain an open question. This thesis presents a 
conceptual framework for assessing the poverty impacts of the VCDA. Poverty 
reduction is viewed through the lens of asset building: the greater a household’s 
assets endowment, the greater its resilience and ability to exit from poverty, and vice 
versa. Given the potentially critical role played by collective enterprises in linking poor 
households with value chains, their economic viability and contributions to value 
chain development are assessed. The framework was applied to the case of 
Soppexcca—a fair-trade certified coffee cooperative from Nicaragua with more than 
500 members. Between 2002 and 2009, Soppexcca received considerable support 
from NGOs to improve its linkages with buyers of certified coffee, in hopes that such 
linkages would provide a pathway out of poverty. The 296 sampled households, 
which included the membership of 11 of Soppexcca’s 16 base cooperatives, provided 
information on changes in their asset endowments between 2005 and 2009 and the 
underlying reasons for the changes. Key-informant interviews and secondary sources 
provided data on asset building by Soppexcca over the same five-year period.  
Results at the household level showed both the potential and the limitations of 
value chain interventions to facilitate asset building by the poor. On one hand, 
through their link to value chains for certified coffee, many households expanded 
their access to short-term and long-term credit, improved the quality of their coffee 
production, and reduced their vulnerability to asset erosion and food insecurity. 
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These results were especially important given that prior to the assessment period 
coffee growers in Nicaragua had experienced a prolonged period (2001–2003), 
during which coffee prices fell below production costs. On the other hand, many 
households struggled to meet their basic needs, which required them to sell their 
coffee outside of the value chain and limited their ability to build their asset 
endowments. The poorest households, which tended to depend heavily on off-farm 
income, were the least able to benefit from participation in the value chain. In many 
cases, these households struggled to purchase basic production inputs, implement 
good production practices for coffee, and secure title to their land.  
Results at the enterprise level showed how large preexisting endowments of 
human and social capital provided a solid foundation for rapid asset accumulation 
during the assessment period. During the early period of Soppexcca development, 
interventions by the private sector played a critical role in building human capital, 
which in turn, facilitated the building of social capital. However, longer-term 
interventions that focused on building Soppexcca’s physical and financial capitals 
and improving Soppexcca’s service offer for its members were carried out exclusively 
by NGOs. NGO support allowed Soppexcca to build infrastructure for coffee 
processing, build its technical assistance program for quality enhancement, and 
expand its credit services for members. Despite major gains in assets during the 
assessment period, however, Soppexcca remained highly vulnerable to asset erosion 
from both internal and external shocks. This research highlights the need for 
innovation in the design of services Soppexcca provides to its members and for 
closer collaboration between value chain stakeholders and external service providers, 
such as NGOs, based on mutual learning and accountability.  
This research stands out from other applications of the asset-building 
approach by focusing on the role of collective enterprises in value chain development 
and asset building at the household level, the deconstruction and specification of 
livelihood concepts and mechanisms, and the detailed exploration of changes in 
assets over time at the household level. The results suggest that if VCDAs are to 
contribute more effectively to poverty reduction, then changes are needed in the 
design of value chain interventions and the adaptation of intervention design over 
time. Development initiatives will require longer-term, nonlinear interventions that 
embrace mutual learning and risk sharing. More tailored interventions are needed 
that recognize the heterogeneity in households’ preexisting asset base, livelihoods 
strategies, and vulnerability context. While the asset-building approach to assessing 
the poverty impacts of the VCDA presented certain limitations, overall it provided a 
robust framework for identifying options that facilitate participation of the asset poor in 
5 
 
value chains—options that most likely would not have emerged from traditional forms 
of impact assessment. That said, the meaningful application of the approach requires 
asking critical questions about the role of the vcda in building assets and a deep 
appreciation of the local context—questions and appreciations for which practitioners, 
so far, have shown limited willingness to incorporate into their assessments.   
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1 Introduction 
 
1.1 Smallholders and agricultural development  
Success in reducing poverty on a worldwide scale has been concentrated in a few 
countries (e.g., those of East Asia) and, in many cases, in urban populations within 
those countries. Rural poverty persists in sub-Saharan Africa and significant portions 
of South and Southeast Asia, as well as Central and South America. Given that more 
than half of the development world’s population lives in rural areas (World Bank 
2007), rural poverty emerges as a fundamental determinant of underdevelopment. 
The reasons for the persistence of rural poverty are varied but are thought to include 
limited household asset endowments (de Janvry and Sadoulet 2000), unequal land 
distribution and uneven power systems (Kay 2006), limited off-farm employment 
opportunities, and ill-designed and poorly implemented policies (Lipton 1977). The 
urgency to address rural poverty could not be greater. While globalizing markets offer 
opportunities for marketing higher-value products that simply did not exist before, 
these markets generally demand considerably more in terms of business acumen, 
efficiency and attention to quality and food safety standards (Reardon et al. 2009) 
than markets for traditional products. These demands can disadvantage the small-
scale farming households (World Bank 2007).  
 Part of the difficulty in reducing rural poverty in the developing world has been 
the incomplete and discontinuous nature of development strategies. During the 
1950s, agriculture was considered to be a low-productivity activity and therefore not 
central to achieving economic growth. In this light, the rural poor contributed to 
growth by supplying their labour to an expanding manufacturing sector. However, 
experiences with industrialization generally failed to provide enough jobs for the 
rural poor. In the 1960s, a major revision in development thinking argued that 
agriculture had a central role in achieving economic growth (Johnston and Mellor 
1961). The challenge facing development planners was to transform traditional 
agriculture into a modern sector through the poor’s adoption of science-based 
technology (Schultz 1964). Support to agricultural development came in the form of 
building extension systems and local institutions to absorb improved technologies, 
particularly new crop varieties and practices (Mellor 1988). During this period, 
several countries in Latin America and Africa also implemented a variety of land 
reforms that aimed to facilitate the poor’s participation in agricultural production. 
Interest in agriculture peaked during the early 1970s in the wake of the 
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technological achievements of the green revolution—itself a product of investments 
by multilateral and bilateral donors and foundations. However, by the late 1970s, 
interest in agriculture had waned considerably in response to a chorus of criticism 
about “second generation problems” of the green revolution, which included the 
negative effects on worsened absolute poverty, inequality of income and asset 
distribution, and negative effects on nutrition, women, and the environment (Griffin 
1972; Harriss 1977; Mellor 1988). In many countries of Africa and Latin America, 
crippling deficits and inflation and the limited options for governments to address 
these problems through direct assistance or policy reform exacerbated these 
problems. Considering Africa, Mellor (1988: 59) argued that 
instead of focusing on food production and building the basic institutions for a 
modern agriculture over a period of decades, donors jettisoned much of what 
that been learned about the agricultural development experiences in Asia and 
in the seventies introduced new programs, such as a diffused provision of 
services targeted to the poor, integrated rural development, programs 
targeted to women, and an attack on environmental problems. These 
programs overlooked the critical need to address concurrently agricultural 
productivity and sustainability issues.   
In Latin America, land reform disappeared from the policy agenda in the 1980s for 
political reasons and its inability to meet poverty reduction expectations (Kay 2006). 
During the 1990s, a period during which the neoliberal policy environment stressed 
limited intervention by governments in markets, overall interest in agriculture declined 
further, as environmental enhancement, policy reform, and democratization took 
precedence. While growth in smallholder agriculture could have contributed to 
meeting these goals, donors showed a limited appetite for major investments in the 
sector (Mellor 1988).    
 The most important change in agricultural development strategy to emerge 
between the late 1980s and late 1990s was the promotion of nontraditional 
agriculture exports (NTAEs). In the context of macroeconomic trade reforms and the 
expansion of free trade agreements, governments and NGOs sought to facilitate the 
poor’s ability to participate in North-South trade in NTAEs. Multilateral and bilateral 
donors provided technical assistance in identifying lucrative markets and the means 
for meeting market requirements (e.g., technical assistance, subsidized credit, and 
infrastructure development). Given the dynamism of the NTAE sector (and the limited 
options in local markets), it was thought that a shift in the production of smallholders 
from staple crops to NTAE would spread the benefits of NTAE growth more widely 
and ensure the economic viability of smallholder production. Examples of NTAE 
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promotion abound in Latin America and the Caribbean, including fresh fruits and 
vegetables (e.g., Guatemala, Chile, Costa Rica, Honduras), fresh cut flowers (e.g., 
Ecuador and Colombia) and highly processed products such as frozen concentrate 
organic juice (e.g., Brazil, Belize). From a rural development perspective, however, 
various researchers criticised these programs for their perceived lack of 
sustainability, inattention to poverty and the environment, and negative effects on 
gender relations (e.g., Stonich et al. 1994; Carter, Barham, and Mesbah 1996; 
Donovan and Poole 2008).  
 By the early 2000s, agriculture had regained its footing in rural development 
debates. The first Millennium Development Goal of halving poverty and hunger is 
thought to have contributed to the renewed attention on agriculture, as the poor and 
hungry are more like to reside in the rural sector. The World Bank (2007) and OECD 
(2006) argued for renewed investments in agriculture to address poverty reduction 
goals, and in both cases, they recognized the diversity of stakeholders, in general, 
and the diversity of rural households, in particular. Some governments have also 
shown renewed interest in agriculture because of improved price incentives from 
agricultural sector reforms and higher commodity prices (World Bank 2007). In some 
areas, the importance of NGOs and private foundations in developing agriculture has 
grown to such an extent that it rivals that of governments (Byerlee, de Janvry, and 
Sadoulet 2009). The private sector has also become more prevalent in the rural 
areas of many development countries, often in the interest of improved access to raw 
materials and enhanced corporate social responsibility. Sharp increases in oil and 
food prices in 2008, and again in 2011, combined with the effects of climate change, 
particularly on poor farming households, have also spurred interest once again in 
agriculture as a way to advance poverty reduction goals.  
 However, doubts remain about whether smallholders, and the poor in general, 
can significantly benefit from reinvigorated efforts to develop agriculture. For some, 
smallholder agriculture is a viable option for addressing poverty reduction goals, 
subject to changes in the policy environment and investment patterns. Discussions 
along this line have focused on improved coverage and quality of financial and 
advisory services available to smallholders, including those provided by collective 
enterprises (Poulton, Dorward, and Kydd 2010), removal of existing entry barriers to 
lucrative nonfarm professions (Haggblade, Hazell, and Reardon 2010), and improved 
functioning of markets for outputs, inputs, and financial services (Hazell et al. 2010). 
For others, smallholder agriculture holds limited promise for addressing rural poverty. 
For sub-Saharan Africa, Ellis (2005) argues that any increase in agricultural output 
would be unable to compensate for the small and declining farm size in already 
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densely settled rural areas, and thus the best option for poverty reduction lies in 
facilitating people’s mobility out of agriculture. For Latin America, Kay (2006) argues 
that those who encourage development processes centred on smallholder agriculture 
generally fail to recognize the extent to which the goals depend on the state and that 
the costs of development might be high and difficult to bear. “Tackling the root causes 
of poverty will require major land redistribution and rural investments which raise 
employment opportunities and improve agricultural productivity” (Kay 2006, 457).  
 Analysts of agricultural development and the role of smallholders agree that 
changes are required at various levels if agriculture is to contribute effectively to rural 
poverty reduction. Exactly what interventions are needed and how to implement them 
remains a matter of debate. The literature provides little encouragement that 
governments and donors are able or willing to fund large-scale, sectorwide 
interventions or renew discussions on agrarian reform. Researchers calling for major 
long-term investments in rural services and infrastructure, in particular the provision 
of public goods (e.g, schools, sanitation, infrastructure, extension services), are likely 
to receive a limited response from governments and donors in the short- to mid-term. 
Considerable interest does exist, however, in supporting agricultural development at 
the micro level—that is, among individual firms and groups of smallholders. 
Discussions on value chains and the potential of the private sector to participate in 
and contribute to rural development processes have captured the attention of policy 
makers and development practitioners. A clear expression of this interest is the 
emergence of value chain development approaches in the strategies of donors and 
NGOs (see Humphrey and Navas-Alemán 2010 for review).  
 
1.2 Value chain development approaches  
Value chain concepts represent an important change in thinking about development 
practice as it relates to the private sector and smallholder agriculture. The literature 
has used the term “value chain” in different ways. For researchers, it often refers to a 
conceptual framework for understanding the relations among independent 
enterprises that share responsibilities in the production of a given product or service. 
Here, a value chain is the set of interfirm linkages required to bring a product from 
production to consumption. This concept has been applied extensively for 
understanding the implications of globalizing markets for the poor. For development 
practitioners, the term has been used to describe a type of development intervention 
that addresses poverty through improved linkages between businesses and poor 
households. The term “value chain development approach” (VCDA) is thus derived 
from the practitioner-oriented literature. This research, however, requires a broader 
16 
 
definition of VCDA, one that recognizes the inputs and interests of various actors in 
the development of a given value chain, including those of the private sector. Use of 
the value chain for understanding globalization processes is explored in chapter 2. 
The following discussion briefly discusses ideas surrounding the VCDA. It concludes 
by presenting a definition of VCDA that is unique to this research.   
In contrast to development approaches that focus narrowly on improving the 
capacities of smallholders to increase their productivity or better manage natural 
resources, the VCDA challenges development organizations to work with two or more 
stakeholders to understand the performance of the chain and identify mutually 
beneficial options for improving chain performance. It is reasoned that by working in 
closer collaboration with private sector actors, VCDA provides increased benefits to 
the poor and enhances options for sustainability beyond the project framework. For 
smallholders, benefits may include increased income, more secure market linkages, 
and access to new services for production. For downstream enterprises, benefits may 
include improved quality and flow of raw material, reduced transaction costs, and 
enhanced environmental and social credentials. Since the mid-2000s, various 
multilateral and bilateral donors, NGOs, and private foundations have embraced the 
VCDA (e.g., McVay and Runnekleiv 2005; SNV 2005; Kula, Downing, and Field 
2006; GTZ 2007; Devaux et al. 2008; DFID 2008; USAID 2008a). VCDA interventions 
by NGOs may include identifying options for improved chain performance, building 
consensus among chain stakeholders on improvement options, provision of technical 
assistance, and the co-financing of infrastructure investments. 
However, leadership in the design and implementation of VCDA is not limited 
to NGOs or government agencies. The private sector has carried out interventions for 
linking with smallholders in the interest of improving their access to raw material and 
promoting social and environmental responsibility. In other cases, the private sector 
carries out interventions in collaboration with development agencies. Two examples 
include Starbucks and the US-based NGO Conservation International, whose 
collaboration aims to “promote conservation and improve livelihoods in a wider range 
of global biodiversity hot spots” (Austin and Reavis 2004, 10) and collaboration 
between the US Agency for International Development and Walmart to “support small 
rural farmers in Central America and to connect them to the retailer’s regional and 
international supply chains” (USAID 2011). Interventions by the private sector may 
include technical assistance for quality enhancement, co-financing of investments in 
infrastructure, and innovations in contractual arrangements for greater risk/benefit 
sharing.  
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Discussions by researchers and development practitioners highlight three 
general types of interventions in support of value chain development:  
• Improved linkages between two or more firms: Interventions are primarily 
concerned with reducing the risks and costs of collaboration between two or 
more enterprises, including trust-building initiatives, improved 
communication mechanisms, and institutional innovations for managing risk.   
• Improved coordination along chains: Interventions aim to resolve 
bottlenecks that increase the cost of doing business along the chain, 
focusing on improving knowledge flows along the chain and facilitating the 
flow of resources along the chain (e.g., credit, inputs, or technical support).  
• Support for weakest link: Interventions directed mainly at smallholders and 
their business organizations to improve their capacities to add value to 
primary production and otherwise comply with strict quality standards by 
downstream actors. 
 
In practice, the type of VCDA implemented depends on the market context 
and the opportunities for achieving mutually beneficial outcomes. Improved 
coordination and improved commercial relations are more likely when chain 
participants are geographically close and share a similar cultural background. NGOs 
and projects are less equipped to facilitate linkages between Southern and Northern 
firms where issues of language, culture, and business practices differ significantly 
and where access to information is limited. Thus, where value chain development 
addresses the linkages between Southern suppliers and Northern buyers, 
interventions generally focus on support for the weakest link or developing new chain 
linkages, often involving the development of collective enterprises. Regardless of the 
type, value chain development interventions vary in scope: some target a selected 
chain and the firms and producing households attached to it while others engage 
various chains (and the actors in them) in a given subsector.  
Not all poor households can be expected to benefit from access to chains for 
higher-value agricultural products. Value chain participation in more demanding 
markets requires smallholders to deliver consistent quality and sufficient quantity. 
Meeting these conditions requires a certain level of infrastructure, land, inputs, 
technology, knowledge, and capacities and skills, which simply may not exist among 
communities of asset-poor producers. Arguably, households require a minimum asset 
endowment in these and other areas to participate successfully in value chains. For 
those who fall below minimum asset thresholds, it is unclear whether public and/or 
private sector interventions can create the necessary preconditions for their long-term 
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participation in value chains. Similarly, collective enterprises and other upstream 
enterprises may lack certain assets to facilitate the participation of smallholders in 
value chains and to respond to the needs of downstream buyers and processors. 
Research suggests that the development of economically viable collective enterprises 
requires major investments by various sources over an extended period, often 
measured in decades (Donovan, Stoian, and Poole 2008).    
This research employs an asset-based approach to explore the impacts of 
value chain development on rural poverty. In broad strokes, this recognizes that 
households struggle to build their productive assets and increase their incomes 
through various market linkages while at the same time trying to reduce their risk of 
falling deeper into poverty. Understanding value chains and VCDA in this context has 
not featured prominently in the value chain literature. Where poverty impacts have 
been discussed in the literature, they have focused narrowly on changes in income or 
prices for a selected product/value chain with little or no discussion of the causes of 
the identified changes. A review of existing information on the impacts of donor-
funded value chain interventions by Humphrey and Navas-Alemán (2010) found few 
independent impact assessments or systematic examinations of the links between 
value chain interventions and poverty outcomes. Given the importance of evaluating 
the claims that value chains contribute to poverty reduction, the status quo—where 
interventions that promote value chain linkages and chain efficiencies hope or 
assume that the ultimate goal of reducing poverty will be an outcome—is worrisome. 
A key statement that emerged from the 2007 international conference on 
value chain development held in Berlin (BMZ 2007) reaffirms the hope that value 
chain approaches reduce poverty and highlights the need for a better understanding 
of the poverty impacts of value chain interventions:  
The value chain approach contributes to reduction of poverty if it is employed 
strategically and if it concentrates on targeting poverty. We have to overcome 
the bias toward the better-off by consciously using the full range of options 
available to support the poor in value chains. This includes fostering 
associations, skills development and learning; facilitating contract 
arrangements; and supporting information and service delivery. Often it is 
necessary to combine value chain promotion with a livelihoods perspective, 
with local economic development, or with vocational training to enable the 
poor to enter (and stay in) commercial markets. Better monitoring tools are 
needed to guide value chain promotion (p. 19).  
More complete analytical frameworks and better evidence are urgently 
needed. Without objective and meaningful poverty assessment of value chain 
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interventions, development actors and value chain stakeholders are limited in their 
ability to learn from previous interventions and improve the poverty-reducing potential 
of VCDAs for future interventions. The fact that discussions on value chain 
development have yet to juxtapose the realities/needs of rural households with the 
realities/needs of downstream actors in value chains presents both an opportunity 
and challenge for this research. The opportunity rests in expanding and deepening 
discussions on how VCDAs can impact the rural poor and on options for 
strengthening their poverty-reducing potential. The challenge lies in bringing together 
concepts such as poverty, rural livelihoods, and value chains, which mostly have 
been developed independently of each other. 
 
Defining value chain approaches to development  
For the purposes of this research, the following definition for VCDA is offered: the set 
of interventions by chain actors (buyers, processors, smallholders) and/or service 
providers (government agencies, NGOs, consultants, projects) to generate higher 
value added and create mutually beneficial relationships between two or more chain 
actors. In some cases, a chain actor leads the approach with or without support from 
NGOs and other types of external service providers. In other cases, service providers 
may play a pivotal role in establishing the conditions that enable private sector 
collaboration. While poverty reduction may not be an explicit goal of a given VCDA, it 
may be part of its measurable impact. 
The concept of value added is borrowed from Porter (1980) and the supply 
chain management literature. It refers to the difference between the sale price of a 
product (which may be influenced by intangible benefits attributed to the product by 
consumers) and the cost of materials and outside services to produce it. Higher value 
added can be achieved, for example, through niche market orientation (certification), 
reduced production and transaction costs, and improved branding and marketing. In 
the value chain context, costs and benefits of higher value addition are shared 
between two or more actors in the chain (although in some cases, the costs may be 
partially subsidised by development interventions).  
Chain actors invest in value chain development to improve their sourcing of raw 
materials and/or enhance corporate social responsibility. The livelihoods of the poor 
may not be a reason for investing in linkages with smallholders. In some cases, the 
duration of their investments may depend on the net benefits obtained, which will 
vary based on market conditions and the company’s business strategy. Public sector 
actors typically invest in the interest of poverty reduction, and their interventions are 
likely to be time-bound. Public-sector and private-sector agents may work 
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independently or collaboratively (through public-private or private-private 
partnerships). In some cases, interventions may not pursue an explicit strategy of 
value chain development but do provide services that ultimately contribute to the 
development of a value chain. For example, a research centre may provide access to 
improved seeds that increase crop productivity, thus contributing to the development 
of the value chain as a whole. For the purposes of assessment, both types of 
interventions are included when defining the boundaries of a given VCDA.  
 
1.3 Options for assessing poverty impacts  
The previous discussion highlights the prominence of value chains and VCDA in 
recent debates on rural development while pointing out that the current dearth of 
information on the poverty impacts of the VCDA has negative implications for 
development in general. So how should we measure the impacts of VCDAs? Current 
efforts to assess the poverty impacts of VCDAs have yielded limited information on 
their strengths and limitations for achieving development goals. The limited utility of 
these assessments follows a general trend of ineffective design and implementation 
of monitoring and evaluation (M&E) for development interventions, including those in 
agriculture (Haddad, Lindstrom, and Pinto 2010). Discussions in the grey literature on 
private sector development have advocated traditional log-frame-based project 
assessment for understanding VCDA poverty implications (e.g., GTZ 2007; DCED 
2008). While log frames and similar forms of “rigorous” assessments may serve the 
technocratic needs of project managers and donors, they are based on assumptions 
inappropriate for understanding complex development processes (Jones 2011), as 
they assume that the implementing organization has the capacity to achieve the 
outcomes and impacts on its own. 
While income-based measures—the focus of most assessments related to 
private sector development interventions (Zandniapour, Sebstad, and Snodgrass 
2004)—provide important insights into the poverty impacts of VCDAs, they are 
insufficient for understanding the implications of VCDAs on diversified rural 
livelihoods (Chambers 2006). While the use of income to define poverty has been 
criticised extensively in the literature (Cardoso and Helwede 1992; Reddy and Pogge 
2002; Anand and Sen 2003; Laderchi et al. 2006; Townsend 2006; Helwege and 
Birch 2007), it continues to be used as an important indicator of success in economic 
growth and development programs. The Millennium Development Goal declaration, 
with its $1 per day poverty line, highlights the enduring nature of subsistence poverty 
measures in development discourse and programming. For example, in assessing 
the impact of donor-funded microfinance projects, the US congress passed a law in 
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2003 requiring that half of all the money provided by USAID to the microenterprise 
sector reach the very poor, defined as those earning less than US$1/day (adjusted 
for PPP) or those in the bottom half of those under the poverty line in their country 
(USAID 2008b).  
While most would agree that poverty is more complex than income, there is 
limited agreement of how to assess multidimensional poverty. During the 1980s and 
early 1990s, Sen (1984, 1985) argued that discourse on poverty should move away 
from income to achievements or capabilities. Various scholars adopted Sen’s ideas 
and developed them into the “capability approach” for the analysis of human well-
being and the design of development interventions (e.g., Nussbaum 2000; Alkire 
2002; Clark 2006; Robeyns 2005). The capability approach conceptualizes poverty 
as a failure to achieve basic capabilities, thus implying that development interventions 
should aim to expand capability. Sen’s ideas have been credited with focusing 
attention on heterogeneity among peoples, drawing attention to group disparities 
(e.g., gender, race, class, caste, or age) and acknowledging that different people, 
cultures, and societies may have different values and aspirations (Pressman 2000; 
DeMartino 2001; Desai 2001; Clark 2006). However, uptake of the capability 
approach has been limited due to the various complications that arise when applied 
in the field (Sugen 1993; Comim 2001; Ysander 1993; Roemer 1996). Townsend 
(2006, 6) concluded that “despite the influence of Amartya Sen’s contributions to 
development studies for two decades, his ideas on capabilities have not reached the 
mainstream of poverty analysis among economics and have been said to leave 
important gaps.”  
Sen’s pioneering work served as a source of inspiration for discussions on 
sustainable livelihoods. The concept of livelihood originated as a critique of single-
sector approaches that tried to solve complex rural development problems (Scoones 
2009). The 1992 paper by Chambers and Conway presents the often-cited definition 
of livelihoods: 
A livelihood comprises the capabilities, assets (including both material and 
social resources) and activities for a means of living. A livelihood is 
sustainable when it can cope with and recover from stresses and shocks, 
maintain or enhance its capabilities and assets, while not undermining the 
natural resource base. (p. 6) 
The concept of sustainable livelihoods evolved to became a much-used tool for 
understanding poverty from a micro perspective and identifying opportunities for 
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development cooperation.1 The overarching perspective shifts from groups of people 
obliged to undertake multiple tasks for survival to individuals rationally combining 
multiple activities in order to minimize risk in contexts of vulnerability. When viewed 
from this perspective, the fundamental issue for development becomes one of 
improving the capacities of the poor to engage effectively in agriculture, labour 
markets, and/or other opportunities while minimizing the potential trade-offs in terms 
of livelihood security (Deininger and Olinto 2001). This approach incorporates 
elements of Sen’s work, namely that individuals actively shape their world within 
social and cultural constraints that define their capabilities and the boundaries of 
legitimate action (O’Laughlin 2004).  
 The sustainable livelihoods (SL) framework (Scoones 1998; Carney et al. 
1999; Farrington et. al 1999) facilitated the application of the livelihoods thinking in 
development programming. It linked inputs (assets) and outputs (livelihood 
strategies), connected in turn to outcomes, which included income and employment 
as well as wider framings such as well-being and sustainability. Assets included 
different types of capital, for example natural, social, human, physical, and financial. It 
assumed that households pursued various outcomes (health, income, reduced 
vulnerability, etc.) by drawing on various assets to pursue a variety of activities. The 
activities they adopted and the way they reinvested in asset building were driven by 
their own preferences and priorities and their vulnerability context, including shocks 
(e.g., drought), overall trends (e.g., resource stocks) and seasonal variations. 
Opportunities were also determined by the structures (e.g., roles of government and 
the private sector) and processes (e.g., institutional, policy, and cultural factors). In 
this context, development interventions aimed to empower the poor to build upon 
their assets, capabilities, and activities to improve their outcomes. The framework has 
been criticized by many for its limited focus on issues of class and agency (Wood 
2003; O’Laughlin 2004; Scoones 2009), as well as for its weak linkage between 
markets/value chains and a household’s asset endowments, vulnerability context, 
and livelihoods strategy (Dorward et al. 2003). 
The sustainable livelihoods framework has been described as a “method 
without a theory” (O’Laughlin 2004, 387). It does not ask questions about why a 
                                               
1
 It was not until the late 1990s that the term “livelihoods” entered into rural development discourse in a 
major way—its takeoff a matter of conjecture. Scoones (2009) suggested that this was in response to 
increased scepticism (both popular and academic) of “Washington Consensus” and, in the case of the 
United Kingdom, with the arrival of a new Labour government and the publication of a white paper that 
committed the Department for International Development (DFID) to a poverty and livelihoods focus. 
However, O’Laughlin (2004, 387) observed that the micro-focus of livelihoods frameworks analysis 
“does not directly challenge the basic lines of macro-economic policies recommended by the IFIs. Nor 
are livelihoods frameworks linked to demands for major redistributive reforms. Rather they are 
concerned with alleviating or reducing poverty. The goal is modest—helping the poor to help 
themselves.”   
23 
 
household chooses a certain strategy or what constitutes improvements in a given 
livelihood context. An option for addressing this limitation is to focus on assets and 
asset building, or the accumulation and longer-term consolidation of assets.2 In short, 
the more assets possessed by a household, the more resilient it is to external shocks; 
the fewer assets possessed, the greater its risk of asset erosion and deeper 
insecurity. In fact, various authors writing in the livelihoods tradition have placed 
considerable emphasis on assets (e.g., Bebbington 1999; Adato and Meinzen-Dick 
2007). Thus, the focus on assets provides an entry point to understanding these 
questions. Among the first applications of an asset framework in the context of a 
developing country was by Moser (1998), focusing on five asset/capital types: labour 
portfolio, human capital (education and training), productive (housing), household 
relations, and social capital (community relations). Moser (2005) described an asset-
building framework that shares common concepts with the livelihoods concept, such 
as assets, capabilities, livelihoods, and vulnerabilities. She argued that the difference 
between the two is a matter of emphasis: asset-building frameworks are more 
specifically concerned with assets and associated asset accumulation strategies 
rather than more generally with livelihoods. This research employs an asset-building 
approach in the livelihoods tradition for understanding the poverty impacts of the 
VCDA.  
 
1.4 Objectives and research questions 
In his 1973 speech to the World Bank’s Board of Governors in Nairobi, Robert 
McNamara argued, “Without rapid progress in smallholder agriculture throughout the 
developing world, there is little hope either of achieving long-term stable economic 
growth or of significantly reducing the levels of absolute poverty.” Unfortunately, 
nearly four decades later, smallholder agriculture has yet to demonstrate its ability to 
provide a sustainable pathway out of poverty for many of the world’s rural poor. Not 
long after that Nairobi speech, overall donor interest in the role of agriculture in 
development declined sharply. Experiences in the green revolution in the 1970s and 
the promotion of NTAEs in the 1980s highlighted the difficulties for development 
interventions to achieve scale and sustainability. The recent reprioritization of 
smallholder agriculture (World Bank 2007; Wiggins Kirsten, and Llambí 2010) 
provides an opportunity to improve the design of development interventions for 
increased poverty impacts over the long term.  
                                               
2
 In general, the importance of building assets to reduce poverty has been recognized by economists, for 
example: Birdsall and Londoño 1997; Attanasio and Székely 1999; de Janvry and Sadoulet 2000; de 
Soto 2000; Sherraden 2000; Deere and Leon 2003; McKenzie 2003; Carter and Barrett 2004; and 
Adato, Carter and May 2006. 
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In this context, the urgency to show that value chain development can 
contribute to poverty reduction goals has never been greater. As noted above, value 
chain development has emerged as the major element of donor and NGO strategies 
for addressing poverty among smallholders through market-based measures. 
However, there is no reason to think that VCDAs provide a silver bullet for poverty 
reduction. After all, the micro focus on VCDA does little to address the overall 
debilitating context in which the poor and other value chain participants operate on a 
day-to-day basis. Moreover, governments and donors have shown limited willingness 
to invest in the longer-term, riskier interventions potentially required for successful 
participation in VCDA by smallholder households and resource-poor enterprises. The 
potential for VCDA to facilitate strong bonds for business collaboration with the poor, 
while making meaningful contributions to rural poverty reduction, will be greatest 
when smallholders are able to respond to the needs and realities of downstream 
chain actors, and vice versa. Understanding the ability of the poor to respond to 
these needs and realities has not featured prominently in discussions on value chains 
and value chain development. This thesis argues that new thinking is required about 
how to design and assess value chain interventions from a poverty-reduction 
perspective. In this context, the following objective was proposed:  
• To gain deeper insights into the ability of resource-poor actors (smallholders 
and their collective enterprises) to benefit from and contribute to the 
development of value chains. 
This objective was addressed through a case study approach that examines 
asset building at two levels: collective enterprise and household. The following 
questions guided the research: 
• How do endowments of productive assets change, either positively or 
negatively, in response to a given VCDA at the levels of collective enterprise 
and household?  
• What factors facilitated/constrained asset building at the collective 
enterprise and household levels?  
• How did differences among rural households in terms of preexisting assets 
and livelihood strategies impact their asset building? 
 
The case study considers multiple interventions carried out by the private 
sector, projects, and NGOs (see table 1) to strengthen the linkages between a fair-
trade certified coffee cooperative in Nicaragua and its coffee-producing members 
(upstream) and buyers (downstream). The following section presents background 
information on the case study, including pertinent information on Nicaragua, value 
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chain development in response to the coffee crisis, and details on the selected 
cooperative and its membership base.   
 
1.5 A case study in Nicaragua 
This case study examines asset building by smallholder coffee producers in 
Nicaragua in response to various interventions designed to improve their linkages 
with value chains for certified coffee. The smallholders were affiliated with a second-
tier, fair-trade certified coffee cooperative named Sociedad de Pequeños 
Exportadores y Compradores de Café, R.L., or Soppexcca, which collaborated with 
coffee buyers in Europe and bilateral donors and NGOs in the design and provision 
of services to its coffee-producing members. This section presents background 
information on Nicaragua, recent trends in international coffee markets, and the role 
of coffee cooperatives in Nicaragua in linking smallholders to higher-value coffee 
markets. The section concludes with an introduction to Soppexcca and the 
interventions it received for linking to value chains for certified coffee.  
 
Background information on Nicaragua 
Nicaragua is a small country, open to the world economy and highly dependent on a 
narrow economic base of manufacturing, agriculture, and mining. It is the second 
poorest country in Latin America, with an estimated gross national income per capita 
of US$1,000 in 2006 (World Bank 2008). Forty-six percent of the population lived 
below the poverty line in 2005, while 15% lived in extreme poverty.3 In the 2010 
Global Competitiveness Report issued by the World Economic Forum, Nicaragua 
placed 112 out of 135 countries in terms of its technological preparedness, 
macroeconomic environment, and state of public institutions (WEF 2010). Despite 
major shocks from Hurricane Mitch in 1998, a banking-sector crisis in 2001, and the 
collapse of coffee prices between 1999 and 2005, overall economic growth has 
averaged 1.7% per capita in real terms during 2001–2006 (World Bank 2008). 
Recent growth has accelerated, fuelled in part by growth of manufacturing exports 
(mainly in the textile and apparel industries) and increased coffee and beef exports.    
Poverty in Nicaragua is largely rural, with 65% of the poor and 80% of the 
extreme poor residing in rural areas. Agriculture accounted for 28% of the total value 
of exports from Nicaragua in 2008, making it the second most important generator of 
foreign exchange, behind light manufacturing (CEPAL 2009). Among agricultural 
                                               
3
 The World Bank’s most recent poverty assessment of Nicaragua (World Bank 2008) estimated poverty 
in 2005 was the amount of income needed to purchase a basket of food and essential nonfood items at 
US$1.15 per day (US$413 per year). The extreme poverty line was based on the amount of income 
needed to purchase a bundle of food that provided 2,187 Kcal/day. This amount was US$0.61 per day 
(US$221 per year).  
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products exported by Nicaragua, coffee is the most important, accounting for 37% of 
the total value of agricultural exports in 2008 (ibid.). Households engaged in 
agriculture generally have lower education levels (93% of all household heads in this 
group have only a primary education or less), and gaps in agricultural productivity are 
large, especially by producer size and region (World Bank 2008). The use of 
agricultural inputs in Nicaragua is generally low: only 11% of all producers use 
certified seeds, 37% use chemical fertilizers, and 67% use insecticides. Lack of land 
title is common among agricultural producers who claim to own land. The World Bank 
(ibid.) estimated that 21% of all agricultural producers do not possess a title on their 
land.  
Average coffee production in Nicaragua is 148 lbs/ha, which places it among 
the least productive producers of Central America, at roughly 50% the productivity of 
Costa Rica and 40% the productivity of Guatemala (Varangis et al. 2003). An 
estimated 96% of the coffee produced in Nicaragua is carried out under shade 
(MAGFOR 2003), which can lower the incidence of pests (Staver et al. 2001) and 
provide an additional source of income and subsistence. There are about 48,000 
coffee farmers in Nicaragua, 80% made up of small producers with less than 3.5 ha 
of coffee in cultivation (Flores et al. 2002). Despite the large number of smallholders, 
farms larger than 3.5 ha produce more than 85% of the Nicaraguan coffee harvest 
due to higher intensity of management and access to purchased production inputs. In 
general, however, coffee producers are typically better off than the landless or those 
who produce basic grains and tubers mainly for subsistence. That said, the poorest of 
smallholder coffee farmers typically lack resources for coffee production and basic 
living expenses and are highly vulnerable to negative changes in output and input 
prices or production-related risks.  
 
1.5.1 Recent fluctuations in international coffee markets  
The recent history of coffee production in Nicaragua is marked by the coffee crisis—a 
period between 1999 and 2005 of dramatically low coffee prices that had negative 
implications for the poor in Nicaragua and in other coffee-growing regions. The 
average composite price4 used by the International Coffee Organization (ICO) for 
coffee fell by 21% in 1999, 25% in 2000, and 29% in 2001. In late 2001, the price for 
coffee hit 40 cents a pound—the lowest annual ICO price since 1971 (Brown, 
Charveriat, and Eagleton 2001). In Central America, prices paid for green coffee did 
                                               
4
 ICO composite prices, calculated by the London-based International Coffee Organization, is a 
weighted composite of four trading categories of coffee. Three of these are arabica (about 70% of global 
trade), and these include Colombian milds (15%); other milds (40%), including coffee from Central 
America; and Brazilian milds (20), the lowest quality arabica. The fourth major traded type of coffee is 
robusta (35%). 
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not allow coffee producers to cover their variable costs of production5 (IADB 2002), 
causing immediate economic and social hardships to producers and labourers, as 
well as longer-term negative effects on coffee productivity due to reduced investment 
in coffee production. In Nicaragua, the crisis set off a chain reaction of negative 
events (Campos 2001; Gonzalez 2001). Tax receipts dropped, forcing local 
governments to scale back services and lay off workers. Coffee plantations scaled 
back or closed, leaving thousands of the area's most vulnerable people with reduced 
incomes to meet basic needs. Reports of hunger in the main coffee-growing regions 
of Matagalpa and Jinotega appeared in the local newspapers (e.g., Enríquez 2001). 
Small growers, in debt to banks and coffee processors who lent them money to care 
for production, were idled and faced the loss of their lands.  
Analysts argued that oversupply was at the root of the coffee crisis (CEPAL 
2002; Ponte 2002). After the coffee export quotas established by the International 
Coffee Agreement (ICA) collapsed in 1989, the regulation of coffee trade was left to 
each individual producer country. Almost immediately following the dissolution of the 
agreement, excessive quantities of coffee entered international markets, prices 
became volatile, and the quality of the coffee began to decline (Ponte 2002). In the 
early 1990s, Brazil’s plantations suffered significant damage from a series of frost 
events that, in part, compensated for the declining quality and excess supply. 
However, by 1997, Brazilian producers had expanded plantings into frost-free areas 
and made productivity-enhancing changes in their production techniques (CEPAL 
2002). Meanwhile, in Vietnam more than a million hectares of robusta coffee were 
planted between 1990 and 2000, enabling Vietnam to surpass Colombia as the 
world's second-largest coffee producer (Thanh Ha and Shively 2008). The resulting 
increase in export revenues provided a boost to the country's overall rural economy 
and led to significant declines in the incidence of poverty and hunger. However, the 
subsequent decline in robusta prices, by 39% in 2000 and 33% in 2001, had a 
domino effect on arabica prices, which were already under pressure from increased 
exports from Brazil.   
Against this background, aggregate coffee consumption remained virtually 
unchanged (FAO 2003). Roasters were reluctant to increase purchases beyond their 
short-term need and new coffee-processing technology had improved the taste of 
lower-quality robusta coffee, thus reducing the need the higher-quality arabica beans 
                                               
5
 In Nicaragua, production costs for traditional coffee production are estimated at US$53/qq (100-lb sack 
of green coffee) or US$0.53 per pound (Varangis et al. 2003). Traditional coffee production in Nicaragua 
takes place without the use of synthetic fertilizers and agrochemicals, where coffee is grown under a 
shade canopy consisting of fruit trees and banana plants. Production costs for coffee produced under 
“semi-technified” systems were estimated at US$58/qq, as opposed to the US$70/qq estimated for 
coffee produced under ‘technified’ systems (ibid.).  
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in their coffee blends. As a result, coffee roasters could market larger volumes of 
robusta beans in higher-end markets (Ponte 2002). The number of international 
coffee buyers, roasters, and distributors also become smaller during the 1990s, which 
was perceived to have resulted in depressed coffee prices and wider gaps between 
farm-gate and retail prices (Oxfam 2002, CEPAL 2002). One important demand-side 
trend during the period was the rapid growth of the high-quality end of the coffee 
market. This market includes gourmet, fair trade, organic, and ecofriendly coffees, 
which offer higher price premiums over traditional-coffee marketing channels and 
other benefits (e.g., long-term trading relationships and access to credit) 
(Giovannucci and Koekoek 2003; Giovannucci and Villalobos 2007) in return for 
higher quality and/or implementation of voluntary and private standards6 related to 
production practices or the structure of marketing relationships.  
Among multilateral and bilateral donors, academics, and NGOs, consensus 
emerged that the best response in Central America to the coffee crisis would be to 
develop value chains that linked smallholder coffee producers to specialty markets for 
coffee, including certified fair trade and organic coffee (USAID 2003; Varangis et al. 
2003; IICA 2004; Bacon 2005; Kilian et al. 2005). A discussion paper prepared for a 
2002 workshop on the coffee crisis in Central America (IADB/USAID/World Bank 
2002, 3) argued that “the region’s competitive advantage in the coffee market lies in 
having the adequate agro-ecological conditions to produce high quality coffees.” 
Development strategies generally focused on 1) improving quality, facilitating 
certification, strengthening collective enterprises in coffee production zones where 
the production of high-quality coffee was most viable, and 2) promoting diversification 
out of coffee for regions with less potential to produce quality coffee.7 There was 
hope that the private sector would also invest in the promotion of value chains for 
certified coffee. Importers within the specialty coffee industry put more resources into 
efforts to improve coffee quality and sustainability than their counterparts that sell 
conventional coffees in the global coffee market (Bacon et al. 2008). 
                                               
6
 Voluntary standards arise from a formal coordinated process in which key participants in a market or 
sector seek consensus, and are usually verified through third-party auditing. Some of these are also 
introduced as a response to consumer requests (such as ecolabels) or as a result of civil-society 
initiatives (such as fair trade labelling). Private standards are developed and monitored internally by 
individual enterprises. What often distinguishes them from mandatory and voluntary standards is their 
lack of third-party verification and a lower degree of transparency and participation of affected 
stakeholders (e.g., preferred supply program by Starbucks).  
7
 For example, in 2003, USAID implemented a multimillion-dollar program in Central America to assist 
smallholders improve coffee quality, form new business linkages, secure longer-term contracts with the 
specialty coffee industry, and identify and implement diversification options for producers who cannot be 
competitive (USAID 2003). In 2005, the US-based NGO Catholic Relief Services (CRS) established a 
Fair Trade Fund, a grant-making mechanism that disburses high-impact grants to organizations and 
projects that promote and expand the fair trade model (Miller 2009). 
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In Nicaragua, donors and NGOs invested in the promotion of value chains for 
certified fair trade and organically certified coffee. Interventions by donors and NGOs 
were critical for developing these chains, as overall involvement by the Nicaraguan 
government in the coffee sector had been absent since the 1980s (Pirotte, Pleyers, 
and Poncelet 2006). It was argued that Nicaragua had a large number of 
smallholders who practised low-input coffee production, many of them organized into 
cooperatives—thus providing an ideal starting point for organic and fair trade 
certification. It was also thought that through their participation in cooperatives and 
other forms of collective enterprises, producers would be able to obtain critical inputs 
(e.g., credit), at a time when few alternatives existed. In return for higher prices, 
smallholders were expected to increase or maintain quality control measures (usually 
related to harvesting and wet milling) and in some cases, implement environmentally 
friendly production practices. They would also have to adjust to the peculiarities of 
cooperatives, including relatively lengthy delays for receiving final payment for coffee. 
During the coffee crisis, participation in fair trade and organic markets offered 
producers in Nicaragua higher farm-gate prices (approximately 40% to 50% over 
prices offered by local intermediaries) and more secure marketing conditions (Bacon 
2005). 
 
1.5.2 Coffee cooperatives in Nicaragua 
Participation in fair trade markets for coffee requires that producers belong to a 
cooperative or other form of collective enterprise. It is estimated that more than 
10,000 coffee-producing households are members of fair-trade certified cooperatives 
in Nicaragua (Cafenica 2007). A substantial number of these farmers are also 
organically certified. Approximately 38% of the 10.7 million kg of coffee produced by 
the more than 9,000 members of the umbrella organization for Nicaraguan coffee 
cooperatives, Cafenica, was organically certified in 2007 (ibid.). Cooperatives sell 
their coffee as fair trade certified, double certified as fair trade and organic, and 
noncertified coffee. Cooperatives manage external relationships with buyers, NGOs, 
and certification agencies and manage relations with members, including the 
operation of an internal price structure that determines prices received at the farm 
gate. Cooperatives receive income from membership contribution (price paid by 
buyers, minus farm-gate price), provision of short-term credit services, and subsidies 
from NGOs and projects (especially for operation of technical services).   
Nicaraguan coffee cooperatives vary in size, from a couple of hundred 
members to more than 2,000. Larger cooperatives are organized into two-tier 
structures, where base cooperatives charged with coordination between members 
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and the main cooperative are organized under an umbrella cooperative charged with 
marketing, provision of inputs and services for production, and processing. This 
structure attempts to make efficient use of the scarce supply of persons with 
leadership skills and business acumen, as well as achieve economies of scale in 
processing and spread the risks of international marketing. Some of the cooperatives 
consist of organically certified farmers only, while others include both organically 
certified farmers and those utilizing conventional methods. The cooperatives are 
democratic in the sense that the leaders are elected, their actions are approved by 
the membership, and meetings are held to make decisions. Larger and more 
established cooperatives have a professional staff for business administration and 
dealing with buyers and development organizations. The smaller cooperatives 
depend on volunteers to fill leadership positions for cooperative administration.  
Since 2006, a major challenge facing coffee cooperatives in Nicaragua has 
been the increased level of competition with local coffee buyers for their members’ 
coffee.8 During the coffee crisis, when many cooperatives experienced a rapid growth 
in membership and prices offered by cooperatives were high relative to local traders, 
cooperatives faced relatively limited competition for their members’ coffee. However, 
since 2006, prices by local traders have increased significantly, in line with the 
general increase in international coffee prices (fig. 1). In 2006, conventional coffee 
prices had surpassed the fair-trade floor price for coffee9. The price premium for fair-
trade certified coffee was fixed at US$0.05/pound for conventional coffee and 
US$0.15/pound for organic coffee. From the perspective of fair trade cooperatives 
and the NGOs, donors, and buyers that support them, the increased competition with 
local intermediaries increases the risk that cooperatives fail to capture raw material 
despite their investments in technical assistance, credit, and training, among other 
services. This reasons for side-selling—the selling of coffee outside of the 
cooperative structure by cooperative members—and the consequences of side-
selling for cooperative and value chain development has received limited attention in 
the cooperative or value chain development literature.  
 
                                               
8
 Information here on the challenges faced by coffee cooperatives in Nicaragua was derived from key 
informant interviews with six certified coffee cooperatives in Nicaragua in 2009 (Prococer, Ucpco, 
Addac, Soppexcca, Cecocafen, Prodecoop).   
9 The fair trade minimum price includes a social premium, which must be used by cooperatives in 
developing the cooperative or coffee-growing communities by projects chosen by the members of the 
cooperatives. In Nicaragua, cooperatives have provided some or the entire social premium to its 
members in order for the cooperative to better compete with local intermediaries on the basis of price. 
The fair trade standards stipulate that when the market price of coffee is higher than the fair trade 
minimum price, the market price plus the fair trade social premium apply. Currently, the fair trade 
minimum price for Central American arabica is US125 cents/pound, plus US 10 cents social premium. A 
US 20-cent premium is added for organic certified coffee. During the past 15 years, the minimum price 
has increased twice, once in 2007 when the social premium was increased by US5 cents/pound and 
again in 2008 when the floor price was increased by US4 cents, from US 121 to 125 cents/pound.  
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Fig. 1. Average prices (FOB) for certified and mainstream Central American arabicas, 
1998–2009  
 
Source data: FLO 2005, 2007, 2010 and International Coffee Organization 2010 
 
1.5.3 The coffee cooperative Soppexcca  
The case study presented in this research focuses on the relationships between 
smallholders who produced coffee, the coffee cooperative Soppexcca, and 
Soppexcca relationships with coffee buyers in the United States and Europe. Based 
in Jinotega, Nicaragua, Soppexcca is of a select group of cooperatives in Nicaragua 
that have received ample support from donors and NGOs for the promotion of 
certified fair trade and organic coffee. Soppexcca is made up of 16 base 
cooperatives. Each base cooperative elects two representatives who participate in 
the general assembly of Soppexcca, from which Soppexcca’s volunteer leaders are 
elected (e.g., president, vice president, members of the oversight committee, 
members of the credit committee). In most cases, coffee-producing households 
formed base cooperatives during the coffee crisis for linking to Soppexcca and value 
chains for certified coffee. In some cases, members of a base cooperative share a 
similar level of asset endowments and a history of land accumulation (e.g., 
households organized into a base cooperative that were once part of a collective 
farm during the agrarian reform efforts of the 1980s). In a limited number of cases, 
base cooperatives facilitated wet processing of coffee; however, in general, base 
cooperatives do not provide services to their members (other than their linkage to 
Soppexcca) nor do they actively participate in decision making at Soppexcca. For this 
reason, base cooperatives do not form a level of analysis for this study.  
Since the early 2000s, Soppexcca received extensive support from coffee 
buyers in Europe and from the public sector, mainly NGOs working with US and 
European donors. The set of these interventions is referred to as VCDA for the 
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purposes of this study. The remainder of this section focuses on these interventions, 
first addressing those from the private sector and then those from NGOs and other 
development organizations.  
 
Interventions from the private sector  
Critical support for Soppexcca’s early development came from a small group of 
European coffee buyers. These buyers sought to recuperate their financial losses 
following the collapse of Soppexcca’s predecessor cooperative, Jiprocoop.10 In 1997, 
after five years of exporting fair trade coffee to European buyers, Jiprocoop declared 
that it would not be able to meet its contractual obligations for the delivery of green 
coffee. During the previous year, Jiprocoop had received US$640,000 in prefinancing 
from six buyers (approximately 60% of the value of the contracts).11 However, poor 
oversight of the cooperative’s administration permitted theft of the prefinancing by the 
cooperative’s professional manager and the Export Committee (Denaux 2008). 
Without funds for prefinancing, Jiprocoop was unable to establish contracts with its 
members and thus unable to obtain the coffee needed to repay the prefinancing to its 
buyers. By 1999, Jiprocoop’s debt, including interest, to its buyers had reached 
US$722,991. Jiprocoop was declared insolvent in 1997. According to Denaux (ibid.), 
default on prefinancing on such a scale was without precedent in the history of fair 
trade, potentially putting at risk the willingness of international buyers in fair trade 
markets to offer prefinancing to cooperatives.  
Following the insolvency of Jiprocoop, five of the six European debt-holding 
coffee buyers offered a solution for repaying the debt—the organization of 
Soppexcca, in which the buyers would have a strong hand in operations—thus 
ensuring the recovery of their losses from the Jiprocoop debacle. The five coffee 
buyers insisted that Soppexcca organize itself as a corporation rather than a 
cooperative, based on their lack of confidence in cooperative governance structures 
to make the sacrifices required to repay the debt. The five debt-holding coffee buyers 
held the majority of shares in the newly formed corporation. The coffee buyer that 
decided not to continue collaboration with Soppexcca did so to avoid future risk 
exposure from coffee cooperatives (Denaux 2008). The European buyers/owners 
mandated that a professional manager administer the company. The manager was 
appointed by the Netherlands-based alternative trade organization (ATO) Max 
Havelaar, in coordination with the buyers/owners. The buyers/owners agreed to 
                                               
10
 Jiprocoop is an acronym for Empresa Cooperativa de Productos Agropecuarios de Jinotega, R.L. 
11
 Prefinancing enables cooperatives to pay producers a significant percentage of the final price when 
producers deliver their coffee to the cooperative. Prefinancing is provided by coffee buyers or by 
specialized lenders. The collateral for the loan is the contract itself. Upon receipt of the coffee in port of 
entry, buyers send payment, minus the prefinancing. 
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freeze all interest on the debt, continue to buy coffee from Soppexcca, and provide 
Soppexcca with prefinancing. Soppexcca and members agreed to repay the debt 
based on the following formula: 50% of the difference between the New York price for 
Nicaraguan coffee and the floor price for fair trade. Debt repayment by Soppexcca’s 
members was divided among the buyers/owners according to the percentage of their 
loss. The other half of the difference between the New York and fair trade price was 
offered to Soppexcca members—this was critical for ensuring that Soppexcca 
competed effectively with local traders for members’ coffee. The debt-reduction 
formula was agreed upon during a period when prices for certified coffee far 
exceeded local prices offered for noncertified coffee. 
Soppexcca’s initial years were marked by intense infighting among members 
over the purchase of green coffee, pitting members loyal to the ex-Jiprocoop 
manager against the new Soppexcca management. An already difficult situation was 
worsened by the arrival of Hurricane Mitch in October 1998, which wiped out a 
significant amount of that year’s coffee production. Infighting and the hurricane 
brought Soppexcca to the brink of collapse. However, by the early 2000s, 
Soppexcca‘s viability had improved significantly in response to 1) financial and 
technical assistance provided the UK-based NGO Christian Aid and 2) expanded 
membership resulting, in part, from the interest of coffee producers in better 
marketing options during the coffee crisis. Under the leadership of the professional 
manager, Soppexcca gradually repaid its debt obligations and expanded commercial 
relations with coffee buyers in Europe and the United States. In 2004 Soppexcca 
reorganized itself as a cooperative, thus providing a legal framework for democratic 
decision-making processes, reducing its tax burden and increasing its options for 
cooperation with development organizations.  
 
Interventions from donors and NGOs  
Between 2000 and 2009, Soppexcca received support from NGOs and bilateral 
donors totalling approximately US$2.1 million. Other relatively large and established 
cooperatives participating in certified coffee markets in Nicaragua received similar 
levels of donor and NGO support prior to and during the coffee crisis (see Ruben and 
Zuniga 2010). Table 1 provides details on 12 of the larger-scale interventions 
received by Soppexcca during the 2000–2009 period. These interventions provided 
financing and technical assistance for the following:  
• Infrastructure development, including the purchase of a dry mill, offices for 
Soppexcca and 11 of its base cooperatives, equipment for two cafés (sale 
of prepared coffee) 
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• Provision of technical assistance to members, for both conventional and 
organic production  
• Provision of short- and long-term credit to members 
• Quality and productivity enhancement, including construction of a cupping 
laboratory, soil and water analysis, training program for extension agents, 
and construction of an organic fertilizer production plant  
• Addressing symptoms of poverty beyond coffee, including provision of 
health and educational supplies to Soppexcca members, as well as support 
for education and training in cooperative leadership 
 
The considerable financial and technical support provided to Soppexcca can be 
rationalised in the context of the coffee crisis, the inability of the Nicaraguan 
government to provide services to the coffee sector, and the overall importance of 
coffee for achieving social and environmental goals. From the perspective of 
governments, donors, and NGOs, collaboration with Soppexcca allowed them to 
reach hundreds of relatively poor producers quickly and efficiently. Whether 
Soppexcca has evolved into a viable business due to the interventions and whether 
the donor-supported services offered by Soppexcca have contributed significantly to 
poverty reduction are questions explored in this thesis.  
 
1.6 Structure of the study 
This thesis contains eight chapters. The introductory chapter has outlined the 
research problem related to the lack of information on and understanding of the 
poverty impacts of VCDA. It has introduced the key questions to be addressed by this 
research and outlined the case study in Nicaragua. Chapter 2 explores the debates 
and lessons learned from the literature of nontraditional agricultural exports, value 
chains, certification, and collective enterprise development. Emphasis is on those 
factors that determined smallholder participation in higher-value markets for 
agricultural products. Chapter 3 presents the conceptual framework for assessing the 
impacts of VCDA at the enterprise level (enterprise with direct and sustained contact 
with smallholders) and farming household. The framework combines concepts from 
the livelihoods/asset-building literature and from the value chain literature to 
understand the internal and external forces that influence asset building by 
households and enterprises. Chapter 4 presents the methodology and methods for 
collecting and analysing data at the enterprise level (the coffee cooperative 
Soppexcca) and household level (coffee-producing households affiliated with 
Soppexcca). Chapter 5 presents the results of asset building by Soppexcca, while 
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Chapter 6 presents the results of asset building by Soppexcca-affiliated households. 
Chapter 7 synthesizes the main findings and discusses their relevance for value 
chain development. The final chapter presents the conclusions from the case study 
as well as recommendations for improving the poverty-reducing performance of 
interventions for the development of Soppexcca and its members in value chains for 
certified coffee.   
 
Table 1 Interventions for building the assets of Soppexcca and its members to 
participate in value chains for certified coffee, 2000–2008 
Intervention 
source 
Period Invested 
(US$) 
Principal activities 
Christian AID  2000–
2002 
25,000 Financing for credit program; training in gender 
equity and cooperative development  
Catholic Agency for 
Overseas 
Development  
2002 45,000 Financing for purchase of the land and building 
of office for Soppexcca 
Project ACRA-
Solidaridad/ 
European Union   
2002–
2005 
150,000 Financing for reactivation of coffee production 
(long-term credit) 
Upgrading of wet-milling infrastructure (long-
term credit for members) 
Operation of technical assistance program 
Christian AID  2002 35,000 Financing for food relief for Soppexcca 
members; uniforms, school supplies  
Thanksgiving 
Coffee/USAID 
2004 15,000 Financing for construction of cupping lab  
Training in cupping techniques  
Lutheran World 
Relief/ 
core funds, and 
USAID 
2005–
2009 
500,000 Financing for technical assistance program; 
production diversification (goats, cocoa); 
equipment for cupping lab and two cafés; 
purchase of dry-processing plant 
Development 
Cooperation 
Ireland  
2005–
2008 
90,000 Financing for strategic plan, internal operations 
manual; expansion of Soppexcca office, training 
of baristas in coffee preparation; purchase of 
land for dry-processing plant 
Inter-American 
Foundation  
2004–
2006 
180,000 Financing for equipment for Soppexcca office; 
study on US specialty-coffee market; training in 
cupping techniques; purchase of truck for coffee 
transport; training in cupping techniques 
Project ECODES/ 
European Union 
2003–
2005 
30,000 Financing for improvements of wet-milling 
infrastructure for members; provision of 
technical assistance for coffee 
Christian AID/ 
European Union   
2007–
2009 
700,000 Financing for construction of 11 base co-op 
offices; technical assistance program; purchase 
of truck; plant for organic compost production; 
credit for construction of ecological wet mills by 
members; provision of technical assistance for 
diversification (cocoa, jams); soil/water analysis   
CATIE/Norwegian 
Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs  
2007–
2009 
35,000 Financing for value chain assessment; training 
in disease/pest management; cocoa production; 
decentralization of administration 
MAGFOR-AECID/ 
European Union 
2007–
2009 
250,000 Financing for technical assistance program  
Training in cupping and coffee drink preparation  
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2 Private sector development and the poor: Review of 
debates and experiences 
 
2.1 Introduction  
This chapter reviews the debates and experiences since the 1980s in the literature 
on linking the rural poor with higher value markets for agricultural products. In doing 
so, it aims to understand how this literature has conceptualized poverty and what 
lessons can be gleaned regarding the design of development interventions. The 
following section reviews intervention experiences in Latin America that aimed to 
promote nontraditional agricultural exports (NTAEs). These interventions typically 
involved relatively large-scale (sectorwide) efforts to develop agribusiness around the 
production and processing of higher value products. Various authors focused on the 
equity impacts of NTAE promotion and on the environmental consequences. The 
third section reviews discussions during the 2000s on value chains and value chain 
development. Particular attention is placed on the concepts of governance and 
upgrading. This section concludes with a summary of the implications of value chain 
discussions for the design of VCDA with smallholders. The fourth section discusses 
two important issues for the participation of smallholders in higher-value markets, 
namely fair trade and organic certification and collective enterprise development. 
Discussions on certification provide timely analysis on the impacts of certification on 
rural households, while discussions on rural collective enterprises provide evidence 
on key factors for building viable enterprises. The final section identifies key research 
gaps related to VCDA and rural poverty.  
 
2.2 Lessons in export promotion from the 1980s and 1990s 
In Latin America, strategies for the promotion of NTAEs for agricultural development, 
if not exactly for poverty reduction, were a precursor of VCDAs. During the 1980s, 
donors and development banks began to place serious attention on the production 
and marketing of NTAEs by smallholders as a means of reducing rural poverty 
(Barham et al. 1992; Conroy et al. 1996). Interest in export promotion in Latin 
America emerged partly in response to the presence of NGOs as agents for rural 
development. NGOs played a major role in the formulation of NTAE development 
strategies with the idea of capitalizing on favourable changes in the international 
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marketing conditions for agricultural products.12 NTAE promotion also dovetailed with 
the goals of governments and development banks in the implementation of structural 
adjustment and market liberalization programs. Reforms in the region often included 
elimination of state-owned development banks; specific credit lines and minimum 
lending requirements to agriculture; demand-driven and co-financed investment in 
rural infrastructure, services, and research; and demand-driven and remunerated 
private extension services (David, Dirven, and Vogelgesang 2000).  
 
2.2.1 Theoretical links between NTAEs and poverty reduction 
Trade theory provides the conceptual link between NTAE exports, economic growth, 
and poverty reduction. In short, trade theory suggests that by following price signals 
of international markets and cost signals of local technologies, countries stimulate 
growth by specializing in products that they produce efficiently relative to the rest of 
the world. Specialization is expected to increase productivity and maximize income 
from available resources, creating an economic surplus. Countries that specialized in 
NTAE production would realize cost savings in production and reduce 
unemployment, with labour-intensive production processes absorbing surplus 
household labour (Moulton and Runsten 1986; de Janvry et al. 1989; de Janvry and 
Sadoulet 1989). Cost savings would be realized, in part, from increased use of 
household labour on small farms, which, it is argued, would be subject to fewer 
agency problems in ensuring a high-quality effort by workers and farm management 
(Binswanger et al. 1995). In addition to low-cost labour and relatively cheap land 
prices, NTAE promotion would also allow some countries in Latin America to take 
advantage of their geographic proximity to the United States. The benefits of 
economic growth from NTAEs were expected to trickle down to the rural poor through 
higher prices and new production and employment options and thus reduce poverty 
over time. 
However, the poverty reduction benefits of increased NTAE promotion are not 
guaranteed. Trade theory is limited in explaining the export-growth link to the extent 
that institutional arrangements, capital endowments and risk tolerance, and public 
                                               
12 The promotion of NTAEs from Latin America was motivated, in part, by positive changes in market 
conditions, the implementation of various free trade agreements, and advances in ocean shipping that 
reduced the related costs. During the 1990s, US fruit imports rose from $2.6 billion in 1990 to $4.2 billion 
by 2000 (Donovan and Krissoff 2001). Much of the surge in US fruit and vegetable imports originated 
from Latin America, including Chile, Guatemala, the Dominican Republic, Honduras, Nicaragua, and 
Costa Rica. Trade agreements, such as the Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI) and the Lomé Convention, 
created options for NTAEs that did not exist before. Enthusiasm for NTAE promotion continues in 
response to the United States-Central America-Dominican Republic Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-
DR), which was signed in 2004. As noted in a report by USAID (2008): “Failure to exploit the 
opportunities afforded by the treaty would make it difficult for CAFTA-DR countries to accelerate their 
economic growth, which has not been fast enough in most cases to achieve significant reductions in the 
incidence of poverty.” (p. 1)   
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investments in research and infrastructure play a major role in determining the ability 
of producers, processors, and exporters to respond to price and cost signals (Von 
Braun and Kennedy 1986; Braham et al. 1992; Berry 2001). In examining the Central 
American cattle exports between 1958 and 1979, Williams (1996) argued that key 
factors for the development of the cattle industry were road construction, access to 
US beef import quotas by processing plants, and the fact that farm households 
lacked official title to their land (thus allowing wealthier individuals and firms access to 
land by investing in government-issued land titles). Investments by the Chilean 
government played a crucial role in NTAE such as grapes (with publicly financed 
research), forest products (with government subsidies), and salmon (with investments 
from Fundación Chile, a quasi-public venture fund) (Rodrik 2010). Beyond the short 
term, comparative advantage can only be maintained to the extent that agents are 
able to manage the risks associated with production for export.13  
Country-level case studies provide insight into the limitations of export 
promotion as a long-term rural development strategy. For example, Jenkins (1997) 
examined the impacts of export promotion in Bolivia. Bolivia’s exports of 
nontraditional products grew rapidly between 1985 and 1990. Econometric analysis 
suggested a significant correlation between the export growth and changes in the 
level and stability of the real effective exchange rate but no relationship with the level 
of export incentives, the level of import duties, or the availability of imported inputs. 
Jenkins argues that improved performance from export promotion would have 
required a more active role of the state in supporting the development of its export 
sector; however, even if more resources were available, such support would have 
been difficult to achieve given the extremely limited capacity of the state. In Costa 
Rica, Hamilton and Thompson (1994) showed how, in collaboration with USAID and 
IMF and the World Bank, the Costa Rica government successfully expanded and 
diversified its agricultural exports but failed to generate the long-term conditions 
favourable to growth.14 Several problems developed that limited the benefits of the 
                                               
13
 Among the risks to smallholders and other agents are 1) increased dependence on market conditions 
for farm inputs and outputs, 2) potential crop failures and agronomic problems, 3) heightened price 
variability and deterioration due to increased regional competition as well as market saturation for export 
crops, and 4) breakdown of institutions that smallholders rely on for credit, technical assistance, and 
marketing of agricultural produce. For processors and exporters, there is the risk of protectionist efforts 
once a nontraditional export makes serious inroads into foreign markets (e.g., Barham 1992), as well as 
the risk of market access restriction due to food safety problems and pesticides residues (e.g., Calvin et 
al. 2003). See paper by Hallam et al. (2004) for discussion of risks associated with markets for NTAEs. 
14
 In addition to cutting back government expenditures and reducing import tariffs, the Costa Rican 
government provided incentives for export-oriented investments, including tax exemptions (free trade 
zones) and export contracts (which provided tax exemptions, tariff reduction for imported inputs, and 
credit of 15% for exports having at least 35% value added in Costa Rica). USAID provided capital and 
technical assistance to promote NTAEs such as cocoa, fresh vegetables, cut flowers, macadamia nuts, 
and tropical fruits (e.g., pineapple). Nontraditional exports (both agriculture and manufactured) increased 
significantly during the 1980s and early 1990s, as did real GDP. 
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policy reforms, including: 1) excessively high incentives for exporters; 2) rapid growth 
of imports due to importation of production inputs and consumer goods; 3) market 
saturation for NTAE products (e.g., macadamia nuts); and 4) prohibitive costs of 
restructuring for small and medium producers.  
In summary, a universal association between export expansion and growth 
does not exist in the literature. Exports may offer one route to rural development. As 
noted by Maxwell and Fernando (1989):  
Growth will be greater with a household or country that is able to sustain 
genuine long-term comparative advantage in a crop, when risks are kept to 
manageable proportions, when the crop has strong linkages to the rest of the 
economy, when consumption linkages are high, and when surpluses are used 
constructively both to hedge against uncertainty and foster growth.  
Some of these conditions are crop specific or depend on conditions in the 
international economy, while others depend on policies related to research, pricing, 
taxation, and infrastructure. The ultimate outcome depends on many factors, 
including its starting point, the precise trade-reform measures undertaken, who the 
poor are, and how they sustain themselves and respond to adverse shocks and 
potential opportunities (Winters, McCulloch, and McKay 2004).   
 
2.2.2 Impacts of NTAE promotion on farming households  
During the late 1980s and early 1990s, numerous studies addressed the poverty 
implications of NTAEs at the household level. Poverty was generally considered as 
income poverty. Sceptics claimed that only the rich, the landed, and the foreign 
benefited from NTAEs. Exclusion of the poor was due to their higher-cost inputs, low 
risk tolerance, inability to adjust to changes in market conditions, and lack of 
bargaining power, among other reasons. In this view, larger producers—which could 
benefit from economies of scale and better access to markets and services—and 
multinational corporations were considered to be the primary beneficiaries of NTAE 
promotion. Proponents of NTAEs argued that, under appropriate conditions, and with 
the appropriate policy framework, the poor participated in NTAE and increased their 
income as a result. Poverty reduction through NTAE was a technical matter; the 
challenge was to select the right product, with the right producers, operating under 
favourable market conditions.  
Among the most studied cases from Latin America is that of winter vegetables 
from Guatemala, with production initiated in 1972 with a loan of US$6 million by 
USAID to the Miami-based Latin America Agribusiness Development (LAAD) 
Cooperation (Murray and Hoppin 1992). These funds were followed by an additional 
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US$5 million loan to the U.S.-owned processing company ALCOSA in 1975. By 
1980, production had spread across the highlands of Guatemala, with exports 
doubling in value between 1980 and 1985. USAID and the World Bank encouraged 
the production of winter vegetables by facilitating access to credit and providing 
grants.   
Von Braun, Hotchkiss, and Immink (1989) analysed the impacts winter 
vegetable production in Guatemala, mainly snow peas, but also broccoli, cauliflower, 
and parsley. They collected data from members of the agricultural cooperative Cuatro 
Pinos on production, incomes, and nutritional attainment, comparing this data with 
that of a control group of nonmembers from the same village. They found that export 
vegetables were adopted by farmers with the least amount of land (average 0.7 ha), 
and incomes of the cooperative-affiliated household increased by an average of 33%. 
Cuatro Pinos members purchased more land than nonmembers between 1984 and 
1985: 23% versus 8%, respectively. While, on average, members grew less corn on 
their land (50% to 60% compared with more than 80% in the control group), their corn 
yields were significantly higher than those of the control group.15 The production of 
winter vegetables intensified labour usage in agriculture, which increased by 45% on 
the farms producing export vegetables. Among the smaller farms, nearly all increased 
labour was provided by household members. A major focus of the study by von 
Braun, Hotchkiss, and Immink (1989) was the impact of NTAEs on nutrition. 
However, they only found a slight difference between the nutritional attainment of 
children of cooperative members and those of the control group, despite evidence 
that cooperative-affiliated households were earning higher incomes and achieving 
higher grain yields.  
Other studies confirmed the positive distributional impacts of winter vegetable 
production in Guatemala. Barham, Carter, and Sigelko (1995), for example, found 
that the rate of land accumulation by smallholder producers (less than 1 ha) was 
significantly more pronounced during the peak of vegetable production than prior to 
vegetable production. Hamilton and Fischer (2003) found that half of their sampled 
households had expanded their landholdings with earnings from winter vegetable 
production between 1983 and 2003. Moreover, of those that reported having sold “a 
little” of their land during the period, only 3% reported that losses from vegetable 
production had contributed to their decision to sell. Hamilton and Fischer (2005) 
                                               
15 Higher yields are possible by cooperative members despite the fact their maize production takes place 
on lower quality land. Possible explanations for these higher yields are better access to fertilizers and 
other agricultural inputs, the nitrogen-fixing property of snow peas, and more intensive cultivation 
practices essential to farming export vegetables (von Braun, Hotchkiss, and Immink 1989). These 
results helped address concerns over the potentially negative impact of NTAE production on food 
security. 
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report positive employment effects, with wage work in the fields providing 
employment for 57% of households sampled. Carter, Barham, and Mesbah (1996) 
attributed the broad-based growth to the following five factors: high labour 
requirements, 2) contractual linkages with processors (including Cuatro Pinos) that in 
some instances helped smallholders overcome working-capital constraints, 3) the 
brief gestation that makes at least two crops per season possible , 4) smallholders’ 
ability to reduce risk by producing a mixture of basic grains and export crops, and 5) 
highly fragmented land distribution before the boom that insulated smallholders from 
direct competition with larger producers.  
However, other studies shed doubt on the positive distributional impacts 
claimed for the winter vegetable case. Carletto, de Janvry, and Sadoulet (1999) 
argued that only the households with more owned land and better quality land have 
been able to persist in growing winter vegetable as toxicity increased, implying higher 
capital costs and higher risks. Of the 101 households interviewed that had produced 
winter vegetables for at least two years beginning in the late 1980s, 57% had 
stopped growing winter vegetables by 1994. The authors used statistical analysis to 
identify the underlying reasons for the reduction in winter vegetable production. 
Analysis suggested that the better-endowed households were able to persist in 
growing NTAEs as toxicity increased and the cooperative’s ability to provide effective 
technical and financial services weakened, implying higher capital costs and higher 
risks.16 Carletto et al. (2007) reinterviewed 296 households that were first interviewed 
in 1985 as part of a Cuatro Pinos study, finding that by 2005 one-quarter of the 
sampled households had stopped producing snow peas for at least two years (most 
sampled households had adopted snow pea production between 1980 and 1986).  
Evidence from other countries in Latin America drew attention to the limits of 
NTAE production for poverty reduction when households lacked critical production 
inputs and were highly vulnerable to market and production fluctuations.17 In 
                                               
16
 Carletto, de Janvry, and Sadoulet. (1999) argued that the Cuatro Pinos cooperative was weakened in 
the early 1990s as a result of a shift in priorities by international donors away from the production and 
marketing of NTAEs, combined with increased default on credit that it had provided to its members: “At a 
time when the importance of access to credit, insurance, and information grew as a consequence of 
increasing capital requirements, higher risk and lower productivity of [NTAEs], the role of the cooperative 
as a source of liquidity, insurance, and technical assistance was much reduced, weakening its mitigating 
role precisely when it was most needed to overcome anti-smallholder biases.” (p. 366) 
17
 Reinhardt was critical of the poverty impacts of NTAE promotion in El Palmar. However, others have 
been more positive about the experiences. Drawing on analysis from Reinhardt (1988) and others, de 
Janvry et al. (1989) concludes that the El Palmar experience “illustrates the conditions that are 
necessary for the successful transformation from traditional to modern agricultural production on small 
farms and the likely effects in terms of output, income, linkages, and long-term resource depletion” 
(p.99). Among the conditions mentioned are 1) diffusion of a technological package suitable for land-
scarce households, 2) proximity to urban markets, adequate demand, and favourable prices, 3) 
availability of low-cost labour, and 4) provision of credit, technical assistance, and other needed 
services. Thus, as was the case for Guatemala vegetables, the overall poverty reduction potential of the 
El Palmar experience remains an open question.   
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Colombia, Reinhardt (1987) examined the production of fresh tomatoes and green 
peppers by smallholders in the coffee-growing region of El Palmar between 1968 and 
1978. Funding from the World Bank, Inter-American Development Bank, bilateral aid 
from Canada and counterpart government funding allowed for the provision of credit, 
technical assistance, and infrastructure development to support the diversification 
into fresh vegetable production, as well as the modernization of coffee production. 
Evidence from household surveys indicated that net income had increased among 
vegetable-adopting households. However, between 1968 and 1978, Reinhardt 
reported that roughly 20% of households producing tomatoes and 16% of those 
producing green peppers had stopped producing the products. Production problems 
and the extent of the necessary cash outlays accounted for the majority (75%) of 
those who had stopped cultivating. Producers also encountered problems of water 
and labour scarcity during critical stages in the cultivation of tomatoes and green 
peppers. Of the smallholders who continued to cultivate the vegetables, average plot 
size was only 0.42 ha for tomato and 0.36 ha for green pepper. This study drew 
attention to an issue often overlooked in the NTAE literature: strategies for income 
generation involving poor farm households based on a single risky crop are not likely 
to achieve major impacts on poverty, as they fail to take into account the diversified 
livelihood strategies of rural households as well as their limited asset endowments. 
In Costa Rica, Mannon (2005) showed how smallholder producers of chayote 
were squeezed out of international markets due to a competitive and high-risk market 
environment. To manage risks, smallholder producers sold in local and international 
markets. This meant that no formal contractual linkages were made with processors 
and exporters. However, when faced with increasing pressure from US importers for 
quality, processors and exporters in Costa Rica began to bypass smallholders for 
large-scale producers, as they were perceived to be an unreliable source for chayote. 
Faced with the withdrawal of donor and government support in the early 1990s, 
smallholders had few options but to concentrate on local markets. When demand fell 
in the US market, chayote exporters stopped sourcing chayote from smallholders. 
Similarly, in Honduras, Stonich (1991) argued that smallholders were pushed out of 
shrimp farming due to shortages of postlarval and juvenile shrimp that are used to 
seed ponds and the resulting increased costs to import stock from other countries. 
Raynolds (2008) found that despite the prominence of organic cocoa and banana 
production in the Dominican Republic, which began in the 1980s as part of the 
government’s efforts to promote NTAEs, rising international competition and buyers’ 
quality expectations, combined with falling organic price premiums and relatively high 
production costs, pose a major threat to island’s estimated 14,000 producers.  
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There was a general attempt in the literature to identify technical factors that 
would explain the participation or nonparticipation of smallholders in NTAE markets. 
Carter, Barham, and Mesbah (1996) reflected this tendency in their comparison of 
three case studies of NTAE promotion in Latin America. They argued that the short-
term poverty reduction potential of NTAE promotion depended on whether small or 
large producers adopted the crop and, over the long term, on the patterns of 
structural change that shifted land between large-scale production and smallholders. 
In the Guatemalan vegetable case, participation of smallholders was high, but the 
overall proportion of land used for growing vegetables was small. In the case of 
grains in Paraguay, grain production favoured larger producers who absorbed 
relatively little labour per hectare and thus resulted in a shift of land to large farms, 
creating highly exclusionary growth for both producers and workers. In the case of 
fruit production in Chile, NTAE adoption bypassed smallholders, and over time land 
shifted from smallholder to larger holdings; however, it should be noted that fruit 
production on large-scale farms absorbs more labour than traditional crops that they 
displace. Among the factors working against the direct participation of the poor in the 
NTAE sectors in Chile and Paraguay were price-quality measurement concerns, 
product perishability (and resulting need for vertical integration), the extended 
gestation period for investments, and the absence of insurance markets.  
In cases where NTAE production was dominated by large-scale 
agribusinesses, the poor can, in theory, benefit through increased employment 
opportunities (Maxwell and Fernando 1989). However, case studies from Latin 
America revealed mixed results. In Honduras, Stonich (1991) showed that of the 
1,130 jobs provided by the 29 farms producing shrimp for export, 31% were seasonal 
jobs and 94% were unskilled. Most of the higher-paying jobs were held by non-
Hondurans while lower ranking administrative positions were filled by people from 
outside the local area. In her study of the cut flower industry in Ecuador, Korovkin 
(2005) drew similar conclusions: “Opportunities appear more as a makeshift solution, 
preventing the ordinary poor from falling into the category of the extremely poor, 
rather than a solid basis for overcoming poverty” (p. 61). Ferm (2008) reported that 
women workers endured unsafe and substandard conditions in the Peruvian 
asparagus and the Colombian cut-flower industries, where the governments were 
unable to pass and enforce comprehensive labour laws and judicial procedures were 
weak.  
However, not all assessments were negative. In Brazil Damiani (2004) found 
that the growth of NTAEs in Northeast Brazil was accompanied by job creation, an 
upgrading of labour skills, and improvements in wages and labour standards among 
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rural wage workers. These effects were attributed to 1) the type of crops involved and 
their high demand for skilled workers to meet high quality demands; 2) the limited 
supply of skilled workers in the region involved; 3) the consumer concerns for the 
labour conditions of production; 4) the characteristics of labour institutions, including 
laws and regulations, government agencies, and rural workers' unions; and 5) how 
labour institutions, crop and technology characteristics, and consumer concerns 
affected the balance of power between growers and rural wage workers and their 
respective organizations.  
There is little discussion in the NTAE literature on the role of externally 
sourced services for upgrading the financial, business, and productive capacities of 
producers and other resource-poor agents, such as cooperatives and small- and 
medium-scale processors. In the Dominican Republic, Raynolds (2004) stressed the 
importance of civil society and government-provided technical assistance in the 
promotion of organic agriculture in the 1980s.18 On the other hand, various studies 
mentioned a steep decline in smallholder participation following the withdrawal of 
project support in the form of credit and technical assistance (e.g., Carletto, de Janvry 
and Sadoulet 1999; Mannon 2005). Julian, Sullivan, and Sanchez (2000) argued that 
limited availability of information and producer training hindered the adoption of 
accepted production and postharvest technologies for the production of winter 
vegetables in Guatemala. In Ghana, Takane (2004) wrote that the lack of information 
by smallholders regarding produce specification (shape, colour, weight, sugar/acid 
context), limited their bargaining power with buyers.  
In summary, the NTAE literature provides evidence that the rural poor, under 
certain conditions, could benefit from NTAE, either as producers or as labourers. For 
producers, evidence suggests that benefits could accrue in the short term; however, 
long-term benefits require greater access to vital services and a more enabling 
regulatory and market environment.  
 
2.2.3 Impacts of NTAE promotion on the environment 
The high use of chemical inputs often associated with NTAE production had negative 
implications for the environment, as well as for the farming households that produced 
NTAEs. Various authors highlighted how this restricted the participation of the poor in 
                                               
18
 Raynolds (2005) is among the few studies in the NTAE literature to mention the positive effect of land 
reform on smallholder participation in NTAE production. She notes that the vast majority of small organic 
producers are agrarian-reform beneficiaries who have received preferential access to government 
services as well as to foreign assistance. Agrarian-reform producers have been required to form 
associations, which have proved central to facilitating organic certification, maintaining export quality and 
consolidating output. See Donovan Stoian and Poole (2008) for a discussion on the development 
trajectories of two important producer associations in the Dominican Republic, Conocado (organic 
cocoa) and Banelino (fair trade banana). 
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NTAEs. In Honduras, Murray (1991) described how the heavy pesticide use in fresh 
melon production generated significant ecological disruption that contributed to the 
demise of melon production by smallholders.19 In the Dominican Republic, Murray 
and Hoppin (1992) documented how unregulated pesticide usage combined with 
limited capacities for alternative production systems led to the end of the production 
of oriental vegetables (e.g., eggplant, bitter melon, fuzzy squash) during the 1980s. 
Facing automatic detentions in the United States, as well increasingly high production 
costs due to chemical inputs, the export of oriental vegetables from the Dominican 
Republic essentially stopped by 1991. In Guatemala, Hoppin (1991, cited in Murray 
and Hoppin 1992) found that nearly all of the surveyed growers sprayed pesticides 
on a calendar schedule rather than when pests were identified. In addition, snow pea 
producers had a significantly higher risk of violating US residue standards than 
growers of other nontraditional crops, with producers using an average of 4.3 
chemicals per season, not allowed by US regulations. Citing Morales, Pérez, and 
MacVean (1993), Conroy, Murray and Rosset (1996) write that soil quality had 
deteriorated and erosion had increased significantly in areas where winter vegetables 
had been produced in Guatemala. 
On the other hand, evidence was also presented that smallholders adopted 
environmentally responsible practices when provided with the means to do so (e.g., 
access to effective services and affordable inputs). Among selected communities 
producing winter vegetables in Guatemala, Hamilton and Fischer (2003) reported 
gains in reducing the reliance on pesticides (especially the most toxic chemicals) and 
in incorporating alternative forms of pest management. Most producers reported that 
they practiced crop rotation, consulted with technicians before fumigation, and 
changed pesticides to avoid increased pest tolerance. One-third of the producers had 
used insect traps and one-fourth had used biological controls. However, Hamilton 
and Fischer reported that the producers still used an average of 17 pesticide 
applications in 2001. They found that producers with the most sustained access to 
pest-management experimentation were most likely to incorporate multiple alternative 
practices, including integrated pest management, to reduce the number of 
                                               
19 During the late 1980s, smallholder melon production was encouraged by large-scale exporters and 
USAID. By 1989, Honduras had become the leading exporter of melons to the United States. However, 
during the course of three tumultuous years, smallholders were largely eliminated from participation. In 
1990–1991, production was nearly wiped out due to pest problems, which were attributed to lack of 
know-how, weather conditions, and frequent pesticide application (pest resistance and emergence of 
secondary pests). Citing Byrnes (1989), Murray (1991) notes that local field technicians were ill-
equipped to deal with the complexities of melon pest problems, as most were trained in the production of 
traditional crops, such as beans and corn. With the introduction of integrated pest management for the 
following production year, production increased markedly; however, at harvest time prices plummeted to 
below production costs, forcing USAID to purchase some of the smallholders’ debt from local banks. By 
the following year, the area farmed by smallholders had dropped by half, as smallholders abandoned 
production and exporters shifted away from contracts with smallholders.  
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applications to about seven per cycle. However, most local farmers relied on 
restricting the proportion of land devoted to NTAE production and crop rotation to 
reduce economic and environmental risks rather than decreasing substantially the 
use of agrochemicals. “Their notion of ‘sustainability’ appeared to be based on 
economically sustaining their families and caring for their land by diversifying 
production rather than on risking a largely nonchemical crop management strategy” 
(Hamilton and Fischer 2003, 95).     
The policy recommendations that emerged from these discussions brought to 
light a quandary facing development practice: how to reduce the environmental 
impact of more intensive production by the poor without leaving them to pay the 
related costs, either through reduced productivity or through increased labour inputs. 
As O’Laughlin (2004, 386) asked, “How to not blame the poor for their own misery 
and deny to developing countries the patterns of consumption that the West enjoys?” 
A tentative answer would involve a mixture of enhanced technologies, improved 
inputs, improved financial and technical services, and subsidies for input purchases. 
However, some of the proposed solutions in NTAE literature left smallholders without 
the option of producing NTAEs or with increased production costs. Murray and 
Hoppin (1992) concluded: “The complex nature of the pesticide problems is a 
warning that more fundamental changes in US development policy may be 
necessary” (p. 605). They suggested that such changes might entail the incorporation 
of alternative pest management practices and a greater emphasis on local needs. 
Conroy, Murray and Rosset (1996) went a step further, advocating the promotion of 
organic production practices as well as a renewed focus on the production of 
traditional crops and food security.  
 
2.2.4 Summary  
The following lessons emerge from the discussion on NTAEs and poverty: 
• Interventions that supported the participation of smallholders in NTAEs were 
based on the belief that participation in higher value markets would increase 
incomes and thus provide a pathway out of poverty. However, evidence at 
the household level suggests that the realities (e.g., lack of assets, 
vulnerability) and needs (e.g., risk mitigation) of rural households restricted 
their long-term participation and their ability to benefit.  
• A common finding among NTAE assessments was that smallholders were 
able to invest initially in NTAE production but later exited in response to 
changes in the market context (e.g., reduced output prices, higher input 
prices, higher quality demands, reduced competitiveness vis-à-vis larger-
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scale producers). Research highlighted the technological restrictions and 
disadvantages in access to inputs and services based by smallholders.  
• The poverty reduction potential of NTAE interventions was generally 
measured in terms of income, landholdings, and equity (participation of 
smallholders relative to the number of medium- and large-scale producers). 
A more nuanced understanding of the household would provide a more 
effective basis for improving the poverty impacts of NTAE interventions.   
 
2.3 Value chains and the search for upgrading opportunities 
The literature on value chains focuses the ability of certain firms (usually large-scale 
retailers and brand-name companies) to determine the rules of the game for the other 
firms involved the production and marketing of a given product. One of the key 
findings of the value chain research was that access to developed-country markets 
depended on entering into the value chains of “lead firms.” Research on value chains 
aimed to identify the terms under which firms entered the value chain and the 
implications for actors in the South (Gereffi 1999; Humphrey and Schmitz 2001). 
Several studies in value chain research from Africa painted rather bleak scenarios for 
the entry of resource-poor actors into value chains (e.g., Dolan and Humphrey 2000; 
Raikes and Gibbon 2000; Ponte 2002; Gibbon and Ponte 2005). During the mid-
2000s, value chain thinking had caught the attention of development practitioners 
who were looking for ways to leverage the private sector in development processes. 
From a development perspective, the focus of value chains changed from one that 
identified the power of Northern firms in establishing increasingly demanding rules 
and preconditions for chain participation to one that searched out opportunities for 
the poor to upgrade in existing chains or to new chains. This section first discusses 
the conceptual origins of value chain research, highlighting the diversity of ideas that 
shaped its development. It then focuses on the two key concepts of value chain 
analysis: governance and upgrading. The section concludes with some thoughts on 
the strengths and limitations of the value chain concept for guiding rural development 
processes.  
 
2.3.1 Origins of the value chain concept  
The origins of value chain thinking lie in the supply chain and business strategy 
literature (Porter 1980) and in the work on commodity chains, which emerged out of 
earlier work in world-systems theory (Hopkins and Wallerstein 1994). The literature 
on supply chain management during the 1980s highlighted the importance of building 
mutually beneficial business partnerships. Porter’s contribution to this literature was 
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the concept of a value chain within a firm and between the firm and its suppliers. He 
defined the value chain as a representation of a firm’s value-adding activities, based 
on its pricing strategy and cost structure and highlighting the interdependencies of 
other actors in the creation of value for a single firm.  
With the publication of the volume Commodity Chains and Global Capitalism 
edited by Gereffi and Korzeniewicz. (1994), the commodity chain concept evolved 
from a focus on world-systems20 to a focus on the microlevel relationships between 
individual firms for international coordination of production and marketing (Bair 2005). 
Gereffi and collaborators were concerned specifically with relationships among 
agents in the more advanced segments of the chain (North-South nexus) and the 
opportunities for Southern agents to move into higher skill and higher value activities. 
Inspired by the export-oriented development of East Asian Tigers and the 
outsourcing of critical manufacturing operations by Northern firms, Gereffi and others 
began asking different questions about the relationship among firms at the North-
South nexus. They focus on the emergence of a “new global manufacturing system,” 
in which economic integration entails coordinated activities along the chains of given 
products (Raikes, Jenson, and Ponte 2000). The prime concern of commodity chain 
analysis was with how powerful Northern-based firms (lead firms) set up and maintain 
production and trade networks. Rather than trying to understand how commodity 
chains are structured and reproduced in a “stratified and hierarchical world-system,” 
attention focused on the influence of lead firms and their presumed importance as 
potential agents of upgrading and development in the South (Gereffi 1999). 
In the 2000s, the term “value chain” emerged in the development literature, 
incorporating elements of commodity chain analysis and Porter’s value chain (see for 
example Kaplan and Kaplinsky 1999; Dolan and Humphrey 2000; Kaplinsky and 
Morris 2001; Gibbon and Ponte 2005). The conceptual underpinnings of the value 
chain debates appear to merge Gereffi’s on commodity chains and concepts from 
Porter and others writing in the supply chain management literature (e.g., Giannakis, 
Croom, and Slack 2004; Sako 1992; Dore 1983; Heide 1993; Albers, Gehring, and 
Heuermann 2003). Whether the shift from commodity chains to value chains reflects 
                                               
20
 World systems analysis (WSA) in the l970s challenged the assumption that the political, social, and 
economic environment of countries was determined by developments within those countries (Wallerstein 
1974; Hopkins and Wallerstein 1994; Chase-Dunn and Crimes 1995). WSA asserted that “development” 
could only be understood contextually, as the outcome of local interactions with an expanding Western-
centred “world economy”. WSA authors attempted to go “beyond the nation-state,” which had been the 
predominate unit of analysis in most development theories (Robinson 1998). A major tenet of WSA is 
the power hierarchy between core and periphery, in which a core (the North) dominated and exploited 
the weak periphery (the South). The peripheral countries, rather than developing along the same paths 
taken by core countries, were instead structurally constrained to experience developmental processes 
that reproduced their subordinate status. Lines of research included: bias in trading systems (e.g., Talbot 
1997; Wallerstein 2002), categorisation of periphery and semi-periphery states (e.g., Mingst 1988), and 
analysis of core-periphery relations (e.g., Firebaugh 1992).  
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genuine conceptual differences is open to debate. Bair (2005) argued that they were 
two distinct concepts, albeit, similar concepts:  
The value chain approach focuses more on the question of how inter-firm 
relations are shaped by the internal logistics of sectors, such as industry 
structure and production-process characteristics that are more technical or 
organizational in nature, with less attention devoted in the value chain scheme 
to the external factors which shape chain dynamics and the distribution of 
value-added along the chain.   
Despite any potential conceptual differences in the two concepts, researchers agreed 
in 2001 to use the term “(global) value chain” regardless of the conceptual orientation 
of the discussion. According to Gereffi et al. (2001), the term “(global) value chain” 
was chosen “because it was perceived as being the most inclusive of the full range of 
possible chain activities and end products.” The decision to adopt the term “value 
chain” over “commodity chain” may also have reflected a desire to avoid misleading 
associations with primary agricultural products that the latter term implies.  
 
2.3.2 Lead firms and chain governance  
Chain governance refers to the coordination by “lead” firms, which are based usually 
in the North, of activities carried out by firms in the South. It is argued that lead firms 
acquire their status due to their proximity to final consumers and/or access to capital 
and technology. Analysis of governance dealt with the direct and indirect influence of 
lead firms on the organization of production, logistics, and marketing systems in the 
South (Humphrey and Schmitz 2005a). The governance structures created by lead 
firms were considered to have important consequences for the access of Southern 
firms to markets and the range of activities these firms can undertake (Gereffi 1999). 
Gereffi (1994) distinguished between two types of governance structures: buyer-
driven and producer-driven, which were determined by power and barriers to entry:   
• Buyer-driven: chains in which large retailers, branded marketers, and 
branded manufacturers established decentralized production networks. 
Entry barriers to the buyer node included costs of market information, 
product design and development, advertising, and supply management 
systems, some or all of which are associated with economies of scale. 
Sources of profits for buyers derived heavily from innovation in design, 
sales, marketing, and financial services rather than from production itself. 
• Producer-driven: chains in which large manufacturers coordinated supplier 
networks. Manufacturers exerted control over backward linkages with input 
suppliers and forward linkages into distribution and retailing. Capital and 
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proprietary know-how constituted the chief barriers to entry to the producer 
node. Source of profit was the combination of scale of production, 
technological proprietorship, and innovation.  
Bair (2005) argued that the idea that chains were driven was a major 
conceptual advance in value chain analysis in that it captured the idea that certain 
types of firms dictated terms to other firms without their being any equity relation 
between the firms. However, Sverrisson (2003) argued that no difference existed 
between buyer- and producer-driven chains: both required that inputs be produced 
according to specifications and in the quantities ordered, and in both cases, power 
resided in nodes near the top of the chain. He added:  
The differences between say automobile chains (producer driven) and apparel 
chains (buyer driven) can equally be traced to the different lead times of 
products in one as against the other, the different capital requirements, and 
different levels of technological sophistication which prevail, and so on, rather 
than governance structures. Indeed, it can be argued that power is a 
consequence of the unequal distribution of technological capabilities and 
marketing skills, and/or social and spatial proximity to (relatively) wealthy 
consumers, etc., and not vice versa. (p. 20) 
Value chain researchers focused their attention primarily on describing 
governance structures in buyer-driven chains (Humphrey and Schmitz 2001). Among 
these chains, clearly describable governance emerged where lead times are short 
and logistics were complicated, such as fresh fruits and vegetables, or where forward 
and backward linkages are extensive, such as clothing manufacture. Dolan and 
Humphrey (2000) detail the extensive requirements of UK supermarkets on fresh 
vegetable producers/exporters in Africa. Not only did supermarkets specify the type 
of products to be supplied (including varieties, processing, and packaging) but they 
also specified quality and environmental and labour requirements.21 Where lead 
times are longer and logistics less complicated—as is often the case with agricultural 
products other than fresh fruits and vegetables—governance patterns were less 
easily detected. For example, in the case of coffee, Ponte (2002) asserted that buyer-
driven governance was exercised by roasters in Europe and the United States 
through the establishment of minimum quantities needed from any particular origin to 
be included in a major blend. And in other cases, no clear governance pattern was 
                                               
21
 Producers and exporters wishing to supply the UK market need monitoring systems that ensure 
compliance with retail (product quality) and legislative (due diligence) requirements. Exporters must be 
up-to-date on UK legislation related to pesticides, residue levels, and food safety and ensure that there 
are sufficient hygiene facilities and protective clothing on site. Further, they have to allocate resources to 
training personnel on quality and safety, as well as develop monitoring and evaluation tools to satisfy 
their overseas customers.  
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detected due to the dispersed nature of supply and demand (Cramer 1999) and the 
relatively low importance of quality of primary inputs on final product quality (Gibbon 
and Ponte 2005).  
Some authors noted the limitations that the concept of governance has for 
understanding the impacts of increasingly globalized markets. Gellert (2003) argued 
that governance failed to consider the underlying conditions that gave rise to a 
particular of interfirm relation or that allowed it to change over time. For example, 
information and technology gaps, combined with limited access to critical inputs, may 
say as much about why Southern firms fail to break away from low-value activities as 
power exercised by Northern firms. In his study of the cashew sector in Mozambique, 
Cramer (1999) highlighted the importance of national-level political constraints on the 
development of agroprocessing industries (e.g., bureaucratic interference with 
production relations, restricted access to credit, lack of skills, and labour supply 
unreliability), rather than externally determined governance structures.  
Some researchers cast doubt on the idea that power is unilaterally exerted by 
Northern firms through the establishment and enforcement of standards and passing 
down of low-return activities. Gereffi (1999) himself indicated doubt that buyer-driven 
chains are actually controlled by buyers. He noted that relatively well-endowed 
Southern producers of apparel sought contact with buyers of increasing 
sophistication, where more benefits could be obtained, leaving less lucrative niches 
to their less-well-endowed counterparts. As access to production inputs become 
increasingly limited in the North, then dependencies by Northern firms on Southern 
firms may develop, rather than vice versa (Pyhne and Mansilla 2003). Sverrisson 
(2003, p. 27) asserts: “Rather than assuming the [Northern] actors control chains and 
invariably get what they want, we can also surmise that rather often they learn to 
want what they get and to select from among the available suppliers.”  
Perhaps in recognition of the limitations of the producer-buyer dichotomy, 
Gereffi, along with Humphrey and Sturgeon (2005), formulated a more nuanced take 
on chain governance that was based largely on industry structure and the 
characteristics of the production process. They identified five types of governance 
based on three factors: 1) the complexity of information and knowledge transfer 
required to sustain a particular transaction; 2) the extent to which this information and 
knowledge can be transmitted efficiently between chain actors, and 3) the capabilities 
of actual and potential suppliers in relation to the requirements of the transaction:  
• Market: repeated market-type links characterized by low informational 
complexity, ease of codification of information, and high supplier capabilities 
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• Modular: links involving specialized suppliers who finance part of production 
on the part of the buyer 
• Relational: links characterized by multiple interdependencies, low ability to 
codify information, and high supplier capabilities 
• Captive: links involving one-way dependency of suppliers, high levels of 
supplier monitoring, and high costs of switching for suppliers, characterized 
by high informational complexity but low supplier capabilities 
• Hierarchy: vertical integration by a single firm, characterized by complexity 
in production, difficulty of codification, and low supplier capabilities.  
 
As relations move from market to hierarchy, the level of coordination 
increased, and with it, the power asymmetry among actors (Gereffi and Sturgeon 
2004). Higher forms of governance entailed increased costs for buyers. These costs 
were more likely to be incurred either by the buyer or by its agents when quality and 
product definition are especially important and/or when the buyer is exposed to 
considerable risk if a given supplier fails to perform (Humphrey and Schmitz 2005b). 
The expanded framework recognized the complexity of transactional information and 
the importance of their codification for the existence of more hands-off relationships. 
However, among the five forms of governance listed, only three dealt with nonmarket 
coordination among firms. Market governance is, by its very definition, coordination 
based on market mechanisms, while hierarchy governance is related to coordination 
among units within a single firm (i.e., the absence of coordination among 
independent firms). The relational form seems unlikely in the case of Northern and 
Southern firm relations, due to large cultural, geographic, and technological 
differences that often exist between them. Thus, we are left with modular and captive 
forms of governance, which closely resemble the two forms of governance originally 
proposed by Gereffi (1994) of producer-driven and buyer-driven, respectively.  
Several authors highlighted the role of social norms in shaping relations along 
the chain. Lead firms may differ in terms of strategic priorities, which influence their 
investment decisions and relations with suppliers (Henderson et al. 2002). Such 
differences may stem from the nature of ownership (equity arrangements or 
nationality), managerial whim, or commitment to certain values (e.g., corporate social 
responsibility, fair trade and organic certification). Such priorities may change over 
time in response to experiences acquired in the context of trading relationships, 
which encourage collaboration (Akerlof 1983). Gibbon and Ponte (2005) stressed the 
importance of overarching social norms in which chain actors operate and their 
implications for chain governance. They noted that the fact that clothing retailers or 
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coffee roasters exercised more hands-off coordination does not mean that they are 
less powerful in their respective chains; rather it reflected their relative success in 
transferring to their suppliers certain mindsets (e.g., quality control) or standardizing 
the production process (quality context) of goods delivered by their suppliers.  
Various studies pointed to the importance of the political-legal framework in 
determining the ability of smallholders to access markets. Thomsen (2007) discussed 
how strong cultural and political connections with state agencies, rather than quality 
or price performance, played a critical role in determining which clothing producers in 
Vietnam had access to lucrative export markets. In a similar vein, Gellert (2003) 
described how an oligopoly of Indonesian-based timber firms came to dominate the 
production and export of processed tropical plywood through alliances with the state 
to gain control over domestic producers of the raw material and negotiated an 
external alliance with Japanese importers to penetrate the Japanese market. 
Wilkinson (2006) documented how the complex regulatory environment for captured 
fish, combined with entrenched interests at different segments of the value chain, 
limited the supermarket’s involvement to the fine-tuning of logistics and the quality 
(freshness) of supplies. 
In summary, discussions on governance highlighted the role of nonmarket 
focuses in shaping the relations between geographically dispersed economic actors. 
In general, buyers at certain links in the chain (usually in the North) play an important 
role in establishing the rules of the game for upstream actors. However, other forces 
also influence relations, including demand for raw material, the political-level 
environment, and business culture. From a development perspective, the key 
question is, How are prospects of the rural poor shaped by the terms and relations of 
participation? And, What opportunities exist for changing these terms? These 
questions are addressed in the following section.  
 
2.3.3 Upgrading by other chain actors 
According to Gereffi (1999), participation in value chains allowed upstream chain 
actors to acquire the skills and resources needed to upgrade by reducing costs, 
increasing the level of processing, or producing new types of goods or services. 
Thus, participation in value chains is a necessary step for upgrading because it “puts 
firms and economies on potentially dynamic learning curves” (ibid., 39). In this 
context, upgrading is primarily conceived as technological change and training that 
render more value adding along upstream segments of the chain. Authors typically 
describe four types of upgrading (Gereffi et al. 2001; Humphrey and Schmitz 2001): 
• Product: production of more sophisticated products with higher unit value 
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• Process: more efficient transformation of outputs  
• Functional: acquisition of new functions with increased skill content  
• Intersectoral: application of acquired competences in a different chain 
 
In practice, however, several complications may arise when applying the 
concept of upgrading. In the case of agriculture, the distinction between product and 
processing is unclear (e.g., organic production is both a production system and a 
product type). Moreover, upgrading can and does occur without any explicit 
coordination among lead firms and their suppliers. Sverrisson (2003, 31) questions 
the unilateral direction of learning (i.e., from lead firms to subordinate firms):   
There is a distinction between knowing how the product should be in order to 
be competitive in core markets and knowing how to make the product 
according to design specifications. The former skill depends on the ability to 
foresee trends and vogues; the other skill pertains to nuts and bolts issues 
such as organization, technology and commerce. In both cases, a degree of 
local and implicit, not to say tacit, knowledge is involved: fashion designers 
need to be able to interpret the lifestyles of their prospective customers, 
garment producers need to understand how to navigate local sources of 
labour and materials, and neither is likely to be of much help to each other in 
doing their particular share of the work. 
In general, case studies examining the upgrading potential of small firms and 
producers in the South provide little reason for optimism. Gibbon and Ponte (2005) 
analysed five chains originating from sub-Saharan Africa and ending in the North 
(citrus, cotton, coffee, cocoa, and fresh vegetables). They concluded that where 
upgrading was successful, it was often preceded, or at least accompanied, by 
increased scale. “Although some successful upgrading to first-tier supplier positions 
has proved possible, this has taken place in chains where competing first-tier 
suppliers are relatively small in scale (fresh vegetables) or where the market structure 
is highly fragmented (cotton)” (ibid., 158). Dolan and Humphrey (2000) examined 
changes in the activities of fresh vegetable exporters in Kenya in response to 
structural changes in the UK retail sector. Several exporters developed relationships 
with importers and added increased value through freight forwarding and importing 
activities. These larger, more aggressive producers/exporters diversified their 
marketing outlets, providing year-round products to supermarket chains and 
increasing their sales to other regions. However, the requirements of the UK 
supermarkets acted as an effective barrier against small exporters and, to some 
extent, small producers. From Chile, Challies and Murray (2011) argued that 
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smallholders were able to comply with good production practice for raspberries 
facilitating access a higher-value international value chain; however, their adoption of 
such practices depended heavily on their access to effective and long-term 
information and guidance from extensionists.  
 
2.3.4 Summary  
• Value chain analysis brought a new perspective to thinking about the 
opportunities for private sector development with the poor. By focusing on 
the needs and requirements of different actors in the chain, it offered a 
systematic way to conceptualize the role of the rural poor in globalizing 
markets. The poor faced difficulties in accessing chains because of their 
limited capacities or skills and/or they faced limited benefits from chain 
participation due to obstacles and bottlenecks (e.g., lack of input markets, 
high transaction costs). The role of development interventions, therefore, 
was to build up the capacities of the weakest links and/or facilitate improved 
coordination and cooperation among chains actors.  
• The concept of upgrading highlighted that participation of the poor in value 
chains required their ability to meet the conditions of downstream chain 
participants. In contrast to NTAE strategies that focused on building the 
supply response of a given sector, value chain analysis as applied by 
development practitioners focused on identifying options for improving the 
ability of the poor to respond to the demand of downstream chain actors. By 
increasing emphasis on the demand, it was argued that the private sector 
itself would support resource-poor enterprises and producers.  
• Critiques of value chain analysis have focused mainly on the concept of 
governance, arguing that examples of clear governance patterns in 
agriculture are limited to complex chains with short lead times and that in 
other cases the determinants of chain participation were shaped more by 
supply and demand factors for key inputs and by the political-legal 
framework than by lead firms. That said, the concept is important in so 
much as it orientates attention toward demand-side factors for chain entry 
and the implications for Southern firms and producers.  
 
2.4 Upgrading in chains for niche products: Certification and collective 
enterprise  
From a poverty reduction perspective, linkages between smallholders and buyers of 
agricultural products in niche markets can offer rewards. By circumventing traditional, 
arm’s length trading relationships, smallholders may access services embedded in 
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commercial relationships (e.g., credit, technical assistance) and add higher value to 
their primary production (e.g., higher quality, certification). On the other hand, new 
trading relationships around higher-value agricultural products often require major 
investments in building the capacities of smallholders and their enterprises to comply 
with production and logistical requirements. In the coffee and cocoa sectors, for 
example, value chain development interventions by NGOs frequently focused on 
bypassing local buyers of undifferentiated projects and linking producers with 
international buyers of certified or otherwise differentiated products (Linton 2008; 
Wollni and Zeller 2007). These markets tend to offer more stable and sometimes 
higher prices, driven by social and environmental consciousness and consumer 
concerns about quality.  
Two instruments that feature prominently in discussions on value chain 
development in higher-value, differentiated value chains are third-party certification 
systems and rural collective enterprises (e.g., Rice 2001; Varangis et al. 2003; Bacon 
2005; Kaplinsky 2010; Raynolds and Unathi Ngcwangu 2010). Certification systems 
involve specified standards, verification procedures, certifications, and often labels, 
thus playing a role in governing relations between actors along a value chain. 
Interventions by NGOs have typically focused on developing value chains under fair 
trade and organic certification systems. In many cases, smallholders must organize 
into rural collective enterprises (RCEs) for linking to value-chain certified products. 
These enterprises allow for increased economies of scale in processing and 
marketing, spreading the certification costs across a large number of growers and 
channeling technical assistance and other services to smallholders. Because they 
often attempt to manage both economic goals and social or democratic goals, they 
are sought out by civil society as partners in value chain development. A rich 
literature exists on both these topics, which is briefly reviewed in the sections below.  
 
2.4.1 Certification systems and the rural poor 
Third-party certification seeks to shape market outcomes related to producer welfare 
and the environment through rules governing production, organization of producers, 
and commercial relationships. In the food sector, fair trade and organic are the two 
most important third-party certification systems. The initial motivations for households 
in developing countries to link to value chains for certified products are usually 
economic (and may be backed by interest in community-level benefits related to 
investments in education or improved health and environmental stewardship). While 
the economic benefits of fair trade certification are obvious, the economic benefits for 
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organic certification are more nuanced, as related benefits depend on productivity, 
production costs, and the premium paid.  
Organic agriculture became popular in the 1960s with movements that 
criticized the destructive nature of agroindustrial practices and created local 
production/distribution/consumption systems linking organic farms—distribution via 
food cooperatives, box schemes, and farmers’ markets—and wholesome outlets 
(Raynolds 2004). Global organic sales are estimated at roughly US$20 billion per 
year and are growing at close to 20% annually in major North American and 
European markets (Yussefi and Willer 2003). Though organic products make up a 
minor share of the world food market, the proliferation of certified commodities and 
their increasing availability in mainstream supermarkets have made organics the 
fastest growing segment of the food industry (Raynolds 2004). Among developing 
regions, Latin America exports the broadest array of organic products. Coffee is the 
region’s most established and widely grown organic product. 
The current concept of fair trade originated in the 1960s in response to calls 
by NGOs and activists for greater equity in international trade based on partnership, 
dialogue, transparency, and respect. The concept centred on providing farmers and 
workers in the South with better prices, more stable markets, and resources for social 
and environmental projects and providing consumers in the North with product 
options that upheld high social and environmental standards. Various researchers 
conceptualize fair trade as a model for “alternative globalization” to the “neoliberal 
paradigm” (see Fridell 2007 for review). In other words, fair trade addresses the 
notion that trade liberalization has been fundamentally unfair to producers in 
developing countries. Fair trade is considered to provide a mechanism through which 
the poor overcome obstacles to marketing their products by responding to 
opportunities in market niches in the North (Raynolds, Murray, and Taylor 2004). With 
its focus on developing alternative institutions and arrangements, fair trade sidesteps 
the debate over whether “state-led cultivation” or “capitalist industrial agriculture” 
provides the best path out of poverty (Barham et al. 2010). Coffee from Mexico was 
the first fair trade product, and in general, coffee has been at the forefront of fair trade 
(FLO 2010). Since the mid-2000s, certified coffee markets in general embrace both 
organic and fair trade certification (e.g., 77% of organic coffee in the United States is 
now also fair trade certified) (Raynolds 2008). 
Much of the literature of certified markets and smallholders focuses on the 
role of certification, in particular certification for coffee, in contributing to poverty 
reduction. The focus on coffee emerged out of concerns over the poverty and 
environmental implications of the coffee crisis—a period of historically low coffee 
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prices that negatively impacted coffee-growing regions around the world (see Section 
1.5.1 for an overview of the coffee crisis). In Central America, for example, prices 
paid for green coffee did not allow coffee producers to cover their variable costs of 
production (IADB/USAID/World Bank 2002), causing economic and social hardships 
to producers and labourers, as well as longer-term negative effects on coffee 
productivity due to reduced investment in production. In response to the crisis, MFIs, 
researchers, and NGOs advocated the development of value chains that operated 
under fair trade and organic norms (e.g., Varangis et al. 2003; Bacon 2005). One key 
avenue of research has been whether certification (and corresponding civil society 
interventions) improved the situation of coffee producers and generated a pathway 
out of poverty.  
 The research on the impacts of certified coffee markets of smallholder coffee 
producers can be divided into two camps: research carried out during the height of 
the coffee crisis and research carried out since 2007, when coffee prices returned to 
(and eventually exceeded) their precrisis levels. Assessment carried out during the 
coffee crisis generally focused on the role of fair trade and organic certification in 
delivering higher producer incomes. Based on a comparison of mean coffee prices 
received by certified producers and noncertified producers, Bacon (2005, 506) 
argued that “participation in alternative coffee trade networks reduces exposure and 
thus vulnerability to low coffee prices.” In Nicaragua, Utting (2005) observed that 
higher prices for fair trade coffee allowed producers to maintain their levels of 
nutrition and access to education and health care during the worst of the crisis but 
generally failed to generate major changes in living standards. In Mexico, Jaffee 
(2007, 260) used a sample of 51 producer households (half of which were involved in 
fair trade) and found higher prices for certified organic and fair-trade producers; 
however, his more in-depth household analysis allowed for an important critique of 
certification systems:  
Fair trade’s guaranteed minimum price—virtually static since the movement’s 
inception—does not fully reach producers and has lost value to inflation....The 
costs and exigencies of high (and rising) international organic standards are 
also changing traditional households’ labour arrangements, communal work 
patterns, and producers organizations’ staff requirements. These and other 
factors stand in the way of realizing the promise that the system provides a 
living wage to peasant farmers.   
 Various authors have challenged potential for fair trade to address rural 
poverty. Discussions often focused on coffee production. For example, in Mexico and 
Central America, Murray, Raynolds, and Taylor (2006) identified the potential for 
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saturation of the demand for fair trade coffee in the major importing markets, taking 
into account the potentially large number of producers that met fair trade criteria. 
Other factors were low quality, limitations for cooperatives to expand their 
membership, limited knowledge of fair trade by producers, and limited attention to 
gender fairness within cooperatives. Raynolds (2002, 24) argued that the capacity of 
fair trade to contribute to poverty reduction was shaped by political and economic 
conditions at various levels, the strength of cooperatives, and “individual 
characteristics of producers such as ideological commitment, educational levels, 
market sophistication, capital and labour resources, and environmental assets.” 
Despite having identified high production costs and low productivity as factors limiting 
the poverty impacts of fair trade, Jaffee’s (2007) recommendations for improving the 
fair trade system focused on adjustments to the framework governing relations 
between coffee buyers and coffee cooperatives. Perhaps the reluctance of these 
authors to discuss productivity issues reflected the overall concern during the coffee 
crisis that coffee was in excess supply. However, such concerns were shortsighted 
and ignored the long history of boom and bust cycles in international coffee markets 
(see Pendergrast 1999 for history).  
During the coffee crisis, fair trade contracts provided producers with a safety 
net that enabled farmers to stay in their communities and work their land (Bacon 
2005). But did they provide a pathway out of poverty? Discussions after the coffee 
crisis generally focused on the limited poverty impacts of participation in value chains 
for fair trade and organic certified coffee. Valkila (2009) concluded that low-intensity 
fair trade/organic producers tended to have higher incomes vis-à-vis their low-
intensity conventional counterparts. However, in both cases productivity was too low 
for coffee production to provide a pathway out of poverty. Barham et al. (2010) 
compared net coffee income from organic and fair-trade certified farming households 
with net coffee income from noncertified farming households. They found that net 
income per hectare was higher for certified farming households but that the difference 
in yields, rather than price, accounted for the difference. They went on to suggest that 
“improving the welfare of coffee growing households through better technology and 
management deserved more attention, especially in developing countries where 
public extension services have been curtailed or eliminated in recent decades” (ibid., 
142). Wilson (2010) highlighted the limited ability of poor farming households to 
accumulate assets through participation in value chains for certified coffee: 
The flexibility of the peasant households to mend and patch together a 
disarticulated capitalist market by stretching out their resources, self-exploiting 
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and self-provisioning, enables them to continue producing coffee for the fair 
trade market even when it is unprofitable. (p. 91) 
A common research finding that emerged following the coffee crisis was the 
limited ability of poor farming households to invest in coffee production, despite the 
higher prices often offered by fair trade contracts. Wood (2003) argued that the poor 
in general are obliged to forgo productive investments and to discount the future in 
exchange for increased security in the present:   
Risk management in the present involves loyalty to institutions and 
organizations that presently work and deliver livelihoods, whatever the longer-
term cost. Strategic preparation for the future…is continuously postponed for 
survival and securing in the present—the Faustian bargain. (p. 455) 
For coffee farmers with sufficiently large asset endowments, risk management would 
partly involve investing in coffee production because it is secure enough to warrant 
such investment, despite the threats of fluctuating prices, unfavourable climate, and 
restricted access to inputs, among other things.  
The limited ability of the poor households to invest in their future (in favour of 
survival in the present) raises serious questions about the ability of value chain 
development in general to provide a viable pathway out of poverty. However, 
discussions on this matter are scarce in the value chain literature. Little attention has 
been paid to understanding the risks and trade-offs that households face as related 
to their participation in a value chain for higher-value products; the assets that they 
have and do not have; or the external constraints that limit their ability to build assets. 
Important questions remain about whether VCDA facilitates poverty reduction among 
the poor with a small asset base. Can interventions effectively improve equity by 
addressing the limitations faced by the poor to build assets and improve their overall 
well-being? Alternatively, would development resources be better spent on improving 
food security? Such questions have yet to emerge in the debates on value chain 
development.   
 
2.4.2 Experiences in collective enterprise development  
From a development perspective, collective enterprises are attractive for 
development agencies because of their perceived ability to combine economic with 
environmental and social objectives, such as sustainable resource management, 
improved local safety nets, and member education. These enterprises typically fall 
into the category of small and medium enterprises (SMEs). Official SME definitions 
tend to focus on the number of employees and the annual turnover, but these criteria 
vary widely across regions and from country to country.  
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This thesis uses the term “rural collective enterprises” (RCEs) to refer to 
enterprises collectively owned by smallholders. The term includes various types of 
smallholder and community-based enterprises discussed in the literature, including 
cooperatives, producer associations, community enterprises, micro and small 
enterprises, and farmer organizations. Recent changes in the political and legal 
environment in developing regions offer possibilities for RCE development that did 
not exist before. Structural adjustment programs substantially reduced or eliminated 
state-backed marketing boards and production cooperatives, thus opening new 
spaces for RCEs in the commercialization of agricultural products. In addition, 
emerging segments and niches in agricultural product markets, such as organic and 
specialty fruits, provide incentives for new collective business endeavours, as well as 
attract external investments for upgrading RCE operations.  
The literature is extensive and covers debate going back more than 100 
years. This section presents a brief overview of some of the salient issues discussed 
in the more recent RCE literature. These issues are primarily concerned with RCE 
governance structures and their implications for long-term RCE viability and the 
design of services that support the development of RCEs. Much of this discussion 
follows a recent review of experiences in RCE development by Donovan et al. (2008) 
that was carried out in the context of collaboration with the Ford Foundation. 
 
Internal factors affecting RCE performance  
The governance of RCEs entails formulation of rules that ensure open and 
understandable election procedures; the division of responsibilities among the board 
of directors, managers, and members; and the establishment of internal control 
mechanisms and rules for the distribution of benefits. Case study evidence suggests 
that most RCEs struggle to establish effective governance, in some cases due to 
limited capacities and in other cases due to government interference.  
At the most basic level, RCEs must adopt effective structures for defining who 
is a member and the costs and benefits of membership. In his review of some 400 
RCEs in Chile, Berdegué (2001) found that all of those considered economically 
viable had formally structured their relations between members and management, as 
well as between administration and external actors (NGOs, buyers, processors). 
Critical among these were rules that governed who had the right to receive benefits 
and who paid the costs of operation. Among the poorest performing RCEs, economic 
benefits were not exclusive to members, with prices paid to members the same as 
prices paid to nonmembers. However, those with exclusive benefits often had limited 
capacity to adjust their benefits to members in response to increased competition 
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from local buyers. This resulted in members reducing deliveries to the RCE and 
increasing deliveries to intermediaries (side selling). Berdegué identified two other 
factors that contributed to RCE success: 1) strong member participation in RCE 
decision making and 2) relatively high levels of preexisting social capital, which 
allowed for effective conflict resolution among members and with outside agents.  
RCEs tend to have various goals (economic, social, environmental) (Donovan, 
Stoian, and Poole 2008), but economic goals must be prioritized. In Senegal and 
Burkina Faso, Bernard et al. (2008) highlighted the difficulties faced by RCEs in 
combining social and economic objectives. They found that 38% of RCEs in Senegal 
and 84% in Burkina Faso had formalized rules and regulations but had varying 
degrees of success. However, such structures did not always translate into improved 
services for members—especially when RCEs were under pressure to deliver public 
goods. Results indicated that greater management capacity was related to increased 
performance for RCEs in Senegal. However, when greater management controls 
were motivated more by a concern for egalitarianism, as in the case of Burkina Faso, 
than for market integration, they were a negative factor for RCE performance. 
Similarly, delivery of public goods by an RCE was associated with lower 
performance, acting as a tax on members. They suggested that the negative 
relationship between performance and the level of controls existed in cases where 
equity and solidarity had greater priority than efficiency: for example, allocation of 
credit based on lottery or the frequent rotation of senior management posts among 
members. In the context of severe lack of resources, formalized administrative 
procedures thus seem to be motivated more by equity in benefit sharing than by 
efficiency in the formation of benefits.  
In general, achieving the right balance between member control and effective 
management challenges most RCEs. In some cases, professional management may 
be the best option for acquiring human capital for RCE management. However, RCEs 
may be reluctant to offer sufficient compensation to attract the best or most 
appropriate management, instead relying on NGO support and/or board members 
(Bebbington, Quisbert, and Trujillo 1996; Donovan, Stoian, and Poole 2008), which 
often results in limited business capacities. Anderson and Henehan (2003) and Lele 
(1981) found that internally sourced, volunteer managers seldom had much 
experience in business, financial management, or marketing. RCE board members 
may fail to understand fully their roles and responsibilities, as they are usually staffed 
by members, who often have limited experience in business management or 
marketing (Donovan, Stoian and Poole 2009). As a result, board members tend to 
provide too little or too much oversight. However, effective RCE management skills 
63 
 
can be built up over time, often with the long-term access to support services. The 
case of El Ceibo in Bolivia provides a convincing example (Bebbington, Quisbert, and 
Trujillo. 1996), whereby long-term partnerships with donors and NGOs played a key 
role in capacity building in RCE administration among the membership base. 
However, such examples are rare in the literature. 
RCE long-term survival depends on the transparency and equitable returns of 
the benefits across the membership base. Several researchers have addressed the 
ability of powerful community members to capture disproportional shares of the 
benefits—so-called elite capture; however, no clear consensus has emerged 
regarding it existence. In Mexico, Klooster (2000) described how a forestry elite 
circumvented the democratic potential of RCEs through intimidation, manipulating 
elections, dodging oversight, and discouraging participation in community 
assemblies. Chirwa et al. (2005) argued that elite capture of benefits was more likely 
to occur during the initial stages of RCE development when RCEs are more likely to 
gain from strong, centralized leadership unconstrained by bureaucracy and when 
RCE members lack basic literacy, business skills and experience. Under these 
conditions, local elites can more easily “capture” the organization and allow leaders to 
misuse RCE resources. On the other hand, Bernard et al. (2008, 22) detected no 
obvious signs of elite capture of benefits among RCEs in Africa: “We have seen that 
high concern with equity in setting up bureaucratic procedures, which is effective in 
fending off elite capture, may occur at the cost of efficiency.” Bebbington, Quisbert, 
and Trujillo (1996, 201) also found limited evidence in the case of El Ceibo in Bolivia: 
“Over time there has been a progressive decentralization of administration in the 
organization. There are now various loci of decision making,…such that power is 
somewhat dispersed among several teams and its Administrative and Overview 
Councils.”  
The importance of direct member participation in RCE governance remains a 
matter of debate. Crouture et al. (2002) argued that members’ involvement was 
essential at all levels of RCE functions. In practice, however, RCE members may be 
reluctant to participate in RCE governance because the 1) economic benefits from 
RCE services are low (and their opportunity costs are high) and 2) perceptions may 
exist that there is limited opportunity to influence the outcomes of RCE operations or 
strategies. Bernard et al. (2008) argued that no clear consensus existed in the 
literature regarding whether more or less participatory governance is conducive to 
RCE development. The case for less participatory governance rested on the notion 
that leaders provide technical expertise, drive, and continuity, while too much 
participation by inexperienced members may impair an RCE’s capacity to identify and 
64 
 
pursue higher income-generating strategies. On the other hand, more participatory 
governance allowed for enhanced sustainability and effectiveness of the organization 
as it helps to adjust decision making to local conditions and customs.  
 
Role of external services in RCE development  
Access to the right combination of externally sourced services at the right time is 
critical for RCE development (Tendler 1983; Bebbington, Quisbert, and Trujillo. 1996; 
Chirwa et al. 2005; Nittler and Tschinkel 2005). However, important questions remain 
about what services are needed and how best to provide them. The discussion here 
targets financial services and nonfinancial services (technical and business services).  
Discussions on financial services have generally focused on the provision of 
services to households and to individually owned microenterprises rather than to 
RCEs. Historically, access by the poor to formal credit services has been limited due 
to weak competition in the banking sector and the high transaction costs (real or 
perceived) associated with lending. A first attempt to address this problem looked at 
subsidized credit programs; however, these did little to achieve increased access by 
the poor to financial services (Gonzalez-Vega 2003). In the 1990s, efforts focused on 
the development of microfinance institutions (MFIs), which attempted to reach the 
poor with services based on sound financial procedures (cost-recovering rates and 
management autonomy). However, the success of MFIs in reaching households, 
often urban-based, did not spill over into increased access to financial services for 
more developed enterprises, whose service needs are more related to liquidity and 
risk management. In their analysis of MFIs in Nicaragua, Bastiaensen and Marchetti 
(2007, 148) concluded that as MFIs focused their objectives on poverty alleviation, 
they ceased to contribute to the strengthening of enterprises. As a result, less 
attention was dedicated to longer-term investment credit and provision of risk capital. 
It was this type of capital, however, that is largely absent from current microcredit 
supply and that could allow poor, capital-constrained entrepreneurs to engage in 
more sustainable changes in their livelihood strategies.   
Traditionally, services for capacity building have focused on technology 
transfer by government agencies and projects, whereby a limited portfolio of free 
services was offered to selected RCEs. In the late 1990s, however, inspired by the 
apparent success of MFIs in reaching the poor through market-based service 
delivery, donors advocated moving away from services offered for free or heavily 
subsidized by state organizations toward the development of markets for services 
(Field et al. 2000; World Bank 2001). In this context, donor investments were required 
to improve the quality and increase the coverage of services, with the understanding 
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that higher quality services would eventually lead to higher effective demand for 
services. However, the development of service markets in the rural sector proved 
challenging given the poor’s limited ability to pay for services and limited supply of 
services. In general, the market development paradigm’s failure to address how to 
build service markets in the context of persistent poverty and weak institutional 
frameworks meant that donors and governments continued to play a major role in 
providing services for RCE development (Philip 2003). Experiences suggested a 
need to identify more ambitious and comprehensive interventions that could deliver 
benefits throughout a given sector (Dawson 2003). Along this line, Sievers and 
Vandenberg (2007) highlighted the potential for synergies to be derived from 
coordination of service delivery among different specialized providers. Based on 
evidence from 30 case studies, they identified success factors for linking business 
advisory services with financial services for microenterprise clients. Evidence 
suggested that combined delivery resulted in higher income for clients.  
 
2.4.3 Summary  
• During the coffee crisis, researchers argued the poverty-reducing potential 
of value chains for certified coffee, focusing mainly on the economic benefits 
from price premiums over conventional coffee. A major motivation behind 
the push by development organizations and Northern buyers for value chain 
development in certified coffee was to maintain competitiveness through 
higher quality (either at the regional or chain level).    
• Research carried out following the coffee crisis presented the impacts of 
certified coffee value chains in a generally unfavourable light. Discussions 
highlighted the limited ability of the poor to benefit from higher prices due to 
their low productivity and their need to cover short-term needs at the 
expense of building future capacities.  
• Cooperatives and other forms of RCEs provide a vehicle through which 
downstream chain actors and NGOs can channel support for value chain 
development. Discussions in the literature agree that effective governance 
is vital to RCE success, especially in more-demanding market 
environments. At the same time, it is recognized that effective governance is 
difficult to achieve because of the multiple interests of members and the 
limited business experience by leaders and members. Evidence has shown 
that RCE governance structures tend to be weak, often resulting in a low 
sense of ownership among members and poor business performance.  
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• Discussions on certification and RCEs provide limited information for 
guiding government and civil society in the design of more efficient and 
effective development interventions. Little attention has been paid to 
understanding the risks and trade-offs that households and RCEs face, the 
assets that they have, or the external constraints that limit their ability to 
build assets. 
• Finally, insufficient attention has been paid to the organisational 
development and life cycle of RCEs. The path to viability can take decades 
rather than years, requiring sustained external support. Commonly RCEs 
are subject to periods of organisational failure and rebirth (e.g., Kachule, 
Poole, and Dorward 2005). 
 
2.5 Research gaps related to VCDA and rural poverty  
This section recapitulates what we know and do not know about the poverty 
implications of VCDAs, based on the literature from chapters 1 and 2. The following 
points summarise what we know from the literature:  
• Discussions on NTAE promotion provide limited evidence that NTAE had 
meaningful or lasting impacts on rural poverty. In many cases, smallholders 
stopped participation due to falling prices, increasing quality requirements, 
and lack of inputs.  
• During the 2000s, governments and civil society began to focus more 
explicitly on poverty reduction and rural development. This led to renewed 
increased in the possibilities of the poor to link with higher-value markets. 
Interventions for value chain development typically focused on upgrading 
the capacities of smallholders, their business organizations, and other 
resource-constrained chain actors to meet quality and environmental 
performance requirements.  
• RCEs can play a critical role in VCDA. In some markets, such as fair trade 
markets, they are essential for achieving market access. However, they 
typically have weak governance, limited income flows, and limited asset 
endowments, which result in long development processes. In addition, 
RCEs often face an incomplete and ineffective service offer and 
unsupportive policy and legal frameworks.  
• The literature shows limited understanding of the poverty impacts of VCDA. 
This provides the public sector and civil society organizations with limited 
evidence to justify their use funds and precludes learning opportunities for 
improving and scaling up.  
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The following points identify information gaps in the literatures on rural livelihoods, 
asset building, and value chains:  
• The role of preexisting asset endowments in determining the poor’s ability to 
participate effectively in VCDA 
• The ability of development interventions to identify and address asset 
building needs of the poor so that they can effectively participate in VCDA 
• The role of collective enterprises in facilitating chain linkages and in 
facilitating the asset building needs of the poor to allow them to effectively 
participate in VCDA 
• The ability of the poor to invest in the building of assets through their 
participation in VCDA, taking into account household strategies, the overall 
risk context faced by households, and the potential trade-offs between 
more-intensive participation in value chains for certified coffee and 
subsistence activities.   
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3 Value chain approaches from an asset perspective: A 
conceptual framework 
 
3.1 Introduction  
This chapter presents a conceptual framework for assessing the poverty impacts of 
VCDA. The framework considers value chains and their role in reducing poverty from 
the perspective of rural households and the enterprises that maintain direct and 
sustained linkages with them (referred to here as “upstream enterprises”—where 
upstream signals the chain segment nearer to primary production). In the case of 
value chains for certified agricultural products, these enterprises are often 
cooperatives or similar types of RCEs. The focus on upstream enterprises recognizes 
that the link between asset-poor producing households and higher-value agriculture 
markets often depends on the ability of upstream enterprises to supply essential 
services to producing households (e.g, credit, certification, technical assistance). It 
also recognizes that upstream enterprises may receive interventions for value chain 
development from various sources, including downstream enterprises, governments, 
and NGOs. At the household level, poverty reduction is conceptualized in terms of 
asset building and livelihood security.  
The basic elements of the conceptual framework emerged out of a multi-
organizational effort financed by the Ford Foundation and led by the Tropical 
Agricultural Research and Higher Education Centre (CATIE)22 to design tools for 
assessing the poverty impacts of VCDA. Collaboration aimed to provide development 
organizations with a field-tested conceptually and methodologically robust tool for 
assessing the poverty impacts of VCDA. We use “poverty impacts” to refer to the 
changes in assets endowments of rural households in response to interventions for 
value chain development. We assume that improved endowments of assets lead to 
improved well-being and increased vulnerability. The assessment of development 
interventions has focused generally on assessing the intervention’s success in 
meeting its specific objectives and outcomes (see Roch 2002; ISEAL 2010) rather 
than its success in facilitating the broader process of building various assets over 
time. Project assessment, by its very nature, would fail to account for the fact that 
                                               
22
 Collaboration with the Ford Foundation began in 2007 when CATIE and the School of Oriental and 
African Studies (SOAS) carried out a review of experiences in the development of rural collective 
enterprises in Africa, Southern Asia, and Latin America (see Donovan, Stoian, and Poole 2008). The 
research included more than 20 case studies on enterprise development and provided a template for the 
interregional and multiorganizational work carried out in the design and validation of the methodology for 
assessing the poverty impacts of VCDA.  
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interventions for value chain development are often uncoordinated and come from 
various sources, including downstream buyers, government agencies, and NGOs—
again suggesting that project assessment is too narrow in scope to provide the depth 
of information needed for improved the poverty-reducing performance of VCDA.   
Between 2008 and 2010, representatives from more than 30 organizations 
participated in the design of a conceptual and methodological framework for 
assessing the poverty impacts of VCDAs. Mayor collaborative work on the design of 
the frameworks occurred during two workshops at CATIE. During the first workshop 
(October 2008), participants deliberated concepts related to poverty and value chains 
and the basic elements of a methodological approach for assessing the poverty 
impacts of VCDA. Debate focused on the trade-offs between rigor and ease of 
implementation, which was considered critical if the assessment tool was to be 
applied in the field. Following this workshop, detailed methodological guidelines were 
prepared (Donovan and Stoian 2009) and later implemented in the context of 12 case 
studies in Africa, Asia, and Latin America. The case study presented in this thesis 
was one of these cases. During the second workshop (October 2009), participants 
discussed the results from the cases studies and their implications for assessment 
design. The workshop highlighted the potential for an asset-based approach to 
identify opportunities for the redesign of VCDA for improved asset building. However, 
it also highlighted the difficulty to achieve the depth and rigor needed for the 
improved design of VCDA while keeping the assessment firmly in the hands of 
development practitioners, as well as the limitations of existing mindsets and attitudes 
for identifying mistakes/gaps in VCDA design and negative outcomes in asset 
building. Discussions in this chapter draw on essential elements of the conceptual 
framework that emerged out of this international and multiorganizational process.  
 
3.2 Framework for assessing asset building at enterprise and household levels  
This section presents the conceptual framework for the assessment of asset building 
at the upstream enterprise level and household levels. The framework at the 
enterprise level incorporates concepts and lessons learned from the literatures on 
value chains (e.g., trust relations and information and resource sharing) and rural 
collective enterprises (governance structures and service provision). The framework 
at the household level combines key concepts from value chain and rural livelihood 
discussions. It recognizes that households engage in various chains in addition to 
subsistence activities and face tradeoffs to intensify their investments in any one 
activity.  
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3.2.1 Assessing asset building at the enterprise level    
The underlying hypothesis is that asset building (increased assets and higher quality 
assets) by upstream enterprises improves their long-term business viability and their 
ability to offer expanded and improved services to their raw material suppliers and 
downstream buyers. Asset building by the upstream enterprise, in turn, depends on 
various factors, including the context in which the enterprise operates, linkages 
between the upstream and other actors (e.g., smallholders, services providers, 
downstream buyers), and the role of preexisting asset endowments and other factors 
(fig. 2). The asset-building framework for assessment is extended to the enterprise 
level by adjusting the indicators applied for each capital to capture business viability, 
rather than well-being and resilience of households.  
Changes in the political and marketing context can have a direct positive or 
negative effect on the ability of upstream enterprises to build assets. Understanding 
these changes also helps to single out the effects of the VCDA. The World Bank’s 
Doing Business project brought considerable attention to the role of the business 
environment in shaping the long-term development prospects of business in 
developing countries. In many developing countries, existing policies, laws, rules and 
regulations are incomplete, conflicting and/or overly complicated (e.g., complex 
export procedures, lack of financial incentive schemes, ill-suited legal forms) and thus 
are rarely conducive to rural enterprise development (Donovan Stoian and Poole 
2008). Market trends make up another important element of the context. In cases 
where upstream enterprises participate in specialty markets, such as tropical fruits, 
changes in the market environment can be quick and unpredictable. In other cases, 
markets are characterized by prolonged boom and bust cycles, such as those of 
cocoa and coffee. In either case, understanding the market context (and the 
enterprise’s ability to identify and respond to changes in the context) provides 
insights into the long-term viability of the enterprise.  
An upstream enterprise’s linkages include those with raw material providers 
(farming households), support services (including credit providers), and downstream 
buyers. Relationships with producers are often two-way: where producers provide the 
enterprise with raw material and the enterprise provides them essential services for 
production (in addition to the market outlet). In some cases, different types of 
providers may link to the enterprise. For example, intermediaries and larger-scale 
producers may be especially important for achieving scale. Upstream enterprises 
often provide services to their members. The ability of the enterprise to provide 
services may depend on factors such as links with donors and government agencies, 
overall level of consolidation of the upstream enterprises, and market orientation 
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(e.g., coffee and cocoa specialty markets have been a major focus for donor 
interventions, while markets for lesser known fruit and vegetable products have 
received considerably less attention). Linkages with service providers offer access to 
inputs and services that help upgrade their technical and business capacities and 
expand their service offer to linked smallholders. Analysis of the linkages between 
services providers and upstream enterprises focuses on such issues as usefulness of 
services received for expanding and improving capacities and services needed but 
not available. 
Upstream enterprises usually link with various buyers operating in different 
markets (local, national, international). In some cases, upstream enterprises may 
provide semiprocessed or processed products to downstream buyers and receive 
certain benefits in return—for example, long-term contracts at favourable terms, 
access to information and joint strategy formulation, and co-investment in 
infrastructure and capacity upgrading. Analysis of the linkages with downstream 
enterprises focuses on such issues as risk and benefit sharing, participation in 
strategy formulation, information sharing, and services offered for upgrading. 
Another potential factor that determines the ability of RCEs to build assets is 
the level of preexisting assets. Four asset types, or capitals, are considered: human, 
social, physical, and financial. Human capital refers to the skills and capacities to 
administer the business and maintain relations with buyers and members. In the case 
of RCEs, human capital exists at the level of professional management, support staff, 
and volunteer leadership. Following Uphoff and Wijayaratna (2000), social capital is 
considered as structural in form (roles, rules, procedures, and precedents as well as 
social networks that establish ongoing patterns of social interaction) and cognitive in 
form (norms, values, attitudes, and beliefs that predispose people to cooperate). 
Physical capital refers to the stock of tools, machinery, and infrastructure for storage, 
production, processing, administration, and provision of services to members. 
Financial capital includes access to credit, credit portfolios (for provision of credit to 
members), risk management tools (e.g., insurance), and income stocks and flows. 
Internal factors in addition to asset endowments that are likely to influence asset 
building by upstream enterprises are history, organizational form (e.g., cooperative 
versus privately owned enterprises), and objectives (economic, social, 
environmental).  
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Fig. 2. Linkages for asset building by upstream enterprises 
 
 
3.2.2 Assessing asset building at the household level    
The underlying hypothesis is that asset building (increased assets and higher-quality 
assets) by households improves their well-being and increases their resilience to 
shocks. Asset building by households, in turn, depends on several factors, including 
linkages with various market actors, preexisting asset endowments, and livelihood 
strategies (e.g., off-farm employment, remittances) (fig.2).  
In the spirit of the livelihoods debates, assets are considered to be both 
tangible and intangible and used for productive activities and/or for household 
subsistence. The following five asset capitals are considered: natural, human, social, 
physical, and financial. Ownership of a particular asset may be either individual or 
collective. For example, a forest may be owned or used by the state and/or one of 
several communities. Certain assets are only effective if combined with others. For 
example, access to high-quality land many have different implications for livelihood 
outcomes depending on access to credit and transport infrastructure.  
Assets are in constant use and recombination by the household. The building 
(erosion) of one asset can imply positive (negative) feedback loops that lead to asset 
building (erosion) of other assets. For example, a healthy and productive coffee 
plantation (natural capital) may be derived from improved farming knowledge (human 
capital) through training and technical assistance that translates into higher income 
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(financial capital), which in turn is (partially) reinvested in processing facilities 
(physical capital) that allows for higher value added (financial capital). Alternatively, 
forest degradation or soil erosion through inappropriate management techniques and 
the removal of coffee plantations may compromise natural capital and lead to 
reduced productivity and, hence, lower income, which in turn impedes investments in 
other assets.  
In most cases, participation in a given value chain will represent just one 
household activity for generating income and accessing services (fig. 3). Other 
activities may include the production of relatively low-value (and low-cost) products 
for sale in local markets and participation in off-farm employment. While in some 
cases, products sold in local markets may generate lower returns, they may be 
critically important for household subsistence, providing access to food during times 
of reduced income and producing various harvests throughout the year, providing 
smoother income and consumption patterns. In addition, value chain linkages may 
facilitate access to vital services for agricultural production, such as production 
inputs, short- and long-term credit, and technical assistance.  
Value chain development influences asset building by farming households, if 
not livelihood strategies as a whole, both directly (through provision of services, such 
as technical assistance and grants) and indirectly (through increased income gained 
from access to high-value markets). Services for developing the value chain are 
provided by NGOs, government agencies, and/or by buyers and private-sector input 
providers. These services can be crucial for building a critical minimum level of 
assets needed for effective participation in the value chain. For example, technical 
services may be required for increasing productivity and improving quality control. 
Business development services may be needed to improve the organizational 
structures of collectively owned enterprises, as well as to maintain their relations with 
existing buyers and diversify their buyer contacts. Financial services may be required 
by both households and collectively owned enterprises to facilitate the purchase of 
needed production inputs during the year.  
Two factors are considered central to understanding a household’s ability to 
build assets because of its participation in VCDA. One is the existence of asset 
thresholds. The notion of asset thresholds suggests that there exists a certain 
minimum combination of assets that are necessary if a household is to participate in 
and benefit from VCDA. If a household’s endowment falls below the threshold, then it 
is likely to be caught in a vicious circle that results in persistent poverty: it does not 
have the assets to fully participate in and benefit from VCDA and its ability to build 
the required assets is highly limited due to its low participation in the VCDA (and 
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limited participation in markets). These households are unlikely to be willing or able to 
shift assets from subsistence to market-oriented production or mobilize new assets 
(e.g, through credit or grants) for production.  
The second issue relates to asset building and erosion over time. Asset 
building is nonlinear: assets built up at the beginning of the VCDA may be highly 
eroded a couple of years later, only to be partially rebuilt by the time of assessment. 
Exposure to the risk of negative events is determined by the context (e.g., negative 
market trends, stricter regulations), market linkages (for example, changes in quality 
requirements), and other relevant factors (climate, land seizure, divorce, death). Risk-
reducing mechanisms include the diversification of market linkages, access to 
services from government and NGOs, and the reallocation of assets among various 
livelihood activities (for example, reduced assets for market linkages and increased 
asset concentration in subsistence and off-farm labour supply). Better understanding 
of causes of asset erosion will contribute to the design of more effective interventions 
for value chain development. However, most research on asset endowments in the 
livelihoods literature is static in nature. It is argued here that a dynamic approach is 
required that would allow for a discussion of asset building (erosion).  
The concept of vulnerability is linked closely to that of asset building. In 
theory, the more assets households have, the less vulnerable they are; the greater 
the erosion of these assets, the greater is livelihood insecurity (Moser 1998). 
Vulnerability considers a household’s limited ability to cope and recover from external 
shocks and stresses without damaging consequences (Chambers 1989). Resilience, 
on the other hand, refers to the responsiveness of households in exploiting 
opportunities and in resisting or recovering from the negative effects of a changing 
environment. The ability of households to limit the impact of external shocks and 
respond to adverse trends depends on the opportunities and limitations for building 
assets and pursuing secure livelihood strategies. A detailed analysis of 
vulnerability/resilience at the household level is beyond the reach of this framework. 
However, specific considerations are taken into account, including 1) extent to which 
households are exposed to shocks, adverse trends, and seasonality effects and 2) 
the assets available to minimize adverse effects. 
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Fig. 3. Linkages for asset building by rural households  
 
3.3 Strengths and limitations of the conceptual framework  
The conceptual framework presented here lays out an alternative approach to 
assessing the poverty impacts of value chain approaches. Its strengths include:  
• Rather than focusing on changes in income or production in response to a 
single intervention, the framework examines changes in asset building at 
the household and enterprise levels in response to a set of interventions for 
value chain development. While this increases complexity, it also allows for 
a more compete perspective on poverty impacts and the related 
opportunities for improved (re)design of VCDA. 
• By focusing on the capacity of upstream enterprises to develop relations 
upstream with rural households and downstream with buyers and 
processors, the framework integrates the value chain concept into 
assessment. To date, assessments of private sector development 
interventions have yet to incorporate this combined focus on enterprise and 
household (e.g., DCED 2008).   
 
Among the limitations presented by the framework are 
• While VCDA generate changes at various levels: household members, 
households, community/territory, individual enterprises, and the chain as a 
whole, the framework focuses attention only at two levels. Information on 
the relations among household members (e.g., gender equity in benefit 
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sharing) would provide a deeper understanding of the strengths and 
limitations of VCDA for improving addressing poverty. Likewise, information 
on changes at the community/territorial level (e.g., effects on hired labour or 
social exclusion, e.g., Arce 2009) would allow for understanding of spillover 
effects of value chain development.  
• Attribution of changes in assets focuses on two potential causes: the set of 
value chain development interventions and the overall context (e.g., change 
in local prices). In some cases, attribution is straightforward, for example, 
increased skill sets for coffee production, given an understanding of the 
interventions and the overall limited supply of technical services for coffee. 
Where changes depend on cash outlays, it may not be possible to 
distinguish between either of these two causes (e.g., increase in local prices 
for coffee and increased access to credit). A more nuanced understanding 
of case-effect relations would be possible with detailed baseline and 
monitoring data for the individual interventions that make up the VCDA. 
However, in many real world assessment situations, such information does 
not exist. This also implies that the role of endogenous factors (e.g., history, 
attitudes) and some external factors (e.g., racism, class) are downplayed. 
This limitation can be addressed partially with information from key 
informants.  
The next chapter presents a methodology for implementing this conceptual 
framework in the context of a case study on value chain development in the coffee 
sector in Nicaragua.  
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4 A case study of value chain development in Nicaragua  
 
4.1 Introduction  
This chapter presents the methods applied in the case study for assessing the 
poverty impacts of value chain development approaches (VCDA). As previously 
noted, the case study focused on the second-tier coffee cooperative Soppexcca and 
its upstream linkages with 1) hundreds of smallholder farming households in the 
Jinotega-Matagalpa region of Nicaragua and 2) its downstream linkages with buyers 
of certified coffee in Europe and the United States. The selection of Soppexcca for 
this study responded to interest expressed by the NGO Lutheran World Relief (LWR) 
—a partner in the CATIE-Ford Foundation collaboration for designing tools for 
assessment of VCDA—in better understanding the poverty impacts of its 
interventions for the development of value chains in certified markets. LWR’s work 
with Soppexcca fell within its declared objective “to improve livelihoods via better and 
more economically productive participation in the agricultural value chain” (LWR no 
date, 2).  
The case study approach provided the best option for understanding the 
change in assets over time and the reasons behind the changes. The approach 
implies that our understanding of the VCDA contribution to asset building by rural 
households will be based on the context (the intervention and nonintervention factors 
that contributed to changes in the impact indicators identified, as well as the relative 
importance of these factors) (Mohr 1995, 1999). In other words, for any observed or 
identified change, the task of the researcher is to demonstrate that the treatment 
caused the change. Despite the qualitative nature of the approach to attribution, 
however, both quantitative and qualitative data are collected and analysed. This 
chapter focuses on the methods for collection and analysis of the quantitative and 
qualitative data.  
 
4.2 Methods mix  
Both quantitative and qualitative data collection techniques were employed in the 
case study. To the extent possible, quantitative information was collected to 
understand the changes in assets and qualitative information was used to understand 
the relevance of the changes and the reasons for the changes. The use of qualitative 
data differentiates this study from the strictly quantitative assessments of asset 
building that are most commonly found in the development literature. In this way, the 
methodology employed here recognises the contribution of researchers in the 
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development field that have exhorted the use of more people-centred approaches to 
assessment (e.g., Haddad, Lindstrom, and Pinto 2010; Chambers 2006).  
The following data collection methods were used for identifying changes in 
asset endowments and their causes at the upstream enterprise and household level: 
key informant interviews, structured interviews (household-level only), and situation-
specific documents/databases.  
• Key informant interviews: Key informants provided information for the 
enterprise-level assessment and for interpretation of the results at the 
household level. Interviews were carried out with: base cooperative leaders 
(3), boards of directors (3), senior Soppexcca staff (3), Soppexcca buyers in 
the United States and Europe (3), leaders of other certified fair trade 
cooperatives in Nicaragua (4), representative from organic certifying agency 
(1), small-scale coffee buyers in local markets (10), large-scale coffee 
buyers in local markets (2), and Soppexcca extension staff (6). 
• Structured interviews: Structured interviews with farming households 
affiliated with Soppexcca provided information on their existing assess 
endowments, changes in these endowments over time, their perceptions of 
the reasons behind the changes, and the utility of various inputs and 
services for agricultural production. Structured interviews sought information 
of both a qualitative and quantitative nature and included both closed and 
open-ended questions.  
• Situation-specific documents/databases: Soppexcca provided secondary 
information in the form of consultancy reports, certification reports, internal 
documents (strategic plan, financial information), and databases (member 
list and detailed credit history for each sampled household). This information 
assisted in identifying changes in asset endowments at both enterprise and 
household levels.   
• Validation and feedback events: Preliminary results were presented to the 
staff of Soppexcca and LWR for feedback and validation (Soppexcca 
offices, January 2010). Results were also presented for discussion at a 
CATIE-Ford Foundation workshop on value chain assessment (Costa Rica, 
October 2009), a FAO workshop on value chains (Rome, June 2010), and 
an ISEAL Alliance workshop on assessment of certification systems 
(London, August 2010).  
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4.3 Data collection methods 
Data collection at the upstream enterprise and household levels focused on changes 
in assets, the causes of the changes, and their relevance to business viability or 
livelihood security over a specific time period. At the upstream enterprise level, 
secondary information and key informant interviews provided information. At the 
household level, secondary information on asset endowments during the period did 
not exist for the vast majority of indicators. Thus, recall information was sought on 
changes in assets. Recall can provide useful data for assessment under certain 
conditions (Bamberger 2004). In the case of this research, efforts to increase the 
reliability of recall information provided by the sampled households included 1) 
extensive pretesting of the household-level data collection guide (see discussions 
below) in collaboration with Soppexcca and LWR staff and 2) the use of key 
informants, including community members and Soppexcca extensionists, to 
triangulate information provided by households. Extensive pretesting also provided 
an opportunity to train data collectors in detecting and responding to errors 
(inconsistencies) in reporting.   
The assessment period covered the period between the 2004/2005 and 
2008/2009 coffee production years.23 This period followed a period of major 
interventions by buyers and NGOs to facilitate Soppexcca’s participation in value 
chains for certified coffee. The first of these interventions took place in the early 
2000s by European buyers and played a critical role in the organisation of 
Soppexcca. Major interventions by NGOs followed during the coffee crisis between 
2003 and 2007. In general, the less routine and more significant a payment, 
purchase, or other event was for a household, the longer the recall and vice versa. 
For example, a five-year recall period was determined feasible for deliveries of coffee 
to Soppexcca (as this is a once-a-year event that determines a significant part of their 
income), as well as for other major purchases (e.g., fertilizers, major consumer 
durables). A one-year recall period served for indicators that addressed more routine 
and/or less significant events, such as contribution of other income sources to total 
income.  
 
4.3.1 Data collection at the upstream enterprise level (Soppexcca) 
The enterprise assessment yielded data on 1) changes in productive assets over the 
assessment period, 2) what factors contributed to these changes, and 3) the 
relevance of these changes for Soppexcca’s long-term viability. Regarding changes 
                                               
23
 The coffee production year in Nicaragua begins in April and ends in March of the following year. 
Activities in spring focus on plant management (pruning, shade management) and fertilization, while 
activities between November and February focus on harvest and postharvest management.  
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in assets, or capitals, the following types were included in the assessment: human, 
physical, social, and financial. Natural capital was not included since Soppexcca 
does not engage directly in primary production. For each capital included, between 
two and three indicators were identified. Table 2 displays these indicators and the 
data collection methods used to respond to the indicators.  
Data collection relied upon key informant interviews with Soppexcca staff and 
collection of secondary information during an 11-month period between March 2009 
and January 2011. Several advantages resulted from such an extended data 
collection period, including: 1) ability to build working relationships with Soppexcca 
staff and 2) the ability to triangulate information and deepen questioning based on 
information collected from other sources. Among the Soppexcca staff interviewed 
were the managing director, director of extension, director of credit, and members of 
the board of directors. The staff members were consulted on various occasions 
during the data collection period. Soppexcca supplied valuable secondary information 
on membership (critical for design of the sample frame for household data collection), 
credit provision over the past five years, relations with buyers, and business strategy 
and performance.  
Identifying the various factors that contributed to Soppexcca’s changes in 
asset endowments was based on secondary information from Soppexcca, reports by 
NGOs and consultants, and key informant interviews with Soppexcca staff. Given that 
external interventions made a significant contribution to most of the investments in 
assets during the assessment period, determining causality was generally 
straightforward. The relative ease of attribution was also facilitated by the limited 
amount of retained earnings held by Soppexcca for major investments in productive 
assets (e.g., physical and human capital). Buyers or other actors along the value 
chains in which Soppexcca participated did not make direct investments in the 
building of Soppexcca’s assets during the assessment period.  
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Table 2. Indicators of asset building at the enterprise level 
Capital Indicator Data collection methods 
Human 
capital 
 
• Change in ability to 
administer basic services for 
buyers and household 
producers 
• Change in ability to provide 
effective on-site technical 
assistance to producers  
• Key informant interviews with 
Soppexcca staff 
• Secondary information  
• Key informant interviews with 
coffee buyers in Europe and the 
United States 
• Key informant interviews with 
members of board of directors 
Physical 
capital 
 
• New investments in 
infrastructure, including  
machinery, equipment, tools  
• Secondary information (project 
reports, Soppexcca reports) 
• Key informant interviews  
Social 
capital 
 
• Change in member 
participation in Soppexcca’s 
governance  
• Change in the diversity and 
strength of relationships 
with buyers  
• Secondary information on sales 
and buyers  
• Key informant interviews with 
members of board of directors 
• Dialogue with Soppexcca 
members 
Financial 
capital 
 
• Change in access to credit  
• Change in savings level and 
liquidity  
• Change in income flows 
• Change in credit distributed  
• Secondary information  
 
 
 
4.3.2 Data collection at the household level 
The household assessment yielded data on 1) changes in productive assets over the 
assessment period; 2) factors that contributed to these changes; and 3) the 
relevance of these changes to livelihood security. A structured interview was applied 
to a representative sample of Soppexcca-affiliated households. Key informant 
interviews and validation workshops were used for interpretation of results and filling 
information gaps.  
 
Sample frame design 
Soppexcca provided a list of affiliated households for the design of the sample frame. 
However, the information contained in the list was limited to name and base-
cooperative affiliation. No information was available on location of the households or 
their coffee production volumes (only production volumes delivered to Soppexcca, 
which, in some cases, proved only a fraction of total coffee production).  
In this context, it was decided that base-cooperative affiliation, where each 
member who belonged to a given base cooperative was included in the sample, 
offered the best approach to sample design. Among the 16 base cooperatives in 
Soppexcca in 2009, 11 were selected for inclusion in the sample frame. With inputs 
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from Soppexcca staff, base cooperatives were selected based on 1) distance from 
Soppexcca’s headquarters, with a roughly equal number of cooperatives located less 
than 25 km, between 25 and 50 km and more than 75 km; and 2) the geographical 
closeness of households in a given base cooperative. (All things being equal, 
cooperatives whose members were more concentrated in a given area were 
preferred to cooperatives with a lesser degree of concentration. This reduced costs of 
data collection without introducing bias into the sample.) A limited number of 
households from the other six cooperatives were also included in this study. This 
allowed for inclusion of all of the organically certified households. Selected base 
cooperatives were located in the north-central part of Nicaragua, where the majority 
of the country’s coffee production takes place (fig. 4). 
 
Source: Embassyworld.com (2011) 
Fig. 4. Map of Nicaragua, with study area located in blue oval  
 
 
The sample included 292 coffee-producing households, or approximately 60% 
of the total reported membership of all the base cooperatives affiliated with 
Soppexcca and 95% of the total reported membership of the 11 base cooperatives 
(table 3). Households from the total reported membership of the selected base 
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cooperatives not interviewed for this study were those that had 1) sold their coffee-
producing land, 2) refused to be interviewed or 3) were unavailable after two visits to 
their home. In total, 16 households were not interviewed. In cases where a household 
included two Soppexcca members and the two members produced two different 
types of coffee―for example, one was an organic producing member and other a 
conventional producing member―the one with the organic system was chosen.  
Within the household, both female and male heads of household were invited 
to participate in the interview. Questions related to production and land use were 
directed to those household members who directly participated in coffee production 
and harvest. In most cases, this was the male household head. Questions related to 
household consumption and changes in access to health care and education were 
directed to the female household head. Each interview lasted between 45 minutes 
and 1 hour and 15 minutes, depending on the complexity of the production system 
and changes in assets. Four to five interviews were carried out per day by each data 
collector. Travel time between households was generally 15 to 30 minutes (walking). 
In a few cases, up to two hours were required to reach households.  
 
Table 3 Sample frame, by production type and base cooperative 
Soppexcca base 
cooperative 
# households 
producing 
conventional coffee 
# households 
producing organic 
coffee 
Total # 
households 
Julio Hernández   28   0   28 
La Unión    24   1   25 
La Unidad     9   0    9 
Osmán Martínez    15   4   19 
Feliciano Hernández   19   2   21 
Ernesto Acuña    23   2   25 
Los Alpes    25   8   33 
El Esfuerzo    18 20   38 
Jesús Rivera    29   2   31 
Bernardino Días Ochoa    20  11   31 
Juan Fernández    6 13   19 
Other base cooperatives    5   8   13 
Total  221 71 292 
 
Data collection and management  
Two data collection assistants, one male and one female, collected household-level 
data. Where possible, the female assistant collected data from households where a 
female was affiliated with Soppexcca. Soppexcca extension staff facilitated contacts 
with community leaders but did not participate in household-level data collection. This 
allowed for confidentiality of the information provided by households and increased 
the level of trust between household members and data collectors. Local guides were 
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contracted for identifying the Soppexcca-affiliated households within a given 
community or base cooperative. Data collection assistants visited a given community 
for several days, often staying at a Soppexcca member’s home (rather than at the 
local Soppexcca office). This facilitated a more relaxed atmosphere and willingness 
to talk on the part of the respondents. The lead researcher accompanied the 
assistants in household interviews, observing household responses, asking follow-up 
questions for clarification and deeper understanding, and providing feedback to 
assistance on their performance.  
The elaboration of the household-level data collection guide took place in 
various iterations over a two-month period. A first draft was elaborated at CATIE, 
applying the general set of indicators that emerged from the international 
collaboration between Ford and CATIE and was adjusted based on preexisting 
knowledge of Soppexcca and the Nicaraguan coffee sector in general. This first draft 
was implemented by the field assistants, together with the lead researcher, over a 
three-week period, with 14 coffee-producing households that belonged to an organic 
and fair trade cooperative having characteristics similar to those of Soppexcca. At 
regular intervals during the testing process, the data collection assistants and lead 
researcher reflected on information obtained and the changes needed in the data 
collection guide and interview techniques. Testing highlighted various options for 
simplifying the data collection guide. For example, questions on the hiring of labour 
for coffee production were removed (despite its importance to coffee production and 
livelihood security) due to the complexity of the issue (and the need for numerous 
layered questions) and the difficulty of the households to assess changes in labour 
usage over time. Two weeks into the data collection process, additional modifications 
were made based on lessons learned in the field (e.g., addition of more detailed 
questions on fertilizer usage and the selling of coffee outside of Soppexcca). Repeat 
trips were made to those households interviewed with the previous version of the 
data collection guide.  
Following the data collection in the field, a consultant entered the information 
contained in the completed household level data collection guide into a Microsoft 
Access database. The data collection assistants reviewed each digitalized interview 
in the database to ensure accuracy or similarity between written household 
responses in the data collection guide and recorded responses in the Access 
database. The lead researcher also reviewed the database to identify any remaining 
contradictions and omissions in household responses. Contradictions and omissions 
were dealt with in one of two ways. In some cases, contradictions were addressed by 
triangulating information with Soppexcca technicians and responses from other 
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members of the base cooperative. In the majority of cases, however, the data 
collection assistants, with the lead researcher, made repeat visits to the households.  
 
Household-level data collection guide  
The household-level data collection guide provided a template for the collection of 
quantitative and qualitative data across each of the five livelihood capitals (see annex 
1). The data collection guide was formulated based on three to four indicators per 
capital. Table 4 displays the indicators used.24 In general, asset-based assessments 
in the literature include one indicator for each capital (although, sometimes excluding 
social capital) that is relatively easy to measure but that provides limited insight into a 
household’s livelihood security (e.g., see asset indicators listed in Hossian et al. 2007 
and Bourdillon et al. 2007). Two types of indicators were used: primary indicators and 
supporting indicators. Primary indicators provide the best information to assess the 
degree of success in asset building. Supporting indicators provide information that 
allows for a better understanding of the primary indicators. Indicators addressed 
outcomes of interventions rather than simply capturing the outputs of the 
interventions. For example, rather than focusing on participation in training events (a 
project outcome), human capital indicators refer to changes in capacities and skills 
for coffee production.  
• Natural capital: The four primary indicators for natural capital focused 
attention on 1) changes in land area under agricultural production, 2) 
changes in area under coffee production, 3) changes in fertilizer usage (as a 
proxy for soil health), and 4) changes in wastewater disposal and herbicide 
usage (as proxies for environmental health). Data on land area and area 
under coffee production were collected at the start and end of the 
assessment period. Households reported their usage of fertilizers over a 
three-year period. Given the relatively high price for fertilizer (and the fact 
that it was purchased only once in a given year), households generally had 
little difficulty in recalling fertilizer purchases. Households reported 
production practices for the disposal of wastewater from wet milling and on 
herbicide usage at the beginning of the assessment period (or the year prior 
to joining Soppexcca, whichever came first) and at the end of the period. 
The supporting indicator, change in land tenure, aimed to provide insights 
                                               
24 Various indicators were originally considered for inclusion in the study but were eliminated during 
pretesting. Among these were gender division of labour (human capital), tree coverage on coffee 
plantation (natural capital), households and hired labour inputs for coffee production (financial capital), 
and changes in food consumption (vulnerability). In some cases, inclusion of these indicators extended 
the interview duration to a point that was unmanageable. In most cases, secondary information provided 
insights into these indicators (e.g., tree coverage).  
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into potential reasons for changes (or lack thereof) in land area or in area 
under coffee production.   
• Human capital: Indicators for human capital focused on whether households 
were able to acquire new knowledge for agricultural production during the 
assessment period. The four primary indicators included: 1) new skills for 
enhanced coffee quality, 2) new skills for pest and disease control, 3) 
application of good production practices in coffee, and 4) new skills for 
production of products other than coffee. Data on new skills for enhancing 
coffee quality and for pest and disease control in coffee production were 
obtained by asking households about relevant production practices at the 
beginning of the assessment period (or prior to joining Soppexcca, 
whichever came first), and at the end of the assessment period. It was not 
possible to observe skills for implementation of good production practices in 
coffee. Nor was it possible to ask households to describe their production 
practices and expect responses of sufficient detail or reliability to assess 
changes. Thus, the following proxy was applied only among those 
households that did not apply purchased fertilizers: ability to reach an 
average productivity of 1,000 lbs/year/manzana25 in coffee production. By 
applying the indicator only to households that did not apply purchased 
fertilizers, the effects of fertilizer application of productivity were controlled. 
When productivity levels averaged more than 1,000 lbs/year/manzana it 
was assumed that these households used good production techniques and 
that these techniques were acquired during the assessment period26. When 
households failed to reach an average productivity in coffee of 1,000 
lbs/year/manzana it was deduced that they did not acquire new knowledge 
for application of good production techniques. The final primary indicator 
focused on new knowledge for the production agricultural products that had 
not been produced prior to the assessment period. The two supporting 
indicators aimed to shed light on potential reasons households did or did not 
acquire or implement new knowledge for coffee production, focusing on 1) 
the role of technical assistance (from a household perspective) and 2) the 
effects of the loss of the male household head.  
                                               
25
 Manzana (mz) is the traditional unit of land measure in Nicaragua: 1 mz is equal to 1.73 acres and 
0.69 ha. 
26
 Households that did not apply chemical fertilizers but did apply good production practices can achieve 
between 1,000 and 1,600 lbs/year/manzana of parchment coffee (J. Hagger, pers. comm.). Alternatively, 
households that do not apply chemical inputs or good production practices have productive levels that 
do not exceed 1,000 lbs of parchment coffee/year/manzana. At higher levels of productivity, these 
assumptions would not hold, as the number of productivity-influencing factors, such as synthetic 
fertilizers, increases.  
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• Social capital: The three primary social capital indicators aimed to 
understand changes in the trust and reciprocity embedded in coffee trading 
relationships. Information on the nature of relationships was obtained by 
asking households to identify buyers and the services that they offered in 
the year prior to the assessment period (or prior to joining Soppexcca, 
whichever came first) and at the final year of the period. Households also 
provided their perceptions of their benefits and solidarity with Soppexcca. 
Information on number of bags of coffee sold to Soppexcca (versus other 
coffee buyers) was obtained for the final two years of the assessment 
period. The third indicator addressed changes in access to other services 
(e.g., health services, credit) through coffee-buying relationships. 
Households provided information on services received before and during 
the assessment period.   
• Physical capital: The three primary indicators for physical capital included 1) 
expansion or improvement of wet-milling infrastructure, 2) expansion or 
improvement of machinery, equipment and tools, and expansion or 
improvement of housing infrastructure. Because of the infrequency and the 
relatively high costs, a five-year recall period was used. Among the types of 
machinery, equipment, tools and infrastructure considered were motorized 
pumps, motorized sprayers, wet mills, and coffee depulpers. The housing 
infrastructure indicators addressed changes in flooring, roofing, and walls,27 
while the major consumer durables indicator addressed changes in access 
to a second home (usually near an urban centre) and motorcycle/vehicle 
ownership, and major consumer electronics.  
• Financial capital: The two primary indicators for financial capital include 
price and coffee benefits from participation in value chains for certified 
coffee and 2) change in access to short- and long-term credit. Price and 
income benefits were calculated for the five-year assessment period, based 
on price data provided by households and key informants and secondary 
information on prices in international coffee markets. Households provided 
information on their access to short- and long-term credit during the five-
year assessment period. A database on credit repayment provided insights 
into the ability of households to repay their credit obligations to Soppexcca.  
                                               
27
 The importance of housing infrastructure on overall livelihood security is highlighted by Cattaneo et al. 
(2007). In Mexico, they found that replacing dirt floors with cement floors significantly improved the 
health of children. Specifically, they found that a complete substitution of dirt floors by cement floors in a 
house led to a 78% reduction in parasitic infestations, 49% reduction in diarrhea, 81% reduction in 
anemia and a 36% to 96% improvement in cognitive development. Additionally, they find that replacing 
dirt floors with cement floors significantly improved adult welfare, as measured by increased satisfaction 
with their housing and quality of life, as well as significantly lower rates of depression.  
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Table 4. Indicators of asset building at the household level 
Capital Primary indicators Supporting 
indicators 
Data collection 
methods 
Natural 
capital  
 
• Change in area under 
agricultural production 
• Change in area under coffee 
production 
• Change in fertilizer usage for 
coffee (proxy for soil fertility)  
• Change in disposal of 
wastewater and herbicide 
usage for coffee (proxies for 
environmental health)  
• Change in 
land tenure 
 
• Household 
interviews 
• Key 
informant 
interviews  
Human 
capital 
 
• New skills for enhanced coffee 
quality 
• Ability to reach productivity of 
more than 1,000 lbs/year/ 
manzana, applied only to 
households that did not apply 
purchased fertilizer (proxy for 
application of good production 
practices in coffee) 
• New skills for production of 
products other than coffee  
• New skills for pest and disease 
control in coffee  
• Perceptions 
on utility of 
technical 
assistance 
• Change in 
household 
composition 
(loss of male 
household 
head) 
• Household 
interviews 
• Key 
informant 
interviews 
 
Social 
capital 
 
• Change in relationships with 
coffee buyers  
• Coffee sold to coffee buyers 
other than Soppexcca 
• Change in access to other 
services and safety nets (e.g., 
emergency credit, 
scholarships, health services9 
 • Household 
interviews 
• Key 
informant 
interviews  
Physical 
capital 
 
• Expansion/ improvement of 
wet-milling infrastructure28 
• Expansion/ improvement of 
machinery, equipment, tools  
• Expansion/ improvement of 
housing infrastructure 
 • Household 
interviews 
 
Financial 
capital 
 
• Price and income benefits from 
participation in certified coffee 
value chains  
• Change in access to short and 
long-term credit  
• Ability to repay 
credit 
obligations 
• Household 
interviews 
• Database on 
credit 
repayment 
                                               
28
 During wet milling the pulp is removed mechanically with a depulper, and the depulped coffee is 
fermented to remove the mucilage. Water is used copiously throughout the process. According to 
Brando (2004), wet-processing consumes from 20 m3 to 100 m3 of water/ton of green coffee, with the 
lower end of the range achieved through recycling. Ecological wet milling utilizes less than 10 m3, ideally 
under 5 m3 of water/ton of green coffee.  
89 
 
 
4.4 Data analysis  
The indicators for the household questionnaire generated multiple perspectives on 
changes in asset endowments over the assessment period. Some indicators 
generated information that was amenable to conventional quantitative analytical 
techniques, while others generated information that were better suited to qualitative 
analysis. Qualitative data from the household interviews were analysed in an 
interpretative manner. The quantitative data were explored by generating descriptive 
statistics (means, standard deviation, medians, minimum and maximum values) and 
later by means of different bivariant and multivariant tests and analyses. Qualitative 
and quantitative data from household surveys were entered into an MS Access 
database and analysed using SPSS (Statistical Package for Social Sciences) and MS 
Excel. 
Two levels of reductionism were applied to determine changes in asset 
building at the household level. A high level of reductionism provided insights into 
major trends in the sample regarding asset building. In this way, it provided a general 
measure of the overall impact of the interventions (e.g., Carter and Barrett 2004; 
Booysen et al. 2008). An asset index was created using principal components 
analysis to assess asset building from a high level of reductionism. However, 
understanding the relevance of asset building for livelihood security and the role of 
the intervention in bringing about these changes required a lower level of 
reductionism. This was achieved through detailed quantitative and qualitative 
analysis at the level of each indicator. The following text provides a brief outline of the 
analytical tools and techniques used in this research.  
 
4.4.1 Quantitative data analysis  
Various tools, described below, were used to analyse the quantitative data generated 
from the household level survey. Among these tools, cluster analysis was especially 
important, as it provided the framework for analysis of the experiences in asset 
building at the household level.  
 
Principal components analysis  
Principal components analysis (PCA) provides a robust option for estimating an asset 
index, which allows for understanding macro changes in asset endowments. PCA 
sets the stage for the most detailed analysis of asset building that is the backbone of 
this research.  
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PCA overcomes the lack of cardinality and fungibility that are inherent in 
asset-based measures of poverty (Filmer and Pritchett 2001). PCA is a technique for 
extracting from a large number of variables the few orthogonal linear combinations of 
the variables that best capture the common information. The first principal component 
is the linear index of variables with the largest amount of information common to all of 
the variables.  
The result of principal components is an asset index for each household (Aj) 
based on the formula: 
Aj = f1 x (aj1 – a1) / (s1) + …+ fN x (ajN – aN) / (SN) 
where f1 is the scoring factor for the first asset as determined by the procedure, aj1 is 
the jth household’s value for the first asset and a1 and s1 are the mean and standard 
deviation of the first asset variable over all households. A basic assumption is that a 
household’s long-run wealth is what causes the most common variation in asset 
variables. To measure asset building over time, an asset index can be computed for 
two time periods using the same indicator (Garip 2010). The intuition underlying this 
method is that a latent (unobservable) variable for each type of capital manifests itself 
through ownership of the different assets. Moser and Felton (2007) argued that PCA 
is appealing for combining variables because it is technically equivalent to a rotation 
of the dimensional axes, such that the variance from the observations was minimized. 
It is similar to a regression in terms of minimizing residuals, but in this case the 
residuals are measured against all of the variables, not just one dependent variable.  
PCA is also useful because its coefficients have an intuitive interpretation. The 
coefficient on any one variable is related to how much information it provides about 
the other variables. If ownership of one type of asset is highly indicative of ownership 
of other assets, then it receives a positive coefficient. If ownership of an asset 
contains almost no information about what other assets the household owns (its 
correlation coefficient is near zero), then it receives a coefficient near zero. And if 
ownership of an asset indicates that a household is likely to own few other assets, 
then it receives a negative coefficient. A higher or lower coefficient means that 
ownership of that asset conveys more or less information about the other assets. 
According to Filmer and Pritchett (1994), such an asset index does well in three 
dimensions: first, it is internally coherent and produces clear separations across the 
poor, middle, and rich households for each asset individually; second, it is robust to 
the assets included; and third it produces reasonable comparison with other 
conventional poverty measures.  
Various studies have applied an asset index for assessing asset-poverty 
conditions (e.g., Filmer and Pritchett 2001; Moser and Felton 2007; Garip 2010). 
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Asset indicators have tended to be highly rudimentary in nature: for example, number 
of cows, number of TVs, or whether a house has windows or a gas stove. In the 
context of this research, more complex indicators related to productive assets will be 
applied to the PCA (rather than a focus solely on consumption-related indicators).   
 
Cluster analysis  
Cluster analysis a key analytical element in this research. It allows for the 
segmentation of households based on key elements of their livelihood strategies and 
their asset endowment. This, in turn, provides a more nuanced understanding of their 
experiences in asset building. Research that examines asset building in response to 
development interventions has tended not to distinguish among different household 
types (e.g., Adato and Meinzen-Dick 2007). In addressing this gap, this research 
applies cluster analysis to group sampled households according to major assets 
(e.g., landholdings) and key elements of livelihood strategies.  
The cluster was formulated using a two-step clustering technique in SPSS.29 
Simulation research has suggested the two-step procedure is effective at reproducing 
“true” clusters (SPSS 2007). As a general rule, two-step cluster analysis requires a 
minimum of about 200 observations to get a reliable solution (Salimath, Cullen, and 
Umesh 2008), which was the case here. Initially, several continuous and binary 
variables were considered for clustering, some related to assets (e.g., total area, area 
under coffee production, and income earned off-farm) and others to household 
characteristics (e.g., age of the household member registered with Soppexcca, 
single-headed household, total household size, and highest education level 
achieved). However, an examination of the correlation matrix between these 
variables showed a low number of correlations with at least medium size (i.e., >.30). 
This suggested the complexity, with many different factors and factor combinations 
influencing the independent variables.   
The solution to this problem was the incorporation of a reduced number of 
variables that offered higher correlations between them. The following two variables 
were selected: 1) area under coffee production in 2008–2009 and 2) percentage of 
total household income derived from off-farm sources in 2008.30 A four-cluster 
solution emerged from this analysis, which was later reduced to three based on 
                                               
29
 The two-step clustering algorithm in SPSS contains two stages: 1) preclustering and 2) hierarchical 
clustering. The precluster stage groups the respondents into several small clusters. The cluster stage 
uses the small clusters as input and groups them into larger clusters. 
30
 Alternatively, data from the 2004–2005 coffee production year (the beginning of the assessment 
period) would have been used to define the clusters. However, it was not feasible to collect detailed 
information on income sources for this year based on recall alone. This situation, combined with the lack 
of baseline data, necessitated use of income information from the 2008–2009 production year. While 
information on area under coffee production for the 2004–2005 production year was available, 
information from 2008–2009 was used, thus allowing for a match with the information on income. 
92 
 
insights into the sample. Clustering carried out on the data at the end of the 
assessment period, rather than at the beginning, does not have any pre-identifiable 
negative implication for the analysis.  
 
Tools for identifying changes, exploring correlation, and prediction   
Various other statistical tools used to identify changes in assets and the factors that 
contributed to the changes. Quantitative data included mainly nominal and interval 
data. These data were explored by producing descriptive statistics (frequencies, 
means, standard deviations, medians, minimum and maximum values) and graphic 
outputs (scatter plots and histograms), and later by bivariate and multivariate tests 
and estimation procedures. Logistic regression was employed to predict the effect of 
multiple variables on a household’s ability to accumulate a given asset (e.g., land for 
agricultural production). Analysis of variance (ANOVA) was employed on various 
occasions for identifying differences in a given asset across the three clusters. 
Among the tests used for understanding correlation were Pearson’s Product Moment 
Coefficient, or Person’s r (a measure of the strength and the direction of an 
association between variables) and t-test (a test to compare the difference in the 
means of values of the dependent variable of two unrelated samples). In general, 
these tools provided support to understanding the changes that took place and the 
relationships between the changes in assets and various independence variables. 
They cannot explain how or why the changes took place or the correlations between 
variables. Questions of how and why the changes took place were addressed based 
on an understanding of the context from which the variables were taken and 
qualitative information from stakeholders.  
 
4.4.2 Qualitative data analysis  
Preliminary analysis consisted in reviewing and sorting the qualitative information 
according to relevance to a particular asset at the enterprise and household levels. 
Data from key informant interviews, observation, household surveys, and secondary 
information were analysed according to each of the dimensions highlighted in the 
respective conceptual framework. This allowed for assessing the potential of the 
various interventions, as well as identifying those elements that could have increased 
this potential. Inductive analysis was used to capture the patterns, themes, and 
categories that emerged out of the data (Patton 1980). Inductive analysis provided 
insights across the asset indicators regarding the relevance of the identified changes 
for household productive capacity and well-being. For example, inductive analysis 
was used to identify variations in the relevance of technical assistance for coffee 
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production and noncoffee-related services provided by Soppexcca for different types 
of Soppexcca members. At the level of upstream enterprise, inductive analysis from 
key informant interviews provided insights into changes (or lack thereof) of certain 
indicators for social capital and human capital. 
  
4.5 Strengths and limitations of methodological framework  
The methodological framework outlined here presents strengths and limitations for 
responding to the research questions and conceptual framework. The following 
strengths are recognized: 
• Variations in the level of reductionism in data analysis provide a more 
complete picture of asset building than typically provided in the literature. 
The use of an asset index allows for general insights into changes in asset 
endowments over time at the household level. Detailed and extensive 
household-level data collection allows for understanding why the changes 
took place and the relevance of the changes for livelihoods security.  
• The use of between three and four indicators for each capital at the 
upstream enterprise and household levels allow for deep insights into the 
nature of changes. Indicators focused on changes in asset endowments in 
response to the value chain development interventions, rather than on 
outputs of the interventions (e.g., participation in training events).  
• The segmentation of households by cluster membership makes possible 
discussions on the differences in preexisting asset endowments and on 
differences in changes in endowments in response to the interventions.  
 
The limitations of the framework deal with the complexity in data collection 
and analysis. By including various indicators for a given capital asset, analysis 
confronts the possibility of ambiguous results for a given capital asset. Without the 
use of control groups and with missing information at the household level, the ability 
to separate out the effects of the interventions for value chain development from the 
context can be inconclusive. The challenges related to the complexity of the data 
collection were addressed through a prolonged period of fieldwork in Nicaragua, 
extensive training and supervision of data collection assistants, and the use of 
multiple data collection methods.  
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5 Asset building by the coffee cooperative Soppexcca 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter examines changes in productive assets of the coffee cooperative 
Soppexcca and the extent to which these changes led to improved business viability. 
During the assessment period (2004–2005 and 2008–2009), NGOs, projects, and 
non-for-profit lending organizations provided technical and financial support to 
Soppexcca (see chapter 1). Much of this support aimed to address the negative 
implications of the coffee crisis through the building of relationships in certified coffee 
markets. Support from the private sector included services that were embedded in 
trading relationships for coffee, such as no-interest advance payments on coffee 
purchases. As detailed in the following discussions, Soppexcca achieved major 
advances in asset building and these interventions played a pivotal role in building 
Soppexcca’s capacity to respond to buyers’ demands and market-related shocks. 
However, results also show that important gaps remain and that addressing these 
gaps implies changes in how Soppexcca operates and in how interventions for value 
chain development are design and assessed.  
 
5.2 Asset building by Soppexcca 
This section discusses changes in Soppexcca’s endowments of capital assets during 
the assessment period. Analysis focuses on four capitals: human, social, physical, 
and financial. Because Soppexcca does not directly engage in coffee production, 
matters of natural capital are covered only at the household level (see chapter 6).  
 
5.2.1 Changes in human capital endowment 
This section evaluates changes in skills and capacities of Soppexcca’s administrative 
staff to 1) sustain relations with buyers, NGOs, and member households and 2) 
provide effective technical assistance to members. It also examines the skills and 
capacities of Soppexcca’s elected leaders (from producing households) to contribute 
to Soppexcca’s governance.  
 
Skills and capacities for sustaining relations with buyers and NGOs 
Before the assessment period, Soppexcca had achieved a notable ability to engage 
buyers for the purchase and selling of coffee and involve NGOs to design 
collaboration for supporting smallholder producers. These abilities were due, in large 
part, to the long-term presence of its professional manager, Fatima Ismael. The initial 
selection of Ms. Ismael was agreed upon by the debt-holding coffee buyers, and her 
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salary during her first years of service was covered by Max Havelaar—a Netherlands-
based fair-trade promotion organization. Since the beginning of Soppexcca, she has 
been responsible for strategic planning (including the purchase of the dry-processing 
plant), as well as day-to-day management, including decisions on short- and long-
term credit assignment, emergency credit allocation, buyer negotiations and 
coordination, and NGO relations. All the coffee buyers interviewed for this study 
expressed their unconditional trust in Soppexcca’s professional management. 
However, they also mentioned how communication stopped when Fatima was out of 
contact and that the overall costs of coordination with Soppexcca were high (due to 
information and communication blackouts).  
During the coffee crisis, NGOs sought out Soppexcca for collaboration in 
building the capacities of coffee-farming households to participate in value chains for 
certified coffee. Soppexcca built up their administrative structures for managing NGO-
financed activities during this period. Long-term relationships with NGOs such as 
Christian Aid and LRW reflected their achievements in this area. On the other hand, 
observation of the interactions between LRW and Soppexcca during fieldwork for this 
research highlighted LRW’s difficulty in obtaining timely information from Soppexcca 
to comply with its donor reporting requirements. There too, information blackouts 
were common, best resolved through repeated and frequent visits by LWR staff to 
Soppexcca offices. Soppexcca appeared to struggle with managing the information 
demands by buyers and NGOs, in addition to the information needed to run their 
business. During the period of data collection, no fewer than three assessments (in 
addition to this one) were being carried out on the impacts of certification and the 
impacts of specific project interventions. Evidence suggests that while Soppexcca 
has the skill, it may lack the capacity to manage effectively the demands placed on it 
by buyers, NGOs and other service providers and by members.  
 
Skills and capacities to provide technical assistance  
Soppexcca’s human capacity to provide technical assistance expanded markedly 
during the assessment period but remained dangerously dependent on external 
support. Prior to 2006, Soppexcca’s extension staff consisted of two persons. In 
2007, project funds allowed expansion to seven persons. Despite the increase in 
staff, their overall capacity to provide technical assistance was limited by the number 
of activities that they carry out. Extensionists were charged with assisting households 
in coffee production and postharvest management, estimating and monitoring coffee 
production for the credit department, and participating in and carrying out training on 
a various subjects (e.g., gender promotion, cocoa production, depending on the 
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project financing the training. Each extensionist was assigned to between one and 
three base cooperatives. The salaries of all extensionists were covered entirely with 
project funds. At the time of data collection for this study, the renewal of contracts for 
five extensionists was in jeopardy, subject to new sources of funding.  
Evidence from household and key informant interviews suggested that 
extensionists were not equipped with the incentives, tools or training to address the 
farm-level production problems of resource-poor households. Among the concerns 
expressed by Soppexcca’s lead extensionist, Rigoberto Pineda, were overburdened 
staff (each extensionist with 60–70 households), limited ability to target assistance to 
households based on need, lack of coordination between technical assistance and 
the credit department, low motivation and limited skills of extensionists (three were 
fired in 2009 for low performance or unprofessional behaviour), tendency to provide 
recommendations with limited understanding of the coffee plantation, and limitations 
to empathize and communicate effectively with producers. At the household level, 
Soppexcca members commonly pointed to a lack of attention and limited capacity to 
identify appropriate solutions to production problems as deficiencies of the 
Soppexcca extension program (see chapter 6 for details).  
Developing and retaining qualified staff was a problem. In general, the 
insecure contractual situation (with salaries for extensionists entirely dependent on 
external project funds) was identified by extensionists during interviews as a major 
source of concern. In 2008, three extensionists were dismissed for poor performance. 
In 2009, a newly hired extensionist, Bayardo Gadea Centeno, was murdered in an 
attempted robbery while returning from a base-cooperative training event. 
Investments in rigorous on-the-job training that would improve working with asset-
poor farming households as well as investments in staff retention and personal 
security have eluded Soppexcca and its supporters . 
 
Skills and capacities of Soppexcca’s elected leaders 
The final indicator examines the skills and capacities of Soppexcca’s elected leaders 
to shape Soppexcca’s operational and strategic decision-making processes and 
provide oversight of the operations. Elected leaders first became part of Soppexcca’s 
organizational structure in 2004 when it converted to the cooperative business. 
Evidence collected for this study suggested that, in general, since 2004 Soppexcca 
achieved mixed results in empowering its elected leaders. On one hand, a board of 
directors has been in place and operating since 2004, based on tested election 
procedures. The board meets regularly at Soppexcca to discuss strategic and 
operational decisions, such as relations with buyers, credit providers, and NGOs and 
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setting prices for Soppexcca-provided credit. However, evidence also suggested that 
the board faced serious limitations to carry out its duties fully and effectively. One 
reason for this was a lack of information on the strategic objectives of Soppexcca or 
its financial status. Two key informants, both with leadership roles on the board of 
directors in 2009, noted that they had no information on the strategic plan and that 
they had not been able to access up-to-date and usable information on the financial 
status of Soppexcca. They attributed the lack of financial information to weaknesses 
in Soppexcca’s administrative department. However, even had they had the 
necessary financial information, evidence suggests that they would not have been 
able to use it to carry out their duties. According to a former member of the Oversight 
Committee (Junta de Vigilancia), whose role it was to oversee financial affairs, during 
the first two years of this three-year term, he did not understand how to interpret 
financial statements. It was not until the final year of this term that he consulted with 
an externally hired accountant to review in detail the financial statements. He was 
replaced after his third year of service.  
 
5.2.2 Changes in social capital endowment 
The nature and strength of Soppexcca’s relationships with its buyers and its 
members provides the basis for analysis of social capital endowment. The 
relationship between Soppexcca and its members involves two factors: 1) the 
exchange of goods and services and 2) members’ involvement in Soppexcca’s 
governance. The latter factor is assessed here, while the exchange of goods and 
services is assessed in chapter 6. Key informant interviews with Soppexcca’s staff, 
elected leaders, and coffee buyers provided the information for assessment.  
 
Relationships with buyers  
The 2008–2009 harvest was sold to seven buyers: five from Europe, which 
purchased 59% of the total volume exported, and two from the United States, which 
purchased the remaining 41%. The five European buyers had purchased roughly the 
same amount of coffee (usually between one and two containers per year) from 
Soppexcca every year since 1999—the year that Soppexcca first exported coffee 
after Jiprocoop’s collapse. US buyers began to purchase coffee from Soppexcca in 
significant volumes in the 2003–2004 harvest. The addition of the US buyers followed 
a period of rapid expansion in Soppexcca membership,31 which allowed for increased 
                                               
31
 Between 2002 and 2006, Soppexcca membership increased by more than 200%, from 150 to 500. 
This was due, in part, to the coffee crisis (with households seeking better marketing opportunities), and 
by Soppexcca’s efforts to support households with newly acquired rights over their land (see discussion 
on natural capital in section 4.4). 
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export volumes. Interviews with European buyers suggested that strong links with 
Soppexcca existed before the assessment period, due initially to Soppexcca’s 
commitment to repay the debt left behind by Jiprocoop. Effective professional 
management and compliance with contractual terms reinforced this initial trust over 
time. None of the interviewed buyers reported major problems over the duration of 
their relationship with Soppexcca with respect to the quality of coffee delivered or with 
compliance with contractual terms (including repayment of prefinancing). One buyer 
regarded Soppexcca as the most reliable among the 10 cooperatives in Latin 
America from which it purchases coffee.   
 Buyers were asked to identify problems encountered in their communication 
and coordination with Soppexcca during their business relationship. Responses 
indicated that relationships exhibited unusually high levels of trust, on the one hand, 
and frustration at the inefficiency of communications and apprehension regarding 
Soppexcca’s viability, on the other. As mentioned previously, strong trust with 
European buyers was based on Soppexcca’s willingness (and that of its members) to 
assume the debt of Jiprocoop, reinforced over the years by competent management. 
According to one buyer, “We feel a special trust with Soppexcca. They kept paying off 
the debt even though they didn’t have to.” Trust was reflected in tangible ways. For 
example, when Soppexcca expressed concerns about its difficulty to capture its 
members’ coffee due to high levels of local competition during the harvest season, 
interviewed buyers agreed to adjust their price formula so that prices offered by 
Soppexcca were more in line with local prices.32 Another buyer noted that “if 
Soppexcca has to request an adjustment in their price, then there is always a good 
and transparent reason.”  
However, communication and coordination from the buyers’ perspective 
remained underdeveloped at the end of the assessment period. Buyers reported 
communication blackouts when Soppexcca experienced problems with delivery of a 
container. In some cases, lack of information about delays left buyers unprepared for 
the arrival of containers before the arrival of the shipping documentation (thus, 
resulting in port charges incurred by the buyer). Communication tended to suffer 
when Ms. Ismael was away from her office. “It is very hard to get communication from 
other Soppexcca staff; communication is very much focused on Fatima,” noted one 
buyer. Given the risky nature of coffee production (especially as related to changes in 
climate and changes in local marketing conditions), efficient and useful 
                                               
32
 Rather than base the price on the New York price for coffee six to eight weeks prior to delivery, the 
price was based on the four-month-average New York price between December and March, when 
coffee producers make decisions about where to sell their coffee. This is also a period when 
international coffee prices are generally highest during the year.  
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communication is prized by buyers. In one case, buyers make an annual trip to 
Soppexcca’s office to get the information they need on expected production volumes 
and local marketing conditions. Information collected also provided the buyer with 
inputs for the promotion of their product in Europe. The buyer added, “We would 
prefer that the information we need were provided in a less costly manner, but we 
have learned to adjust to the situation.” While overall confidence in Soppexcca by its 
buyers was exceptionally high prior to and during the assessment period, buyers 
expressed concern about the durability of their relationship with Soppexcca, 
especially as related to the high concentration of responsibility in Soppexcca’s 
manager. As stated by one buyer, “What would happen if Fatima left? It would be 
hard to understand the change in our relationship with Soppexcca if she left.” She 
went on to add, “We want and need more people in Soppexcca that we can rely on.”  
 
Members’ involvement in Soppexcca’s governance  
In 2004, the Soppexcca Board of Directors met for the first time. To what extent has 
the board been able to make meaningful contributions to Soppexcca’s governance? 
Evidence during the assessment period indicates that the board faced major 
challenges in effective governance. The main reasons were insufficient skills and lack 
of information. One board member noted that she received no training in basic 
business or in cooperative management prior to assuming her post. She claimed that 
during her entire period on the board she had little understanding of how the farm-
gate price was calculated by Soppexcca or of the contract price for coffee between 
Soppexcca and its European and US buyers. What skills and knowledge she 
acquired while on the board were acquired through trial and error—a potentially 
effective yet costly approach to building human and social capital. A similar 
experience was reported by a former member of the Oversight Committee. 
Informants noted that the board and the Oversight Committee generally did not have 
access to timely financial information, largely because of the lack of information 
rather than inaccessibility of information.  
Interviews highlighted the board’s reluctance to question, debate, or probe 
Soppexcca’s management in strategic decisions and investments. For example, 
according to one source, there was no debate or request for additional information on 
the issue of Soppexcca’s investment in the dry-processing plant (see discussion 
below on physical capital). According to one former board member, “Any effort to 
discuss the decentralization of Soppexcca’s administration drew criticism from the 
other board members because it was perceived to show a lack of respect for Fatima.” 
Interviews with former board members also indicated that the board did not set the 
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agenda for its meetings; rather management set the agenda, with no up-front 
consultation.  
 
5.2.3 Changes in physical capital endowment 
Notable additions to Soppexcca’s physical capital took place during the assessment 
period. Soppexcca began the period with a warehouse that housed the administrative 
and technical staff and was where coffee was received and stored (fig. 5). Bilateral 
donors provided grants to construct the warehouse. By the end of the assessment 
period, Soppexcca had made the following additions to its endowment of physical 
capital: 
• Field offices: Eleven offices were constructed in 2008 with project funds. 
They provide an office and housing for Soppexcca extensionists and space 
for meetings, training, and the storage of parchment coffee prior to delivery 
to Soppexcca. The offices were not equipped with communication 
equipment, and in most cases were not connected to power or telephone 
grids.  
• Cupping lab: Soppexcca constructed a cupping lab in 2005 with financial 
assistance from an NGO and a US coffee buyer. In general, donor 
strategies considered cupping labs important as a tool for responding to the 
coffee crisis—they were thought to allow cooperatives greater ability to 
increase their bargaining power vis-à-vis buyers and to implement internal 
quality control procedures.  
• Cafés in Jinotega: In 2007, in an effort to add increased value to green 
coffee, Soppexcca constructed two cafés in Jinotega, one located within 
Soppexcca’s office and the other at the central plaza in Jinotega. Both sold 
prepared coffee drinks and roasted, packaged coffee and pastries. The 
cafés provided employment and skill-building opportunities for a small staff 
derived from Soppexcca’s membership population.  
• Fertilizer production facility: In 2008, the facility was constructed for the 
production of chicken-manure fertilizer. This plant aimed to reduce 
Soppexcca’s dependence on Biogreen and provide for an additional source 
of operating funds for Soppexcca. As of 2009, however, the plant had not 
begun to produce fertilizer due to the uncertainty surrounding the use of 
chicken mature as a nitrogen source for the production of organic coffee. 
• Dry-processing plant: Prior to 2009, Soppexcca used third-party services for 
dry processing of parchment coffee (necessary for the conversion of 
parchment coffee to green coffee). The mill was owned by another 
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organically certified coffee cooperative. However, over the years, various 
concerns emerged over the relationship with the processing mill, including: 
1) restricted access to facilities during the harvest season (when demand 
peaked) and 2) perceptions that the mill mixed coffees (thus diluting quality). 
In 2008, Soppexcca purchased its own plant at a cost of US$614,344, 
using. US$119,344 of its own funds. These funds were derived from 1) use 
of the social premium from the sale of fair trade coffee and the difference 
between the price Soppexcca received for coffee from its buyers and the 
price paid out to growers. A long-term loan from an US-based lending 
organization provided US$280,000 and NGOs donated the remaining 
US$215,000. In 2009, US$10,000 were invested by Soppexcca in 
upgrading facilities and equipment, thus allowing the plant to be become 
operational in 2009. Soppexcca estimates that future investments over the 
next five years will total US$288,500.33 In addition to addressing the 
negative perceptions of third-party processing, Soppexcca ownership of a 
dry-processing plant was expected to generate operating income: 
Soppexcca’s membership supplied only about 40% of the plant’s maximum 
capacity of 2,500 MT of parchment coffee per year. ,   
• Other equipment: Between 2003 and 2009 Soppexcca acquired additional 
equipment such as trucks, computers, and office equipment, mainly with 
grants from project funds.  
 
Grants from bilateral donors were essential for the building of Soppexcca’s 
physical capital. From the perspective of both donors, such investments were in line 
with their strategy for increasing the competitiveness of the Central America coffee 
sector in terms of improved quality and increased value added. For Soppexcca, these 
investments allowed it to increase the range of services that it offered to its members 
(and thus, its income generating potential). It is not possible to predict the extent to 
which members will ultimately benefit from investments in the dry-processing plant. 
This will depend on factors both internal to Soppexcca (e.g., ability to operative and 
improve mill) and external factors (e.g., future collaboration with civil society and 
external demand for processing services).    
 
                                               
33
 These expenses include: construction of a warehouse exclusively for organic coffee (US$120,000; 4-
mz drying patio (US$52,000); level drying patios (US$12,000); vehicle for internal coffee transport 
(US$25,000); construction of industrial area for roasting, milling, and packaging (US$30,000); fences for 
drying patios (US$25,000); cafeteria for workers (US$18,000); illumination of drying patios (US$6,000).  
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Fig. 5. Soppexcca warehouse and administrative office, Jinotega 
 
5.2.4 Changes in financial capital endowment  
To appreciate how far Soppexcca advanced in financial capital endowments over the 
assessment period, a brief reminder of its financial capital endowments at the start of 
the period is useful. In the late 1990s, Soppexcca emerged from the ashes of its 
predecessor organization US$722,991 in debt. At the start of the assessment period, 
Soppexcca still had roughly US$450,000 in outstanding debt. Moreover, it had little to 
offer its members in terms of short-term credit—critical for the purchase of fertilizer 
and for carrying out coffee tree maintenance. By 2008, however, Soppexcca had paid 
off its debt, expanded its short-term credit portfolio to approximately US$300,000, 
and provided long-term credit to its members—a service that few coffee cooperatives 
or other coffee buyers in Nicaragua were able to provide. This section discusses how 
these changes were possible and addresses the remaining major challenges faced 
by Soppexcca’s for further building its financial capital endowments.   
Two factors played a major role in Soppexcca’s ability to pay the inherited 
debt from Jiprocoop. First, sales of coffee increased significantly during the 2000s, on 
average, by 25% per year between 2001–2001 and 2007–2008 (table 5). Not only did 
sales increase but Soppexcca diversified its market outlets, making a significant 
inroad into the US market. The other contributing factor was the willingness of 
Soppexcca-affiliated household producers to accept reduced coffee prices during the 
period between 2000–2001 and 2007–08. Producers relinquished 50% of the 
premium obtained from their participation in certified fair-trade coffee markets during 
these years. For example, if the average New York price for coffee from Nicaragua 
was US$100, and the price obtained by Soppexcca from a certified coffee buyer was 
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US$130, US$15 dollars was applied to reduce the debt and US$15 remained with the 
producer. This arrangement required a major sacrifice on the part of producing 
households over numerous years, as well as a high level of commitment to 
Soppexcca by the debt-holding coffee buyers. In return for their contributions to debt 
reduction, Soppexcca-affiliated households received no additional services, other 
than the continued existence of Soppexcca.   
  
Table 5. Sales by Soppexcca (100-lbs green coffee), 2000–2001 to 2007–2008 
Production 
year 
Exports to 
EU buyers 
Exports to 
US buyers 
Total 
exports 
Sales in local 
market 
Total 
sales 
% 
increase 
2000–2001 3,750 0 3,750 130 3,880  
2001–2002 4,800 0 4,800 40 4,840 24.7 
2002–2003 5,560 760 6,320 60 6,380 31.8 
2003–2004 7,654 2,766 10,420 430 10,850 70.1 
2004–2005 11,920 2,074 13,994 148 14,142 30.3 
2005–2006 7,303 2,117 9,420 2,151 11,571 -18.2 
2006–2007 6,175 1,560 7,735 60 7,795 -32.6 
2007–2008 7,595 5,204 12,799 365 13,164 68.9 
Total  54,757 14,481 69,238 3,384 72,622  
 
Soppexcca’s income sources from services provided to members are a 
charge of US$2 per 100-lb sack of coffee exported and interest from short- and long-
term credit. Project funds provided restricted income for technical assistance and 
other activities. When fees and project funds were not available to cover costs, 
Soppexcca accessed funds from the sale of coffee to finance its operations. 
However, to the extent that it provided services that most private sector agents in 
Nicaragua were unable or willing to provide (technical assistance, long-term credit, 
social services), Soppexcca was placed at a disadvantage to other coffee buyers, 
which offered prices similar to those offered by Soppexcca without the additional 
costs. Usable information on Soppexcca’s financial status did not exist. However, 
with information Soppexcca provided on coffee sales and contract prices, as well as 
information provided by key informants on grower payments and export and 
processing expenses, it is possible to estimate income available to Soppexcca for 
covering the administration and office-related exports, capital investments, interest 
payments, and debt reduction. Table 6 shows that estimated income (after paying 
expenses to growers, export, and processing) totalled US$971,480 during the eight-
year period. This equates to an average of US$121,435/year. Given that so much of 
Soppexcca’s earning were channelled into repaying the debt, relatively little was 
available for covering salaries and capital investments. Key informants confirmed that 
much of Soppexcca’s administration costs were covered with project funds. Given the 
recent major investments in the dry-processing mill, it is unlikely that Soppexcca will 
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be able to operate without continued subsidies from NGOs and projects for the 
midterm.  
  
Table 6. Income and expenses from the sale of conventional and organically certified 
coffee by Soppexcca, 2000–2001 to 2007–2008 
 Total 
sales 
(100-lbs 
green 
coffee) 
Weighted 
average 
price for 
green 
coffee 
(US$) 
Total 
income 
(US$) 
Purchase of 
coffee from 
growers 
(US$) 
Export and 
processing 
expenses 
Income after 
grower, 
export and 
processing 
expenses 
Conventional 
2000–2001 1,800 83.12 149,613 111,600 20,664 17,349 
2001–2002 3,880 87.64 340,048 232,800 44,542 62,706 
2002–2003 5,076 72.46 367,792 314,712 58,272 -5,192 
2003–2004 10,024 112.29 1,125,578 651,560 115,076 358,942 
2004–2005 12,242 118.45 1,450,026 1,224,200 140,538 85,288 
2005–2006 9,594 133.19 1,277,760 1,160,840 110,136 6,784 
2006–2007 5,935 136.10 807,770 718,135 68,134 21,501 
2007–2008 10,155 159.46 1,619,340 1,320,150 116,579 182,611 
Total 58,706  7,137,927 5,733,997 673,941 729,989 
Organically certified 
2000–2001 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2001–2002 380 136.00 51,680 23,560 4,364 23,756 
2002–2003 1,304 137.09 178,764 80,848 14,972 82,944 
2003–2004 826 136.00 112,336 70,210 9,484 32,642 
2004–2005 1,900 145.60 276,640 235,600 21,814 19,226 
2005–2006 1,978 149.00 294,648 237,300 22,704 34,644 
2006–2007 1,860 144.66 269,060 232,500 21,355 15,205 
2007–2008 3,009 172.47 518,970 451,350 34,545 33,075 
Total 11,257  1,702,098 1,331,368 129,238 241,492 
Source: Author’s calculations, based on data provided by Soppexcca 
 
Capitalization of credit program 
Soppexcca’s offer of short-term credit secures its access to parchment coffee 
produced by its members. Given the overall lack of affordable credit for smallholder 
coffee producers, access to Soppexcca’s credit program provided powerful incentives 
for members to comply with the credit terms and to access the otherwise higher costs 
of doing business with Soppexcca (e.g., delayed final payment, higher quality 
requirements, lack of transport services). Between 2001–2002 and 2007–2008, 
Soppexcca achieved a major increase in the size of its short-term credit portfolio 
(table 7). Delinquency in payment was a major problem (see chapter 6 for 
discussion), largely due to 1) the use of credit for purposes other than the purchase 
of coffee production inputs and 2) weather, diseases, and other natural factors that 
resulted in major fluctuations in production from year to year. The increase in the 
credit portfolio was due to 1) the direct injection of funds by projects and donors for 
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short-term credit and 2) the transfer of funding from long-term credit to short-term 
credit upon repayment of long-term credit by members.  
 
Table 7. Short-term credit (US$) distributed by Soppexcca, 2001–2002 to 2007–2008 
 2001–
2002 
2002–
2003 
2003–
2004 
2004–
2005 
2005–
2006 
2006–
2007 
2007–
2008 
Total credit 
distributed 2,116 166,573 163,309 130,099 218,614 242,916 373,672 
Approximate 
membership  150 250 350 450 500 500 500 
Mean credit  14.1 666.3 466.6 289.1 437.2 485.8 747.3 
Source: Author’s calculations based on data provided by Soppexcca 
 
Long-term credit was especially critical for Soppexcca members because it 
allowed them to renovate their plantations (critical, in many cases, after years of 
neglect during the coffee crisis) and expand their coffee holdings. The ability of 
Soppexcca to offer long-term credit to its members appears to be rare among coffee 
cooperatives in Nicaragua. Among the four coffee cooperatives that were interviewed 
as key informants for this research, none reported the capacity to offer long-term 
credit to members. Soppexcca first offered long-term credit in 2002–2003. The total 
size of the long-term credit portfolio varied from year to year. In 2007–2008, 
US$83,303 was offered as long-term credit, with all of these derived from project 
funds. Soppexcca’s ability to access funds for long-term credit reflects its strong links 
with NGOs during the coffee crisis. Repayments of long-term loans were channelled 
into the short-term credit program rather than reused to provide long-term credit. This 
reflected the high risks related to long-term credit provision as well as the more 
urgent need to secure access to parchment coffee through the provision of short-term 
credit.  
 
5.3 Summary  
On the surface, Soppexcca appears to be an extraordinary success, but there are 
important gaps and weaknesses in asset building that limit its ability to deliver 
tangible benefits to its membership base and make it highly vulnerable to internal and 
external shocks in the future.  
Strong professional leadership, combined with a long-term commitment from 
buyers and NGOs to its development and the institutional framework provided by fair 
trade certification, played an important role in determining Soppexcca’s ability to face 
down multiple crises while building up its asset base. The overall context for coffee 
marketing, including the coffee crisis (and expansion of membership and interest by 
donors in coffee cooperative development) and the high demand for specialty coffee 
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from Central America, allowed Soppexcca to compete head-on with local coffee 
buyers while offering a range of services to its members. Major limitations of human 
capital included the limited capacities of Soppexcca to build an effective extension 
program. Soppexcca learned through trial and error, which was expensive for both 
Soppexcca and, in some cases, for its members. Identified gaps in social capital 
endowments included 1) limitations for effective member participation in governance 
and 2) limited progress in decentralization of management responsibilities and the 
related risks to long-term viability. Limitations to build effective internal leadership 
within the cooperative resulted in a high concentration of power and information in 
the professional manager, hence vulnerability of the organization and all the value 
chain relationships. Financial capital endowments, while larger than at the start of the 
assessment period, were still weak and made Soppexcca highly dependent on donor 
funds. The fact that technical assistance was 100% financed by projects was a major 
concern for Soppexcca.  
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6 Asset building by Soppexcca-affiliated households 
 
 
6.1 Introduction  
This chapter explores changes in asset endowments by Soppexcca-affiliated 
households during the five-year period between 2004–2005 and 2008–2009. The 
majority of the households sampled for this study joined Soppexcca during the early 
2000s, during the worst years of the coffee crisis. Thus, the 2004–2005 and 2008–
2009 assessment period follows a period of rapid growth in Soppexcca’s 
membership. It also coincides with a major increase in external support for 
Soppexcca’s infrastructure development and credit and technical assistance 
programs. Moreover, during this period prices for noncertified coffee increased 
significantly, as well as local competition among intermediaries for raw material. The 
next section examines variations in asset building from a macro perspective, looking 
at variations among the sample in terms of preexisting assets, changes in assets 
during the assessment period, basic elements of livelihood strategy, and production 
systems (organically certified versus conventional). Each of the next five sections 
explores in detail changes for the indicators identified in chapter 5 for a particular 
capital asset (natural, human, social, physical, and financial). The final section 
provides a brief summary of salient findings.   
 
6.2 A first look at asset building and potential mitigating factors  
This section presents a macro perspective of the major changes in asset 
endowments among the coffee-growing households during the assessment period 
along with analysis of the potential mitigating factors, such as preexisting assets and 
livelihood strategies, production system, and income flows. A cluster solution is 
presented that aims to capture the overall potential of the sampled households to 
build assets during the assessment period. This cluster solution is used throughout 
chapters 6 and 7.  
 
6.2.1 Macro trends in asset building  
This section provides an overview of variations in preexisting asset endowments 
among sampled households and changes in asset endowments over the five-year 
assessment period. The asset index included nine indicators, with at least one 
indicator for each of the five livelihood capitals. Table 8 shows descriptive statistics 
for the indicators for 2004–2005 and 2008–2009. With the exception of productivity in 
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coffee and double-headed households, the mean indicator values were higher in 
2008–2009 than in 2004–2005. The lower value for productivity in coffee reflected 
unfavourable weather conditions and related disease problems. The lower value for 
double-headed households reflects that membership had not expanded significantly 
since 2005, the average longer life expectancy for women in Nicaragua (67 for 
women versus 71 for men, according to WHO 2006), and either a deliberate effort by 
Soppexcca to include single women among its ranks and/or deliberate efforts by 
single women to join Soppexcca’s ranks.   
Table 9 displays the scoring coefficients for each of the indicators using the 
combined data from 2004–2005 and 2008–2009. The coefficients were derived from 
the first principal component provided by principal components analysis (PCA), and 
were used in the formulation of the asset index. Indices were computed by multiplying 
each indicator by the corresponding PCA coefficient and summing these values up 
(see chapter 4 for details). Among the higher scoring coefficients were total land 
area, major productive investments in production equipment, number of credit 
sources, and use of fertilizer. In terms of consumption, ownership of a car, 
motorcycle, or second home, all of which can imply dramatic changes in the quality of 
life for rural households, was also high. The indicator “improved flooring” scored the 
lowest coefficient.   
 
Table 8. Descriptive statistics for asset indicators, 2004 and 2009 (N=292) 
Productive assets Coefficient 2004–2005 2008–2009 
Ownership of a car, motorcycle, or second 
home (1=yes) 
Mean   0.02   0.17 
SD   0.14   0.38 
Improved flooring (cement or tile) (1=yes) Mean   0.38   0.42 
SD   0.49   0.49 
Total land area Mean   6.35   6.58 
SD 10.05   9.19 
Productivity in coffee (100-lb bags wet 
parchment/manzana) 
Mean 18.67 15.29 
SD 16.10 23.67 
Fertilizer usage (1=yes) (100 lb-bags 
complete fertilizer, urea, and /or Biogreen) 
Mean   0.44   0.75 
SD   0.50   0.43 
# alternative agricultural productive activities 
(addition to basic grains, bananas, and 
coffee) 
Mean   0.25   0.47 
SD   0.47   0.70 
# wet mill and other major production 
equipment/infrastructure owned 
Mean   0.28   1.16 
SD   0.64   1.36 
Double-headed household (1=yes) Mean   0.90   0.83 
SD   0.30   0.38 
# credit sources, both short- and long-term Mean   0.46   2.00 
SD   0.57   0.95 
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Table 9. Scoring coefficients for asset indices generated by PCA 
Productive asset Scoring coefficient* 
Ownership of a car, motorcycle, or second home .537 
Improved flooring (cement or tile) .185 
Productivity in coffee  .425 
Total land area  .634 
Fertilizer usage (1=yes) .526 
# alternative agricultural productive activities .389 
# wet mill and other major production equipment owned  .592 
Double headed household .388 
# credit sources, both short and long-term  .583 
* Scoring coefficient is the weight assigned to each variable (normalized by its mean and 
standard deviation) in the linear combination of the variables that constitute the first principal 
component. 
 
Asset indices for 2004–2005 and 2008–2009 ranged from a low of -5 to a high 
of 5. This range captures considerable variation among the sample in terms of overall 
well-being and resilience. For those households with the lowest asset index, 
malnutrition and other signs of biting poverty (e.g., inaccessibility to medicines, 
limited ability to carry out agricultural production) were detected during data collection 
(fig. 6). On the other hand, households with the highest asset index owned 
considerable land that was employed in agricultural production, reared livestock in 
addition to coffee production, and owned motorized vehicles and homes with cement 
floors.    
Table 10 displays the indices for 2004–2005 and changes in the indices over 
the course of five years. For classifying relative differences in asset endowments 
among the sampled households, households with an asset index between -5 and -2 
were classified as poor (n=68), while those with an index of 2 to 5 were classified are 
rich (n=40). Households with an asset index between -1.9 and 0 were classified as 
medium-low wealth (n=108), while those with an asset index between .1 and 1.9 
were classified as medium-high wealth (n=76). Among the households classified as 
poor in 2004, 28, or 42.1% of all the poor households, achieved major improvements 
(2+ increase in their index) in their asset indices, while 12 households, or 17.6% of all 
the poor households, made improvements (an income of 1 in their index). While 11 
households were worse off (16.2% of all poor households), no household initially 
classified as poor was much worse during the period. Most of the medium-low and 
medium-high households showed improvement or major improvement in their asset 
indices in 2009, as compared to 2004–2005. Approximately 25% of the households in 
these two groups experienced a decline in their asset index. Richer households were 
most likely to have experienced a decline in their asset index over the period, often 
due to the division of their productive lands among family members.  
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 In general, the asset index suggests that positive changes took place among 
a sizable segment of the sampled households. However, the extent to which an 
increase in the asset index led to improved well-being and resilience remains an 
open question. An asset index is too reductionist an approach to provide such 
insights. Only through a more detailed assessment on changes in assets can this 
issue be addressed. The remainder of these chapter focuses on this issue.    
 
 
Fig. 6. Children with observable signs of malnutrition belonging to an asset-poor 
household affiliated with La Union base cooperative, Jinotega 
 
Table 10. Change in households' asset index from 2004–-2005 to 2008–2009 
2004 asset 
index 
Major 
improvement* 
Improvement* Same Worse* Much 
worse** 
Total 
Poor households 
-5 to -3   3   0   7   0   0   10 
-2.9 to -2.0 25 12 10 11   0   58 
Medium-low wealth 
-1.9 to -1.0 19 12   7 11   0   49 
-0.9 to 0 17 18 12   4   8   59 
Medium-high wealth 
.1 to 0.9 15   6 15   5 10   51 
1 to 1.9   8   3   6   2   6   25 
Rich Households 
2.0 to 2.9   4   0   6   3   9   22 
3 to 5   0   0 10   4   4   18 
Total 91 51 73 40 37 292 
* An increase or decrease in the asset index of 1 between 2004 and 2009. 
** An increase or decrease in the asset index of 2 or more between 2004 and 2009. 
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6.2.2 Variation in asset endowments according to livelihood strategies  
A clustering technique was used to identify basic elements of livelihood strategies 
pursued by the sampled households. Using the SPSS cluster algorithm (see chapter 
4 for details), four cluster solutions were identified. However, two of the clusters were 
highly similar in nature; that is, they both included cases with relatively low 
dependence on off-farm income sources and a relatively large number of acres in 
coffee production. One of the clusters had 44 households and the other had nine 
households, with the major difference being that the land area of households in the 
nine-member cluster was significantly larger than that of the 44-member cluster. 
When both of these clusters were compared to the rest of the sample, their average 
land area was relatively large. Thus, a three-cluster solution was imposed, where the 
previous 44 and nine-member solutions were combined into a 53-member cluster. 
The following three clusters resulted from the analysis: 
• Cluster 1 (n=77, 26.4% of sample): High dependence of income derived 
from off-farm sources, with relatively small area under coffee production  
• Cluster 2 (n=162, 55.5% of sample): High dependence on farm-derived 
income and relatively small area under coffee production 
• Cluster 3 (n=53, 18.2% of sample): High dependence on farm-derived 
income and relatively large area under coffee production. 
   
Table 11 presents an analysis of variance (ANOVA) comparing selected 
indicators across the three clusters. The analysis allows for testing the validity of the 
clusters with respect to intergroup heterogeneity and intragroup homogeneity. In 
general, the cluster solution was found to be robust and was therefore used as the 
basis for subsequent analysis of intervention impacts and changes in capital assets. 
ANOVA results were generated for production-related indicators (area under coffee 
production, productivity) and various other indicators, including percent of total 
income derived from off-farm sources, single-headed household, age of household 
heads, and level of education achieved by the household heads.   
The defining feature of cluster 3 was the relatively large size of landholdings 
under coffee production. The mean area under coffee production for the entire 
sample was 2.52 mz, with a standard deviation of 2.62. The mean value for cluster 3 
was 6.36 mz. However, for most households, the area under production was 
considerably smaller. Clusters 1 and 2, which contain approximately 77% of the 
sampled households, each had an average production area of 1.67 mz. The 
difference between the means of the three clusters was statistically significant at the 
.05 level of confidence. In general, the variation within each cluster was small, with 
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the largest variation found in cluster 2 (1.30). The similarity in average area under 
coffee production between clusters 1 and 2 does not hold with respect to productivity 
of coffee. The average productivity for coffee—measured in pounds of wet-parchment 
coffee produced between 2004–2005 and 2008–2009--for households in cluster 2 
was 1,830 lbs/manzana/year, which was more than twice that of households in 
cluster 1 (884 lbs/manzana/year). The mean value for households in cluster 3 was 
2,655 lbs/manzana/year.34 The difference between the means of the three clusters 
was statistically significant at the .05 level of confidence.  
 
Table 11. ANOVA results comparing selected indicators within and across clusters 
 Cluster Mean Standard 
deviation 
95% confidence interval 
Lower limit Upper limit 
Area under coffee production 
(manzana) 2008–2009 
F (2, 290)=96.98, p<.05 
1 2.15 1.44 1.82   2.28 
2 2.57 1.54 2.33   2.81 
3 9.19 6.82 7.31 11.07 
Total 2.52 2.62 3.19   4.14 
Five-year average 
productivity, 2008–2009 to 
2004–2005 
(pounds/manzana of wet 
parchment coffee)  
F (2, 290)=22.71, p<..05 
1   884   773   708 1,059 
2 1,830 1,699 1,567 2,094 
3 2,655 1,642 2,203 3,108 
Total 1,730 1,609 1,545 1,916 
% total income derived from 
off farm sources 2008 
F (2, 290)=692.97, p<.05 
 
1 63.81 17.31 59.88 67.73 
2   5.90 9.82   4.37   7.42 
3   3.24 6.68 17.41 23.96 
Total 21.68 28.44 17.41 23.96 
Total household size 
F (2, 290)=2.56, p<.10 
1 5.66 2.21 4.53 5.54 
2 5.15 2.19 4.70 5.38 
3 6.00 2.23 5.16 6.39 
Total 5.17 2.21 4.92 5.43 
Age of household head 
registered with Soppexcca  
F (2, 290)=2.84, p<.10 
1 44.08 12.18 40.00 45.52 
2 42.02 13.30 40.56 44.69 
3 48.62 10.65 43.42 49.29 
Total 43.34 12.61 41.89 44.79 
Highest level of education for 
household member 
registered with Soppexcca 
F (2, 290)=0.34, p>.10 
1 3.61 3.76 2.58 4.28 
2 2.96 2.20 2.45 3.13 
3 3.25 2.48 2.35 3.71 
Total 3.18 2.74 2.69 3.32 
 
The defining feature of cluster 1 is the high percentage of total household 
income earned from off-farm sources. Roughly 64% of their estimated annual income 
was derived from off-farm sources. Among the motivating factors for pursuing off-
                                               
34
 Coffee production figures related to primary production are reported in the parchment state. To 
convert parchment coffee to green coffee—the export state of coffee—divide by 0.50.   
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farm income were low productivity and fluctuating coffee prices, limited access to 
credit, and adverse climatic effects. Formal employment opportunities were generally 
limited in rural Nicaragua, and most households found employment as seasonal 
agricultural labourers on coffee plantations. However, not all households that 
depended on off-farm income were considered asset-poor. In a few cases, a high 
dependence on off-farm income reflected the ability to generate income from salaried 
employment or from other business activities, such as small-business ownership. In 
general, however, most households in this cluster sought out seasonal, low-skill, off-
farm employment, usually in the coffee sector.  
Though households in cluster 2, which made up the majority of the sample, 
were considered to be households with sufficient assets to avoid having to seek off-
farm work, they were nonetheless struggling to sustain their livelihoods through on-
farm production, given their relatively small landholdings and low productivity. This 
hypothesis is supported by the fact that households in cluster 2 generally had a 
significantly higher asset index than those in cluster 1 (table 12) at the beginning and 
end of the assessment period.  
Household size and age of the household member affiliated with Soppexcca 
were used as proxies for labour input. A positive relationship was expected between 
household size and ability to carry out coffee production and build productive assets, 
ceteris paribus. Among the three clusters, the average household size varied from a 
high of 6 for cluster 3 to a low of 5.15 for cluster 2. Households in cluster 1 averaged 
5.66 persons. These results were statistically significant at the .10 level of 
confidence. The higher the average age of the registered household member, the 
larger the preexisting levels of asset endowments (up until a certain age, after which 
households may begin divesting their assets). Households in cluster 3 had the 
highest average age, at 48 (with a standard deviation of 12.61). Households in 
cluster 2 had the lowest average age, at 42 (with a standard deviation of 13.30). In 
the middle were households in cluster 1, with an average age of 42 (with a standard 
deviation of 12.18). The differences between the means for age were statistically 
significant at the .10 level of confidence. 
 
114 
 
Table 12. ANOVA results comparing 2004–2005 and 2008–2009 asset indices 
across clusters 
 
 
Cluster Mean Standard 
deviation 
95% confidence interval 
Lower limit Upper limit 
2004 asset 
index 
F (2, 
291)=67.29, 
p<.05 
1 2.96 1.25 2.68 3.24 
2 4.07 1.65 3.81 4.32 
3 6.13 1.56 5.70 6,56 
Total 4.15 1.86 3.94 4.36 
2009 asset 
index  
F (2, 
291)=59.02, 
p<.05 
1 3.27 1.74 2.88 3,67 
2 4.56 1.68 4.30 4.82 
3 6.57 1.70 6.10 7.04 
Total 4.59 2.01 4.35 4.82 
 
 
 The differences in the means for educational achievement by the Soppexcca 
registered household member were not statistically significant. However, the 
relatively high standard deviation for educational achievement for cluster 1 reflects 
the heterogeneity within the cluster as regards livelihoods strategies. Some 27% of 
the households in the cluster had no formal education, while approximately 90% of 
the households had less than 10 years of formal education. However, the remainder 
of the households had 10+ years of formal education. These households tend to work 
as professionals, such as teachers, skilled labour, and shopowners.  
 
6.2.3 Variation in asset endowments according to coffee production system  
An important focus of the interventions involving Soppexcca during the assessment 
period was the expansion of organically certified coffee production. Soppexcca 
offered various services to stimulate organic production, including preferential access 
to short- and long-term credit, subsidies for input purchases. However, the number of 
organically certified growers declined during the assessment period, Forty-one 
households identified themselves as having been organically certified but later having 
decided to return to conventional production practices. The majority of these 
households (59%) belonged to cluster 2, implying that they had relatively low asset 
endowments and depended on farm production for most of their income. The 
remaining 41% was split between households from clusters 1 and 3. Only three 
households were in transition to organic production in 2009.  
Seventy-one sampled households carried out organic coffee production in 
2008–2009. The distribution of organically certified households was roughly even 
across the clusters: 36% belonged to cluster 1, 20% to cluster 2, and 19% to cluster 
3. Table 13 displays descriptive statistics for selected indicators according to 
production system, as well as the results of t-tests for equality of means. These 
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statistics suggest that 1) organically certified households tended to have significantly 
lower levels of productivity in coffee and 2) were more likely to depend on off-farm 
sources of income to make ends meet. Interestingly, the difference in the means for 
the asset index was not statistically significant. This suggests that asset building by 
organic producers was not diminished by their overall lower level of income (due to 
markedly lower productivity and limited land area). In the sections that follow, the role 
of Soppexcca and others in facilitating asset building by organically certified 
households is given special consideration.    
 
Table 13. Descriptive statistics comparing conventional and organically certified 
households for 2008–2009  
 Producer type Mean Std. Deviation 
Five-year average productivity in coffee 
(100-lbs parchment)* 
Conventional** 
 19.55 17.34 
Organically certified  10.32   8.04 
Age of household member affiliated with 
Soppexcca 
Conventional  
 44.14 13.16 
Organically certified 
 47.14 11.20 
% income generated off-farm* Conventional 
   0.18   0.27 
Organically certified  
   0.28   0.31 
Highest level of education achieved by 
household member affiliated with 
Soppexcca 
Conventional 
 3.08   3.01 
Organically certified 
 3.49   3.79 
Total landholdings  Conventional 
 6.66   8.59 
Organically certified 
 7.10 10.90 
Total area under coffee production Conventional 
 2.54   2.70 
Organically certified  
 2.46   2.40 
Total number of household members Conventional 
 5.30   2.54 
Organically certified 
 5.87   2.71 
Asset index (higher the index, higher the 
asset endowment) 
Conventional 
 0.38   2.43 
Organically certified 
-0.50   2.18 
* Difference in means is statistically significant at the .05 level 
** Conventional=221; organically certified=71 
 
 
 
6.2.4 Variation in income by cluster and producer type 
In 2008, most households from clusters 1 and 2 did not earn enough gross income to 
rise above the World Bank’s income poverty line. Table 14 divides the income of the 
sample into deciles, taking into account producer type and cluster membership.35 
Using the $1 and $2 per capita per-day criteria for income poverty, and assuming an 
average household size of five, the corresponding cutoff points for identifying those 
households in extreme poverty and those in poverty were US$1,825 and US$3,650, 
                                               
35
 Income levels were estimated for the 2008 calendar year based on the five most important income 
sources as reported by sampled households. Income from on-farm productive activities was reported as 
gross income, as 1) the complexity of calculating production costs was not feasible during the household 
interview and 2) reliable secondary information on coffee production costs (which take into account 
differences in production modes and technologies among growers) are not available. In this sense, 
income estimates will overestimate (to varying degrees) the actual income available to Soppexcca 
members for consumption and savings. 
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respectively. Using these cutoff points, 185 of the sampled households were income 
poor in 2008, while 117 were extremely income poor. Among the income poor, for 
both organically certified and conventional producers, 98% of the households belong 
to clusters 1 and 2. The percentage of organic producers that can be considered 
income poor is roughly 66%. This is slightly larger than the percentage of 
conventional producers that can be considered income poor (58%).  
 
Table 14. Total gross income deciles during 2008 
Cluster 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
173–
715 
716–
1042 
1043–
1421 
1422–
1823 
1824–
2466 
2467–
3139 
3140–
4554 
4555–
7004 
7005–
11,519 
11,520–
69,446 
Conventional 
1   6   8   9   5   5   2   7   3   4   0 
2 14 12 12 17 16 19 12 15   7   5 
3    0   1   1   0   0   1   2   5 14 19 
Subtotal 20 21 22 22 21 22 21 23 25 24 
Organically certified 
1   3   2   3   5   7   2   2   1   3   0 
2   5   6   4   3   4   2   5   4   0   0 
3   1   0   0   0   0   0   2   1   1   5 
Subtotal   9   8   7   8 11   4   9   6   4   5 
           
Total 29 29 29 30 32 26 30 29 29 29 
 
 
Table 15 presents ANOVA results comparing annual income sources for 2008 
with cluster membership. Results indicated significant differences between the 
clusters for all income sources. Mean gross annual income for the sample was nearly 
US$5,000. However, the mean annual income for households in cluster 1 was nearly 
half that amount (US$2,617). Households in cluster 2 followed this closely 
(US$2,927). The mean annual income for households in cluster 3, at US$14,627, 
was roughly 4.5 times the mean income for households in clusters 1 and 2.  
In general, options for diversifying risks and spreading income generation over 
the year through on-farm production appeared to be limited across all clusters. For 
households in clusters 2 and 3, the vast majority of their 2008 income was derived 
from the sale of coffee (85% and 92%, respectively). While households in cluster 1 
derived less of their annual income from coffee (33%), the combination of coffee and 
off-farm employment generated 88% of 2008 income. Across the clusters, sales of 
bananas provided limited, albeit steady, income throughout the year. The production 
of basic grains (corn and beans) was more for home consumption, with only 
surpluses sold in local markets. The percentage of total income derived from basic 
117 
 
grain sales by households in clusters 2 and 3, at 4%, was twice as much for 
households in cluster 1.  
 
Table 15. ANOVA results comparing annual income sources (2008) with cluster 
membership 
Dependent 
variable, with 
ANOVA outcome 
Cluster Mean (US$) (SD in 
parentheses) 
Standard 
error 
95% confidence interval 
Lower limit Upper limit 
Total income 
F(2,292)=80.98, 
p<.05 
1 (n=77)  2,617.89 (±2,557.38)   291.44   2,037.44   3,198.34 
2 (n=162)  2,927.63 (±2,729.88)   214.47   2,504.07   3,351.18 
3 (n=53) 14,627.13 (±13,220.57) 1,815.98 10,983.09 18,271.17 
Total   4,969.49 (±7,604.97)   445.04   4,093.57   5,845.41 
Income from sale 
of coffee to 
Soppexcca 
F (2, 292)=50.73, 
p<.05 
1 (n=77)    676.30 (±1,033.05)   117.73     441.83     910.78 
2 (n=162)   1,590.67 (±1,827.73)   143.60   1,307.09   1,874.26 
3 (n=53)   7,211.93 (±8,578.70) 1,178.24   4,847.62   9,576.24 
Total    2,369.85 (±4,543.32)   265.88   1,846.56   2,893.14 
Income from sale 
of coffee to other 
buyers  
F(2, 292)=38.77, 
p<.05 
1 (n=77)   191.67 (±229.54)     26.05     139.80     243.55 
2 (n=162)     895.58 (±1,528.08)   120.06     658.49   1,132.67 
3 (n=53)   6,262.33 (±9,582.39) 1,316.24   3,621.10   8,903.57 
Total    1,684.06 (±4,740.90)   277.38   1,138.14   2,229.99 
Income from 
bananas 
F(2,292)=18.49, 
p<.05 
1 (n=77)    66.85 (±196.82)      22.43     22.17     111.52 
2 (n=162)   121.37 (±171.71)     13.49     94.73     148.01 
3 (n=53)     528.46 (±1,027.21)   142.45   242.48     814.44 
Total    179.69 (±489.06)      28.67   123.26     236.11 
Income from 
basic grains 
F(2, 292)=4.55, 
p<.05 
1 (n=77)     64.74 (±246.71)     28.12       8.74     120.73 
2 (n=162)    162.72 (±475.82)     37.38     88.90     236.55 
3 (n=53)    329.74 (±748.89)   102.87   123.32     536.16 
Total     167.20 (±498.97)     29.20   109.73     224.67 
Income from 
other agricultural 
sources 
F(2, 292)=3.97, 
p<.05 
1 (n=77)    25.88 (±78.74)       8.97       8.01       43.75 
2 (n=162)       99.73 (±381.26)   29.95     40.57     158.88 
3 (n=53)      233.87 (±705.12)   96.86     39.51     428.22 
Total       104.60 (±419.02)   24.52     56.34     152.86 
Income from off-
farm sources 
F(2, 292)=61.79, 
p<.05 
1 (n=77)      1,618.34 (±1,651.09) 188.16 1,243.58   1,993.09 
2 (n=162)      157.28 (±465.58)   36.58     85.05     229.52 
3 (n=53)      304.64 (±752.62) 103.38     97.19     512.09 
Total          569.31 (±1,153.94)   67.53   436.40     702.22 
 
 
6.2.5 Summary  
The following key points can be taken from this section: 
• The asset index showed that significant levels of asset building had 
occurred during the assessment period. Those households with the least 
assets at the beginning of the period were the least likely to have 
accumulated assets during the five-year assessment period.  
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• The cluster solution captured variation in key elements of livelihood 
strategies among the sampled households. The solution distinguished 
between those with highly limited land area and limited ability to dedicate 
human capital to on-farm production (cluster 1); those with limited land area 
but with greater capacity to dedicate human capital to on-farm production 
(cluster 2); and those with both land and human capital for on-farm 
production (cluster 3).   
• Producers of organic coffee tended to have lower coffee productivity and 
depend more on off-farm income. However, they were generally not more 
asset poor than conventional households.  
• Among households in clusters 1 and 2, various products in addition to 
coffee were sold in local and regional markets, but the contribution of total 
income from products other than coffee was small. 
 
6.3 Changes in natural capital endowment  
This section examines changes in natural capital based on the following indicators: 1) 
number of hectares under production; 2) land-use arrangements, 3) area under 
coffee production, 4) fertilizer use, 5) and production practices that impact natural 
capital beyond the household level.  
 
6.3.1 Changes in total land area 
Approximately 27% of the sampled households (n=80) increased their total 
landholdings between 2004–2005 and 2008–2009. This occurred despite the 
relatively high costs for land expansion and establishing coffee production.36 
However, the number of households expanding their area and the average size of the 
expansion differed markedly across the clusters. Households in cluster 3 had the 
highest percentage of households that increased their total landholdings (at 40.4%). 
This was followed by households in cluster 2 (26.5%) and cluster 1 (20.%) (table 16). 
Cluster 3 also had the highest number of households that had expended their 
holdings by more than 4 mz. In comparison, only five households in clusters 1 and 2 
combined were able to increase total area by more than 4 mz. Most households in 
cluster 2 expanded their holding between 1 mz and 2.9 mz, while most households in 
cluster 1 expanded their holdings by less than 1.9 mz.  
                                               
36
 The purchase of land for coffee production varies widely in Nicaragua, depending on whether or not 
the land already has existing coffee plants in production and the location. According to Soppexcca key 
informants, a manzana of land with coffee in good condition costs between US$4,000 and $5,000. A 
manzana of land with coffee production in less than prime condition ranges in cost between US$3,000 
and $3,500. A manzana of land without coffee in production varies from US$1,000 to $2,000.  
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Approximately 9% of the sampled households (n=26) reduced their 
landholdings during the assessment period. Among the various motivations for 
reductions of landholdings were passing land to offsprings, division of assets 
because of divorce, sale of low-productive land, exit from agricultural production, and 
sale of land to cover debt and medical expenses. Only among four households did 
reduced landholdings exceed 4 mz. In these cases, the reductions were due to the 
division of land for providing an inheritance to offspring.   
 
Table 16. Frequency distribution for change in landholdings, 2004–2005 to 2008–
2009 
Change in 
landholdings 
Change in # 
manzanas 
Cluster Total 
(n=292) 1 (n=77) 2 (n=162) 3 (n=52) 
Reduction  
4+   0     2   2     4 
3–3.9   0     1   0     1 
2–2.9   0     3   1     4 
1–1.9   3     6   1   10 
less than 1   2     5   0     7 
No change  56 102 28 186 
Increase  
less than 1   7     6   0   13 
1–1.9   3   14   5   22 
2–2.9   2   13   7   22 
3–3.9   1     4   1      6 
4+   3     6   8   17 
  
 
Between 2004–2005 and 2008–2009, the total area under agricultural 
production by the sampled households increased from 1,863 mz to 1,975 mz—an 
increase of 9.2% (table 17). Among the three clusters, the greatest percent of net 
change in landholdings was achieved by households in cluster 2, where area 
increased by 12.6%. (This took into account that 43 households increased their 
landholdings on average by 2.9 mz, while 17 households reduced their landholdings 
on average by 2.1 mz.) Households in cluster 1 also recorded a significant net 
increase in total landholdings—adding 24.25 mz during the five-year period (with an 
increase of 9.7%). Households in cluster 3 experienced the smallest percent of net 
change in landholdings (7.4%). On the other hand, they had the highest average 
increase in landholdings, with holdings increasing an average of 1.6 mz—nearly twice 
the average increase for the sample as a whole.      
Soppexcca provided various services that influenced the land acquisition and 
usage by its members. Chief among these was long-term credit. Soppexcca provided 
generous terms for long-term credit, which members repaid with the delivery of coffee 
over a three-year period, following a three-year grace period. Twenty-five sampled 
households received about US$70,000 in credit for the purchase of land between 
120 
 
2004–2005 and 2008–2009. Households identified no buyer of coffee other than 
Soppexcca as having provided long-term credit. For those households that increased 
their landholdings during the assessment period, the Pearson’s correlation coefficient 
suggests that the relationship between access to long-term credit and the purchase 
of land is positive and somewhat strong (r=.476, n=90, p<.05). However, correlation 
is not the same as attribution, and attribution here is especially difficult, given that, in 
many cases, various factors made possible the acquisition of new land in addition to 
credit. The following evidence from households illustrates this point. Households #60 
and #223 increased their holdings by 4.5 mz and 6 mz, respectively, through a 
combination of cash income from the sale of coffee and basic grains and credit. 
Household #131 obtained 4 mz from land reform and another manzana through cash 
purchase. Household #277 purchased 4 mz with income obtained from the sale of a 
truck and obtained one additional manzana from an inheritance. Finally, household 
#205 increased its area by 40 mz with cash income derived from the sale of inherited 
land. 
 
Table 17. Change in total landholdings, 2004–2005 to 2008–2009 
Cluster  Total area 2004–
2005 (SD) 
 
Total increase 
in area 
Total 
reduction in 
area 
Total area 
2008–2009 
% 
change 
1 (n=77)  Sum (mz)     249.00   28.00   3.75   273.25 9.74 
Mean   3.23 (±3.13) 0.36 0.05   3.54  
2 
(n=162)  
Sum (mz)     709.00 124.47 35.00   798.47 12.62 
Mean   4.38 (±4.36) 0.77 0.22   4.93  
3 (n=52)* Sum (mz) 873.75   83.5 19.00   938.25 7.38 
Mean 17.06 (±15.65) 1.58 0.37 17.04  
Total 
(n=291)* 
Sum (mz) 1,944.85 235.97 57.75 2,123.07 9.16 
Mean   6.68 (±9.10) 0.80 0.20   7.30  
* Excludes one case with reduction in total area of 65 manzanas (mz)  
 
6.3.2 Changes in area under coffee production  
Fifty-four percent of the sampled households achieved an increase in their area 
under coffee production between 2004–2005 and 2008–2009. In cluster 1, roughly 
38% of households increased their area under coffee production (table 18), 
compared to 57% in cluster 2 and 68% in cluster 3. Households in cluster 2 made up 
roughly 59% of the total number of households that expanded areas under coffee 
production. Cluster 1 was the only case where the majority of households did not 
increase their coffee-production area. This likely reflects their overall smaller land 
area and reduced access to credit from Soppexcca and other sources (see section 
on financial capital), among other factors.  
The 17 households that reduced their area under coffee production provided 
various explanations. The two most common reasons were inheritance to sons or 
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daughters and land exchange (whereby the new land had less, though perhaps more 
productive, coffee or coffee plantations closer to the home). Other causes were 
divorce (n=2), sale of land to cover debt (n=1), and unproductive coffee plantations, 
with replacement of coffee with basic grains or cocoa (n=3).  
 
Table 18. Frequency distribution of change in area under coffee production, 2004–
2005 to 2008–2009 
Change in area under 
coffee production 
Change in # 
manzanas 
Cluster Total 
(n=292) 1 (n=77) 2 (n=162) 1 (n=77) 
Reduction  
4+   0   0   1     1 
3–3.9   0   1   0     1 
2–2.9   0   3   2     5 
1–1.9   1   0   1     2 
less than 1   5   3   0     8 
No change 0 42 62 13 117 
Increase  
less than 1 14 36   1     51 
1–1.9   9 38 10   57 
2–2.9   2 12   8   22 
3–3.9   2   5   5   12 
4+   2   2 12   16 
 
 
The total area under coffee production by the sampled households increased 
from 827 mz to 1,066 mz between 2004–2005 and 2008–2009—an increase of 
nearly 30% (table 19). The highest percent change in area under coffee production 
was recorded by cluster 2 (23.7%); although, the percent change in area was only 
slightly smaller for clusters 1 and 3. Evidence also suggested that households 
intensified their production of coffee over the five-year period. Among households in 
cluster 1, the percentage of area dedicated to coffee production increased by 8%, 
from 52.6% to 60.6%. Among households in clusters 2 and 3, the coffee area 
expanded by 7.3% and 8.3%, respectively.  
Sampled households identified whether their expansion of coffee area 
resulted from the purchase of new land, land clearance, and/or the conversion of 
other production systems to coffee. They reported approximately 151 mz of coffee 
production that was expanded on previously existing land, thus requiring changes in 
land use (elimination of annual crops, reduction of forest cover, or bringing idle land 
into production). The most common crop reduced was basic grains. Roughly 50% (or 
75 mz) of expanded coffee production was achieved through reduced basic grain 
production. Another 35% (or 53.3 mz) of expanded coffee production was achieved 
through the cultivation of previously idle land. The reduction of forest cover attributed 
to only 7% (or 10.5 mz) of the expansion in coffee. The remaining 7% of expanded 
coffee production came at the expense of pasture (8.75 mz) and horticulture (3 mz).   
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Table 19. Change in area under coffee production, 2004–2005 to 2008–2009 
Cluster Total area 
under 
coffee 
2004–2005 
Mean area 
under 
coffee 
2004–
2005 (SD) 
% total 
area under 
coffee 
2004–2005 
Total 
area 
under 
coffee 
2008–
2009 
Mean area 
under 
coffee 
2008–2009 
(SD) 
% of total 
area under 
coffee 
2008–2009 
% change 
in area 
under 
coffee 
2004–2005 
to 2008–
2009 
1 (n=77) 131.00 1. 73 
(±1.32) 
52.61   165.50 2.15 (1.44) 60.57 26.34 
2 (n=162) 316.00 1.95 
(±1.41) 
44.57   414.00 2.57 (1.54) 51.85 31.01 
3 (n=53) 381.00 7.18 
(±8.21) 
43.61   487.25 9.19 (6.82) 51.93 27.89 
Total 
(n=292) 
827.00 2.83 
(±4.22) 
47.72 1,066.75 3.67 (4.13) 50.25 28.99 
 
Logistic regression showed the effects of credit, off-farm income, and 
preexisting land size on the expansion of area under coffee production. The strongest 
predictor of increased area under coffee was access to long-term credit. For each 
US$500 instalment of credit obtained, households increased their odds of expanding 
area under coffee production by 1.5 times (table 20). On the other hand, the larger 
the preexisting landholding, the less likely a household was to have expanded their 
area under coffee production. This reflected the fact that households with relatively 
large landholdings were less likely to desire growth in scale compared to households 
with smaller areas. For households in clusters 1 and 2, growth in the area under 
coffee production during the assessment period was likely an attempt to recuperate 
area previously under coffee that was lost during the coffee crisis (due either to 
neglect or removal for the planting of basic grains).In general, the higher the 
dependence on off-farm labour for total income generation, the less likely the odds of 
having expanded the area under coffee production. This reflected these households’ 
higher degree of vulnerability and the related constraints on expanding production for 
the market.    
 
Table 20. Multiple logistic regression showing effects of credit, off-farm income 
generation and preexisting land ownership on coffee expansion  
(N=292)* B S.E. Sig. Odds ratio 
Preexisting land holding (2004–2005)  -.065 .025 .010   .937 
Percentage income generated off-farm  -1.230 .525 .019   .292 
Age of Soppexcca member -.028 .013 .030   .972 
Total credit received between 2004–2005 
and 2008–2009 (US$500 units) 
1.589 .282 .000 4.897 
N household members  -.038 .065 .561   .963 
Constant 1.532 .572 .007 4.627 
* The model as a whole correctly classified 77.2% of all cases.   
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6.3.3 Changes in fertilizer usage  
The ability of farming households to make the best possible use of their land 
depends, in part, on their timely access to quality fertilizers. In this context, fertilizer 
usage and its related impacts of soil fertility are important. Maintaining high yields 
over time requires a positive soil nutrient balance in the coffee plantation.37 Without 
fertilization, this nutrient balance is negative—unless yields are extremely low—and 
sustained coffee production requires regular application of organic or inorganic 
fertilizers. See annex 2 for details on coffee nutrient requirements and related 
fertilizer options in Nicaragua. This remainder of this section describes changes in 
fertilizer use by organically certified and conventional households.   
 
Fertilization for organic coffee production 
In the 2008–2009, about 37% of the organically certified households reported using 
compost on their coffee plantations and all reported using dried coffee pulp38 (table 
21). The use of dried coffee pulp requires relatively little investments in labour or 
transport. However, the labour- and transport-related costs of fertilization with 
compost can be high given the large amount of compost needed and the scarcity of 
key ingredients, such as cow or chicken manure.39 Among sampled Soppexcca 
members that were organically certified in 2009, 25% in cluster 1 reported having 
produced compost in the 2008–2009 production year. The percentage of use was 
higher among organic certified households in clusters 2 and 3 (42.4% and 50%, 
respectively). The reduced use of compost by households in cluster 1 reflects the 
relatively high labour costs for the production of compost (including opportunity costs) 
and the limited ability of these households to cover the related costs. Interviews with 
households and Soppexcca revealed that the nutritional context of the compost 
fertilizer was low, due to 1) lack of access to cattle manure and 2) lack of basic tools 
(e.g., thermometer for measuring internal temperature of the compost pile) and skills 
for production of compost.  
                                               
37
 The soil nutrient balance is determined by the nutrients coming from fertilizers, the atmosphere, and 
shade trees (litter and mycorrhiza fungi) and nutrients leaving the plantation through the production of 
coffee berries and the leaching of nutrients into the atmosphere and waterways. 
38
 It was not possible to obtain reliable estimates from households on how much compost was produced 
and applied to their coffee plantation since 1) the units for compost vary by household and the quality of 
the compost applied (in terms of nutrient content) varies according to the inputs used and the production 
methods applied. 
39
 Labour involved the collection of organic materials, transportation, preparation, and application on the 
farm. The first few hundred pounds of organic material can be obtained with relatively little effort since 
coffee pulp, bean stems, and cattle manure can be sourced nearby. However, access to subsequent 
tons may be prohibitive due to the costs related to transportation in mountainous areas with poor road 
conditions. The production of several tons of compost requires infrastructure for storage, as well as 
equipment for measuring the temperature and nutritional content. During one interview, a formally 
certified organic producer recalled having stored mounds of compost inside this home (for lack of an on-
site storage facility) for months at a time, enduring the smell and the heat generated by the compost. 
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Table 21. Use of compost and dried coffee pulp for coffee fertilization, 2008–2009 
 # of households 
using compost  
% # of households 
applying dried 
coffee pulp 
% 
Cluster 1 (n=77) 
  Conventional    2   4.1 25   51.0 
  Organic   7 25.0 28 100.0 
Cluster 2 (n=162) 
  Conventional    8   6.3 79   61.7 
  Organic 14 42.4 33 100.0 
Cluster 3 (n=53) 
  Conventional    2   4.7 26   60.5 
  Organic   5 50.0 10 100.0 
 
 
For many organically certified households, the most important source of 
externally sourced nutrients was processed chicken manure sold under the 
trademark Biogreen.40 During the three-year period between 2006–2007 and 2008–
2009, among households that reported using Biogreen, the mean number of bags of 
Biogreen applied per year was approximately 27 for households in cluster 1, 31 for 
households in cluster 2 and 40 for households in cluster 3. In 2006–2007, Soppexcca 
provided Biogreen at no cost (with project funds) in an effort to increase yields of 
households already certified. This explains in large part the reason behind the 
markedly higher usage in Biogreen in 2006–2007 by households in cluster 1 (table 
22). Many of these households stopped using Biogreen when the subsidies ran out. 
Over the next two years, Soppexcca provided Biogreen at a cost of US$7.03/100-lb 
sack (including delivery).  
Table 23 highlights the overall lack of nitrogen for coffee production faced by 
most organically certified households, despite the introduction of Biogreen. During 
the 2008–2009 production year, the average nitrogen balance on certified organic 
coffee plantations was negative across all three clusters. The nitrogen balance was 
worst for households in cluster 3 (-81.99 kg), followed by those in cluster 1 (-57.66 
                                               
40
 In 2006–2007, Soppexcca introduced Biogreen to its organically certified members. Since then, it has 
been shown to be the best option for supplying nitrogen for organic coffee production According to key 
interviews with Soppexcca staff, previous efforts at supplying nutrients through the production of 
compost and dried coffee pulp were unsuccessful. The use of Biogreen is controversial because the 
chicken manure used for Biogreen production is sourced from the largest factory farm in Nicaragua. The 
only organic certifying agency in Nicaragua that permitted the use of Biogreen was Biolatina. In 2009, 
however, Biolatina threatened to cut Biogreen from its list of approved organic inputs. According to the 
Nicaraguan representative of Biolatina, Jaime Picado, the change in policy responded to perceived 
changes in the flexibility of the interpretation of the EU organic regulations concerning chicken-based 
manure fertilizer. He also stated that Biogreen did not comply with regulations because it was produced 
from chickens that were produced in an intensive way. He advised that organic producers should pursue 
“sustainable” options for fertilization, based on inputs obtained on farm. Follow-up interviews with 
Soppexcca in late 2009 revealed that Biolatina had not yet formally change their regulation, and thus 
Biogreen and other chicken-manure based fertilizers continued to be in use by organically certified 
households.   
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kg) and those in cluster 2 (-39.01). However, without access to Biogreen, the average 
nitrogen balance would have been significantly worse, at -53 kg for households in 
cluster 1, -51 kg for households in cluster 2, and -155 kg for households in cluster 3.  
 
Table 22. Reported Biogreen usage, 2006–2007 to 2008–2009 
Coffee 
production 
year 
N households 
using at least one 
bag of Biogreen 
% sampled 
households using 
at least one bag of 
Biogreen 
Total bags 
used 
Average # bags 
used (SD) 
Cluster 1 (23 organic) 
2006–2007 11 45.8 291.0 26.5 (±15.7) 
2007-2008   4 16.7 131.2 32.8 (±45.1) 
2008–2009   4 16.7 100.8 25.2 (±20.2) 
Cluster 2 (27 organic) 
2006–2007 14 51.9 506.9 36.2 (±31.9) 
2007–2008 14 51.9 428.5 30.6 (±22.3) 
2008–2009 13 48.2 359.2 27.6 (±21.6) 
Cluster 3 (8 organic) 
2006-2007   7 77.8 430.0 61.42 (±98.2) 
2007–2008   5 55.6 118.4 23.67 (±19.5) 
2008–2009   4 44.4 150.4 37.60 (±16.3) 
 
Table 23. Nitrogen balance in organically certified coffee, 2006–2007 to 2008–2009 
Coffee 
production 
year 
Average area in 
coffee 
(manzana) 
Average 
minimum 
amount (kg) of N 
required * 
Average total N 
supplied with 
Biogreen **(kg) 
Estimated N 
shortfall or 
overage (kg) 
Cluster 1 (n=23) (standard deviation in parenthesis) 
2006–2007 2.2 (±1.6)   71.28   26.8 (±36.3) -44.49 
2007–2008 2.2 (±1.6)   71.28   13.9 (±42.3) -57.35 
2008–2009 2.0 (±1.3)   66.00     8.3 (±23.2) -57.66 
Cluster 2 (n=27) 
2006–2007 1.9 (±.7)   62.04   36.1 (±56.6) -25.96 
2007–2008 1.9 (±.7)   62.70   36.7 (±52.9) -26.02 
2008–2009 1.9 (±.7)   62.70 23.69 (±30.4) -39.01 
Cluster 3 (n=8)  
2006–2007 6.0 (±3.6) 198.99 650.1 (±692.9) 451.15 
2007–2008 5.8 (±2.5) 190.74   93.6 (±118.6) -97.11 
2008–2009 5.8 (±2.5) 190.74 108.8 (±136.4) -81.99 
All households (n=58)  
2006–2007 2.5 (±2.0) 83.82     30.5 (±172.9) -53.34 
2007–2008 2.6 (±2.0) 84.15   35.5 (±66.2) -48.66 
2008–2009 2.5 (±1.9) 82.50   30.2 (±64.5) -52.30 
* The product of the average number of manzanas under coffee production during the three-
year period and the estimated amount of nitrogen required to keep coffee yields at a 
reasonable level and to maintain soil fertility, in addition to recycling coffee pulp and using 
nitrogen-fixing shade trees (33 kg/manzana). Calculation assumes that households use dried 
coffee pulp for fertilization. A reasonable level of productivity is considered the national 
average for coffee production (562 kg/manzana green coffee, or 1,124 kg wet parchment 
coffee), as reported by Flores et al. 2002. See Valkila (2009) for discussion of nutritional 
requirements for organic coffee production. 
** Based of reported number of sacks of Biogreen applied in a given year. Biogreen provides 
1 kg of N per 45 kg sack.  
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Fertilization for conventional coffee production  
For households that produced conventional coffee, the use of synthetic fertilizer 
represented a major financial investment in natural capital.41 This is especially true of 
the 2008–2009 production year when the cost of fertilizer reached record high 
prices.42 Data on fertilizer use was collected from 152 producers between 2006–2007 
and 2008–2009. Seventy-two of the households (47.4%) reported no fertilizer use 
during the period. These households applied organic fertilizers (e.g., dried coffee 
pulp), and generally had ultralow productivity (table 24). Among households in cluster 
1, approximately 42% applied at least one 100-lb. bag of complete fertilizer in 2008–
2009, while 18% applied at least one bag of urea. The average application was 614 
lbs/household of complete fertilizer and 465 lbs of urea. The number of households in 
cluster 1 that applied synthetic fertilizer and urea is significantly higher in 2008–2009 
than for the previous two years.  
 
Table 24. Reported synthetic fertilizer usage, 2006–2007 to 2008–2009 
Fertilizer 
used 
Coffee 
production 
year 
N households 
using at least 
one bag of 
fertilizer 
% sampled 
households 
using at least 
one bag of 
fertilizer 
Total 
bags used 
Average # bags used 
(standard deviation in 
parenthesis) 
Cluster 1 (n=33 conventional producers) 
Complete 
fertilizer  
2006–2007   7 21.2   48.0 6.9 (±3.0) 
2007–2008   9 27.3   55.6 6.2 (±3.3) 
2008–2009 14 42.4   86.0 6.1 (±3.5) 
Urea 2006–2007   2   6.1   10.2 5.1 (±4.1) 
2007–2008   3   9.1   19.7 6.6 (±4.3) 
2008–2009   6 18.2   28.0 4.7 (±3.0) 
Cluster 2 (n=92 conventional producers) 
Complete 
fertilizer 
2006–2007 49 53.3 225.5 4.6 (±3.1) 
2007–2008 61 66.3 306.7 5.0 (±3.3) 
2008–2009 69 75.0 403.9 5.9 (±5.2) 
Urea 2006–2007 17 18.5   68.8 4.0 (±1.7) 
2007–2008 20 21.7   69.8 3.5 (±1.6) 
2008–2009 22 23.9 121.5 5.5 (±6.1) 
Cluster 3 (n=27 conventional producers) 
Complete 
fertilizer 
2006–2007 25 93.6 102.0 4.1 (±3.0) 
2007–2008 26 96.3 103.7 4.0 (±3.0) 
2008–2009 23 85.2   94.1 4.1 (±3.2) 
Urea 2006–2007   9 33.3   42.1 4.7 (±2.2) 
2007–2008   8 29.6   30.8 3.9 (±2.6) 
2008–2009 11 40.7   42.4 3.9 (±2.5) 
                                               
41
 For growers of Arabica coffee in southern Brazil, the share of fertilizers in total production costs varies 
between 16.2% and 23.2% (ICO 2009). In Colombia, fertilizers accounted for 23.7% of production costs 
in 2008, while in Costa Rica, fertilizers accounted for 12.3% of production costs in 2007–2008 (idid). 
42
 In the 2008–2009 coffee production year, the cost of inorganic fertilizer reached record high prices. 
The annual average price of urea in the world market went up from US$309/ton in 2007 to US$517/ton 
in 2008. Prices reached US$770/ton in August 2008, before falling steadily during the remainder of the 
2008 (ICO 2009). The high fertilizer prices in 2008 and 2009 pushed up production costs by as much as 
30% in Central America and resulted in reduced nitrogen supplies and slower crop development 
(Ganes-Chase 2009). 
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The marked increase in fertilizer use 2008–2009 coincides with Soppexcca’s 
efforts to link fertilizer purchases to short-term credit. Beginning in the 2007–2008 
production year, inorganic fertilizer was sold by Soppexcca to its members at a cost 
of approximately US$43 per 100-lb sack.43 Prior to that year, Soppexcca members 
purchased inorganic fertilizer on their own accord from agricultural input suppliers or 
from local coffee buyers. According to key informants in Soppexcca, the decision of 
Soppexcca to facilitate the purchase of fertilizer for its members was to 1) increase 
the amount of the annual credit for production that was actually spent on coffee 
production (rather than on basic household consumption) and 2) reduce the costs of 
inorganic fertilizer purchases.  
Table 25 highlights differences in fertilizer usage for conventional coffee 
production among the clusters. Between 2006–2007 and 2008–2009, the average 
nitrogen balance for households in cluster 1 was -15.41 kg. Households in cluster 2 
fared better at 23.70 kg, while those in cluster 3 achieved 122.83 kg. Limited use of 
fertilizers partially explained why the average productivity in coffee for households in 
cluster 1 (401.82 kg/manzana) fell far below the national average productivity (1,124 
kg/manzana). Despite the tendency of households in cluster 2 to use the 
recommended amount of nitrogen in their plantations, average productivity in coffee 
for these households (831.82 kg/manzana) did not meet the national average, 
suggesting that factors other than fertilizer use limited their productivity (e.g., 
production techniques, pest and disease management). Households in cluster 3, with 
an average productivity of 1,206 kg/manzana), on average, had a surplus of nitrogen 
usage and met the national average productivity.  
 
6.3.4 Change in herbicide usage  
Agrochemical abuse can lead to erosion of natural capital through reduced 
biodiversity and sustainability. In general, evidence suggests that smallholders may 
overuse herbicides as a result of bad advice, social pressure, and efforts to reduce 
production related risks.44 The two most commonly identified herbicides used in 
                                               
43 The following types of inorganic fertilizers were sold by Soppexcca to its members during the 2008–
2009 coffee production year: 18-1-17 for US$29.80, 21-30-01 for US$57.65, and 20-20-0 for US$44.10. 
Beginning in 2009–2010, only 25-5-12 was sold at a cost of US$24.50. The offer of only one fertilizer 
allowed for faster delivery by the fertilizer wholesaler.  
44
 It is commonly asserted that smallholders may rely on smaller quantities of chemical inputs, which 
function as a substitute for manual control practices. However, this may not always be the case. In 
Costa Rica, Bellamy (2010) shows that smallholders may apply as much, if not more, herbicide for 
coffee production—while at the same time, investing significantly higher amounts of household labour 
used in the manual control of weeds—than their larger-scale counterparts. Among the factors that she 
attributes to this finding are: risk-averse behaviour regarding the use of herbicides (small-scale 
producers have fewer resource available to them as a safety net during years when profits are lower 
than expected), influence of chemical input providers on production technologies (and related lack of 
technical assistance by government-based organizations and NGOs), and social pressure (the idea that 
legitimate producers are those with “clean” coffee plantations). 
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coffee production by Soppexcca members were paraquat and glyphosate.45 The 
sampled households reported generally low use of herbicide; usage in 2008-2009 
averaged 1.5 herbicide applications during the production year, with an average 
application of 1.24 litres of herbicide. Average usage per year is 1.86 
litres/manzana/year. This usage is very low in comparison with other studies from 
Central America. One recent study by Bellamy (2010), estimated an average 
application of 4.78 litres/manzana/year (6.47 litres/hectare/year) for small-scale 
coffee producers in Costa Rica. Interviews with households reported that few applied 
the recommended number of applications. Rather, they tended to apply herbicide 
once during the year (during the wet season), and carry out manual removal of 
weeds during the rest of the year.  
 
Table 25. Nitrogen balance in conventional coffee, 2006–2007 to 2008–2009 
Cluster  Mean area in 
coffee 
(manzana) 
Mean minimum 
amount (kg) of N 
required * 
Mean total N 
supplied with 
compete fertilizer 
**(kg) 
Mean N 
shortfall or 
overage (kg) 
1 (n=32)   1.3 (±1.1) 45.55     30.13 (±45.52) -15.41 
2 (n=95) 1.5 (±0.8) 51.29     74.99 (±97.64)   23.70 
3 (n=26)  6.2 (±3.7) 196.78 319.60 (±262.35) 122.82 
All households 
(n=153)  
2.3 (±2.5) 75.61 108.56 (±166.79)   32.95 
* The product of the average number of manzanas under coffee production during the three-
year period and the estimated amount of nitrogen required to keep coffee yields at a 
reasonable level and to maintain soil fertility, in addition to recycling coffee pulp and using 
nitrogen-fixing shade trees (33 kg/manzana) Calculation assumes that households use dried 
coffee pulp for fertilization. A reasonable level of productivity is considered the national 
average for coffee production (562 kg/manzana green coffee, or 1,124 kg wet parchment 
coffee), as reported by Flores et al. (2002). See Valkila (2009) for nutritional requirements for 
organic coffee production. 
** Based of reported number of sacks of fertilizer applied in a given year. It is assumed that 
complete fertilizer is 25-5-12 used, which provides 6.75 kg per 45-kg sack. 
 
                                               
45
 Paraquat (also referred to by its trade name Gramoxone) acts as a nonselective that destroys the 
green tissue of the plant by drying the leaves. Its use has been banned in 13 countries, including: 
Sweden, Denmark, Austria, and Finland (Binham 2003). Its use in the United States is restricted 
because of its high toxicity, high epidermal absorption, and longer persistence in the environment (EPA 
1997, cited in Bellamy 2010). In Germany, the product is restricted to use on fields crops only once 
every four years (Madeley 2001). Paraquat is less expensive than glyphosate and readily available in 
Nicaragua. Although glyphosate (also referred to by its commercial name Round-up) is more expensive 
than paraquat, producers may prefer its use it because it completely kills the weeds. In the agricultural 
environment, glyphosate can be toxic to beneficial soil organisms and beneficial arthropod predators 
(Buffin and Jewell 2001). Glyphosate is of concern for environmental reasons, in particular for its effects 
on the aquatic environment. It is moderately toxic to fish. The use of glyphosate may result in significant 
population losses of a number of terrestrial species through habitat and food supply destruction and thus 
threaten endangered species and biodiversity. It also affects beneficial insects and earthworms. 
Nitrogen fixation may be reduced, lowering soil fertility. It can increase the susceptibility of some 
nontarget plants to fungal diseases and interferes with other metabolic processes such as ion and lignin 
production. Glyphosate can be persistent for more than three years in soils, depending on soil type and 
climate and has been found in surface water and groundwater. 
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6.3.5 Change in wastewater disposal methods  
Coffee wetmilling—the process of removing the pulp from the coffee cherry and the 
mucilage from the coffee bean through fermentation—is a major source of water 
contamination in coffee-growing areas in Central America.46 Traditionally, producers 
in Nicaragua wet milled along the banks of a river. This eliminated the need for water 
pumps and other wet-milling infrastructure. In this context, improvements in water 
quality can be obtained when smallholders refrain from discharging contaminated 
water (from fermentation) and coffee pulp directly into an aboveground water source.  
Sampled households reported their disposal method for wastewater and 
coffee pulp for two periods: 2008–2009 and the year prior to their joining Soppexcca. 
Among the producers of conventional coffee, 57.5% of those in cluster 1 (n=26), 
73.9% of those in cluster 2 (n=82), and 69.8% (n=30) of those in cluster 3 reported 
having adopted more environmentally friendly techniques for dealing with wastewater 
(table 26). On the other hand, 35% of sampled conventional households in cluster 1 
(n=14), 26.1% of those in cluster 2 (n=29), and 16.3% of those in cluster 3 (n=7) 
discharge wastewater directly into the stream—the same as they did prior to joining 
Soppexcca. The low adoption of more environmentally friendly wastewater disposal 
methods by producers of conventional coffee from cluster 1 reflected constraints on 
time (due to need to work off-farm) and limited human capital (many from cluster 1 
are single-headed households—see human capital discussion below). The majority of 
the sampled organically certified producing households (across the three clusters) 
reported having adopted more environmentally friendly methods for dealing with 
wastewater since their affiliation with Soppexcca.  
Households identified the factors that influenced their adaptation of 
environmentally friendly methods for wastewater disposal. Approximately 66% of the 
sampled households identified technical assistance and training provided by 
Soppexcca as the major factor. Several households (about 31%) responded that the 
changes were due to their own initiative, for example, by observing changes carried 
out by neighbouring households. A small percentage (about 3%) identified technical 
assistance from NGOs and other coffee buyers as important in their decision to 
upgrade.  
 
                                               
46
 Water used in the milling process is highly contaminated, containing sugar from the pulp and residuals 
from the fermentation, and can be harmful to surrounding water bodies, human health, and aquatic life if 
discharged directly into surface waters. Based on a chemical analysis of the wastewater generated from 
a coffee-processing plant, Haddis and Devi (2008) found that wastewater contained organic load, 
nutrients and suspended matter. They found that the people residing near a large-scale wet-processing 
plant who used stream water containing pulping water for domestic purposes suffered from severe 
health problems: 84% of the total surveyed population suffered a spinning sensation, 32% had eye 
irritation, 85% reported skin irritation, 42% had stomach pain, and 25% suffered from nausea.  
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Table 26. Changes in methods used for the wastewater disposal 
Cluster Disposal methods reported by 
sampled households during 
the production year prior to 
joining Soppexcca 
Disposal methods reported by sampled 
households in 2008–2009 
Disposal in 
lagoon or pit 
Application as 
fertilizer 
Discharge into 
water bodies 
Conventional 
1 (n=40) Disposal in lagoon or pit 
 2 0  0 
Application as fertilizer 
 1 0  0 
Discharge into water bodies 23 0 14 
Total 26 0 14 
2 (n=111) Disposal in lagoon or pit 12 0  0 
Application as fertilizer 
 1 0  0 
Discharge into water bodies 69 0 29 
Total 82 0 29 
3 (n=43) Disposal in lagoon or pit 
 5 0  0 
Application as fertilizer 
 0 0  0 
Discharge into water bodies 30 1  7 
Total 35 1  7 
Organically certified  
1 (n=26) Disposal in lagoon or pit  2 0  0 
Application as fertilizer 
 0 0  0 
Discharge into water bodies 24 0  0 
Total 26 0  0 
2 (n=30) Disposal in lagoon or pit  5 0  0 
Application as fertilizer 
 1 0  0 
Discharge into water bodies 24 0  0 
Total 30 0  0 
3 (n=10) Disposal in lagoon or pit  2 0  0 
Application as fertilizer 
 0 0  0 
Discharge into water bodies 
 8 0  0 
Total 10 0  0 
 
 
6.3.6 Insecure land tenure and its effects on natural capital  
Given the expenses required to maintain and expand natural capital (e.g., purchase 
of fertilizer, purchase of land, renovation of coffee), such investments are likely only 
when land tenure is reasonably secure. Two base cooperatives affiliated with 
Soppexcca, El Esfuerzo and Julio Hernandez, emerged out of the collectivization of 
agriculture that occurred during the Sandinista government of the 1980s. These base 
cooperatives experienced relatively small changes in their area under coffee 
production (fig. 7) during the assessment period. Highly insecure land tenure was the 
primary reason for such limited expansion (discussed below). 
 
Struggle for land tenure: case of El Esfuerzo 
The history of coffee production by members of El Esfuerzo and Julio Hernandez 
make clear the struggles in accessing natural capital. Before the 46 households 
organized under the umbrella of El Esfuerzo, they worked as labourers on the coffee 
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plantation of Julio Montenegro. After the Sandinistas took power, the coffee-growing 
lands of Julio Montenegro were confiscated, so the households provided labour to 
the government in operation of the coffee plantation. Following the Sandinistas’ 
withdrawal from power in 1990, the government of Violeta Chamorro extended a 10-
year land rental agreement with the households, known as the Area Propiedad de los 
Trabajadores (APT), or Workers’ Property Area. The households established an 
enterprise, named Denis Gutierrez, to handle marketing of their coffee and the 
payment to the state under the APT program.  
 
 
Fig. 7. Change in coffee production area, 2004–2005 to 2008–2009, by base 
cooperative 
 
 
Under a marketing agreement made with the coffee exporter Agrisami, 
Agrisami provided credit to the households and the households supplied a set 
amount of green coffee to Agrisami. The agreement worked as designed for several 
years. Then, in the late 1990s (exact date unknown), the original owner of the coffee 
plantation, Julio Montenegro, returned to reclaim his land. Agrisami provided Denis 
Gutierrez with a three-year loan to compensate Julio Montenegro. The loan was to be 
paid with deliveries of coffee. This revised agreement worked as designed for two 
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years; however, in the third year, Agrisami failed to provide annual credit for the 
production of coffee. The households organized under Denis Gutierrez struggled to 
collect sufficient coffee to meet their delivery quota, which, according to them, they 
did meet. However, Agrisami claimed that Denis Gutierrez failed to meet its quota 
(with an outstanding debt of US$1.4 million), and therefore, Agrisami took possession 
of the land. In the late 1990s, the households retained a lawyer, who fought the case 
for nine years before achieving success. Currently, the lawyer is in possession of the 
collective land title and will release it to the households (now organized as El 
Esfuerzo) when she is paid the US$80,000 owed for her services. The major reason 
the households sought membership with Soppexcca was for assistance in resolving 
their land titling problem.  
 
Struggle for individual land titles: case of Julio Hernandez 
The households that made up Julio Hernandez once laboured on a state-owned 
coffee plantation Corinto Finca. In 1990, a private company began administering the 
plantation, while ownership remained with the government. In 2000, the households 
living on Corinto Finca petitioned successfully for a group title to the land, receiving 
title in 2001. However, little had changed in how the households participated in coffee 
production. They were paid for their labour in coffee production by a newly formed 
community association, and had little understanding or control over how their coffee 
was sold or how any potential surplus from coffee sales was used. In 2002, they 
retained a lawyer in an effort to obtain individual plots. The households covered the 
costs of the lawyer and a community representative. In 2003, without having obtained 
individual land titles, households divided the common area into plots of 3.75 mz and 
began to produce coffee individually. In 2003, 13 households formed the cooperative 
Julio Hernandez and sold coffee for the first time through Soppexcca. At that time, all 
the coffee plantations were highly depleted. In 2005, members of Julio Hernandez 
began to invest in renovation with credit from Soppexcca. In 2006, individual titles 
were finally received. Overall productivity levels have increased significantly, from a 
two-year average of 996 lbs/manzana in 2004–2005 and 2005–2006 to a two-year 
average of 1,569 lbs/manzana in 2008–2009 and 2007–2008. In recent years, all 
sampled households of Julio Hernandez reported access to long-term credit for 
renovation.  
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6.3.7 Summary 
Changes in key indicators for natural capital during the assessment period: 
• Significant number of households (80) acquired new land for agricultural 
production, with most for coffee production. At the same time, a smaller, but 
still significant, number of households reduced their landholdings. Net 
percentage increase in landholdings was approximately 9.2% for the 
sample.   
• A greater number of households expanded coffee production on existing 
land (158). To the extent that coffee is more stable and less extracting than 
other crops, this represents an increase in natural capital. However, for 
households in clusters 1 and 2, increased coffee production generally came 
at the expense of reduced basic grain production, which could result in 
increased vulnerability to food shortages over the short to midterm.   
• Soppexcca was the major source of long-term credit for the expansion of 
land. For households in cluster 1 and all organically certified households, it 
was the only source of credit during the five-year assessment period.  
• For much of the sample, the soil nutrient balance for coffee production was 
negative. Many households in cluster 1 did not apply fertilizer of any type. 
On the other hand, beginning in 2007–2008, the use of fertilizers increased 
significantly for households in clusters 2 and 3. 
• The recent increase in fertilizer use among conventional households was 
tied to Soppexcca’s incorporation of fertilizer purchases into short-term 
credit, which included transport and a relatively low price for fertilizer.  
• In general, the building of natural capital has been extensive and significant, 
both for the households themselves and the communities in which they live. 
Quantitative and qualitative evidence suggests that Soppexcca-provided 
interventions have played a significant role in facilitating the building of 
natural capital.   
 
6.4 Changes in human capital endowment  
Changes in human capital endowments are perhaps the most difficult to assess, as 
on-farm practices could not be measured and direct questions of practices had the 
potential to be fraught with bias. Rather than focus on the outcomes of interventions 
(e.g., number of training events in which the household participated), the research 
aimed to capture data on the outcomes (e.g., improved skills for on-farm production). 
In the case of skills for coffee plantation management, analysis focused on identifying 
households that had not implemented good production practices. The focus on the 
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negative allowed for the control of the effects of fertilizer use on productivity (see 
section 6.2.1). Other indicators applied were new skills for enhancing coffee quality 
and new skills for production of agricultural products other than coffee. Analysis also 
examined the capacities of female-headed households to intensify coffee production 
and examined the perceptions of households on the utility of Soppexcca-provided 
services.  
 
6.4.1 Skills and capacities for coffee plantation management  
Among those households that did not apply purchased fertilizers to coffee production, 
achievement of coffee productivity within the range of 1,000–1,600 lbs/year/manzana 
provided an indicator of a household’s ability to apply good production practices in 
coffee. As noted previously, to separate out the effects of good production practices 
from fertilizer application, only those households that did not apply fertilizer were 
considered. Thus, households with productivity levels between 1,000 and 1,600 
lbs/year/manzana that did not apply fertilizer were considered to have applied good 
production practices and to have acquired these practices during the assessment 
period through Soppexcca-provided assistance (most households did not report 
access to technical assistance prior to Soppexcca membership). Households that 
had productivity levels below 1,000 and that did not apply fertilizer are assumed not 
to have acquired good production practices during the assessment period.   
Table 28 shows that 113 households had a five-year average productivity for 
coffee of less than 1,000 lbs/year/manzana. Roughly 62% of these households were 
conventional producers. Three of every four of these households belonged to the 
lowest productivity quartile (90–415 lbs/year/manzana) and belonged to cluster 1. 
The other 38% of households with less than 1,000 lbs/year/manzana production were 
organically certified. The 23 organically certified households from cluster 1 made up 
82% of all organically certified households in cluster 1. These data suggest that many 
of the sampled households from clusters 1 and 2 have yet to develop the skills or 
capacities to apply good production practices. Evidence also suggested that some 
resource-poor households did improve their capacities for applying good production 
practices. Fifty-seven households either had preexisting production skills or acquired 
new skills for implementing good production practices related to coffee. Over three-
quarters of these households (n=44) were conventional producers, many of which 
belonged to cluster 2. Thirteen organically certified households had average 
productivity levels between 1,000 and 1,600 lbs/year/manzana, the vast majority 
belonging to cluster 2.  
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Regarding attribution, most households generally did not report access to 
technical assistance before joining Soppexcca (see section on social capital). This 
suggests that Soppexcca contributed to their building of human capital. However, 
attribution is weak, since preexisting high levels of knowledge about plantation 
management may have facilitated improved management practices, as well as 
information obtained through contacts with other producers. In addition, some 
households with low productivity (below 999 lbs/manzana), may have acquired 
necessary skills but were unable to implement them due to other obligations or lack 
of complementary assets (e.g., family labour or disposable income for hiring labour). 
 
Table 27. Productivity quartiles for households with low and medium productivity 
levels (2004–2005 to 2008–2009) 
 Quartiles 
Low productivity: households with 
5-year avg. productivity between 0–
999 lbs/manzana 
1 2 3 4 Total 
Organic (Mean=546; SD=244) 80-350 351-560 561-737 738-960  
      Total # hh 10 11 11 11 43 
      # Cluster 1   7   4   8   4 23 
      # Cluster 2   3   5   3   5 16 
      # Cluster 3    0   2   0   2   4 
Conventional (Mean=604; SD=220) 90-415 416-636 637-752 753-999  
      Total # hh 17 17 18 18 70 
      # Cluster 1 13 10   6   3 32 
      # Cluster 2   3   7 11 14 35 
      # Cluster 3   1   0   1    1    3 
Medium productivity: households 
with 5-yr avg. productivity between 
1,000–1,600 lbs/mz 
1 2 3 4 Total 
Organic (Mean=1,256; SD=178) 1,070-
1,083 
1,084-
1,230 
1,231-
1,408 
1,409-
1,527 
 
      Total # hh   3   3   5   2 13 
      # Cluster 1   0   0   1   1   2 
      # Cluster 2   3   2   4   1 10 
      # Cluster 3   0   1   0   0   1 
Conventional (Mean=1,255;  
SD=172) 
1,010-
1,102 
1,103-
1,193 
1,194-
1,400 
1,400-
1,560 
 
      Total # hh 12   9 10 13 44 
      # Cluster 1   0   6   3   2 11 
      # Cluster 2 11   3   5   8 27 
      # Cluster 3   1   0   2   3   6 
 
 
6.4.2 Skills and capacities for pest and disease control  
Reported incidence of diseases and pests also provided useful information for 
assessing the building of skills and capacities for coffee plantation management. A 
coffee disease commonly reported by Soppexcca members was anthracnosis.47 
                                               
47
 Anthracnosis (Colletothichum spp) is caused by a fungus that attacks plant parts that are weak, 
diseased, or damaged. It is more common in plants that are stressed due to having too high a fruit load 
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Anthracnosis causes reductions in productivity (up to 70%) and ultimately kills coffee 
trees. A coffee tree is most vulnerable to the disease when production is high in a 
given year, relative to the nutrition available to the tree. However, the effects of the 
disease can be partially contained with effective pruning and shade management. 
Sixty-one sampled households (21% identified one or more outbreaks of 
anthracnosis during the assessment period (table 29). Anthracnosis was most 
common among households in cluster 1 (n=17, 22% of cluster), followed by 
households in cluster 2 (n=35, 22%), and cluster 3 (n=9, 17%). These data provide 
additional evidence that the upgrading of skills and capacities related to relatively 
complex aspects of coffee production (e.g., pruning, shade management, soil 
management) have not been achieved for a significant segment of the sample.  
 
Table 28. Reported incidence of anthracnosis in coffee production 
Cluster Organic Conventional Total 
  Average productivity* Average productivity* 
Low   Medium   High   Low   Medium   High   
1 2 3   3 4 1   4 17 
2 3 0     6 1 8 17 35 
3 0 0   3 0 0   6   9 
Total 5 3 12 5 9 27 61 
* Five-year average between 2004–2005 and 2008–2009. Low = 0-999 lbs-wet parchment 
coffee per year; medium=1,000–1,599 lbs wet parchment coffee per year; high=1600+ lbs wet 
parchment coffee per year.  
 
 
Another indicator of increased skills for enhancing coffee productivity was 
improved control for coffee borer beetle (Hypothenemus hampei).48 Overall, the 
households reporting a major productivity loss due to the coffee borer was limited 
(n=6). Part of reason behind the relatively low incidence of major productivity loses 
from the coffee borer beetle was the use of specific control practices. These included: 
1) removal of green and red coffee berries before and after the main harvest period 
and 2) use of traps to capture the beetle. Among the 220 sampled conventional 
households, 194 reported removing berries before and after main harvest. Among 
these, more than half (101 households) reported to have acquired the practice due to 
                                                                                                                                       
for the level of fertilization being applied. Key factors that determine risk to anthracnosis are production 
level, shade and fertilization. Prolonged periods of rain can also increase the risk of an infestation. 
Pruning helps reduce the impacts of the disease by removing infected material after the harvest (thus, 
reducing inoculum for the new harvest). As shade regulates the crop and reduces the nutritional demand 
of the coffee, it reduces the incidence, but even with shade it can be common if there is a reasonable 
crop but no fertilization. It was very common during the coffee crisis, when plants were trying to produce 
but households could not afford to apply fertilizer. The same can be expected when fertilizer costs are 
very high.  
48
 The following cultural measures reduce infestation: reduce heavy shade; prune to keep the tree as 
open as possible; picking should take place at least once a week during harvest season and once a 
month at other times; as few berries as possible should be left on the ground; all infested berries should 
be destroyed; and before a main flowering, the crop should be stripped completely (Crowe 2004).  
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Soppexcca technical assistance. Among the 71 sampled organically certified 
households, all reported to remove berries before and after main harvest, with 
roughly 44% attributing the practice to technical assistance and training received from 
Soppexcca and the remaining 56% from other sources. Fewer households reported 
the use of traps for the elimination of the beetle: 40 conventional households and 19 
organic households. In the majority of these cases, the design and use of traps was 
attributed to technical assistance and training, mostly provided by Soppexcca.   
 
6.4.3 Skills and attitudes for enhancing coffee quality  
The quality of parchment coffee derives, in part, from specific actions taken by 
producers.49 These include, for example, selective harvest of coffee cherries, 
effective shade management, reduced agrochemical use, and appropriate control of 
the fermentation process. Upgrading the skills and capacities of households for 
carrying out these activities was a major focus of Soppexcca technical assistance 
and training. During interviews, households (n=247) responded to the open-ended 
question: “What changes have you implemented over the past five years to improve 
the quality of the coffee you produce?” The question allowed for insights into how the 
households interpreted the concept of quality, as well as their ability (and willingness) 
to implement quality-enhancing measures.50 Households responded in one of two 
ways: 1) indicated one or more measures taken, where the measures could have had 
a positive effect on quality (n=153) or 2) did not identify any action taken (either 
because they did apply quality control measures or because they did so prior to the 
assessment period) or identified actions related to productivity and not quality (e.g., 
increased fertilizer use) (n=94). The discussion below focused on the first response 
type.   
Fifty-four reported having adopted selective harvesting during the assessment 
period. The vast majority of these households were from clusters 2 (n=31) and 3 
(n=12). Six households from cluster 1 identified selected harvest as one of their 
efforts for improved quality. A smaller number of households identified improved wet 
milling to improve their quality of parchment coffee. This implies proper fermentation 
times, identification and removal of defective or unripe beans, and proper calibration 
                                               
49
 Following Dries et al. (2006), quality is considered to encompass all the desirable characteristics a 
product is perceived to have. This approach leaves a wide scope for interpretation: quality can mean 
conforming to standards (including standards pertaining to the environment, local specialities, organic 
production, ethics, and even taste and smell) and it can refer to subjectively perceived quality attributes. 
50
 During pretesting and a first stage of interviewing, households were asked specific questions about 
production and postharvest management. However, there was little variation in the responses across 
households. Based on an understanding of the context, there was reason to think that answers were 
biased due to the importance of quality to Soppexcca (and access to Soppexcca as a buyer of their 
coffee). Recognizing this potential bias, and also the fact that we were unable to observe harvesting 
techniques and postharvest management firsthand, the use of an open-ended question was considered 
most appropriate.  
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of depulping machines, among other practices. Eighteen households identified 
improved attention to wet-milling processes, of which 10 were from cluster 2 and 
eight from cluster 3. Eighteen households—all belonging to clusters 1 and 2—
identified increased attention to shade management and pruning as a central part of 
their effort to improve the quality. Sixteen households identified the adaptation of 
practices for control of the coffee borer beetle to improve quality, half from cluster 2 
and half from clusters 3 and 1. Many households (n=45, 18% of the sample) linked 
quality with their low (or reduced) application of external production inputs, such as 
fertilizers and herbicides. The majority of these households were from cluster 1 
(n=22) and cluster 2 (n=19). The following quote from an interviewed household 
exemplified positive attitudes toward quality by households from clusters 1 and 2: 
“We have been traditional producers who do not apply chemical inputs; we remove 
weeds by hand, we harvest the ripe cherries, we do not mix garbage in the bags, and 
we keep the baskets and sacks clean.”   
 
6.4.4 Skills and capacities for production of other agricultural products  
Among a subset of sampled households (n=86), agricultural production expended 
during the five-year assessment period. In most cases, expansion was limited to a 
handful of low-value products traditionally produced by smallholders in Nicaragua 
(n=42), such as basic grains, citrus, and bananas. In other cases, expansion included 
nontraditional products (n=44), such as cocoa, taro root, goat rearing, and honey. 
Citrus and banana expansion took place in coffee plantations and required limited 
cash investments or investments in building human capital. The same was not true 
for expansion in nontraditionals, and in these cases, Soppexcca (e.g., cocoa and 
goat rearing) and local NGOs (e.g., honey and taro root) played an important role in 
facilitating the necessary investments. Most common among the nontraditional 
products was cocoa, which had been a priority of Soppexcca’s technical assistance 
since 2008. 
Twenty-eight households initiated cocoa production in 2007–2008 (table 30). 
Roughly 40% of them were organically certified households. Nearly 8% of cluster 1 
households invested in establishing cocoa production. There was also strong 
participation in establishing cocoa by households in clusters 2 (10%) and 3 (11%). In 
most cases, cocoa was added to existing coffee plantations, thus providing an 
additional source of shade. Evidence suggested that Soppexcca played a major role 
in upgrading the skills to carry out basic cocoa production practices. In all but one 
case, Soppexcca donated the seedlings for establishing the cocoa plantations. It also 
provided technical assistance. The fact that organic producers feature so prominently 
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among the households taking up cocoa production likely reflects the interest by 
Soppexcca in increasing the incomes of its organic suppliers (and thus reducing the 
risk that they would exit organic production). Soppexcca also provided long-term 
credit to nearly 50% of the households (n=13) to cover the fixed costs of establishing 
the cocoa plantation.   
 
Table 29. Households that initiated cocoa production 
Cluster  Organically 
certified 
Conventional Total % of total cluster 
membership 
1   3   3   6   7.8 
2    6 10 16   9.9 
3    2   4   6 11.3 
Total 11 13 28   9.6 
 
 
Eight households established new taro root plantations on their farms. Only 
recently did the export market for taro root emerge in Nicaragua, due mainly to 
actions by NGOs and a few large agricultural exporters in Nicaragua to supply the US 
ethnic market with taro root following the demise of production in the Dominican 
Republic (Donovan 2009). In most cases, the area in which taro root was planted was 
small (0.25 mz), and in all cases, no external support was provided. One household 
expanded into honey production, for which, a government agency donated basic 
equipment and a local NGO played a key role in providing technical assistance and 
market outlets.  
 
6.4.5 Role of technical assistance in building human capital  
Evidence presented thus far suggests that most households faced major limitations to 
upgrading their skills and capacities for coffee production, to some extent reflecting 
limitations in the design and implementation of technical assistance programs by 
Soppexcca. Analysis of the role of technical assistance in building human capital 
considered the perceived usefulness of Soppexcca-provided technical assistance 
provided over the past two years (2007–2008 and 2008–2009) and the ability of 
households to follow recommendations provided by Soppexcca extensionists, as 
reported by sampled households.  
For most households, Soppexcca was the only provider of on-site technical 
assistance during the assessment period. Sampled households were asked to report 
their perceptions on the usefulness of technical assistance for coffee production 
between 2007–2008 and 2008–2009. Among the sampled households, 55.7% 
(n=162) reported satisfaction with technical assistance during the two-year period. 
The remaining 44.3% (n=129) reported some type of grievance with technical 
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assistance provision. Responses from households shed light on the extent of the 
problem: 
• Household #26: “We were visited once in 2008, but he didn’t provide 
technical advice; he arrived to inform us of a meeting at the cooperative.”   
• Household #48: “The technicians have been absent. They give me credit 
without making an estimation of my harvest.” 
• Household #61: “The extensionist never arrived to visit the coffee plantation. 
Once I requested that he visit the plantation, but he never came.” 
• Household #265: “I lack technical recommendations when I need them: on 
one occasion I requested a visit from the extensionist because the coffee 
berries were falling off the branches, but he never arrived.”  
• Household #187: “He only comes to estimate the harvest. When training 
events are carried out, I am able to consult with the extensionist—that is 
how I have obtained technical assistance.” 
• Household #277: “Visits are only for estimating the harvest—the 
extensionist does not know my coffee plantation. He sends others from the 
community to assist me and does not provide recommendations.”  
• Household #281: “The extensionist only comes to make estimates of the 
harvest, and when does arrive, he is not able to take much time to explain 
what needs to be done.” 
• Household #282: “Sometimes he indicated which product I should use, but 
the extensionist did not indicate the doses and I burned the plants.” 
• Household #290: “The extensionist provides useful recommendations, but 
he is not able to service all of the (base cooperative) members. I wish he 
would visit more.” 
 
Those households that reported having received recommendations by 
extensionists during the two-year period also evaluated their ability to respond to the 
recommendations. Thirty-two households considered that their ability to respond was 
very high, while another 134 households considered their ability to be high. However, 
caution is warranted in assessing these responses, as extensionists may not have 
recommended practices or inputs, even if they were needed, knowing that the 
household’s ability to respond was minimal. In this sense, negative responses may 
provide more insight into 1) the challenges of building human capital when other 
forms of capital are not present and 2) the limits of current approaches by Soppexcca 
to technical assistance aimed at building human capital. Sixty-four households 
considered that their ability to respond was limited, while 20 considered that their 
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ability was very limited. Analysis of responses suggests that asset constraints and 
limited ability to understand the recommendations were key factors: 
• Household #132: “I have not had the time to respond to the 
recommendations.” 
• Household #114: “I have not applied fertilizer for lack of money or the other 
recommended activities for lack of labour.” 
• Household #277: “I have not understood the recommendations.”  
• Household #14: “Actually, I have not been able to act on the 
recommendations for applying fertilizer because I did not make the request 
for fertilizer (with Soppexcca) in time.”  
• Household #243: “I have not comprehended the information that is 
presented to me.” 
• Household #47: “I have not had the inputs, or the money required. By 
money, I mean money to pay for labour.” 
 
6.4.6 Capacities of female-headed households for intensifying coffee production 
Traditionally, both men and women are actively involved in coffee production. Men 
typically take charge of pruning, fertilization, and fermentation, while women are 
actively involved in harvest and in providing food for labourers. In addition to coffee 
production, female household heads are responsible for household maintenance, 
while male heads are reasonable for the production of corn, beans, and other staple 
crops. In this context, the absence of men (divorce, death, or abandonment) from the 
household can have serious implications for the ability to a household to actively 
participate in and benefit from coffee production. Evidence indicated that female-
headed households struggled to achieve productivity levels at par with those of two-
headed households, suggesting large trade-offs between off-farm labour and 
household maintenance, on the one hand, and coffee production and other cash-crop 
production on the other.   
Females led 42 (14%) of the sampled households (table 31). In 11 of these 
cases, the absence of the male was due to death from natural causes or from 
accident. Divorce or long-term separation was reported in 15 of the cases, and in 
remaining cases, a male never entered the household. Average coffee productivity 
(2004–2005 to 2008–2009) of female-headed households in cluster 1 was roughly 
40% lower than the average productivity of all cluster 1 members (for all members). 
Roughly 12% of the membership of cluster 2 was made up of female-headed 
households. In the case of conventional producers in cluster 2, evidence suggested 
that they were able to dedicate more resources to coffee production and thus 
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maintain productivity levels more in-line with the average for all conventional cluster 
members. In the case of organically certified members, however, productivity levels 
were 66% less than those of all organically certified cluster members. Three 
households from cluster 3 were single-headed households. Similar to organically 
certified households from cluster 2, the average productivity levels of female-headed 
organically certified households from cluster 3 was considerably lower than that of all 
organically certified cluster members.   
 
Table 30. Coffee productivity for women-headed households 
 # female headed % total 
cluster 
membership 
Comparison of productivity 
Average 
coffee 
productivity 
of single-
headed 
households* 
Average 
coffee 
productivity 
of all 
sampled 
households* 
% 
difference 
Cluster 1 
Conventional 11 22.4   652   919 -34.0 
Organically 
certified    8 28.6   482   824 -52.4 
Total 19 24.7   578   884 -41.9 
Cluster 2 
Conventional 17 13.3 1,775 2,003 -12.1 
Organically 
certified   3   9.1   551 1,101 -66.6 
Total 20 12.4 1,530 1,830 -17.9 
Cluster 3 
Conventional   1   2.3 2,462 2,945 -17.9 
Organically 
certified   2 66.7   560 1,549 -93.8 
Total   3   5.7 1,511 2,654 -54.9 
* Five-year average productivity estimates (2004–2005 to 2008–2009) for wet parchment 
coffee, reported in pounds/manzana. 
 
 
6.4.7 Summary  
Changes in key indicators for human capital during the assessment period: 
• Roughly 24% of the sampled households did not acquire the skills or 
capacity to apply good production practices for coffee. This was reflected by 
their five-year average productivity levels below 1,000 lbs/manzana.  
• Households demonstrated their ability to adopt practices for controlling 
pests and diseases when the solution was intuitive and the costs were low 
(e.g., coffee borer beetle). However, when technical knowledge was needed 
to identify the problem and external inputs needed to remedy the problem, 
they faced major difficulties in responding and suffered major reduction in 
production, and in some cases, in plantation health (e.g., anthracnosis).  
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• Across all clusters, evidence suggested that households were generally 
aware that it was import to achieve higher quality. Most households had 
taken some steps to enhance quality by, for example, selective harvest and 
improved fermentation techniques. This highlighted the ability of Soppexcca 
staff to induce change when the costs were relatively low in terms of human 
capital upgrading.  
• Expansion of on-farm productivity activities was limited to 29% of the 
sampled households. Expansion into nontraditional, often higher-value, 
crops was carried out by about half of these households. Where expansion 
into nontraditional crops did occur, evidence suggested that Soppexcca 
played a major role in facilitating the expansion, providing technical 
assistance and credit and offering future market outlets.  
• Soppexcca’s technical assistance program faced major limitations to 
building human capital among households in clusters 1 and 2 as related to 
good production practices in plantation management. Evidenced suggested 
that support was spread too thin, was incomplete (e.g., not linked with other 
services, such as credit, and faced challenges to respond to the needs of 
households.  
• Female-headed households faced major challenges to intensifying their 
coffee production. Soppexcca’s current service offer had little potential to 
address the challenges they faced: they were too vulnerable to receive 
credit, had too few assets to invest in hired labour and other inputs, and 
found that the trade-offs for intensifying household labour for coffee were 
too high. A major benefit for these households’ participation in Soppexcca 
was reduced vulnerability through the floor price of fair trade.  
• Overall, school attendance among households’ dependents was high. While 
some evidence of a gender bias existed in school attendance, the bias was 
limited. Among members of clusters 1 and 2, Soppexcca support for 
education provided a facilitative role in promoting school attendance. 
However, this research was not able to address the critical question of the 
quality of the education and ability to apply skills in off-farm employment. 
Secondary information suggests that the quality of rural education in 
Nicaragua is subpar.  
 
6.5 Changes in social capital endowment  
This section explores changes in social capital endowment for the production and 
marketing of coffee. When looking at social capital from the household perspective, 
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Soppexcca is viewed as one among several possible outlets for the marketing of 
coffee. Each outlet presents a unique set of advantages and disadvantages. In this 
sense, asset-poor households may benefit from diversified buyer portfolios, even 
when some of these contacts may offer terms less favourable than Soppexcca’s. 
Discussions here explore the ties that bind the sampled households to coffee buyers.  
 
6.5.1 Changes in number and nature of ties with coffee buyers  
Prior to joining Soppexcca, the majority of sampled households maintained buying 
relationships with a single coffee buyer, and in most cases this buyer was a local 
intermediary (table 32). In the case of households from cluster 1, nearly 55% sold 
their parchment coffee exclusively to local intermediaries, mainly those based in the 
markets of Jinotega and Matagalpa. Some households (7.8%) sold exclusively to the 
Jiprocoop cooperative (the predecessor to Soppexcca), while another 7.8% sold 
exclusively to exporters. The rest of the households sold to a mix of buyer types 
(usually a mix between local intermediaries and exporters) or were not producing 
coffee prior to joining Soppexcca. Relationships with buyers were similar for cluster 2, 
with the major difference being that a higher percentage of households sold 
exclusively to exporters (13% compared to 8% for cluster 1). Results for cluster 3 
were different from the other two clusters in various ways: 1) a significantly lower 
percentage of households sold exclusively to local intermediaries, 2) a higher 
percentage of households sold exclusively to exporters, and 3) nearly one-third of the 
households sold to various types of buyers, thus allowing for diversification of risks 
and access to credit under different conditions.  
 
Table 31. Marketing relationships for coffee before joining Soppexcca 
  
  
Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3 Total 
# % # % # %  
100% sold to cooperatives    6    7.8   12    7.5   3    5.7   21 
100% sold to exporters   6    7.8   21   13.4 13   24.5   40 
100% sold to local intermediaries 
(including market) 42   54.6   86   53.4 18   34.0 146 
Diversified buyer portfolio (mix of 
cooperatives, exporters, and local 
intermediaries)   7    9.1    9    5.6 17   32.1   32 
No coffee production prior to 
joining Soppexcca 16   20.8   33   20.5   2    3.8   51 
  77 100.0 161 100.0 52 100.0 290 
 
Sampled households also reported services provided by the different buyer 
types to which they sold coffee prior to their having joined Soppexcca. Results 
indicated that, overall, 1) few had access to markets for certified coffee and 2) access 
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to technical assistance and credit was highly limited for households that sold to 
buyers other than cooperatives. Fifty-six households reported selling to exporters (40 
exclusively and 16 as part of a diversified buyer portfolio). A relatively small 
percentage of households reported having received credit (19.6%, n=11) and even 
fewer reported having received technical assistance (8.9%, n=5). Thirty households 
reported selling to a cooperative (21 exclusively and nine as part of a diversified 
buyer portfolio). The cooperative in this case was Jiprocoop (which was certified fair 
trade), the predecessor to Soppexcca (see section 1.5.3 for details). As expected, 
households that sold to a cooperative reported greater access to technical assistance 
(86.7%, n=26), credit (76.7%, n=23), and assistance with the purchase of inputs 
(53.3%, n=16). One hundred and sixty-eight households reported selling to local 
intermediaries (146 exclusively and 22 as part of a diversified buyer portfolio). Thirty-
two of these households reported access to credit from intermediaries (19%), while 
another 17 reported assistance with transportation (10.1%).  
For many households, transportation of their coffee to the buyer implied both 
risk and considerable out-of-pocket expense. In general, households shipped their 
bags of parchment coffee to Soppexcca via public transportation. Often stored on top 
of the bus, their coffee was exposed to the rain, delays from mechanical failure, and 
contamination from other goods (fig. 8). Extensive exposure to moisture leads to 
mould growth, which results in price penalties or outright rejection at the Soppexcca 
warehouse in the name of quality control. In some cases, households reported 
hauling coffee to the bus stop only to be informed that the bus was already full and 
that they would have to wait until the following day to load their coffee. In these 
conditions, access to buyer-provided transportation services for coffee represented 
an important service for reducing marketing costs.  
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Fig. 8. Risks for marketing coffee related to public transportation: example from the 
road between Los Alpes and Jinotega (April 2009) 
 
 
Diversification of relationships with coffee buyers  
Sampled households used various options for selling parchment coffee, including 
selling to buyers in the Jinotega and Matagalpa markets, to direct coffee exporters, to 
high-volume local intermediaries, and to Soppexcca. Each buyer type implies a 
unique set of benefits and costs from the perspective of coffee-growing households 
(table 33). Most sampled households maintained relations with at least two buyer 
types, one of which was Soppexcca. In some cases, relationships existed with three 
buyer types.  
Market buyers offer producers cash in hand upon delivery of parchment 
coffee. Most buyers purchase coffee with a mixture of their own capital and financing 
provided by direct exporters. Prices are set by direct exporters, with market buyers 
receiving a commission for each bag delivered to the exporter. Market buyers 
provided various types of services to their suppliers of raw material. Most of the 
market buyers provided credit (n=14, 77.7% of the sampled buyers). The average 
size of the total credit portfolio of these buyers for the 2008–2009 production year 
was US$18,223. Not all coffee producers received credit; on average, roughly 60% of 
producers were reported by buyers to have received credit. Requirements for credit 
varied across buyers and according by the size of the credit, but in general, for 
relatively small amounts of credit, the conditions were accessible—for example, 
providing a photocopy of their national identification card or receipt for a motor. The 
average interest rate was high at 3.5% per month. However, in many cases, no 
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interest was charged for credit taken out between November and December (thus 
providing low-cost access to cash for covering harvest-related expenses). The fact 
that most coffee buyers were also buyers of basic grains allowed for flexibility in 
repayment: if the coffee harvest fell short, producers could pay with the basic grains 
harvest.  
Interviews with market buyers suggested that nearly all had increased their 
quality requirements over the assessment period; however, the requirements were 
relatively low. The most common change identified by market buyers was a 
reluctance to purchase mixed coffee (parchment coffee derived from both ripe and 
unripe berries). Other changes included increased scrutiny for coffee with a large 
percentage of physical defects (e.g., holes from the coffee borer beetle) or improperly 
fermented51 or musty/mouldy beans. In most cases, coffee with a relatively high 
percentage of defects is purchased, but at a reduced price. There was mixed 
evidence on how the quality of coffee purchased has changed since 2005: 10 
sampled buyers (55.6%) reported that the overall quality of the coffee they received 
had improved in recent years; seven reported that overall quality had decreased, 
while three reported no change. In cases where buyers reported improved quality, 
efforts by cooperatives to improve quality were cited as a possible contributing factor.   
 
                                               
51
 After depulping coffee cherries to remove the skin and some of the pulp, the separated seed will still 
have a significant amount of pulp attached. The remaining pulp is loosened by fermentation, allowing it 
to be washed away before drying. If fermentation is not stopped as soon as the remaining parchment is 
no longer slimy and has a rough texture, the coffee acquires undesirable flavours. 
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Table 32. Characteristics of trading relationships for coffee sold by Soppexcca-
affiliated households 
Buyer Services offered Quality 
requirement 
Conditions 
Market buyers 
in Jinotega and 
Matagalpa*  
Purchase of coffee 
Short-term credit 
Exchange of basic 
food items for 
parchment coffee 
(before and after 
harvest) 
++ Flexibility in credit repayment 
(paying coffee debt with basic 
grains production) 
No interest on credit taken prior to 
harvest; 5%/month interest on all 
other loans 
Full payment upon delivery 
Price to producer: exporter price, 
minus commission 
Emergency credit (with interest) 
Locally 
embedded 
intermediaries   
Technical 
assistance 
Short-term credit  
Fertilizer 
(delivered) 
Transport 
++ Land title not required for credit 
Interest rate at 1.5%–2%/month  
Full payment upon delivery, price 
based on New York market price  
Direct exporters 
(CISA Exporta-
dora, 
Exportadora 
Atlantic) 
Short-term credit  
 
++ Contract and land title required for 
credit  
Interest rate 1.5%–2%/month 
Final payment upon delivery, priced 
based on New York market price  
Soppexcca Technical 
assistance 
Certification 
Fertilizer 
(delivered) 
Short- and long-
term credit  
Emergency credit  
Other services 
Access to projects 
+++ Land title not required for credit 
Floor price (fair trade) 
Organic certification requirements 
(organically certified members only) 
Interest rate 1.2%/month 
Partial payment upon delivery, final 
payment in June 
Emergency credit (with/without 
interest) 
Other services** 
* Information based on results from 18 key informant interviews carried out on-site with buyers 
of coffee at the markets of Jinotega and Matagalpa in August 2009 
** For example, emergency transport to hospital or donations for funeral expenses 
 
Locally embedded intermediaries depended on direct exporters for access to 
international coffee markets, but because they tended to have closer contacts with 
the communities that produce coffee, they were able to offer services that other 
buyers were unable to provide. During interviews with households, the name Osman 
Gutierrez was mentioned repeatedly by households from the three base cooperatives 
Osman Martinez, Ernesto Acuña, and La Unión. Next to Soppexcca, Osman 
Gutierrez provided the most extensive services for coffee-growing households. 52 
                                               
52
 In 2008–2009, Osman Gutierrez purchased coffee from approximately 550 households in selected 
communities in Jinotega. Several of these households were members of Soppexcca. Interviewed 
households expressed strong bonds with Osman Gutierrez. Prior to their membership with Soppexcca, 
households depended on Osman Gutierrez for the purchase of their coffee and for the provision of credit 
and agricultural inputs. Credit was provided without formal land titles or other forms of collateral. In 
2008–2009, a total of US$325,000 was offered in credit at 18% per year, with 90% of producers 
receiving credit. Up to 50% of the anticipated value of coffee was provided as credit. Quality 
requirements were established by the exporters but are generally in-line with those required by other 
buyers (limited tolerance for beans that are mouldy, overfermented, or insect damaged). Like market 
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Among households in the Osman Martinez base cooperative, relations with Osman 
Gutierrez were established prior to joining Soppexcca, and he was clearly identified 
as their primary buyer of coffee (with Soppexcca providing a supplemental source of 
credit and secondary market outlet). 
Relatively few sampled household maintained relationships with direct 
exporters of coffee (n=5). Prices offered by direct exporters for first and second 
quality coffee fluctuate in relation to chains in the New York commodity market. 
Annual credit was provided based on a contract, with land titles generally required as 
collateral (in cases where producers have a history of compliance with contractual 
obligations, land titles may not be required). Credit during the 2008–2009 production 
year was offered at a 17% annual interest rate. Producers have the option to receive 
final payment (market price minus amount of annual credit) upon delivery of 
parchment coffee. Additional services, such as on-site technical assistance and 
transportation, were not reported. 
Soppexcca only purchased first quality coffee. In 2008–2009, credit was 
available to most members at annual interest of 16% for short-term credit and 14% 
for long-term credit. Soppexcca also provided credit for emergencies at the same 
short-term interest rate. In addition, it provided credit for the purchase (or donation, in 
especially needy cases) of the coffin in the case of the death of a member. Among 
the coffee buyers discussed here, Soppexcca was the only one that offered long-term 
credit. It was also the only one that offered access to certification. Its technical 
assistance services were expanded in 2007. For Soppexcca-affiliated producers that 
received short-term credit, coffee was paid in three instalments: 63% in June (in the 
form of credit), 18% upon delivery of parchment coffee at the Soppexcca 
headquarters (between December and March), and the remaining 18.8% following 
the export of green coffee to buyers in the United States and Europe. The final 
payment takes place between May and June. In addition to services for the 
production and marketing of coffee, Soppexcca also provided access to development 
projects, which have played a role in expanding the options available for agricultural 
production (e.g., cocoa, small livestock), as well as in reducing the costs of 
education, for example.  
 
                                                                                                                                       
buyers, he purchased all grades of coffee and provided no-interest credit for food just prior to the harvest 
period. Gutierrez covered costs for picking up coffee, thus allowing producers to avoid the expense and 
risk of transport. During 2009, prices were based on the New York commodity market and, in the case of 
first quality parchment coffee, ranged from a high of US$0.564 to a low of US$0.436. For Soppexcca 
members, relations with Osman Gutierrez offered certain benefits, such as access to transport, an 
additional source of low-risk credit, and lower transaction costs (e.g., no paperwork for receiving credit 
and no trips to Soppexcca’s office for receiving payments).  
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Sales of coffee to Soppexcca and other coffee buyers  
Evidence suggested that Soppexcca was an important buyer for a majority of the 
households. For organically certified households, the mean percentage of coffee sold 
to Soppexcca was 73.1, while for conventional producers, the mean percentage was 
57.2 (table 34). A two-way between-groups analysis of variance was conducted to 
explore the impact of cluster membership and production type on levels of side 
selling. The interaction effect between cluster and production type was not 
statistically significant, F(2, 289)=0.242, p=0.785. There was a statistically significant 
main effect for production type, F(1, 89)=13.715, p=0.00; however, the effective size 
was small (partial eta squared=0.046). The main effect for cluster, F(1,298)=0.479, 
p=0.620, did not reach statistical significance.  
 
Table 33. Percentage of coffee sold to Soppexcca 
Cluster Percentage of parchment 
coffee sold to Soppexcca * 
N SD Median 
Organically certified   
1       69.99b**   27 33.29 81.75 
2    74.48b   32 22.47 76.25 
3    76.95b   10 28.98 91.49 
Total   73.08   69 27.78 79.05 
Conventional  
1   54.55a   50 32.82 54.27 
2   59.48a 128 30.86 66.19 
3   53.51a   43 33.94 63.86 
Total 57.20 221 31.89 64.17 
* Average percentage of production sold to Soppexcca from 2005–2006 to 2007–2008 
** Means with the same letter are not significantly different 
 
 
Evidence here suggested that price was not the major factor behind selling to 
buyers other than Soppexcca. Households were asked their motivations for selling 
coffee to other buyers, and their responses, presented below, illustrate diverse 
reasons. The most common response related to the need to cover production 
expenses for the coffee harvest (n=31). Households also identified emergencies and 
expenses as the main reason for selling to buyers other than Soppexcca (n=8), poor 
quality (n=4), and limited access to credit (n=2). Below are quotes from households in 
cluster 1 (emphasis added): 
• Household #171: “To pay for workers during harvest time, because the 
advance payment that Soppexcca provides is limited.”  
• Household #126: “To cover basic needs during the harvest time, such as 
payment of workers and purchase of food.”  
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• Household #266: “Medical expenses; one of our boys got sick.”  
• Household #24: “Because my brother needed money, so I sold coffee in the 
market to resolve his need.”  
• Household #60: “To cover the costs of baskets for harvest, given that I didn’t 
make by request for credit from Soppexcca in time.”  
• Household #108: “I did not owe Soppexcca any of my coffee harvest. I only 
sell to Soppexcca when the production is good. In these cases, I sell half to 
Soppexcca and half to others.”  
• Household #137: “Low production and lack of money to send our children to 
classes in the first months of the year.”  
• Household #166: “Our production was low. Had we delivered the production 
to Soppexcca, we would not have received any income because of our 
existing debt with Soppexcca.” 
 
The most common type of response from cluster 2 related to the need to 
cover production expenses for the coffee harvest (n=59). Soppexcca’s strict quality 
requirements were also mentioned as a factor in their decision to sell to other buyers 
(n=19). Several households identified better prices and other services (n=8). The 
need to cover household-related expenses was also common (n=18). Below are 
quotes from households in cluster 2 (emphasis added):  
• Household #162: “The amount of advance [credit] provided by Soppexcca 
does not cover the costs of hiring coffee pickers.”  
• Household #253: “To cover the costs for construction of a house, given that 
la final payment by Soppexcca is late.”  
• Household #145: “The final payment is very late, and there’s a need to pay 
coffee pickers; also, it has happened that our coffee has been too humid to 
pass inspection by Soppexcca.”  
• Household #188: “Due to delays in the provision of credit—the intermediary 
is much quicker. Soppexcca always delivers credit in June, while the 
intermediary delivers in May.”  
• Household #195: “I do not have credit with Soppexcca because I do not 
have a national identification card. Osman Gutierrez provides me credit, and 
it is for this reason that I sell him coffee”  
• Household #190: “Mr. Osman Gutierrez pays better than Soppexcca; 
Soppexcca has too many price deductions, and Mr. Gutierrez is less 
concerned with quality.”  
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• Household #245: “Final payment is very late and in CISA (exporter) final 
payment is early.”  
 
As before, the most common response from cluster 3 related to the need to 
cover production expenses for the coffee harvest (n=20). In other cases, households 
identified the strict quality requirements imposed by Soppexcca and its buyers as the 
main reason for selling to other buyers (n=8). Other motivations included: need to 
cover household expenditures (n=2) and better conditions provided by other buyers 
(n=7). Below are quotes from households in cluster 3 (emphasis added): 
• Household #3: “Soppexcca demands too much quality and due to only a few 
imperfect beans they will pay you the price for second-quality coffee.”  
• Household #19: “The amount of credit offered by Soppexcca is very low and 
through my relations with [the direct coffee exporter] Atlantic I receive 
US$10,000. I have not received any credit from Soppexca. Soppexcca also 
demands too much in terms of quality.”  
• Household #185: “Osman Gutierrez offers the same conditions as 
Soppexcca. I have a credit history with Osman and it is easy to sell him our 
coffee.”  
• Household #194: “Transport is very difficult from our farm to the road. The 
other buyer collects our coffee at the farm.”  
• Household #245: “Final payment is very late and payment from CISA [direct 
coffee exporter] is much quicker.”  
 
6.5.2 Role of nonmarketing factors for building social capital with Soppexcca  
Analysis thus far suggests that access to value chains for speciality coffee and 
related services for production and marketing only partially explain the ties between 
Soppexcca and its members. Analysis below suggests that the strength of these ties 
depends as much, if not more, on the ability of these services to increase members’ 
resilience to external shocks. These services may or may not relate to the marketing 
of coffee. It is in this regard that Soppexcca stands out from the other buyers 
mentioned above. Interviews with households revealed three ways in which 
Soppexcca-provided services increased resilience and provided incentives for the 
household to maintain its ties with Soppexcca: resilience to unexpected expenses 
(e.g., health complications and funeral expenses), income shortages and future asset 
erosion, as well as improved access to education for household dependents.  
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Resilience to unexpected expenses 
Households were asked to evaluate their access to health care services. A significant 
percentage (29.2%) responded that attention at publicly provided health clinics had 
improved in recent years, with increased attendance by medical professionals and 
increased capacity to provide basic medicines. However, many of these households 
also reported that the range of treatments and variety of medicines available were 
limited and the supply of medicines was sporadic. Evidence showed that Soppexcca 
played an important role in 1) facilitating medical examinations and access to medical 
brigades and 2) providing donations and credit resources for the purchase of 
medicines and specialty treatments. In addition, Soppexcca provided credit and 
donations for households that suffered a death of a close relative. When asked if 
Soppexcca had facilitated their access to medical attention during the preview three 
years, 83 households responded affirmatively. For 29 households, attention included 
the female household head receiving one or more examinations for cervical cancer. 
For 54 households, facilitation included credit or donations for medical expenses and 
funeral expenses for one or more household members. Examples of household 
responses follow: 
• Household #35: Credit of US$1,621 for operation in Managua following 
major accident; donation of coffin following death of wife.  
• Household #13: Credit for US$108 for prostate operation. 
• Household #202: No-interest credits of US$325 for emergency operation for 
wife. 
• Household #240: Donation of coffin, bread, and coffee for funeral and burial 
of mother; donation of US$25 for covering related expenses. 
• Household #213: Cervical cancer exam for mother; donation of US$162 
following death of father.  
• Household #214: Cervical cancer exam for wife; US$324 donation to cover 
medical expenses following accident. . 
• Household #237: Donation of coffin and coverage of other funeral-related 
expenses following death of wife. 
• Household #228: US$540 no-interest credit for eye operation.  
• Household #253: Cervical cancer exam for wife; when mother was sick, 
Soppexcca provided transport to the town of Jinotega for treatment; 
following death of mother, donation of coffin and coverage of other funeral-
related expenses. 
• Household #292: Donation of coffin and coverage of other funeral-related 
expenses following death of wife; assistance with food for children.  
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Resilience to income shortages 
Resilience to income shortages refers to the ability of households to cover critical 
household-related expenses and/or cover critical production-related expenses at 
times when income flows are nonexistent or otherwise highly constrained. Asset-poor 
coffee producers can be considered especially prone to such constraints, given that 
related income flows are generated during a relatively short period during the year, 
while production-related expenses occur throughout the year. Access to credit was 
important for addressing income shortfalls. While it was not feasible to ask 
households about their use of credit, interviews brought to light that short-term credit 
was used for overcoming consumption shortfalls, first, and for coffee production, 
second. While other coffee buyers offered credit, in most cases the terms placed 
asset-poor households at risk of 1) land-title seizure or 2) extremely high interest 
rates for prolonged periods. Soppexcca credit was provided at favourable rates (see 
section 6.5 for details) and with the understanding that delays in repayment could be 
addressed with future coffee harvests at the same rate.  
Soppexcca was the first and only source of credit for most households during 
the assessment period. Prior to their joining Soppexcca, only 20% of cluster 1 
households had access to credit, while nearly 40% of cluster 2 members had access 
(table 35). In both cases, access was provided mainly by local intermediaries (market 
buyers), and in limited cases through NGOs. Cluster 3 members generally had 
access through commercial banks. In most cases, the reason stated for not using 
credit was fear of noncompliance with the credit terms and the related possibility of 
losing their land. In many other cases, the reason was an inability to comply with the 
credit conditions, namely a formal land title. In a few cases, households reported a 
limited understanding of the supply of credit. During recent years, however, the 
percentage of households in clusters 1 and 2 with access to at least one provider of 
short-term credit increased significantly, from 26% to 85% in cluster 1 and from 40% 
to 85% in cluster 2. In most cases, the sole provider of credit was Soppexcca (for 
details on credit supply, see sections 6.7.2 and 6.7.3).  
 
Table 34. Increase in access to short-term credit for households 
Cluster Number of short-term credit sources reported by 
sampled household (n=291) for the period 
between 2004–2005 and 2008–2009 
Households with at least one credit 
source during the two years prior to 
joining Soppexcca 
1 2 3 Total # % 
# % # % # % # % 
1   52 67.5 12 15.6 1 1.5   65 84.6 20 26.0 
2 106 65.8 26 16.1 5 3.1 137 85.0 64 39.8 
3   27 50.9 20 37.7 2 3.8   49 92.4 43 79.2 
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Soppexcca’s success in attracting asset-poor producers to its credit programs 
lay in the design of its credit program (that was backed with NGO support). The 
repercussions for noncompliance with credit conditions vary according to the lender. 
In the case of local intermediaries, extensions of the credit period or repayment with 
other crops may be an option, but in both cases, these options represent significant 
direct costs and present future risks and trade-offs. Access to credit through 
exporters or commercial banks generally requires the surrender of a land title as 
collateral. The high costs of intermediary-provided credit and the high risk related to 
bank-provided credit partially explain why so few households had access to 
commercial banks prior to joining Soppexcca (other reasons may be limited 
willingness of commercial banks and coffee exporters to lend to smallholders). 
Soppexcca gave credit to its members without the requirement of a land title as 
collateral. When credit was not repaid fully in a given year, an understanding existed 
among households and Soppexcca that the unpaid debt would be carried over to the 
next production year.  
The importance of credit in terms of social capital came through in the 
following quotes from sampled households (in response to the question: What is your 
overall level of satisfaction with Soppexcca and why?): 
• Household #34: “Soppexcca helps to resolve difficulties (for coffee 
production), like credit. The selling of coffee is quick, but…the price paid is 
not what one would expect—the price paid does not reflect the quality that 
we deliver.” 
• Household #52: “We have received benefits, such as training and credit, 
and Soppexcca does not embargo our land titles when we are late paying 
our credit.” 
• Household #91: “The ease of access and the trust involved in receiving 
credit. We are sure that they [Soppexcca] won’t take our land.” 
• Household #116: “When I had a credit need, Soppexcca helped me. They 
also provided assistance when my mother died.” 
• Household #264: “Access to credit has improved our income—how we are 
able to engage with others: we are better for being organized.”  
• Household #272: “Access to credit and the security that they [Soppexcca] 
will not take our coffee parcels. We work better being organized.” 
• Household #275: “The difference in prices offered by Soppexcca, in 
comparison with those offered in the market, are not much. Additionally, one 
has to wait for the final payment from Soppexcca. But, I consider that the 
credit does help us.” 
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• Household #280: “Access to credit and inputs has been important. Before 
we had to leave to work in order to purchase fertilizer. Now Soppexcca 
provides us with credit.” 
• Household #286: “Since we joined Soppexcca, we have felt like we are 
improving, given that without our organization, we would not have had credit 
or have produced coffee.” 
 
Resilience to future asset erosion 
For households belonging to the base cooperative Julio Hernandez, Soppexcca 
membership has provided critical resources for making coffee production possible 
(thus providing increased security of landholdings), and for those in El Esfuerzo, 
Soppexcca membership has provided hope for making future coffee production more 
viable. In both cases, households provided services to former coffee plantations, 
rather than being coffee producers themselves. Increasing the human and natural 
capital of these households has represented a major investment for Soppexcca. In 
the case of Julio Hernandez, prior to organizing their base cooperative for 
participation in Soppexcca, households had yet to market their coffee and directly 
receive the benefits. Their coffee was sold collectively to a local community member, 
with little understanding of the price he received in the market in Jinotega. It was not 
until 2005, with credit and technical assistance provided by Soppexcca, that the 
members began to invest in coffee production. Prior to 2005, no investments had 
been made in coffee production since the early 1990s (when the former state-owned 
plantation passed into the community’s hands). Thus, without Soppexcca 
intervention, it is likely that coffee production would have remained too low to be 
economically viable and producers would have had either to sell their land or focus 
on basic grain production. In the case of El Esfuerzo, as of 2009, Soppexcca was 
seeking external assistance to enable it to provide the base cooperative with a 
US$80,000 loan to pay its legal obligations, and thus received their collective land 
title (see section 6.3.6). The significance of Soppexcca support comes through in the 
following quotes from sampled households (in response to the question: What is your 
overall level of satisfaction with Soppexcca and why?): 
• Household #139 (El Esfuerzo): “Credit for production, as well as the 
possibility of a credit to legalize or lands.” 
• Household #151 (El Esfuerzo): “Soppexcca gave us the opportunity to have 
access to an organization and credit without having legal land titles—the 
earnings to the producer. Soppexcca supports us in many ways; it has 
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always helped us with family matters, especially health. In the future, we 
hope that Soppexcca will be able to resolve the legal problem.” 
• Household #268 (Julio Hernandez): “The opportunity to be better organized, 
with credit and training on how to manage coffee.” 
• Household #272 (Julio Hernandez): “Security that no one will remove us 
from our lands. I work better being better organized.”  
• Household #274 (Julio Hernandez): “Soppexcca responds to the needs of 
producers, providing credit and teaching how to better cultivate coffee.”  
 
Improved access to education for household dependents 
In general, better-educated people use resources more efficiently and are more likely 
to innovate in production on and off of the farm. Education may also allow for entry in 
nonagricultural activities. The questions addressed here are to what extent did the 
dependants of Soppexcca-affiliated households have access to formal education, 
how did access to formal education vary across the sampled households, and what 
role, if any, did access to value chains for certified coffee play in facilitating access to 
education. Results show a difference in access to education based on gender and 
preexisting asset endowments. However, the magnitude of the difference was small. 
This likely reflected actions by the government53 (e.g., elimination of enrolment fees 
and increased funding for rural education), combined with increased prices for coffee 
and support by Soppexcca and its members (e.g., provision of school supplies, 
construction of two primary schools).   
Among the 203 households that had one or more female dependants, 141 (or 
69.5%) reported schooling for all of their female dependants during the 2008–2009 
academic year. Cluster 2 had the highest percentage of households reporting 
schooling for all female dependants (73.3%), followed by cluster 3 (68.9%) and 
cluster 1 (16.3%). Among the 182 households that had one or more male 
dependants, 137 (75.3%) reported schooling for all of their male dependents. Similar 
to the case of females, cluster 2 had the highest percentage of households reporting 
schooling by all male dependants (82.5%), followed by cluster 1 (69.4%) and cluster 
3 (75.3%). An independent-samples t-test was conducted to compare school 
attendance rates by females and by males. There was a significant difference in the 
number of household members for females (mean=0.48; SD=0.892) and males 
                                               
53
 In general, Nicaragua’s performance in education is noteworthy for the high enrolment rates and the 
increases in such enrolment since 1990, rising from about 73% to almost 92% in 2006; however the 
primary completion rate during the same period increased by only 5 points, from 60% to 65% (ECLAC 
2009). However, despite rather equitable access to primary school, substantial inequities exist in access 
and quality of preschool and postsecondary education. Nicaragua trails other Latin American countries 
in the quality of its primary and secondary education (Angel-Urdinola and Laguna 2008). 
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(mean=0.30; SD=0.578), with a t-statistic (383) equal to 2.316 (p=.021, two tailed). 
However, the magnitude of the difference in the means (mean difference =0.18, 95% 
CI: .026-.325) was small (eta squared=0.012). That is, only 1.2% of the variance in 
number of household members not attending school can be attributed to sex.  
Attribution of school enrolment to participation in Soppexcca and the specialty 
coffee value chain was not possible. However, it was possible to identify the 
important supportive role played by Soppexcca and its donors in facilitating access to 
primary and secondary education. Since 2007, households have received a school 
package (notebook, backpack, and other supplies) at the start of each school year. In 
2009, Soppexcca provided 25 scholarships for males and 19 scholarships for females 
to reduce the costs of secondary education (covering transportation and lodging 
expenses). During the same year, only 10 other households reported having received 
a scholarship from a source other than Soppexcca. In addition, Soppexcca provided 
the funding for the construction of two primary schools, with a combination of its own 
funds and fair-trade dividends (see fig. 9). It was beyond the scope of this research to 
assess the quality of the construction or the education received—however, from a 
social capital perspective, the investment in local communities by Soppexcca is 
noteworthy. The significance of these services was identified by households from 
clusters 1 and 2 when they were asked to identify major benefits from Soppexcca 
membership: 
• Household #47 (cluster 2): “We have benefited from credit, but more than 
anything, from the scholarship for studies.”  
• Household #126 (cluster 1): “They have helped us with the school packets 
and with credit.”  
• Household #209 (cluster 2): “Help with basic necessities, such as school 
packages, uniforms, and during the coffee crisis, help with food.” 
• Household #252 cluster 1): “Access to credit, scholarships, a higher price 
for coffee, and help with the school packets.” 
• Household #268 (cluster 2): The offer of credit for maintaining coffee 
production and for health care, training, and scholarships for our two sons.”  
• Household #277 (cluster 2): “Projects provided through Soppexcca, access 
to credit, and a scholarship for my husband to study accounting.” 
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Fig. 9. La Amistad primary school, constructed with funds from Soppexcca and fair-
trade social premiums 
 
6.5.3 Summary  
Changes in key indicators for social capital during the assessment period: 
• Various types of buyers maintained relations with the sampled households, 
each offering different services valued by the sampled households. 
Households sold to different buyers to meet different livelihood needs. In 
many cases, Soppexcca was not the primary buyer of coffee, despite its 
ability to offer higher prices and more favourable credit terms.  
• Soppexcca’s ability to increase its capture of raw material from members 
will require additional services that address livelihoods realities and needs, 
especially those related to income shortfalls (e.g., more agile payment, 
subsidies for strategic investments, highly targeted and rapid credit). 
• Soppexcca did not replace preexisting linkages for coffee marketing. 
Rather, Soppexcca became one of several coffee buyers. Diversified 
linkages for coffee marketing emerged as a strategy to cover chronic 
income shortages.  
• For most households, the strength of ties with Soppexcca lay in 
Soppexcca’s ability to offer services that increase their resilience to chronic 
income shortfalls, asset erosion, and unanticipated expenses. Most other 
coffee buyers were unable to provide similar services. 
 
6.6 Changes in physical capital endowment  
Changes in physical capital endowments were assessed with the following three 
primary indicators: 1) expansion and improvement of wet-milling infrastructure, 2) 
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expansion and improvement of machinery, equipment, and tools, and 3) expansion 
and improvement of housing infrastructure.  
 
6.6.1 Expansion of wet-milling infrastructure  
Expansion or improvement of wet milling encompasses the construction (or 
refurbishment) of a mill enclosure (fig. 10), construction (or refurbishment) of the 
fermenting tanks, and the purchase (or repair) of machines for depulping and 
pumping water. While most investments were made at the household-level, some 
investments in wet-milling infrastructure were been made collectively, among a 
subset of households in a base cooperative or among all the members of a base 
cooperative. Three collective wet mills were constructed between 2004–2005 and 
2008–2009: one for two members of Bernardino Diáz (US$6,607), one for all the 
members of Ernesto Acuña (US$56,000), and another for the members of Julio 
Hernandez (US$5,589). All of these expenditures in collective wet-milling 
infrastructure were facilitated by a long-term credit from Soppexcca, the costs of 
which were spread out among participating households in the form of individual 
three-year credits (to be repaid with the delivery of green coffee to Soppexcca).  
Individual households invested US$137,958.59 in wet-milling infrastructure 
during the assessment period, of which US$113,686 was invested by households 
that produced conventional coffee and US$24,269 by households that produced 
organically certified coffee. Table 36 provides expenditures for wet-milling 
infrastructure made by individual households between 2004–2005 and 2008–2009. In 
general, data show that households in clusters 2 and 3 achieved considerable 
advances in their wet-milling capacities. Expenditures by cluster 2 households 
averaged US$822 (conventional producers) and US$825 (organically certified 
producers). Cluster 3 members producing conventional coffee reported an average 
investment of US$1,502, while investments by organically certified households 
averaged US$799. On the other hand, average investments by households in cluster 
1 were markedly smaller. Among those in cluster 1 that produced conventional 
coffee, average investments totalled US$499, while those by organically certified 
households were US$563. 
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Fig. 10. Example of wet-milling infrastructure for coffee production financed with long-
term credit from Soppexcca  
 
Evidence suggested that the Soppexcca credit program contributed to 
investments in wet-milling infrastructure and machinery. Forty-three households—or 
32% of all households that invested in construction/upgrading of wet-milling 
infrastructure and machinery—received short- or long-term credit that was used for 
construction/upgrading of wet-milling infrastructure and machinery. These 
households reported a total of US$97,847 in credit received between 2004–2005 and 
2008–2009. In some cases, households reported using a percentage of long-term 
credit received for the renovation of coffee plantations and short-term credit received 
for the production of coffee to invest in physical capital. In addition, a strong focus on 
improving the quality of coffee and improved environmental stewardship by 
Soppexcca-provided extension services is likely to have encouraged some 
households to invest in more environmentally friendly forms of wet milling for the first 
time. 
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Table 35. Expenditures for infrastructure and machinery for wet milling of coffee (for 
individual household usage) between 2004–2005 and 2008–2009  
Type of 
infrastructure or 
machinery 
# of households 
making an 
investment 
Total 
investment 
reported (US$) 
Average investment 
(SD in parentheses) 
(US$) 
Max reported 
investment 
(US$) 
Cluster 1  
Conventional households 
Wet mill    2   671    335 (±474)   671 
Depulper   5 2,761   552 (±506 1,397 
Water pump   1   559 559 (na)   559 
Total   8 3,991     499 (±434) 1,397 
Organically certified households  
Wet mill    0       0 0    0 
Depulper     4 2,253         563 (±298) 839 
Water pump    0      0 0    0 
Total   4 2,253         563 (±298) 839 
Cluster 2 
Conventional households 
Wet mill  16 27,686 1,730 (±1,891) 6,987 
Depulper 28 11,431 408 (±255) 1,118 
Water pump   9   4,483 498 (±146)   866 
Total 53 43,600    822 (±1,197) 6,987 
Organically certified households 
Wet mill    5   7,099    1,420 (±1,228) 3,186 
Depulper 10   5,198 5,205 (±259)   950 
Water pump   2   1,733   866 (±909) 1,509 
Total 17 14,029   825 (±797) 3,186 
Cluster 3 
Conventional households  
Wet mill  18 49,318 2,740 (±2,650) 11,179 
Depulper 14 10,915 780 (±310)   1,230 
Water pump 12   5,864 489 (±228)   1,118 
Total 44 66,097 1,502 (±1,979) 11,179 
Organically certified households 
Wet mill    3 5,478   1,826 (±1,380) 3,354 
Depulper   5 1,688   338 (±253)   671 
Water pump   2    823 411 (±90)   475 
Total 10 7,989    799 (±978) 3,354 
 
 
6.6.2 Expansion of other machinery and tools  
Sampled households reported their acquirement of machinery and tools (in addition 
to those used for wet milling) between 2004–2005 and 2008–2009. The largest 
investments in other machinery and tools were made by households that produced 
conventional coffee in clusters 2 and 3 (table 37). However, the mean investment for 
households in cluster 2 is markedly smaller than that of households in cluster 3. 
Overall, investments by conventional households were markedly larger than 
investments by organically certified households.  
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Table 36. Machinery and tool investments (in addition to wet-milling infrastructure 
and machinery), 2004–2005 to 2008–2009 
Cluster # of 
households 
making an 
investment 
Total 
investment/
household 
(US$) 
Mean 
investment/house
hold (US$) (SD in 
parentheses) 
Max  
investment/ 
household 
(US$) 
Median 
investment/ 
household 
(US$) 
Conventional households 
1 (n=49)   40   5,185  130 (±335)   1,945   29 
2 (n=129) 103 34,084  331 (±917)   7,826   84 
3 (n=43)   38 46,937 1,235 (±2645) 14,405 412 
Total  
(n=221) 
181 86,206   476 (±1449) 14,405   84 
Organically certified households 
1 (n=28)   20   1,847  92 (±143)    637   58 
2 (n=33)   24   4,642 193 (±439) 2,096   63 
3 (n=10)   11   6,639 603 (±850) 2,907 313 
Total  
(n=71) 
  55 13,127 239 (±509) 2,907   67 
 
 
In general, findings suggest that households from cluster 1 and 2 struggled to 
build their physical capital endowments for on-farm production. For these households 
that made acquisitions, support from NGOs often made the acquisition possible. 
Among the 48 households that produced conventional coffee in cluster 1, 40 acquired 
new machinery and tools,54 and eight did not report any change in endowment of 
other machinery or tools during the assessment period. Among those households 
that increased their endowment, the mean cash investment was roughly US$129. 
Given the high level of variation in the sample, the median value is also reported 
(US$28.65). Among the 20 organically certified households in cluster 1, the mean 
investment, about US$92, was somewhat lower than the mean investment for 
conventional households of the same cluster. The largest purchase was for US$637 
for the construction of a goat corral, using funds donated by a local NGO.  
Among the 131 households that produced conventional coffee from cluster 2, 
103 households increased their endowment of other machinery and tools during the 
period under observation.55 The average cash outlay for the machinery and tools was 
roughly US$331. The average value of acquisitions by organically certified 
                                               
54
 The most common acquisition was for small tools for the production of coffee and basic grains, such 
as machetes, shovels, and sorting screens. Another common acquisition was backpack sprayers for the 
application of liquid fertilizers and herbicides (number of households=19; three of the sprayers were 
donated by local NGOs and 14 were purchased at an average cost of about US$86). Other, less 
common, acquisitions included silos for storage of basic grains (4), barrels for storage of basic grains 
(2), and motorized chain saws (2). The largest cash investment was for US$1,945 for the construction of 
a hotel and gardens for attracting tourists.  
55
 The most common acquisition was for basic tools for production of coffee and basic grains (machetes, 
shovels, screens). Seventy-two sprayers were acquired at an average cost of US$87. Other common 
acquisitions included large farm animals (14, at an average cost of US$155) and silos for the storage of 
basic grains (13, at an average cost of US$100). Two households acquired a used truck, one (for 
US$7,825) was purchased with credit from a commercial bank and with income from the sale of coffee, 
while the other (for US$3,922) was purchased with income derived from off-farm employment.  
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households in cluster 2 was significantly lower at US$193. In most cases, 
acquisitions were for spray backpacks and small tools. The largest single acquisition 
was of a motorized chopper for the production of livestock feed, at a cost of 
US$1,788, acquired through the sale of livestock. 
Among the 42 households that produced conventional coffee in cluster 3, 38 
increased their endowment of other machinery and tools during the period under 
observation.56 The average cash outlay for related acquisitions was roughly 
US$1,235, which was more than three times the outlay made by conventional 
producers in cluster 2 and nearly 10 times that made by conventional producers in 
cluster 1. The average value of acquisitions by organically certified households in 
cluster 3 was roughly half that of their conventional counterparts, at about US$604.  
 
6.6.3 Addition to and improvement of housing infrastructure 
Secure shelter allows households to meet their subsistence needs and to be 
productive on and off the farm. Typical housing infrastructure for Soppexcca 
members observed during data collection included a one-room hut with a zinc roof, 
dirt floor, and in some cases, a latrine (fig. 11). Sampled Soppexcca members 
reported 1) additions to their housing infrastructure (e.g., construction of a new home, 
addition of a new room or shop) and 2) changes in the state of their existing 
household infrastructure (e.g., addition of a solar panel, laying of a concrete floor). 
Questions related to access to basic services such as electricity, telephone services, 
and running water were not asked because the vast majority of communities in which 
the sampled households lived did not have access to such services.  
Table 38 presents expenditures for the construction of new houses between 
2004–2005 and 2008–2009. Reported expenditures likely underestimate total 
investments, as timber and other products were likely sourced on the farm and some 
materials were donated by projects (e.g., zinc roofing, latrines). Such caveats aside, it 
is surprising the number of households that did not report additions to or 
improvements in housing during the period. In the case of cluster 1, 83% of the 
households did not report any investment in housing. The results for clusters 2 and 3 
were similar, at 71% and 81%, respectively.  
                                               
56
 The most common acquisition was for basic tools for the production of coffee and basic grains 
(machete, shovel, screens). Forty-four backpack sprayers were acquired at an average cost of US$78. 
Other common acquisitions include silos for the storage of basic grains (19, at an average cost of 
US$82) and motorized chain saws (15, at an average cost of US$572). Two households acquired a 
used truck during the period, one (for US$11,179) was purchased with credit from a commercial bank 
and with income from coffee sales, while the other (for US$3,912) was purchased with income derived 
mainly from the sale of coffee. Two motorized choppers for the production of livestock feed were 
acquired at an average cost of US$1,705. One household invested US$7,154 to add expand its house 
and construct nature trails in an effort to attract tourists. This investment was made possible with prize 
winnings for coffee cupping contests, a long-term loan from Soppexcca, and earnings from coffee sales. 
The largest single acquisition was a barn, at a cost of US$2,794, acquired through the sale of coffee. 
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Fig. 11 Typical housing infrastructure, La Union base cooperative, Jinotega  
 
 
Among the 61 households producing conventional coffee that invested in new 
housing, the average expenditure was US$ 2092. As before, expenditures vary 
considerably according to cluster. Households in cluster 1 had expenditures of about 
US$2,614; however, the mean is highly influenced by one household that spent more 
than US$16,000 on a house in the town of Jinotega, with savings accumulated during 
various years of working in the United States. For this reason, the medium value 
(US$671) provides a more reliable estimate of central tendency. The mean value of 
expenditures by conventional coffee-growing households in clusters 2 and 3 is 
US$1,250 and US$5,596, respectively. Only nine households that produce 
organically certified coffee had expenditures for new housing during the period. The 
average expenditure was US$838 across all three clusters.  
 
Table 37. Expenditures for new housing infrastructure, 2004–2005 to 2008–2009 
Cluster # households 
reporting 
investments 
% of 
households 
reporting 
investments 
Total cash 
investment 
(US$) 
Mean investment 
(US$) (SD in 
parentheses) 
Median 
amount 
(US$) 
Conventional households  
1 (n=49) 12 24.5   31,610 2,634 (±4,838)   671 
2 (n=129) 41 31.8   51,269 1,251 (±1,561)   838 
3 (n=43)   8 18.6   44,774 5,597 (±5,965) 3,969 
Total 61 27.6 127,652 2,093 (±3,499)   839 
Organically certified households 
1 (n=28)   1 3.6  2,236 2,236 (n.a.) 2,236 
2 (n=33)   6 18.2   6,540      1,090 (±1,565)   475 
3 (n=10)   2 20.0   2,515   1,258 (±593) 1,258 
Total   9 12.7 11,291      1,255 (±1,310)   839 
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Investments in upgrading key features of existing housing infrastructure during 
the assessment period were also limited across the clusters (table 39). In 2004–2005, 
about 60% of the households that produced conventional coffee lived in houses with 
a dirt floor. By 2008–2009, the percentage had decreased to 55%.57 Four organically 
certified households upgraded the floors of their houses during the five-years. All four 
households attributed the sale of coffee as the major factor that allowed for 
investment in upgrading. 
Most rural households reported having zinc roofs, regardless of income or 
location. However, a few households reported having roofs made of sheets of black 
plastic that were tied onto poles made from cut tree branches. In 2004–2005, eight 
households from clusters 1 and 2 reported having a plastic roof, but by 2008–2009, 
the number fell to four.58 These data paint a rough picture of the changes in roofing 
infrastructure. The age and condition of the zinc are also important determinants of 
the quality of the roofing. Households were asked if they had invested in the 
replacement of zinc during the five-year period. Responses indicated that few had 
done so. Of the 209 households that reported having zinc roofs in 2004–2005, 27 
(12.9%) reported having purchased zinc, with an average expenditure of about 
US$175.  
Similarly, there was little variation in the material used for the construction of 
walls for the houses of the sample. Most had walls made of rough-cut wooden 
planks. In the worst case, houses had walls made of sheets of black plastic tied to cut 
tree branches. In the best of cases, walls were made of cement or of a combination 
of cement of other material, mainly wood. Only five households reported having 
upgraded their building material from plastic or wood to cement.59  
 
                                               
57
 One household received a donation of cement that allowed for the upgrade from dirt to cement floor. 
Another used the proceeds for the sale of property to cover the expense of upgrading. The remaining 
four households reported that the sale of coffee and other projects had allowed for the upgrading. 
58
 One of the households that upgraded the roof was able to do so with support of materials received 
from other family members. The other three households invested in upgrading with income received 
from the sale of coffee and other agricultural products. 
59
 Three of the households (all conventional producers from cluster 3) were able to provide an estimate 
of their expenditures, which on average was US$656. One household (conventional from cluster 2) was 
able to upgrade with donations from other family members and another (organic cluster 1) was able to 
upgrade with income derived from off-farm employment. Seven households reported have invested in 
upgrading existing materials, at an average investment of US$452. All these households attributed their 
ability to investment to the sale of coffee.  
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Table 38. Improvements in housing infrastructure, 2004–2005 to 2008–2009 
Cluster # households 
reporting 
# households 
with lower 
quality material 
in 2005* 
# households 
with lower 
quality material 
in 2009* 
# households 
with improved 
quality of 
material 
Floor (lower quality=dirt; higher quality=cement, wood, ceramic) 
Conventional households 
1 (n=49) 
  46   25   24 1 
2 (n=129) 125   89   83 6 
3 (n=43) 
  42   14   12 2 
Total 213 128 119 9 
Organically certified households 
1 (n=28) 25   9   9 0 
2 (n=33) 32 21 17 4 
3 (n=10) 
  9   4   4 0 
Total 66 34 30 4 
Roof (lower quality=plastic tarp; higher quality=zinc panel) 
Conventional households  
1 (n=49) 
  47 1 1 0 
2 (n=129) 125 7 3 4 
3 (n=43) 
  45 0 0 0 
Total 217 8 4 4 
Organically certified households 
1 (n=28) 26 0 0 0 
2 (n=33) 32 0 0 0 
3 (n=10) 
  9 0 0 0 
Total 67 0 0 0 
Walls (lower quality=plastic tarp, mud or wood; higher quality=cement or combination 
cement and other material) 
Conventional households 
1 (n=49) 
  46   25   25 0 
2 (n=129) 118   90   85 5 
3 (n=43) 
  38   16   16 0 
Total 202 131 126 5 
Organically certified households 
1 (n=28) 25 13 13 0 
2 (n=33) 28 19 19 0 
3 (n=10) 
  7   4   4 0 
Total 60 36 36 0 
 
6.6.4 Summary 
Changes in key indicators for physical capital during the assessment period: 
• Investments to upgrade wet-milling infrastructure were most common 
among the sample, with 135 households (105 conventional and 30 organic) 
investing US$92,465 (US$68,196 in collective investments and US$24,269 
in individual household investments). In addition to reducing water 
contamination and usage, these investments could improve the quality of 
green coffee. 
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• Investments in upgrading other equipment and tools for on-farm production 
totalled US$99,333 during the assessment period. Most of this amount was 
invested by households producing conventional coffee (US$86,206), with 
the remaining amount (US$13,127) invested by organically certified 
households. Among households producing conventional coffee, the average 
annual investment during the five-year period was US$2,625—or, 
US$59/year/household. Among organically certified households, the 
average annual investment during the period was US$2,625—or, 
US$8.99/year/household.  
• Investments in new housing infrastructure totalled US$138,943. Again, most 
of this amount was invested by households producing conventional coffee 
(US$127,652), with the remaining amount (US$11,291) invested by 
organically certified households. Overall investments to improve existing 
housing infrastructure were limited across the sample.  
 
6.7 Changes in financial capital endowment  
This section explores changes in financial capital endowments among sampled 
households. Discussions begin with an analysis of income levels and sources. 
Although not an asset per se, income flows are a key determinant of a household’s 
ability to build assets. The diversification of income sources, or lack thereof, provides 
insight into the vulnerability context faced by the households. Attention turns to 
access to short- and long-term credit, examining who gets credit, how much is 
obtained, and from which sources, as well as the ability of households to repay their 
short- and long-term credit obligations. 
 
6.7.1 Price and income benefits from certified coffee  
Fig. 12 compares the prices of parchment coffee received by sampled households 
between July 2003 and June 2009. Soppexcca prices for members were formulated 
by averaging the contract price for each type of coffee (less any Soppexcca-related 
expenses and investments) and subtracting the standard deduction for Soppexcca-
provided services, such as processing, marketing, taxes, and certification. During 
2008–2009, these deductions were US$22 for conventional coffee and US$24 for 
organic coffee. Costs of transporting parchment coffee to Soppexcca are paid by the 
grower. During the 2002–2003 growing year—the last year of the coffee crisis—
Soppexcca offered prices that were more than double those offered by direct 
exporters and local buyers. That said, the Soppexcca prices during that year were far 
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below the base price for fair trade coffee,60 reflecting the fact that sales of fair trade 
coffee made up a relatively small percentage of total coffee sales. 
During 2003–2004, however, the gap between prices for conventional coffee 
offered by Soppexcca and by other buyers closed markedly. All coffee buyers offered 
increased prices. However, price increases offered by direct exporters and market 
buyers61 during that year outpaced those offered by Soppexcca. During the 
assessment period, prices offered by direct exporters and market buyers peaked 
briefly above those offered by Soppexcca. This generally occurred during the harvest 
season (December and March) when competition among buyers was highest. In 
addition to direct exporters and market buyers, coffee producers also had the option 
to sell second-quality coffee to market buyers at 50% of the first-quality price. The 
differentiation in price between first- and second-quality coffee emerged in the 2000s. 
Prior to the coffee crisis, coffee was generally in mixed quality based on the New 
York price.  
 
                                               
60 The fair trade price = minimum price of US$125/100 lb + US$ 10/100 lb social premium. However, 
when the New York coffee price reaches US$125 or more, the fair trade price = New York price + 
US$10/sack. (Note: the fair trade premium increased by $5/sack on June 1, 2007. New York price = 
daily closing price of the second position coffee 'C' futures contract at the New York Board of Trade.) For 
certified organic coffee an extra minimum differential of US$20 per sack is applied. However, the precise 
amount of direct additional income a producer receives through fair trade is difficult to calculate, primarily 
because payments vary according to the cooperatives’ handling of debt servicing, cooperative 
expenses, distribution of fair trade social premiums. Secondly, most cooperatives cannot sell all their 
members’ coffee through fair trade channels and so sell the remainder at regular prices. But payments 
to producers for sales of fair trade and non-fair trade coffee are often pooled into a single payment. 
61
 Prices set by direct exporters are 20% to 30% of the New York contract “C” price for coffee (with 
variation depending on demand for coffee by processors). The margin covers costs faced by exporters 
in the processing and marketing of coffee. Data for New York prices were obtained from the International 
Coffee Organization. Market buyers purchase parchment coffee under contract with direct coffee 
exporters. Price offered by market buyers is the direct exporter price, minus a commission, which varied 
at the time between US$0.57 and US$2.78 (per 100-lb bag of parchment coffee). Commissions were 
reported by sampled market buyers in Jinotega and Matagalpa for the 2008–2009 production year.   
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Fig. 12 Prices paid for parchment coffee in Nicaragua, July 2003–May 2009 
 
Table 40 estimates the difference in farm-gate prices for parchment coffee 
between those offered by Soppexcca and those offered by other local buyers. For 
organically certified coffee producers, selling organically certified coffee to Soppexcca 
provided prices between US$35/100 lbs and US$55/100 lbs higher than selling to 
local buyers. An outlier was 2008–2009, when differential reached roughly 
US$63/100 lbs In general, the data suggested that price differentials for organic 
coffee had increased in recent years. According to interviews with Soppexcca staff, 
this reflected high demand for organically certified and fair trade certified coffee, as 
well as a limited supply response. For producers of conventional coffee, the price 
differential received from the sale of coffee to Soppexcca fluctuated between 20% 
and 30% over the price offered by other local buyers. That said, there are higher 
costs related to the sale of coffee to Soppexcca, as compared to direct buyers or 
other buyers, including 1) especially high quality standards and 2) delayed final 
payment (about 20% of total payment) until after all coffee contacts have been paid 
by Soppexcca buyers (between May and June). For some coffee producers, these 
additional costs reduce or eliminate the potential price benefits from the sale of 
conventional coffee to Soppexcca.  
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Table 39. Estimated price benefit from sale of parchment coffee to Soppexcca (as 
compared to direct exporters), 2003–2004 to 2008–2009 
Production 
year 
Reference price 
(US$/100 lbs) 
Producer price (US) 
(US$/100 lbs) 
Price (US$) 
benefit from 
selling to 
Soppexcca 
% higher 
price from 
selling to 
Soppexcca 
Non-
certified* 
Fair trade 
certified 
Direct 
exporter** 
Soppexcca 
Organically certified 
2003–2004 NA 140.00 NA   85.00 36.23 73.5 
2004–2005 NA 140.00 NA 124.00 38.70 45.9 
2005–2006 NA 140.00 NA 120.00 35.76 42.9 
2006–2007 NA 140.00 NA 146.00 54.72 60.4 
2007–2008 NA 150.00 NA 150.00 41.97 38.9 
2008–2009 NA 155.00 NA 150.00 63.30 72.4 
Conventional 
2003–2004   65.03 125.00   48.77   65.00 16.23 32.7 
2004–2005 114.73 125.00   85.30 109.00 24.70 28.2 
2005–2006 112.32 125.00   84.24 100.00 16.76 19.0 
2006–2007 122.71 126.71   91.28 121.00 30.72 33.0 
2007–2008 144.05 154.05 108.03 130.00 21.97 20.4 
2008–2009 116.61 135.00   86.70 110.00 23.30 26.4 
* Four-month average of New York “C” contract price between December and March  
** Price is calculated at 75% of the four-month average of the New York price.  
 
Previously, it was observed that most Soppexcca-affiliated households sell a 
significant percentage of their annual coffee production to buyers other than 
Soppexcca. Table 41 presents estimates of the annual gross income benefits 
sampled households received by selling coffee to Soppexcca and other buyers (thus 
taking into account side selling). Among households in cluster 1, organically certified 
households earned an estimated US$164, roughly seven times the earnings of their 
conventional counterparts. Among households in cluster 2, additional earnings were 
only marginally higher, for producers of conventional and organically certified coffee, 
at US$72 and US$252, respectively. Organically certified households from cluster 3 
achieved the highest additional income (US$1,356), followed by conventional 
households from the same cluster (US$341).  
Table 41 also provides insights into the cost of side selling to the sampled 
households in terms of reduced gross income from coffee between 2006–2007 and 
2007–2008. Across all organically certified producers, on average, households 
captured 67% of the highest possible income benefit from sales to Soppexcca. 
Households in cluster 3 captured 71%, followed by households in cluster 2 with 69%, 
and households in cluster 1 with 64%. The ability to capture fully the income benefits 
from participation in certified coffee markets was markedly lower, however, for 
households producing conventional coffee. Among all conventional producers, on 
average, 36% of the income benefits were captured. Households in cluster 3 
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struggled the most, with 32% of total benefits captured, followed by households in 
cluster 1 (33%) and cluster 2 (38%).  
   
Table 40. Estimated average annual gross income benefit (US$) for households from 
coffee sales to Soppexcca and other buyers (2007–2008 to 2008–2009) 
Cluster Total 
coffee 
production 
(100 lb. 
green 
coffee) 
Highest 
possible 
income 
from 
coffee* 
Highest 
possible 
income 
benefit** 
Actual income 
from coffee 
taking into 
account sales to 
Soppexcca and 
other buyers 
Actual 
additional 
income from 
coffee sales 
from sales to 
Soppexcca 
Percent  
of total 
highest 
possible 
income 
captured   
Conventional 
1    5.9    635     63    347   21 33 
2   18.0   1,940   191 1,154   72 38 
3 100.2 10,822 1,064 5,791 341 32 
Total   31.3   3,379    333 1,933 119 36 
Organic 
1   6.6   902    256    631    164 64 
2   9.5 1,296    368    966    252 69 
3 49.4 6,719 1,909 5,171 1,356 71 
Total 14.0 1,905    541 1,392    363 67 
* Assumes that 100% of coffee production was sold to Soppexcca. The following two-year 
average farm-gate prices were used: US$ 136 for organic coffee and US$ 114 for 
conventional coffee. 
** Difference in income generated from 100 percent of coffee production being sold to 
Soppexcca versus income generated from 100 percent of coffee being sold to other buyers. A 
two-year average farm-gate price of US$ 97 was used for estimating income from sales to 
other buyers.  
 
6.7.2 Diversification of short-term credit sources 
As highlighted previously, most sampled households (57%) did not report access to 
short-term credit prior to joining Soppexcca. However, since 2005, opportunities for 
obtaining short-term credit increased, as prices in international coffee markets 
increased significantly and have remained at relatively high levels. In addition to 
Soppexcca, other sources for short-term credit for agricultural production identified by 
the sampled households were 1) commercial banks and specialized lending 
organizations, 2) coffee buyers, such as direct exporters and intermediaries, 3) NGOs 
and projects, and 4) informal lenders (individual persons).  
Collateral requirements varied among the different types—for example, formal 
lenders and direct exporters required land titles for credit access while Soppexcca, 
intermediaries, specialized lending organizations, NGOs, projects, and informal 
lenders typically did not. The cost of short-term credit provided by Soppexcca (16% 
annual interest) was markedly less in 2008–2009 than credit provide by other 
sources. The average annual interest charged by all other sources was 21.3%. The 
cost of short-term credit by other sources showed relatively limited variation: El 
Fondo de Desarrollo Local (FDL), a specialized lender for agricultural production, 
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charged an average of 23.5%; Osman Gutierrez charged an average of 22.2%; the 
commercial bank Citibank charged 19.6%; while the NGO Casa del Niño charged an 
average of 18.6%. However, annual interest rates that significantly exceed these 
average rates were reported: market buyers charged 50% to 60% annual interest and 
one informal lender changed 120%. On the other hand, these lenders typically 
provided credit in the form of basic grain and other basic foodstuffs throughout the 
year in exchange for promises to deliver coffee during the harvest season. 
 Forty-four households from clusters 1 and 2 (or 15% of the sample) reported 
no use of short-term credit between 2004–2005 and 2008–2009. Among the 248 
households that received short-term credit, most (n=160, 55%) reported Soppexcca 
as their only source of short-term credit. However, households were able to obtain 
credit from Soppexcca and other sources in some cases. For households in clusters 
1 and 2, additional credit was often sought for the production of basic grains. In the 
case of cluster 3, households often sought additional credit for coffee production. 
Sixty-seven households reported credit sources in addition to Soppexcca (table 42). 
The mean amount of the most recent additional credit obtained varied markedly by 
cluster: from a low of US$225 for households in cluster 1 to a high of US$2,352 for 
households in cluster 3.  
Soppexcca provided credit that covered only the most basic of coffee 
production activities. The amount provided was based on an assessment by a 
Soppexcca extensionist, with little input from the producer. A four-year credit history 
from Soppexcca was available for the 174 households that received credit from the 
four-year period between 2004–2005 and 2007–2008. (Credit history for the 2008–
2009 production year was not available at the time of data collection.) The cluster 
make-up of this subset of the sampled households was as follows: 43 from cluster 1, 
97 from cluster 2, 34 from cluster 3. Table 43 compares the average amount of credit 
received by these households across the three clusters between 2004–2005 and 
2007–2008. The differences between the mean credit values were statistically 
significant across all four of the years under observation. The mean credit values for 
households in cluster 1 ranged from a high of US$197 in 2007–2008 to a low of 
US$110 in 2006–2007. With the exception of the year 2005–2006, the mean credit 
values for households in cluster 2 were roughly twice the mean credit values of 
households in cluster 1. Households in cluster 3 received markedly greater credit 
volumes that those of clusters 2 and 3.  
 
Table 41. Access to short-term credit from sources other than Soppexcca 
Cluster # 
household 
Source Mean amount 
of credit Bank/ Intermediary NGO Informal 
174 
 
reporting 
access to 
credit 
specialized 
lending 
organization 
/exporter /project lender (US$)* 
Households with credit in addition to Soppexcca-provided credit 
1 12 3   1   7 1    225 
2 39 9 14 14 2    467 
3 16 6   6   1 3 2,353 
Households with credit only from sources other than Soppexcca 
1   2 0 0 2 0    130 
2 11 4 3 4 0    514 
3   8 4 3 0 1 1,140 
* Credit amount reported to last credit received from reported source 
 
Between 60% and 74% of the 174 households received credit in any one year 
(table 43). Among the 43 households in cluster 1 that received credit during the 
period between 2004–2005 and 2007–2008, only four households received credit in 
each of the four years. Nine households received credit in three of the four years, 10 
households received credit during two of the four years, and 20 households received 
credit in only one of the four years. Among the 97 households from cluster 2 that 
received credit from Soppexcca during the four-year period, 11 households received 
credit in each of the four years. Twenty-eight households received credit in three of 
the four years, 19 households received credit during two of the four years, and the 
remaining 39 households received credit only once during the four years. Among the 
34 households from cluster 3 that received credit from Soppexcca during the four-
year period, seven households received credit in each of the four years. Five 
households received credit in three of the four years, six households received credit 
during two of the four years, and the remaining 16 households received credit only 
once during the four years. 
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Table 42. ANOVA comparing short-term credit provided by Soppexcca, from 2004–
2005 to 2007–2008, by cluster 
Production 
year 
Cluster # house-
holds 
receiving 
credit 
Mean credit amount 
(SD) (US$) 
Standard 
error 
95% confidence 
internal around the 
mean 
Lower 
limit 
Upper 
limit 
2004–2005 
F (2, 88)=15.17 
p<.05 
1   20 132.63 (±79.43)   19.86      90.30    174.95 
2   61    240.84 (±159.48)   21.31    198.13    283.54 
3   24    480.39 (±312.31)   78.08    313.97    646.80 
Total 105    264.72 (±214.74)   22.89    219.22    310.21 
2005–2006 
F (2, 
106)=26.29, 
p<.05 
1   29    231.48 (±218.54)   41.30    146.74    316.22 
2   74    282.60 (±209.36)   27.03    228.51    336.68 
3   26   1,111.19 (±1003.39) 236.50    612.22 1,610.16 
Total 129     409.80 (±549.52)   53.37    303.97    515.63 
2006–2007 
F (2, 
67)=11.65, 
p<.05 
1   24     110.59 (±130.76)   32.69       40.91    180.27 
2   58     193.62 (±199.11)   32.30    128.18    259.07 
3   24     562.50 (±495.45) 137.41    263.10    861.90 
Total 106     245.37 (±310.64)   37.95    169.60    321.14 
2007–2008 
F (2, 
104)=46.58, 
p<.05 
1   33     197.12 (±188.40)   34.98    125.45    268.78 
2   64   390.26 (±320.4)   44.01    301.93    478.59 
3   27    1,805.03 (±1305.53) 278.34 1,226.19 2,383.87 
Total 124       635.68 (±886.68)   86.94    463.24    808.12 
Source: Soppexcca credit department 
 
As evidenced above, most households did not receive credit during each of 
the years under analysis. This raises the possibility that households were unwilling or 
unable to receive additional credit. Table 44 presents data of household’s ability to 
repay short-term credit for the four years between 2004–2005 and 2007–2008. 
Among households in cluster 1, the percentage of households unable to repay their 
short-term credit obligations to Soppexcca fluctuated between 20% (2004–2005) and 
55% (2005–2006). In the 2005–2006 year, six households had a debt of more than 
US$100 to Soppexcca. Each US$50 of debt roughly translates into an additional bag 
of parchment coffee that has to be delivered to Soppexcca without pay during the 
following production year. Given that, on average, a household in cluster 1 only 
produces 8.8 bags per year, even a small amount of debt can mean limited or no 
access to credit during the following year. In the case of cluster 2 households, the 
results are only slightly more encouraging, with the percentage of households unable 
to meet short-term credit obligations ranging from 17% (2007–2008) to 38% (2004–
2005). This analysis highlights the double-edged sword that credit provision 
represented for those households with relatively limited land available for coffee 
production and that had yet to achieve reasonable productivity levels that would allow 
increased ability to repay credit obligations. 
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Table 43. Household ability to repay short-term credit for coffee production provided 
by Soppexcca to household producers, 2004–2005 to 2007–2008 
 End-of-the-year short-term credit balance (US$)* 
-101 and 
less 
-100 to -51 -50 to -1 0-50 51 and over 
Cluster 1 
2004–2005 
  1 1 2 4 12 
2005–2006 
  6 9 1 2 11 
2006–2007 
  1 1 4 4 14 
2007–2008 
  4 4 7 2 16 
Cluster 2  
2004–2005 
  8 9 6 4 34 
2005–2006 11 2 0 5 56 
2006–2007 
  3 3 7 7 38 
2007-2008 
  5 2 4 4 49 
Cluster 3  
2004–2005 
  1 1 0 1 21 
2005–2006 
  0 0 0 0 26 
2006–2007 
  3 0 0 1 20 
2007–2008 
  4 1 0 1 21 
Source: Soppexcca credit department 
* Obtained by subtracting short-term annual credit obligations and advance payments for 
coffee deliveries from total income obtained from coffee sold to Soppexcca. The amount of 
advance payment varies between 2004-2005 and 2007–2008 (based on international coffee 
prices), from a low of US$0.10/lb (parchment) to a high of US$0.20/lb (parchment).  
 
 
6.7.3 Diversification of long-term credit sources 
As discussed previously, the ability households from clusters 1 and 2 to expand 
coffee production was related to their access to long-term credit. Credit was also 
used by the sampled households for investments to improve wet-milling operations 
and purchase livestock. Soppexcca was the most important source of long-term 
credit for the sampled households (table 45). Analysis here focuses on understanding 
which sampled households received long-term credit (and how much was received 
and from which sources), as well as the ability of the sampled households to repay 
the credit provided by Soppexcca. 
Between 2004–2005 and 2008–2009, 25 sampled households received 
US$70,011 in credit for the purchase of land. The average amount of credit was 
US$2,756. Roughly 85% of this credit was provided by Soppexcca. Among the 
clusters, the average amount varied from a low of US$1,584 for households in cluster 
1 to a high of nearly US$3,000 for households in cluster 3. However, the difference in 
the mean values across the clusters was not statistically significant. For households 
in clusters 1 and 3, Soppexcca supplied nearly all of the credit for land expansion. 
Among households in cluster 2, a total of US$40,162 in credit was received, of which 
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roughly 77% was provided by Soppexcca. The remaining 23% of the credit was 
provided by other coffee buyers (e.g., Osman Gutierrez) and commercial banks.  
 
Table 44. ANOVA comparing long-term credit from 2004–2005 to 2008–2009 
Credit use Clus-
ter 
N Total credit 
reported 
(US$) 
% credit 
provided by 
Soppexcca 
Mean 
credit 
amount 
(SD) 
Stan-
dard 
error 
95% confidence 
internal for mean 
Lower 
limit 
Upper 
limit 
Purchase of 
land  
F (2, 22)=.047 
p>.05 
1   3     4,751 100.0 1,584 
(703) 
   406 -163 3,331 
2 14    40,162 76.5 2,869 
(2,400) 
   641 1,483 4,254 
3   8    25,097 95.5 2,998 
(2235) 
   790 1,129 4,866 
Total 25    70,011 84.9 2,756 
(2194) 
   439 1,850 3,661 
Renovating 
existing coffee 
plantations or 
establishing 
new 
plantations  
F (2, 
136)=16.10 
p<.05 
1   25    22,057 100.0    882 
(1,141) 
   228    411 1,353 
2   91    75,927 94.6    832 
(574) 
    60    712    951 
3   23    62,068 99.0 2,699 
(3152) 
   657 1,335 4,061 
Total 139 160,064 96.9 1,150 
(1583) 
   134    884 1,415 
Other needs 
(purchase of 
wet-milling 
infrastructure, 
purchase of 
livestock, etc.) 
F (2, 42)=3.34 
p<.05 
1   7     3,321 66.1   475 
(250) 
    94    243    705 
2 22    31,226 66.9 1,556 
(2,041) 
   448    623 2,489 
3 16    63,301 57.2 3,769 
(4,776) 
1,194 1,224 6,313 
Total 45    97,847 61.3 2,174 
(3,387) 
   504 1,157 3,192 
  
 
For many households, credit for expansion and improvement of coffee 
plantations provided capital for rebuilding natural capital after a prolonged period of 
erosion during the coffee crisis. The average amount of credit across the sample for 
the five-year period was US$1,150.62 The average amount varied by cluster: from a 
low of US$882 for households in cluster 1 to a high of US$2,699. Soppexcca was the 
                                               
62
 Setting up a new area of coffee production requires significant investment. In addition to the direct 
costs (years one to three) of establishment (land clearing, planting, establishing and maintaining the 
coffee until fruit bearing), households must bear the opportunity costs of approximately three years 
without income until the plants begin to produce. The standard amount that Soppexcca lends to its 
members to establish a manzana of coffee is $1,200 (2009). Rodríguez and Vásquez (2004) estimate 
set up costs for smallholder coffee production at $1,203, of which US$ 1,040 is for setup and US$164 is 
for maintenance during the first year. These figures include expenses for chemical inputs and labour. 
However, not all of the increase in coffee area by Soppexcca members is new production (increase 
could be the rejuvenation of previously unproductive coffee). Many households affiliated with Soppexcca 
do not use any chemical inputs and the hiring of labour is reduced to a minimum. This implies that the 
overall costs of expansion of coffee production may be much lower in some cases.  
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major source of credit for expansion and rejuvenation of coffee plantations, providing 
nearly 97% of the total credit obtained. In only a few cases were commercial banks 
and specialized finance organizations able to provide long-term credit for improving 
coffee plantations. 
By providing long-term credit, Soppexcca, commercial banks, and other coffee 
buyers facilitated the expansion of infrastructure, machinery, and tools, as well as 
livestock and other types of investments for agricultural production among the 
sampled households. Forty-three sampled households received long-term credit for 
the abovementioned purposes. These households reported US$97,847 in credit 
received between 2004–2005 and 2008–2009. Soppexcca accounted for 61% of the 
total credit reported by the sampled households. With the reduced involvement of 
Soppexcca, the difference between the mean credit amounts per cluster increase 
markedly. The majority (64%) of the long-term credit was provided to 16 households 
in cluster 3. The mean credit received by households in cluster 3 was US$3,769. 
Households in cluster 2 received approximately 32% of the total credit amount. The 
average size of the credit was US$1,556, or approximately 41% of the mean amount 
received by households in cluster 3. Households belonging to cluster 1 received on 
average US$475 of the long-term credit for expansion and maintenance of physical 
capital and other agricultural-related investments. The average amount of credit 
received by households in cluster 1 was a mere 13% of the average amount received 
by households in cluster 3.Table 46 sheds additional light on the difficulty faced by 
households to comply with long-term credit obligations to Soppexcca. Credit 
repayment was assessed over the period between 2004–2005 and 2007–2008 for 72 
households. Compliance was lowest for households in cluster 1, where only two of 
the sampled households had sufficient coffee production to meet their long-term 
credit obligations for the given year. Among households in cluster 2, during years of 
relatively low production, such as 2004–2005 and 2006–2007, few households were 
able to comply (in the extreme case of 2004–2005, none of the households 
complied). In years of higher production, such as 2005–2006 and 2007–2008, 
between 39% and 36%, respectively, of the sampled households were able to comply 
fully with their long-term credit obligations. Results for cluster 3 also appeared to 
fluctuate according to production volumes, with 22% of households fully complying 
with credit obligations in period of low production volumes (2004–2005 and 2006–
2007), and 60% to 67% in periods of relatively high production levels (2005–2006 
and 2007–2008).  
 
179 
 
Table 45. Percentage compliance with long-term credit obligations with Soppexcca 
from 2004–2005 to 2007–2008 
 Percentage compliance with long-term credit obligations* 
0%–24% 25%–49% 50%–74% 75%–99% 100%+ 
Cluster 1 
2004–2005 
  5 0 0 0 0 
2005–2006  
  7 1 3 1 0 
2006–2007 
  3 0 0 0 0 
2007–2008 
  3 0 0 1 2 
Cluster 2  
2004–2005 10 0 0 0 0 
2005–2006 
  7 3 2 2 9 
2006–2007 10 6 2 0 2 
2007–2008   9 1 2 2 8 
Cluster 3  
2004–2005 
  5 2 0 0 2 
2005–2006   
  2 1 3 0 9 
2006–2007   
  5 0 2 1 2 
2007–2008 
  2 0 0 1 6 
Source: Soppexcca credit department 
* Percentage compliance calculation = (total coffee delivery—short-term credit 
obligations)/long-term credit obligations, negative percentage compliance reported as zero  
 
6.7.4 Summary  
Changes in key indicators for financial capital during the assessment period: 
• The price benefits received from participation in value chains for certified fair 
trade coffee were diluted due to 1) high costs of operations by Soppexcca 
(and their need to repay debt and capitalize) and 2) need by households to 
sell a significant percentage of their annual production to buyers other than 
Soppexcca. Any solution to this problem will likely require sustained 
investments by the public sector to build assets at the household level to 
expand and smooth income generation and increase resilience. 
• Soppexcca was the main provider of short-term credit to households in 
clusters 1 and 2. Few organizations, including not-for-profit lenders, were 
able to assume the risks related to offering credit to asset-poor coffee 
households. Soppexcca was the only provider of long-term credit.  
• Soppexcca’s members faced major challenges in complying with short- and 
long-term credit obligations in any one year due to fluctuations in coffee 
production and need to sell coffee to buyers other than Soppexcca. Debt 
repayment depends heavily on a good harvest. Overall commitment to 
repaying Soppexcca-provided credit was high by most households (given 
that future credit depends on their ability to repay outstanding debt).  
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7 Lessons from the Soppexcca case study  
 
7.1 Introduction  
This chapter discusses lessons from the Soppexcca case study (chapters 5 and 6) in 
the context of the literature on poverty reduction and private-sector development. The 
following section discusses asset building by Soppexcca and other rural community 
enterprises and the related impact on relationships with buyers and members. The 
third section discusses asset building by the rural poor at the household level and the 
related implications for improved welfare and strengthened resilience. The final 
section presents a critical reflection on the application of the conceptual and 
methodological framework and related implications for development practice. 
 
7.2 Asset building by Soppexcca  
The initial stage of Soppexcca’s development presents a near worst-case scenario 
for cooperative development in a competitive international market. In its first two 
years, Soppexcca inherited a considerable debt from its predecessor organization 
and faced down Hurricane Mitch. Between 2000 and 2003, the coffee crisis meant 
that producers struggled to deliver their coffee to Soppexcca. While fair trade and 
other markets for certified coffee offered higher prices, only a relatively small 
percentage of Soppexcca coffee entered fair trade markets during the years of the 
coffee crisis. Production of certified organic coffee had not yet begun. Despite the 
formidable odds, however, Soppexcca achieved major additions to its asset base 
during the assessment period, but that increase in assets did not come cheaply for 
Soppexcca, its NGO partners, or its members. The literature has yet to provide 
sufficient insights into which options would most effectively build RCEs in less time 
and at less expense, given the generally inhospitable business environment in which 
RCEs operate and the realities of government, donor, and NGO support.  
 
7.2.1 Lessons in human capital development 
Preexisting levels of human capital at Soppexcca were high but were concentrated in 
a few key staff. A dedicated professional general manager and some key 
extensionists held the organization together prior to and during the assessment 
period. In his review of cooperatives in Asia and Africa, Harper (1992, 142) observed 
that relatively successful cooperatives included “an unusual person in that she or he 
possessed entrepreneurial characteristics and management skills of a high level.” 
Harper’s findings certainly hold true for the Soppexcca case. Only in isolated 
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instances did interviewed Soppexcca members mention difficulties or concerns with 
lower-level administrative staff.  
The central issue related to human capital concerned the sustainability of an 
effective administration. In the context of this research, key informants expressed 
concern that the general manager will soon leave Soppexcca and that buyer relations 
would suffer as a result. The centralized governance structure in place prior to and 
during the assessment period provided stability and inspired trust with members, 
NGOs, and buyers. Soppexcca has struggled to build a more active and informed 
member participation in its governance. As noted by Utting (2008), Soppexcca’s 
efforts to build human capital must overcome high levels of illiteracy in most of its 
members, low education levels of representatives on the board, and an overall lack of 
knowledge about how to manage legal, commercial, organizational, and certification 
requirements. However, the viability of Soppexcca and its credibility as a producer-
owned enterprise may depend on increasing human capital among members for 
cooperative strategic decision making and oversight. The literature has yet to address 
the potential for collaboration between RCEs, service providers, and research centres 
to build more effective and sustainable bottom-up governance structures. Also, 
literature discussions of cooperative administration have yet to go beyond the 
potential for elite benefit capturing by volunteer or professional leaders. Evidence 
here suggests that more in-depth discussions are needed, taking into account issues 
of culture, information sharing, and the role of NGOs in building and supporting the 
development of effective governance structures. 
The dramatic increase in the number of extensionists featured prominently 
among the changes in human capital. However, to what extent has this change 
improved Soppexcca’s capacities to promote improved skills among its members? In 
countries such as Nicaragua, where government-provided extension services for 
coffee are in short supply, RCEs can play an important role in upgrading producers’ 
skills. Discussions in the literature provide little recognition that cooperatives struggle 
to build their own capacity to provide effective technical assistance to its membership 
base. This may be because discussions have generally focused on RCE 
development in Africa, where the political-legal environment for cooperative 
development is markedly different from that of Latin America. Soppexcca faced 
several challenges to build the capacities of its extension staff: 1) culture and 
mindsets (extensionists with willingness or incentives to identify problems of poor 
farmers and respond with tailored approaches), 2) unstable contract periods and high 
turnover (contracts dependent on NGO support), and 3) limited ability to upgrade and 
apply their skills (need to carry out tasks in addition to extension). Another problem 
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was a lack of useful information. For example, evidence suggested that technical staff 
learned the best options for organic fertilization through trial and error during the first 
years of production. At the time of assessment, no program existed for assessing and 
monitoring the performance of Soppexcca’s extension staff. In addition to upgrading 
the RCE skills for administration and marketing—a task often identified in the 
literature (e.g., Collion and Rondot 2001)—there is a need for deeper thinking about 
why RCE-provided technical services may not have the desired impact and what can 
be done to make their services more effective.  
 
7.2.2 Lessons in social capital development 
Soppexcca enjoyed especially high levels of preexisting social capital as compared to 
most cooperatives. The strong bonds between Soppexcca and its European buyers 
and many of its early members are a direct result of Soppexcca’s ability to organize 
itself after the embezzlement of funds by the manager of its predecessor cooperative. 
Various authors have identified the catalysing role of failure and crisis in building 
social capital in cooperatives (Harper 1992; Chirwa et al. 2005).  
During the assessment period, bridging capital expanded to include new 
relations with coffee buyers in the United States, while relations with existing 
European coffee buyers remained strong. Interviewed buyers considered Soppexcca 
to be among their most trusted (if not the most trusted) supplier of specialty coffee. 
Interviews also revealed high levels of shared beliefs and attitudes in fairness, 
quality, and transparency in business relations. Trust was reinforced by Soppexcca’s 
ability to comply with volume commitments (and effectively communicate when 
problems emerged that might jeopardize their ability to comply) and supply coffee 
that consistently met or exceeded buyer expectations.  
However, Soppexcca’s social capital with its buyers may have come at the 
expense of increased benefits for its members. A commitment by Soppexcca to 
deliver high quality coffee to buyers implied higher production costs for members 
during a period of intense local competition for coffee. Recognizing that during most 
of the assessment period local markets offered farm-gate prices at or near those 
offered by Soppexcca and that their quality requirements were generally lower, a 
strong motivation existed for members to sell coffee outside of Soppexcca. 
Soppexcca grower prices during much of the assessment period were depressed due 
to the need to repay the debt to the European buyers.  
If costs were higher, and the price incentive was reduced, then why did 
households deliver their coffee to Soppexcca? For many of the better-off households, 
interviews pointed to access to credit as the primary motivation. For others, including 
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the most asset poor, it was assistance with land tenure problems, social support, and 
insurance against major negative price fluctuations in coffee. This suggests that the 
glue that bonds Soppexcca to its members is Soppexcca’s provision of services other 
than the marketing services that form the core of its mission—at least for the poorer 
members. Membership in Soppexcca rested on their access to services that provided 
opportunities for building assets and increasing resilience to shocks—services 
supported in large part by NGOs. Soppexcca delivered services in high demand by 
households and of very limited supply (e.g., short- and long-term credit, assistance 
with land tenure, technical assistance, and a form of insurance for changes in coffee 
prices through fair trade certification). These findings are in line with observations by 
Ruben and Lerman (2005, 44), who argued that cooperative membership in 
Nicaragua has more to do with noneconomic factors, including uncertainties 
regarding land ownership and outstanding debts and better access to services.  
 The weakest component of Soppexcca’s social capital endowment related to 
the limited progress in democratizing decision making and planning processes. 
Formal member participation in Soppexcca’s governance (e.g., organization of the 
board of directors and other groups) began during the assessment period, following 
the reorganization of Soppexcca from a privately owned enterprise to a cooperative. 
Members lacked the capacity to fill these roles in an effective manner for various 
reasons, including lack of information and limited ability to oversee operations. 
According to one board member, board members felt attempts to question 
Soppexcca’s management and the performance of the board were disrespectful to 
senior management. There can be little doubt that Soppexcca would benefit from a 
stronger and more effective board with more effective member participation, providing 
increased stability and legitimacy over the long term. However, addressing this issue 
will require a strong commitment among managers and members to improve the 
quality and timeliness of information flows and capacity building among a critical 
mass of members to facilitate their ability to provide guidance and oversight for 
cooperative management. 
 Soppexcca made little progress in strengthening the capacities of base 
cooperatives to coordinate the delivery or transport of coffee or to facilitate the 
provision of services (e.g., credit delivery, technical assistance). Throughout the 
assessment period, base cooperatives had little if any direct role in Soppexcca’s 
operations (beyond that of providing elected leaders to serve on the boards of 
directors and similar groups). Given the geographical dispersion of Soppexcca’s base 
cooperatives and the difficulty in coordinating actions, development of the base 
cooperatives could provide potential solutions for addressing some of the most 
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vexing problems identified by members (e.g., dependence on public transport for 
delivery of coffee, need to travel to Soppexcca for all payments, limited access to 
technical assistance).  
To what extent has Soppexcca positively influenced social capital at the 
territorial level? The results were mixed. Prior to the assessment period, Soppexcca 
opened its membership to base cooperatives and unorganized communities with both 
high and low average levels of asset endowments. In some cases, asset 
endowments were especially low, with major investments needed to upgrade their 
productive capacities (e.g., Julio Hernandez, El Esfuerzo). During the assessment 
period, Soppexcca increased its base cooperative membership by only one base 
cooperative (Los Alpes). Moreover, no plans exist to expand the membership base 
beyond the approximately 500 members currently enrolled because of the limited size 
of the short-term credit portfolio and the reluctance to reduce the average amount of 
credit across the membership base. Thus, the ability of Soppexcca to increase its 
membership base will depend on its ability to increase its human and financial 
capitals. In this sense, it remains unclear how far Soppexcca’s activities foster a more 
broadly based territorial development in Jinotega. These finding support those by 
Bebbington, Quisbert, and Trujillos (1996), who described the reluctance of the cocoa 
cooperative El Ceibo in Bolivia to reduce its membership fees (given its repaid 
accumulation of physical capital, most of which was subsidized with donor funds) and 
allow for more broad-based participation.  
 
7.2.3 Lessons in physical capital development 
Soppexcca’s endowments of physical capital increased significantly during the 
assessment period. NGO-backed projects financed most of the direct costs for these 
investments, the exception being the dry-processing plant, which was financed with a 
combination of its own funds, grants, and loans. At the time of data collection for this 
study, the fertilizer production facility had yet to function due to uncertainties about 
the interpretation of organic standards on the use of chicken-manure fertilizer. The 11 
offices for base cooperatives provided a meeting space for training and other events, 
as well as lodging facilities for Soppexcca extension staff. Given the limited role of 
base cooperatives in the production and transport of coffee, however, these offices 
appear underutilized. The dry-processing plant allowed Soppexcca greater control 
over the processing of its coffee (rather than depending on third-party processors). It 
also provided a potential long-term option for generating income. Currently however, 
the plant requires major additional investments in upgrading and expanding 
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equipment and in achieving full operating capacity, thus casting doubt on the income-
generating potential in the midterm.  
The physical capital endowment at the end of the assessment period 
approached that of other large coffee cooperatives in Latin America that had enjoyed 
strong NGO support prior to and during the coffee crisis. For example, Prodecoop, a 
second-tier cooperative in Las Segovias, Nicaragua, increased its assets from 
US$1.2 million in 2001 to $1.8 million in 2005, in addition to increasing its overall 
capacity for business administration and coffee processing (Valkila and Nygren 
2008). The importance of physical capital for long-term cooperative development is 
recognized by the literature. Bebbington, Quisbert, and Trujillo (1996) identified major 
investments in chocolate processing as a major factor in the success of El Ceibo 
cocoa cooperative in delivering economic benefits to its members. In their review, 
Donovan, Stoian, and Poole (2008) argued that processing infrastructure was a key 
factor in determining the economic viability of RCEs in Latin America. However, they 
also cautioned that RCEs typically operated processing infrastructure at less than full 
capacity and owned second-hand equipment, which lowered initial investment but 
resulted in higher maintenance and operating costs over time. This appears to be the 
case with Soppexcca in its purchase of the dry-processing plant for coffee.  
  From Soppexcca’s point of view, the investments in physical capital were 
critical to 1) increase its long-term ability to generate income from sources other than 
the sale of green coffee and 2) reduce its dependence on NGO support for covering 
basic operations. However, the current debt (and future liabilities) assumed by 
Soppexcca in purchasing the dry-processing plant leads to questions about the 
related opportunity costs. Repaying the debt will reduce Soppexcca’s ability to offer 
higher prices to its members and to invest in other assets that could provide a more 
direct impact on members’ asset base in the short-term to midterm (e.g., targeted 
credit services, innovations in technical assistance). As long as Soppexcca struggles 
to compete with prices offered by local traders, there is limited opportunity for 
Soppexcca to increase its payments and services to its growers that would reduce 
side selling and increase its capture of raw material.  
In general, Soppexcca’s investing considerable sums in the purchase and 
upgrading of the dry-processing plant, at the expense of other investment needs, 
reflects the difficulty of operating in a competitive market and limited government 
support for developing value chains for certified coffee. Ideally, any one cooperative 
would have alternatives to the purchase of the dry mill, in the form of a competitive 
local processing sector for certified coffee. Similar considerations have been 
observed elsewhere: in answering the question why the cashew sector in 
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Mozambique was unable to compete internationally in the processing of cashews 
(and thus forced to export unprocessed nuts), Cramer (1999) argued that the 
problems faced by the Mozambique industry were more political in nature than 
technical or related to relations along a value chain. The development of the cashew 
sector would require that the Mozambique government and others abandon the idea 
of competing based on a level playing field and accept the need for a clear vision for 
sectorwide development, capacity and willingness to enforce standards, and 
mechanisms for mediating relations between firms.  
 
7.2.4 Lessons in financial capital development 
Various researchers have acknowledged the challenges faced by RCEs in generating 
and sustaining the income flows that would allow for cost recovery and significant 
levels of investments and savings (Tendler 1983; Berdegué 2001; Anderson and 
Henehan 2003). The findings suggest that participation in fair trade markets allowed 
for significant investments but was not enough to cover all expenses. During the 
assessment period, Soppexcca paid off its debt with its coffee buyers and built its 
credit program; however, technical assistance and long-term credit depended entirely 
on external support and no retained earnings were reported during the assessment 
period.  
The market context hindered, in part, Soppexcca’s ability to build financial 
capital. Prior to the assessment period, when prices for fair trade certified coffee 
received a significant price premium over locally sourced noncertified coffee, 
Soppexcca’s sales of fair trade coffee represented a small percentage of its total 
sales. During the assessment period, sales of fair trade coffee grew rapidly, but the 
price premium received by Soppexcca for its fair trade coffee (relative to prices paid 
by local traders) was considerably smaller. The use of the social premium from fair 
trade sales provided much-needed funds for paying down the debt and making 
strategic investment (at the expense of increased income or community development 
projects for members). Subsidies from donors and NGOs filled in the remaining gaps, 
one of which was the cost of technical assistance. This also meant that NGO and 
donors played a major role in determining the objectives and priorities of technical 
assistance, which may or may not have been in line with the interests of Soppexcca 
members.  
Donor subsidies played a critical role in building Soppexcca’s credit program. 
During the assessment period, Soppexcca made major advances in accumulation of 
funds for offering short-term credit. Contributions to the portfolio flowed directly from 
grants and from the repayment of long-term credit (also subsidized with donor funds). 
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Soppexcca was the only coffee cooperative to provide long-term credit to members 
among the five cooperatives interviewed for this research. Among microfinance 
institutions, scarce amounts of long-term credit flowed to smallholder coffee 
producers. Funding for Soppexcca’s long-term credit program stemmed from strong 
relations with a few key NGOs. While Soppexcca was willing to offer long-term credit 
with donor funds, it was not willing to recycle the repayment of long-term loans into 
the long-term credit portfolio. The risks were too high and the need to use short-term 
credit for securing access to raw material was too great. As noted in the household-
level analysis, long-term credit played a critical role in building assets at the 
household level. For most households, their strong bonds with Soppexcca meant that 
the risk they faced in taking credit with Soppexcca was relatively low, and thus, 
Soppexcca was able to provide credit to households that would most likely have not 
taken credit from other sources.  
The offer of a credit program by Soppexcca was, however, a double-edged 
sword. On one hand, without short-term credit, Soppexcca would have little hope of 
competing with local traders, and long-term credit is among the most valued services 
that Soppexcca provides to its members. On the other hand, evidence from 
household interviews made clear that short-term credit from Soppexcca was not 
always used for coffee production (a situation also observed by Valkila [2009] among 
Nicaraguan coffee cooperatives, delinquency rates for any given year were high and 
administration of the credit program consumed significant staff time and resources. In 
2008, Soppexcca took a major positive step to improve the performance of its credit 
program by offering the direct purchase of fertilizer with credit funds. Household 
interviews detected a significant increase in fertilizer usage following the 
implementation of this policy. The ability of Soppexcca to make further gains in 
reducing delinquency and increasing access to raw material will likely hinge on its 
ability to redesign its credit and extension services toward the needs of its members. 
In discussions on the development of resource-poor enterprises, researchers have 
expressed concern that credit is not enough for promoting long-term business viability 
and have called for increased effectiveness (through specialization, for example) and 
greater integration of services (Sievers and Vandenberg 2007; Donovan, Stoian, and 
Poole 2008). Along these lines, opportunities for innovation by Soppexcca would 
include the integration of credit and extension services. This would clearly demand 
high levels of training and coordination among extension staff and the ability of credit 
staff to incorporate more criteria into credit decisions. However, to reach the least 
asset-endowed members, who are also the most risk-averse members, benefits and 
risk-sharing mechanisms (joint investments) will be necessary.  
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7.3 Factors that contributed to asset building by Soppexcca 
High levels of preexisting social and human capital enabled Soppexcca to respond to 
crises, build new links with buyers and NGOs, and expand its access to raw material. 
These preexisting endowments resulted directly from interventions by European 
coffee buyers when Soppexcca first emerged from the ashes of its failed 
predecessor. The support of a professional manager, who was capable of balancing 
the needs and realities of buyers and NGOs, as well as those of poor rural 
households, stands out among these interventions. The buyers had a clear objective 
in their support: to recuperate their financial losses from the theft of their prefinancing 
by the previous cooperative’s administrator. This explains the buyers’ insistence on a 
top-down administration model for the newly formed entity. This early buyer 
intervention provided credibility to the general manager and allowed for access to 
certified markets at a time when such assess was highly prized by exporters (during 
the height of the coffee crisis). Throughout the assessment period, some buyers 
provided Soppexcca with no-interest, short-term loans and permitted renegotiation of 
contract prices based on changes in local marketing conditions. 
This experience highlights the potential of downstream businesses to invest in 
value chain development when the related incentives are clear and the means to 
intervene successfully are at hand. The coffee crisis and the resulting relatively high 
price for fair-trade certified coffee provided the means for securing agreement from 
Soppexcca’s members to debt repayment, change in organizational form (from 
cooperative to privately held company, with the debt-holding buyers as the owners) 
and the selection of the general manager. By the early 2000s, buyer involvement 
declined, as by then a trusted general manager was in place, a plan for debt 
repayment existed, and NGO support was on the rise. Could NGOs have facilitated 
further intensive collaboration between Soppexcca and its buyers based on mutual 
interests and shared objectives? The literature has advocated public-private 
partnerships (PPP) for value chain development with smallholder producers (e.g., 
Hartwich et al. 2007; Rich and Narrod 2010). Case studies have typically focused on 
chain actors operating in the same country, where differences in culture and business 
practices may be smaller as compared to differences between Southern exporters 
and Northern importers. Evidence here suggests that further intensive collaboration 
between Soppexcca and its buyers would have been challenged by 1) limited 
production volumes of Soppexcca and buyers’ need to diversity their supply base, 2) 
reluctance of buyers’ to share core competences (roasting and marketing) with 
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Soppexcca, and 3) Soppexcca’s reluctance to allow buyer involvement in decision-
making processes and business operations.  
 During the assessment period, NGOs provided significant and sustained 
support for building Soppexcca’s asset base. Through project frameworks, NGOs 
financed Soppexcca’s credit program and a significant percentage of its operating 
budget. They also facilitated investments in large infrastructure and machinery. The 
dry-processing coffee plant would not have been possible without support from 
NGOs, including not-for-profit lenders. In general, the achievements of Soppexcca 
did not come cheaply and highlight that coffee cooperatives require significant and 
sustained external (outside the value chain) investment for building their assets. 
Others have identified the critical role of long-term external support for the building of 
cooperatives in value chains for certified products (Bebbington, Quisbert, and Trujillo. 
1996; Lyon 2002; Ronchi 2002; Donovan, Stoian, and Poole 2008).  
In their study of the cocoa cooperative El Ceibo, Bebbington, Quisbert, and 
Trujillo (1996) discuss the “donor dependency syndrome,” whereby cooperatives fail 
to seek out new sources of investments and joint ventures due to dependency on 
NGO and project support. However, the Soppexcca experience paints a more 
complicated picture than that. NGOs sought out collaboration with Soppexcca 
because of Soppexcca’s high levels of social and human capitals. In the process, 
Soppexcca was able to negotiate co-investments in infrastructure upgrading and 
contributions to its credit program. Given the turbulent environment for coffee 
production and marketing in Nicaragua and the limited support from the public sector, 
it was highly unlikely that Soppexcca could have had access to alternative sources of 
investment. In short, effectively linking cooperatives to high-value and competitive 
markets does not come cheaply, and there may be few alternatives to long-term and 
sustained donor support.  
 In addition to high preexisting levels of social and human capital, Soppexcca 
made an attractive partner for NGOs and buyers because of its own internal 
commitment to combining economic, social, and environmental objectives. The 
commitment manifested itself in various ways: incorporation of asset-poor base 
cooperatives (e.g., El Esfuerzo and Julio Hernandez), commitment to fair trade 
relations and organic production, encouragement of female participation in 
cooperatives and leadership, investment in women’s health programs, targeted long-
term credit for women coffee producers, and the provision of emergency credit. In 
general, cooperatives struggle to balance the multiple objectives related to markets 
and membership welfare (e.g., Barton and Merino-Pérez 2002). The relative ease 
with which Soppexcca adopted these goals can be traced to fair trade certification 
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and related partnerships (e.g., certified buyers, Max Havelaar), the coffee crisis and 
the perceived urgency to shift to niche markets, and the unique history of the coffee 
sector in Nicaragua. This history includes a strong role of cooperatives in organizing 
smallholder production and limited smallholder use of agrochemical inputs and other 
modern production techniques. 
Achievements similar to Soppexcca’s as related to gender equity are rare in 
the literature. In general, participation of women in RCE management and 
governance is rare, despite the fact that in several RCEs women play a critical role in 
harvesting and processing. Cultural factors largely prevent them from playing a more 
prominent role in management decision making. Murray, Raynolds, and Taylor (2006) 
found that among the fair trade certified cooperatives in their sample, several had 
launched projects for strengthening the role of women, such as education and 
training programmes, handcraft production and marketing, and other income-
generating initiatives. But these initiatives focused on activities largely outside coffee 
production. They also found that more established cooperatives tended to maintain 
traditional patterns of gender inequality, while recently organised cooperatives fared 
better in changing these conditions. In Guatemala, the newer cooperatives had 
greater numbers of women participating as leaders (Lyon 2002). This provides 
additional importance to the birth of Soppexcca from the ashes of its predecessor 
organization and the initial decisions by the intervening coffee buyers in the selection 
and hiring of the general manager. 
 
7.4 Factors that hindered asset building by Soppexcca 
The policy context in which Soppexcca operates emerges as a central hindering 
factor in Soppexcca’s asset building during the assessment period. First, the near 
absence of the Nicaraguan government in coffee production or processing obligated 
Soppexcca to invest scarce funds in the provision of technical services, despite the 
public-good character of these services. Moreover, the lack of a strategy for the 
development of specialty coffee limited coordination among cooperatives and other 
private sector actors and pushed cooperatives like Soppexcca to invest individually in 
expensive dry-processing plants that will remain inefficient without major investment 
in plant upgrading. Second, the market context worked against Soppexcca 
throughout the assessment. At the beginning of the period, when international coffee 
prices were at their lowest, Soppexcca’s access to certified markets with relatively 
large price premiums over noncertified coffees was limited, thus reducing the price 
offered to members. Near the end of the period, Soppexcca had expanded its access 
to certified markets, but price premiums of certified coffees had fallen significantly, 
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thus reducing incentives for growers to supply to Soppexcca, despite relatively high 
levels of social capital between Soppexcca and its members. A more favourable 
marketing environment would have provided Soppexcca with flexibility to invest in 
asset building while maintaining price incentives for members to deliver coffee to 
Soppexcca. Third, there was the matter of high coordination costs resulting from the 
poor road and electrical and communication networks of rural Nicaragua. From a 
producer perspective, this reduced the attractiveness of Soppexcca vis-à-vis other 
buyers with decentralized credit, payment, and transport services. Finally, there was 
the fact that most of the Soppexcca membership had little formal education, and little, 
if any, experience in business or NGO relations. This presented a major challenge for 
Soppexcca management looking to promote greater member participation in 
governance.  
 In their analysis of collective action in Mesoamerica, Hellin, Lundy, and Meijer 
(2009) argued that development agencies were important in the early stages of RCE 
development and suggested that links to the private sector became more critical as 
enterprises developed. Findings here countered this argument, suggesting that 
strong private sector support in the early stages of Soppexcca’s development was 
critical to building social capital with buyers and with producing households. In 
general, the Soppexcca findings show that both private and public sectors played a 
critical role in the initial stages of Soppexcca’s development and that public sector 
support remained critical even as the enterprise had developed a substantial asset 
base. Moreover, evidence suggested that few options existed for more intensive 
buyer involvement in Soppexcca’s operations during the assessment periods—as the 
major challenges facing Soppexcca were related to the supply of coffee from its 
members rather than with demand-related factors such as quality or certification. The 
reasons were varied but included intense local competition for coffee, Soppexcca’s 
need to invest in debt repayment and in infrastructure expansion, and gaps and 
duplications in the service offer by NGOs.  
Donovan, Stoian, and Poole (2008) argued that limited access to effective and 
timely services was a major reason behind the long periods observed for RCEs to 
develop into economically viable enterprises. To some extent, these findings held 
true for the Soppexcca case. Intensive private sector involvements (with backing from 
Max Havelaar) in the early stages of Soppexcca’s development put it on the fast track 
to economic viability. However, by the mid-2000s, human and social asset building 
had slowed, and financial capital was still underdeveloped. By the end of the 
assessment period (2009), Soppexcca had yet to become a viable enterprise. 
Without continued NGO support, its technical assistance operations would stop 
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almost immediately and its credit department would shrink significantly over the 
midterm. The role of NGOs in fostering Soppexcca’s development was acknowledged 
by Utting (2008) in her assessment. However, she makes no mention of potential 
gaps in its service offer and potential limitations by Soppexcca and its NGO partners 
to identify and respond to organizational development needs.  
Interventions in Soppexcca by NGOs and projects generally focused on 
provision of technical assistance, expansion of infrastructure, and financing the credit 
program. With these interventions, Soppexcca increased its capacity to obtain higher 
quality raw material and in greater volumes (through membership expansion). These 
outcomes were in line with recommendations by development banks and others for 
Central America during the coffee crisis, namely that coffee-sector development 
focus on improving quality and accessing markets for certified coffee. From the 
perspective of long-term business viability, however, the findings here suggested that 
significant gaps existed in Soppexcca’s asset endowment. Addressing these gaps 
would require services over the midterm to long term for increasing productivity at the 
farm level; improving the coverage and effectiveness of technical assistance; 
reducing costs and increasing efficiency in operations; developing platforms for 
conflict resolution; building the capacities of volunteer leaders; democratizing 
planning and decision-making processes; and building the capacity to identify 
lessons learned and to innovate.  
Case study results highlighted the need for better monitoring, assessment, 
and learning by Soppexcca and its supporters if Soppexcca were to build more 
assets in less time and at less expense. A clear example of this was the introduction 
of organic production by Soppexcca as a response to the coffee crisis. The rush to 
implement organic production without locally adjusted good production practices and 
without monitoring of the related outcomes implied unforeseen costs for Soppexcca’s 
members (reduced productivity and plant health) and Soppexcca (future difficulty to 
promote organic production among membership). The case study also suggested 
that innovation was urgently needed in the design of extension services (to increase 
coverage and quality) and in the provision of short-term credit (more direct linkage 
between credit and coffee production). While some progress was detected in the 
latter, much work remained regarding the former. 
 
7.5 Asset building by Soppexcca-affiliated households 
Chapter 6 began by presenting an asset index (comprised of nine variables related to 
productivity assets, consumption, and household composition as proxies for 
resilience and well-being) of the sampled Soppexcca households. The index showed 
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that nearly half of the sampled households improved their resilience and well-being 
during the assessment period. On the other hand, it showed that 25% of the sample 
showed no change and another 25% showed lower resilience and well-being. The 
index indicated that although a large group of households progressed during the 
period, some failed to benefit for one reason or another—a source of major concern 
for the design of pro-poor VCDA. More detailed household-level data were required 
to understand why the changes did or did not take place and the relevance of the 
changes (or absence of change) for resilience and well-being.  
 
7.5.1 Lessons in natural capital development 
Data on natural capital covered chains at the household level (change in land area, in 
area under coffee production, and in fertilizer use) and at the territorial level (potential 
for abuse of agrochemicals and change in wet-milling techniques). At the household 
level, the results were generally positive, with strong increases in landholdings and 
even stronger increases in area under coffee production, but with limited change in 
use of fertilizers (a proxy for soil fertility).  
Following land reforms in Nicaragua during the 1990s, various academics 
highlighted the difficulties of most rural households to increase their access to land 
through the emerging land markets (e.g., Everingham 2001; Broegaard 2005; 
Bouche, Barham, and Carter 2004; Deininger, Zegarra, and Lavadenz, 2003; 
Broegaard 2009). Among the reasons were that formal credit remained strongly 
skewed against poor households, there was limited land made available for rent, and 
reforms were incomplete or noncredible. The results from the Soppexcca study 
showed how barriers to formal credit could be overcome for some households 
through links with Soppexcca and certified coffee markets. These results held even 
though formal land titles were not held by most of the sampled households. The fact 
that nearly one in three sampled households expanded their landholdings over the 
assessment period suggests that conditions were generally favourable for 
households to expand and intensify their agricultural production. Evidence suggested 
that Soppexcca played an important catalytic role in land expansion but that 
households also invested their own funds from the sale of basic grains and coffee, 
sold other tangible assets, or benefited from inheritance.  
  Beginning in 2005, the sharp increase in international coffee prices, combined 
with increased support from Soppexcca, meant that interest in and capacities for 
expanding coffee production were generally high across the sample. Results for the 
sample reflected this interest, with 59% of the sample increasing their area under 
coffee production. However, households from cluster 1 were the least likely to have 
194 
 
expanded their area under coffee. The smaller response from cluster 1 likely reflects 
limitations for land substitution and intensified input use. In general, a strong predictor 
of ability/willingness to expand area under coffee production was access to credit, as 
expanding coffee production requires extensive labour and purchased inputs. It is 
likely that households’ willingness to expand coffee production also reflected reduced 
risk to price shocks in coffee through Soppexcca membership (and fair trade 
certification). Tucker, Eakin, and Castellanos (2010) argued that price shocks were 
perceived as particularly stressful by smallholders in Central America in comparison 
to other types of shocks (e.g., climate variability). While, in general, smallholders may 
not be fully aware of the potential benefits of fair trade (Murray, Raynolds, and Taylor 
2006; Valkila and Nyugren 2008), Soppexcca proved its ability to offer favourable 
marketing conditions and expand its service offer throughout the coffee crisis.  
 Despite the importance of secure access to land for agricultural production, 
assessments have overlooked the issues of land tenure security (or lack thereof) as a 
major obstacle for smallholders to benefit from fair trade (e.g., Raynolds 2002; Utting 
2008; Nelson 2009; Beuchelt and Zeller 2011). In trying to understand why some 
households did not expand their coffee production area, this research highlighted the 
struggles for land tenure by members of two base cooperatives (El Esfuerzo and 
Julio Hernandez), which together, made up about 16% of sampled households. Their 
experiences highlighted the complicated history of land tenure in Nicaragua as well 
as the marginalization of the rural poor in addressing the issue. It is inconceivable 
from a social justice perspective that poor households from El Esfuerzo should be 
strapped with the debt for ensuring their land titles: it was thrust upon them by 
government policies and it should be repaid by the government. However, reality 
suggests that this will not happen anytime soon. It is here that the social benefits of 
Soppexcca were most evident, with Soppexcca assisting in raising funds for debt 
repayment and providing technical assistance for maintaining coffee plantations (and 
thus claims to land) in the case of El Esfuerzo. Experiences from El Esfuerzo and 
Julio Hernandez call for increased attention to aspects of inequalities of wealth and 
power, lack of enforcement, and lack of impartiality by the Nicaraguan government. 
 Household access to synthetic and organic fertilizer served as a proxy for 
understanding soil fertility on coffee plantations. In general, the literature has 
recognized the positive relationship between soil fertility and increased household 
income (e.g., Yamano and Kijima 2010). In the case of organic fertilizers, results 
showed that most households used insufficient organic fertilizer to maintain 
reasonable levels of coffee productivity. More intensive application of purchased 
organic fertilization (chicken-manure based) was frustrated by high costs (including 
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transport costs, as more organic fertilizers than inorganic fertilizers must be applied to 
reach the same level of yields) and limited income by households (for purchase and 
application). Valkila (2009) argued that large quantities of organic materials were 
available for the manufacture of organic fertilizer in Nicaragua but that labour costs 
were high for its production. Results here told a different story. Some organic 
materials were available but not the ones that supplied major amounts of nitrogen 
(e.g. cattle or chicken manure). Skills, tools (e.g., thermometer) and infrastructure 
(e.g., shed for storage) for producing organic fertilizers on farm were also major 
constraints. Valkila skipped the larger question of how to improve access to 
fertilization for smallholders, taking into account the context in which they operate. 
The case study brought to light years of struggle by Soppexcca to identify effective 
and affordable fertilizer options for organic and conventional coffee production.  
Among households that produced conventional coffee, data suggested that 
recent usage had increased due to 1) changes in Soppexcca’s credit program (i.e., 
inclusion of fertilizer purchase as part of short-term credit allocation rather than the 
provision of cash) and 2) bulk purchase and distribution of fertilizer by Soppexcca. 
However, the asset poor from cluster 1 were more likely to have a negative nitrogen 
balance in coffee production—again, highlighting the limitations of these households 
to build their asset base. Path dependency may also have played a role in household 
decisions about fertilizer usage, as many did not apply inputs to their coffee 
plantation prior to becoming organically certified. In general, without more focused 
attention on issues of fertilization by Soppexcca, its partners, and the Nicaraguan 
government, there is little reason to think that higher coffee prices or changes in the 
credit program will induce meaningful change across the sample. Debates 
concerning the role of government in promoting fertilization by smallholders in Africa 
have resurfaced recently (e.g., Ariga and Jayne 2009; Dorward and Chirwa 2011). 
Such debates are urgently needed for smallholder production of coffee and other 
crops in Nicaragua and other parts of Latin America. In the case of organic 
production, debates must include standards-setting agencies and civil society.  
Environmental impact assessment was not conducted as part of this research, 
although its significance for sustainable management of natural capital is important. 
Most sampled households applied little or no herbicide to their coffee plantations 
before or during the assessment period. Few households reported using significant 
quantities of systemic chemicals for coffee production. The reduced dumping of wet-
milling waste, however, represented a major change in production practices. Prior to 
the assessment period, most of the sampled households discharged wet-milling 
wastes directly into surface water. At the end of the assessment period, only 25% of 
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households discharged coffee without treatment. Soppexcca was identified by the 
households as having played an important role in influencing the change. This 
funding highlighted the potential for Soppexcca to influence change when 
technologies are relatively simple and required inputs are available to smallholders.  
 
7.5.2 Lessons in human capital development 
Authors have argued that smallholders can improve their human capital when 
affiliated with RCEs (e.g., Kaganzi et al. 2009) or value chains (e.g., Escobal, Agreda, 
and Reardon 2000). To some extent, the Soppexcca case supported this argument 
(e.g., implementation of improved harvest and postharvest techniques for quality 
control). When coffee-producing households were able to understand the production 
problem and had the resources to address the problem, they generally did so. In the 
case of enhanced coffee quality, the changes required were mainly improved 
techniques for harvesting and postharvest management, including wet milling. The 
upgrading of these skills was a priority of NGO interventions and thus of Soppexcca 
technical staff. The selection process for harvesting coffee was one of the most 
common changes identified in coffee production practices—despite the increased 
use of labour required. Roughly 10% of the sample expanded into cocoa production 
during the assessment period with the help of Soppexcca-provided training and 
inputs. While the number of households involved in cocoa production was relatively 
small, the implications of the cocoa production are potentially large for Soppexcca’s 
members, as it is compatible with coffee production and has a relatively secure 
market. 
However, the Soppexcca results also paint a more complex picture of human 
capital development than has been painted in the literature heretofore. If the learning 
and the uptake of new skills for agricultural production implies uncertainty, reduces 
short-term income flows, or requires complementary assets (e.g., financial capital), 
then related learning tends to be limited to those households with relatively large 
asset endowments. This was the case with the implementation of good production 
practices for coffee among Soppexcca members. Moreover, evidence suggests that 
Soppexcca and its supporters placed relatively less emphasis on increasing 
productivity than increasing quality. An asset-based assessment shows the need for 
the reverse in development priorities. While other researchers have highlighted the 
low productivity of the smallholder coffee production in Nicaragua (Wilson 2010, 
Beuchelt and Zeller, 2011; Valkila 2009), they have not identified lack of human 
capital, or the limitations to build human capital when overall asset endowments are 
limited, as a major cause.  
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Households’ perceptions of the overall limited utility of technical assistance 
increased the validity of this finding, as well as key informant interviews with the 
leader of Soppexcca’s technical assistance unit that highlighted the challenges for 
operating the extension program. In general, households were critical of Soppexcca’s 
extension services, with many households identifying irregular and infrequent visits 
over many years and limited utility of visits. Possible reasons for the limited 
satisfaction with the extension services include: 1) limited incentives for good 
performance, 2) poor training, 3) cumbersome administrative and project-related 
duties (e.g., estimating crop harvest, training events on issues not related to coffee 
production), and 4) lack of monitoring and prioritization of households based on need.  
In addition to an incomplete service offer, another possible reason why the 
sampled smallholders did not change from low-input to more intensive production for 
coffee is related to the perceived risks from the change (especially as related to tree 
crops with their relatively long investments periods) and lack of risk management 
tools (including effective technical services). 
Discussions on the link between smallholders and collective enterprises tend 
not to dwell on the limitations of the latter to deliver effective services for coffee 
production to the former. For example, Utting (2008) argues that “the issue of 
empowerment of small producers is directly related to the role of producer 
organizations.” However, evidence here and elsewhere (e.g., Valkila 2009; Wilson 
2010) suggests that increased productivity in coffee is critical for long-term 
empowerment and that RCEs face major limitations in designing and delivering 
technical assistance and other critical services. In her review of the fair trade impact 
literature, Nelson (2009) discusses empowerment from participation in fair trade in 
various ways (e.g., self-confidence, ability to negotiate, producer knowledge of fair 
trade), none of which include empowerment to build assets through more intensive 
participation in value chains for coffee and other crops. Discussions of empowerment 
in the context of speciality coffee value chains and poverty must include productivity 
and the ability of the poor to increase productivity through their links with collective 
enterprises and other value chain actors.  
Of course, limitations to apply good production practices in coffee were not 
only the result of limited knowledge—application of good production practices implied 
higher labour and inputs costs, which some households were unable to bear. This 
was particularly evident in the case of households headed by females (with no male 
counterpart). Evidence suggested that female-headed households, which made up 
about 17% of the sample, faced many major limitations to investing their scarce 
labour in coffee production. Female-headed households showed significantly lower 
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performance in coffee production than two-headed households and in general 
depended on off-farm employment for the majority of their income. These results 
support previous research from Africa on the limited ability of female-headed 
households to participate effectively in formal markets for agricultural products (e.g., 
Zeller, Diagne, and Mataya 1998; Quisumbing and Pandolfelli 2010). In general, 
experiences from Africa, as well as those from the Soppexcca case, suggest the 
need for greater attention to the potential trade-offs between livelihood activities as 
well as to the specific needs of women in building an asset base that would allow for 
effective participation in value chains over the long-term.   
 
7.5.3 Lessons in social capital development 
Assessment of social capital aimed to capture changes in the ability of households to 
build assets through their relationships with coffee buyers. The Soppexcca results 
highlighted the mismatch between social capital building from the enterprise 
perspective and social capital building from the perspective of asset-poor 
households. For Soppexcca, social capital building may be best expressed through 
increased member loyalty, which leads to increased export volumes, increased 
efficiencies and high income for Soppexcca, and improved and expanded Soppexcca 
service offer for its members. This is the social-capital development scenario often 
assumed by writers in the literatures on collective enterprise and fair trade 
certification (e.g., Bacon 2005; Utting 2008; Kaganzi et al. 2009). However, for 
Soppexcca’s members, the household-level results showed that increased social 
capital from value chain relationships often implied access to Soppexcca-provided 
services, as well as access to complementary services provided by other coffee 
buyers. The need for complementary services from other buyers allowed households 
to compensate for their overall low asset endowments and vulnerability to shocks. In 
this case, interest in survival and security in the present led households to maintain 
relationships with various coffee buyers, despite that fact that such actors imply 
reduced income benefits in the present and reduced security in the future—a 
situation outlined by Wood (2003) in his discussion on the “Faustian Bargain” faced 
by the rural poor.  
Linkages to value chains for certified coffee through Soppexcca offered: 
access to credit, technical assistance, development projects, and emergency 
assistance. However, the study highlighted the variety in services offered by other 
coffee buyers that responded to different needs of asset-poor households. For 
example, local market buyers provided low-cost and dependable access to buyers 
with relatively low quality requirements. Most market buyers had expanded their 
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provision of short-term credit throughout the year. The most common credit involved 
the provision of basic grains and other foodstuffs to coffee producers, rather than 
cash, which was repaid with interest in coffee following the harvest, according to 
market price. In some cases, intermediaries had emerged whose service offer rivalled 
that of Soppexcca in various ways. The intermediary, Osman Martinez, lived in the 
area where he purchased coffee, which reduced coordination costs with coffee 
growers for the provision of technical assistance, short-term credit, transport, 
emergency credit, and payment for coffee. Prices were comparable to those offered 
by market buyers; however, payment was on the spot, without the need to transport 
coffee to the market.  
 Qualitative information on the reasons for side selling highlighted the role of 
credit from non-Soppexcca sources to fill short-term income gaps that allowed 
households to meet harvest-related expenses (hiring of labour for harvest and 
meeting increase food consumption of family labour) and household expenses (e.g., 
school expenses, food security). In this light, side selling was a logical response to 
coffee production where assets were limited and vulnerability was high, due to lumpy 
income flows, low productivity in coffee, and limited income-generating options 
outside of coffee, among other factors. Several factors limited the ability to 
Soppexcca to capture more of its members’ production, including having the highest 
quality requirements of all buyers, limited amounts of short-term credit, rigid and 
centralized payment, and credit systems that allowed limited flexibility in addressing 
household needs/realities for funds. Some authors have suggested that households 
sell outside the cooperative mainly because of higher prices offered by local coffee 
buyers (e.g., Reuter 2010) or because buyers fail to provide effective services 
(Kaminski, Headey, and Bernard 2010). However, evidence here suggests that 
neither relative prices nor major failures of Soppexcca in service provision featured 
prominently in households’ selling decisions—the major factor was access to 
expanded credit services that filled income gaps during the year and increased 
overall resilience. This has important implications for policies designed to access side 
selling by cooperatives, other downstream chain actors, and external supporters, 
such as NGOs.  
The findings on social capital bring to light an important issue in the design of 
VCDA in coffee. From the perspective of Soppexcca, the fact that significant volumes 
of coffee production were sold to other buyers despite its investments in credit and 
technical assistance (among other services), increased its risk of noncompliance with 
downstream buyers and reduced its overall economic viability. However, higher sales 
to Soppexcca by member households will only be obtained with increased resilience 
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(including resilience to food insecurity) at the household level and by a more tailored 
and agile service offer by Soppexcca that responds to the consumption and 
production realities of households during the year. This study showed that addressing 
issues of food security and overall low levels of preexisting asset endowments will be 
critical to designing pro-poor value chain development interventions.  
 
7.5.4 Lessons in physical capital development 
On a positive note, favourable marketing conditions for coffee, combined with 
interventions by Soppexcca (mainly credit and technical assistance) to improve 
coffee quality and promote environmentally sound production, facilitated investments 
in physical capital for coffee production. On the other hand, investments in wet-milling 
infrastructure provided little relief from chronically low productivity levels and high risk 
in coffee production, and investments in physical capital for other agricultural 
activities (e.g., basic grain production, tree-crop production, timber extraction and 
processing) were considerably smaller. Cluster membership proved an effective 
predictor of increasing physical capital. For example, households from cluster 3 made 
up 40% of all the households that invested in expanded/improved infrastructure and 
machinery for wet milling, with an average investment of more than two times that of 
households from cluster 2 and more than three times of those from cluster 1. In short, 
expanded physical capital among asset-poor households during the assessment 
period offered the potential to enhance quality and environmental performance but 
provided limited benefits for a more intensified and diversified agricultural production. 
 Data on investments in housing infrastructure further supported the argument 
that Soppexcca members faced major challenges for investing in physical capital 
despite the upturn in coffee markets. For example, only 17% of households in cluster 
1 reported any addition or improvement to housing infrastructure during the five-year 
assessment period. This suggested that additional income from increased coffee 
prices may have allowed for investments in natural capital or for increased household 
consumption, though it was insufficient to allow for improvements in basic housing 
infrastructure. These findings supported those by Utting (2009, 137), who concluded 
that “little evidence was found of improvements to the physical structure, including the 
walls and roof of their homes, even though most [interviewed Soppexcca members] 
described the poor condition of their homes and their desire to reinforce them with 
concrete walls and a more solid roof.”  
Promoting investments in households’ physical capital (particularly machinery 
and equipment for soil preparation, weed control, postharvest management, and 
processing) that increase productivity and expand options to add value to coffee and 
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other crops (e.g., basic grains) through savings and credit programs or other means 
can increase the return to land and labour resources, raise incomes, and improve 
food security. Discussions on the impacts of value chains, certification systems, or 
RCEs have yet to address this issue.  
 
7.5.5 Lessons in financial capital development 
During the early years of the coffee crisis, researchers argued that higher prices for 
coffee through participation in value chains for certified coffee would provide a viable 
option for the development of smallholder coffee production in Central America and 
elsewhere (Harris et al. 2001; IADB/USAID 2002; Varangis et al. 2003; Bacon 2005; 
Calo and Wise 2005; Jaffee 2007). The analysis of the financial capital of 
Soppexcca’s members highlighted the potential for VCDA to alleviate the effects of 
extremely limited asset endowments and income flows, even if such contributions do 
not lead to additional asset building or provide a secure pathway out of poverty. In 
this sense, the findings support recent studies arguing that higher prices for certified 
coffee have been insufficient to address chronic rural poverty among smallholders 
and their labour providers because of limited production volumes and small 
landholdings (Valkila and Nygren 2008; Valkila 2009; Barham et al. 2010; Beuchelt 
and Zeller 2011). The findings of this research add an additional level of complexity 
to current discussions, arguing that the lack of preexisting assets for effective 
participation in value chains for certified coffee are a major reason behind the low 
productivity and overall limited ability to intensify coffee production.   
In many cases, sampled households offered products in various local and 
natural markets in addition to coffee, for example: beans and bananas for regional 
markets and citrus for local markets, as well as providing labour for coffee production 
on other farms. However, opportunities to significantly increase or diversify income 
through the sale of other products and services in Nicaragua were severally limited. 
Contributions from the marketing of other agricultural products, such as citrus and 
bananas, provided steady income during the year but contributed relatively minor 
amounts to total income. The effects of constrained and generally lumpy income 
flows influenced the building of social capital (e.g., side selling), natural capital (e.g., 
limitations to improve soil quality), physical capital (e.g., limited investments in 
infrastructure, machinery and tools), and human capital (e.g., limited ability to 
dedicate more household labour and access hired labour for coffee production). 
Utting (2008) provided similar evidence of the overall dominance of coffee production 
for total income generation by Soppexcca members (96% of total gross income in 
2005).  
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In general, discussions on household economy for coffee producers have 
focused only on coffee-related income (e.g., Valkila and Nygren 2008; Wilson 2010). 
Increasing the returns from off-farm labour and from the sale of products other than 
coffee may provide opportunities to strengthen livelihoods at a relatively lower cost 
(both to households and to development interventions). For organic coffee producers, 
certification did not provide price benefits for the sale of other producers produced 
on-farm, as these products were sold as conventional products in local or national 
markets. Again, the promotion of the organic cocoa production by Soppexcca has the 
potential to change positively this situation. However, in general, the development of 
value chains for organic cocoa in many parts of Central America has proven to be a 
challenge (e.g., Donovan, Stoian, and Poole 2008), thus highlighting the importance 
of a complete service offer for cocoa production by Soppexcca and others. 
The large contribution of coffee to total income for Soppexcca members 
counters findings by Barham et al. (2010), who found that coffee producers in 
southern Mexico derived 65% of their total income from subsidies, remittances, and 
off-farm employment, while deriving only 19% of income from coffee production. For 
all but one region included in their study, nonagricultural wages were reported to be 
two and three times what farmers could earn working their own organic or 
conventional coffee plots, respectively. Thirteen percent of their sample reported a 
member working locally as a nonagricultural labourer. Households also benefited 
from government stipends that covered education costs for children. In the case of 
the Soppexcca sample, only 3% of households reported access to nonagricultural 
labour opportunities, while stipends for education were equally rare (and often 
provided by Soppexcca, not the government). Based on these findings, Barham and 
colleagues argued for an integrated approach to smallholder development that 
improves productivity and prices and supports other pathways for improving incomes. 
The findings of this thesis strongly support such recommendations, highlighting the 
need for long-term commitments to such an approach given lack of government 
support and the limited development of alternative markets for on-farm production 
and off-farm employment.  
Evidence suggested that participation in certified coffee markets through 
Soppexcca provided meaningful income benefits for households in clusters 2 and 3 
that produced conventional coffee and for all households that produced organically 
certified coffee. In general, the data suggested that organic producers earned more 
income from coffee production than low-input conventional producers. However, the 
data did not allow for comparison of the income benefits between conventional and 
organic. Valkila (2009) compared low-intensity coffee production and coffee yields 
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between conventional and organic coffee producers in Nicaragua. He found that 
organic certification slightly improved income compared with the low-intensity 
conventional production because the organic price premium was available and costs 
of production were generally low for both low input organic and conventional 
products. However, as input usage for organic coffee production increases, the 
economic benefits become less certain due to higher production costs. Valkila 
considers why producers would grow coffee organically, even when the economic 
advantages are not always clear. He offers that producers recognized the price 
stability with organic coffee, were proud to be identified as ecologically sound 
producers, and were concerned about their health.  
 Analysis by Beuchelt and Zeller (2011) estimate production costs for organic 
coffee rather than using estimates from secondary sources (e.g., Valkila 2009). They 
estimated that while farm-gate prices for certified coffee were higher than those for 
conventional coffee during the late 2000s, the profitability of certified coffee 
production is uncertain due to higher production costs related mainly to higher use of 
hired labour. The authors argued that per capita net coffee incomes were generally 
insufficient to cover basic needs of all the coffee-producing households. Moreover, 
they argued that organic producers had become poorer relative to conventional 
producers due to the rising price for conventional coffee. The strength of these 
findings depends heavily on the production cost estimates for conventional and 
organic coffee. Beuchet and Zeller considered the following costs: variable input 
costs (fertilizer and weed control), hired labour for coffee harvest, and other hired 
labour costs. However, experiences in data collection for this research highlighted the 
difficulties of collecting reliable data on labour costs: these costs vary by year and 
across production activities depending on 1) expected yields and 2) income available 
for the purchase of inputs and hired labour. In the case of Soppexcca, production 
practices for low-input conventional and low-input organically certified production 
were similar (the main difference being the use of weak doses of herbicides to lower 
weed control costs by conventional producers)—and, in general, neither producer 
type applied purchased fertilizers on a regular basis or applied farm-produced 
fertilizer other than dried coffee pulp. Thus, this research suggests that that question 
remains open whether organic producers are poorer than their conventional 
counterparts.  
As noted previously, short-term credit played an important role in facilitating 
the building of natural and physical capitals. Evidence also suggested that it reduced 
household vulnerability to major biannual fluctuations in coffee production, helped to 
smooth consumption over the year, and provided funds for covering the costs of the 
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coffee harvest (a period when overall income flows are typically most constrained). 
Just prior to the assessment period, few of the interviewed households reported 
access to credit sources. During the assessment period, 85% of the sampled 
households reported access to at least one short-term credit. However, most 
households were not able to receive credit on a yearly basis, and evidence 
suggested that households faced major difficulties in repaying short-term credit 
obligations due to variations in coffee production and overall limited low production 
volumes. Soppexcca was the main source of long-term credit for its members, 
supplying just more than half of the long-term credit obtained for expansion of 
infrastructure, machinery, and tools, as well as for the purchase of livestock. Here 
too, however, evidence suggested that households struggled to repay long-term 
credit obligations. These findings support the argument made by Wilson (2010) that 
smallholder coffee producers in Nicaragua are caught in a debt trap. Wilson identified 
various reasons for this situation, many of which are supported by evidence from this 
study, including fluctuating yields, rising consumption and production costs, rising 
wage labour costs, overall low credit amounts (sufficient for only the most basic of 
productive activities), and the use of credit for household consumption. Breaking the 
dependence of the asset-poor on credit requires major investments in building their 
overall asset base and reducing the risks of food insecurity.  
 
7.6 Factors that contributed to asset building by households  
Carter and Barrett (2004) argue the importance of a dynamic view of asset building 
and the notion of asset thresholds, above which households are more likely to reach 
a higher level of returns to their assets and emerge out of poverty over time. 
However, Carter and Barrett provide limited insight into which assets the poor can 
accumulate and the processes by which they accumulate them. Various other 
authors have highlighted the limited potential for higher prices for certified coffee to 
impact household well-being when natural and financial capital endowments are 
highly constrained. In this sense, two factors were considered critical for asset 
building by the sample: preexisting asset endowments and access to Soppexcca-
provided services. Discussions on preexisting asset endowments consider two 
thresholds: a lower threshold, above which households achieved minimum levels of 
asset building through participation in value chains for certified coffee, and an upper 
threshold, above which households achieved significant increases in their asset 
endowments. 
Households intensified their human capital endowments to varying degrees 
during the assessment period through more sophisticated coffee production methods 
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and, in some cases, new skills for diversifying their on-farm production. The 
magnitude of these changes and the degree to which the changes represented real 
increases in overall livelihood security depended on access to complementary 
assets. Meeting the lower threshold implied that a household had surplus household 
labour for intensifying coffee production and had minimum knowledge of basic coffee 
production techniques. During the assessment period, these households showed 
new skills for improving the quality of coffee (e.g., better wet-milling and harvesting 
techniques), implementation of low-input organic production, understanding of good 
production practices for coffee, and diversification of on-farm production (e.g., 
production of cocoa). In general, the households had a male head, belonged to 
cluster 2, were in the middle- to upper-middle age bracket, and derived most of their 
household income from on-farm agricultural production (or from more lucrative, year-
round nonagricultural employment). Relatively few complementary assets were 
required to meet this threshold, namely: land with a preexisting coffee plantation and 
minimum levels of financial capital for meeting increased production costs associated 
with improved production methods.  
Meeting the upper threshold implied that households had, in addition to 
sufficient labour and basic knowledge of coffee production, sufficient access to more 
or less high levels of complementary assets, namely: relatively large land 
endowments, access to sufficient credit for acquiring production inputs and labour 
services, and diversified income sources that allowed greater risk taking. During the 
assessment period, households that met the upper threshold built their human capital 
through implementation of intensive organic production practices, improvements in 
coffee production practices for increased productivity and quality, and diversification 
of on-farm production. Households meeting this upper threshold typically came from 
cluster 3 and from a limited number of relatively asset-rich members of cluster 2. The 
overall limited number of households that meet the upper threshold for the building of 
human capital raises questions about the effectiveness of technical assistance 
programs that are designed and implemented without paying attention to the 
underlying conditions that limit households’ ability to apply human capital to more 
intensive on-farm production.  
In general, natural-capital endowments following the coffee crisis were highly 
deteriorated after years of reduced and forgone investments. By the end of the 
assessment period, many households had realized sizable investments in building 
natural capital, which offered potential for restoring their natural capital asset to 
precrisis levels. As above, two thresholds levels described the ability of the sampled 
households to build their natural-capital endowments. The lower threshold for 
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building natural capital consisted of having reasonably secure access to their land 
with productive coffee plantations. With the exception of households from El Esfuerzo 
and Julio Hernandez base cooperatives, households at the beginning of the 
assessment period generally met this threshold (some exceptions included members 
from other base cooperatives that had abandoned their coffee plantations because of 
plant disease or insufficient labour). During the assessment period, these households 
were able to access short-term credit (used for various purposes, including coffee 
production) and long-term credit for rejuvenation of coffee plantations and expansion 
of land area. The overall relevance for asset building, however, depended on access 
to complementary assets that would have allowed increased investments in soil 
fertility and development of more intensive agroforestry production systems.  
The upper threshold for building natural capital consisted of having, in addition 
to secure land access, relatively large landholdings and endowments of human, 
social, and financial capitals. These complementary assets allowed for consistent 
investments in soil fertility (fertilizer application) and more intensive agroforestry 
production systems (with relatively high productivity in coffee and a range of 
products). Strong social capital endowments implied that they have access to short-
term credit from several sources, as well as to various outlets for marketing their 
coffee. Human capital included relatively large household sizes with productive 
activities focused on on-farm production for the market. Households that reached the 
upper threshold for natural-capital building tended to be producers of conventional 
coffee from cluster 3. These few households provided most of the coffee supplied to 
Soppexcca.  
 As for financial capital, access to short- and long-term credit was the major 
change experienced by the sampled households during the assessment period. The 
fact that so many households gained access to credit for the first time during this 
period reflected 1) the poor state of the Nicaraguan financial services sector prior to, 
during, and after the coffee crisis and 2) the ability of Soppexcca to offer acceptable 
credit terms to households that otherwise would not have taken credit. Among the 
various credit sources, three offered favourable terms (e.g., 12% to 15% interest per 
year): Soppexcca, the local intermediary Osman Gutierrez, and the direct exporters 
(Atlantic and CISA). In addition to these preferred sources, many households 
accessed credit from local market buyers throughout the year but at considerably less 
favourable terms (approximately 60% interest per year). During the assessment 
period, households that met the lower threshold level of preexisting assets were able 
to access credit from one preferred source, mainly Soppexcca, in addition to local 
market coffee buyers. These households, mainly from clusters 1 and 2, had sufficient 
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natural and human capital endowments to provide a coffee production stable enough 
to cover basic needs, thus offering a higher chance of compliance with contractual 
obligations for delivery of coffee (for debt repayment) to Soppexcca. Overall credit 
amounts provided by Soppexcca were generally small and covered only the most 
basic activities for coffee production. Thus, the upper threshold considered the ability 
of the sampled households to access credit from Soppexcca and other sources, 
mainly Osman Gutierrez or a direct exporter. However, meeting this threshold 
required high levels of social capital and, in many cases, relatively large endowments 
of natural and human capitals (for direct relations with an exporter).  
 By the end of the assessment period, some households had realized sizable 
investments in physical capital, which offered households the potential to intensify 
their on-farm production in coffee and other products. The lower threshold for building 
physical capital consisted of improvements and expansions in tools, machinery, and 
infrastructure for wet-milling. Meeting this threshold implied that households had 
preexisting levels of natural and human capitals that permitted sufficient coffee 
production to repay long-term credit and otherwise invest in coffee production. 
Households in clusters 2 and 3 were able to invest in wet-milling improvements. The 
relatively equitable level of investments reflected Soppexcca’s overall support for 
improving the quality of coffee produced by its members through technical 
assistance, training, and long-term credit. The upper threshold consisted of major 
investments in tools, machinery, and infrastructure (other than wet-milling), for which 
Soppexcca-provided credit was generally unavailable. Only a relatively few 
households from cluster 3 were able to meet this threshold, suggesting that relatively 
large endowments of natural and human capital from outside the coffee system were 
required.  
  Unlike the other capitals, the factors that contributed to social-capital building 
depended less on preexisting asset endowments and more on the design of services 
offered by Soppexcca. For those households with the least amount of assets, the 
benefits related mainly to assistance with land tenure and access to emergency credit 
and other social services. For most households, Soppexcca represented an important 
coffee buyer that contributed to increased earnings from coffee and reduced the risks 
of major negative fluctuations in coffee markets, as well as being an additional source 
of short- and long-term credit and other services. Soppexcca’s ability to offer services 
to its members was due to the extensive support from NGOs and buyers over the 
assessment period. As noted previously, such support would not have been possible 
without Soppexcca’s high levels of preexisting social and human capitals or without 
its participation in certified fair-trade markets. Fair trade relationships offered 
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Soppexcca access to no-interest loans from its buyers and low-interest loans from 
specialized fair-trade lending organizations. Fair trade certification also facilitated the 
investments by NGOs and donors looking for partners in addressing the coffee crisis, 
in particular, and in promoting the smallholder coffee sector, in general.  
 
7.7 Factors that hindered to asset building by households  
Carter and Barrett (2004) argued that “poverty traps” explained why those 
households with the least assets stay poor over time. These households earned 
lower rates of return on their already modest asset endowments and thus had less 
surplus for investments after meeting immediate consumption needs. Building their 
asset base required increased savings (reduced current consumption), increased 
earnings through additional work or other income sources, and/or access to new 
credit sources. If poor households are unable to increase savings or have limited 
access to new income-generating or credit opportunities, then they settle into a 
poverty trap, where they do not accumulate the assets that would allow them to 
achieve higher returns on their existing assets. Various authors have identified the 
difficulty of smallholder coffee producers in Nicaragua to accumulate assets through 
increased earnings from certified coffee sales (due in part to their general lack of 
natural and financial capital) or to stimulate asset accumulation and higher asset 
returns through access to credit. Evidence from Soppexcca-affiliated households 
suggested that they faced limited opportunities to identify and participate in value 
chains for higher-value markets other than coffee and faced extremely limited 
opportunities for nonagricultural employment.  
Researchers have evidence that relatively poor households may not benefit 
from development interventions due to their low levels of preexisting assets. In 
Bangladesh, Hallman, Lewis, and Begum (2007, 132) argued that households’ 
responses to improved fish-farming technologies were muted due to low levels of 
certain assets: “Technologies that require high threshold levels of certain assets, 
such as land or financial capital, are likely to exclude the poor unless programs find 
other arrangements to work around the assets they lack. An important lesson from 
this study is that program approaches intended to overcome the low asset stocks of 
the poor—and therefore allow them to adopt technologies—may be extremely difficult 
to design and tailor in practice.” In Kenya, Place et al. (2007, 189) assessed the 
livelihood impacts on interventions for soil fertility replenishment practices (SFP). 
They found that even through SFP were taken up by a number of poor households, 
their impact was limited by the small percentage of land under SFP and the overall 
weak rural economy. In Bangladesh, Hossain et al. (2007) argued that relatively rich 
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households achieved direct positive impacts from the adoption of modern rice 
varieties (e.g., higher yields, lower costs), while the poorer households received 
mainly indirect benefits in the form of increased employment in rice production and 
reduced real price of rice. While these studies provide insights into how technologies 
shape rural livelihoods, they do not probe deep enough into household needs and 
realities to provide evidence of poverty traps and related exit strategies. 
The Soppexcca case study provides clear evidence that a poverty trap existed 
for a significant subgroup of households. For them, the overall impact of participation 
in value chains for certified coffee was insufficient to overcome the trap during the 
assessment period. The reasons for the trap included insufficient preexisting assets, 
incidence of major shocks (e.g., coffee crisis, Hurricane Mitch), marginalization from 
political processes, and limited access to services for building assets. Natural-capital 
endowments were highly constrained due to lack of investment (from inability to 
recover from the coffee crisis or unresolved land conflicts) and the limited size of area 
under coffee production. For these households, coffee production permitted access 
to credit from buyers in the markets of Jinotega (in exchange for basic grains). These 
households had limited access to Soppexcca-provided credit and faced trade-offs to 
dedicate more household labour to on-farm production. Moreover, they had limited 
capacities to implement improved coffee production techniques due to lack of human 
and financial capitals, combined with a limited ability to assume risks involved in the 
change of production techniques. The need to fill income gaps during the year 
implied that a limited amount of their coffee was sold to Soppexcca. These 
households were more likely to be from cluster 1, have a single household head, 
produce conventional coffee, and depend on temporary off-farm work (mainly during 
the coffee harvest season) for a significant part of total annual income. For these 
households, preasset endowments allowed for only modest asset building through 
their participation in Soppexcca. That said, Soppexcca represented an important 
focus of risk reduction in the form of 1) emergency loans and social services and 2) 
insurance against major reductions in coffee prices. 
In addition to limited preexisting assets, marginalization from decision-making 
processes hindered asset building. The struggle by members of El Esfuerzo base 
cooperative highlighted the extent to which the poor are excluded from judicial 
processes for land tenure. As long as the members of El Esfuerzo are left holding the 
debt incurred to defend their land rights, there is little possibility for them to 
accumulate assets through any type of on-farm production. Marginalization from 
decision-making processes was also evidenced in Soppexcca, for example through 
the limited consultation on investment in the dry-processing plant, the limited ability of 
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Soppexcca’s volunteer leaders to effectively carry out their oversight roles, and the 
limited accountability of the technical assistance programs. Decisions by donors and 
buyers to focus their interventions on improving coffee quality (rather than increasing 
productivity and strengthening food security) reflected limited appreciation for the 
needs and realities of the poorest producers among Soppexcca’s membership.  
 Finally, the overall context in which Soppexcca’s members operated during 
the assessment period was generally not conducive to asset building or reduced 
vulnerability. Vital services were missing, including insurance and other risk-reducing 
services and mechanisms, technical assistance for crops other than coffee, and 
access to tools and land for more intensive basic-grain production. Transportation 
and electricity infrastructure increased production costs and increased the risks of 
noncompliance with requirements for coffee quality. Markets for other products 
derived from coffee plantations (e.g., bananas, citrus, and timber) were highly 
underdeveloped. During the assessment period, costs for basic foodstuffs and 
fertilizers reached near-crisis levels in Nicaragua and other parts of the developing 
world. Addressing these changes in the overall context in which Soppexcca members 
operate required urgent and coordinated action if value chains for coffee and 
agricultural and forest products were to reduce poverty among the most vulnerable 
smallholders.  
 
7.8 Differences in asset building across clusters  
The analysis of asset building across clusters of farming households in response to 
development interventions allows for more-targeted policy recommendations and sets 
this research apart from similar studies that employed an asset-building framework. 
For example, none of the case studies presented in Adato and Meinzen-Dick (2007), 
which dealt with the impacts of agricultural research on rural livelihoods, made a 
genuine effort to draw insights for better policy based on preexisting differences in 
livelihood strategies or asset endowments. Several of the Adato and Meinzen-Dick 
case studies concluded that agricultural research had had modest to limited impacts 
on strengthening rural livelihoods (e.g., Bellon et al. 2007; Hossain et al. 2007; Place 
et al. 2007). This likely reflected the limited nature of the interventions (technology 
development for a single crop) being assessed. Altogether, the cases provide limited 
insights into how to better design policies for the generation and transfer of 
agricultural technology to the rural poor. Earlier research by Moser (1998) on assets 
and vulnerability did not recognize the role of differences in preexisting assets on the 
outcomes of asset building, nor did the more quantitative work by Carter and 
colleagues (e.g., Carter and Barrett 2004). It is argued here that applications of asset-
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building frameworks benefit from a nuanced understanding of the realities of different 
types of households, complex interventions, and effects on multiple and diverse 
strategies. 
The remainder of this discussion examines the insights gained from the 
comparison of asset-building results by Soppexcca-affiliated households according to 
their cluster assignment.  
 
Cluster 1: limited ability to build assets through value-chain participation 
Overall experiences with the accumulation of natural capital by the cluster 1 
households during the assessment period provided relatively positive, albeit mixed, 
experiences. A surprisingly high percentage of these households expanded their total 
landholdings (21%) or expanded their area under coffee production (38%). These 
results were not markedly different from changes in landholdings and area under 
coffee production by cluster 2 households (although they were considerably smaller 
when compared to similar changes by cluster 3 households). For the cluster 1 
households that increased their landholdings and area under coffee production, full or 
partial attribution to Soppexcca and its marketing and credit services was possible in 
many cases. Given the lack of options for agricultural diversification, combined with 
the need to recuperate natural-capital endowments following the coffee crisis, any 
increase in area under coffee production was likely to provide additional income 
sources and improve resilience in the midterm.  
However, in other areas of natural-capital building, the performance of cluster 
1 households was low in both absolute and relative terms, with likely negative 
consequences for sustainability. For example, cluster 1 members who produced 
organic coffee were 50% less likely to use compost for coffee fertilization than their 
cluster 2 counterparts. Only 16% of cluster 1 organic producers used Biogreen 
between 2007–2008 and 2008–2009 for coffee fertilization, compared to roughly 50% 
of cluster 2 organic producers. Among households that produced conventional coffee 
from cluster 1, low fertilizer use in coffee production was equally worrisome, with 
roughly 35%of households applying as little as one bag of fertilizer in a given year—
roughly 50% of the usage rates of households in cluster 2. One positive sign in 
fertilizer usage was the increase by cluster 1 households in 2008–2009 in response 
to the linking of Soppexcca-provided credit with fertilizer purchases. Where relatively 
small investments in human and financial capital were required for upgrading natural 
capital, such as the application of improved wastewater-disposal techniques, the 
take-up by cluster 1 households was high and the differences between results for 
households from cluster 1 and 2 were small. 
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 Results suggested that cluster 1 households were less likely to have 
developed improved skills or capacities for the application of good coffee production 
practices during the assessment period than households in other clusters. For 
example, roughly three-quarters of the households that exhibited the lowest 
productivity in coffee among all sampled households (and thus practised the least 
intensive form of coffee production) belonged to cluster 1, while the majority of 
households that had achieved relatively high productivity levels through new skills for 
plantation management belonged to cluster 2. With roughly 22% of households in 
cluster 1 headed by females (nearly twice the percentage of single-headed 
households in cluster 2), efforts to build human capital must recognize the limited 
labour capacity for coffee production and the related need for labour-saving 
technologies. Households from cluster 1 were also the least likely to have acquired or 
implemented new skills for improving their coffee quality, such as improved 
techniques for harvesting or wet milling. In general, households from cluster 1 
practised no-input and low-skill production techniques prior to the assessment period 
and were unable to improve production in response to interventions for building 
human capital by Soppexcca and others.  
Changes in social capital among households in cluster 1 were generally 
positive and of a magnitude equal to, if not greater, than the corresponding changes 
for households in clusters 2 and 3. Most households from cluster 1, like those from 
cluster 2, sold their coffee to only one type of coffee buyer prior to joining 
Soppexcca—usually a local intermediary. During the assessment period, the majority 
of households from all clusters developed links with Soppexcca while maintaining 
their links with previous coffee buyers—thus, effectively increasing the flexibility and 
range of services offered by buyers in general. Households from cluster 1 were 
generally no more or no less likely to sell their coffee outside of Soppexcca than 
households from other clusters. Households from cluster 1 were the least likely to 
have received credit for agricultural production prior to the assessment period. 
However, their access to credit during the period was nearly equal to that of 
households from cluster 2. Qualitative evidence suggested that households from 
cluster 1 benefited significantly from other socially oriented interventions by 
Soppexcca, such as the donation of coffins and school supplies, provision of 
emergency credit, facilitation of medical services, and assistance with land tenure 
conflict.  
Similar to their experiences in the building of human capital, cluster 1 
households struggled to build their physical-capital endowments, and results for the 
assessment period showed that their achievements were markedly lower than those 
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of households from clusters 2 and 3. The mean total investment in physical 
infrastructure for coffee production among cluster 1 households producing 
conventional coffee was 61% and 33% of similar investments by households from 
clusters 2 and 3. Similar results were identified for households producing organic 
coffee. Moreover, few households from cluster 1 had the resources to improve their 
housing infrastructure during the assessment period. Where improvements were 
identified—for example, the construction of a new latrine—local NGOs and 
government agencies were identified as having provided the resources for the 
investments. Interestingly, no major difference was identified in the ability to upgrade 
housing infrastructure between cluster 1 households and those in clusters 2 and 3. 
This suggested that households, when possible, prioritized investments in coffee 
production over those of housing infrastructure, potentially in response to the urgent 
need to recuperate natural capital following the coffee crisis as well as the relatively 
high price for coffee during most of the assessment period.   
The financial capital analysis showed that cluster 1 households improved their 
income flows only marginally through their participation in the certified-coffee value 
chain. Given overall low productivity levels, the potential for major gains in income 
were limited form the start. However, the need to sell coffee outside of Soppexcca, 
despite Soppexcca’s higher prices, significantly reduced income benefits. For many 
cluster 1 households, qualitative evidence suggested that shortages of cash prior to 
the coffee harvest season required households to seek sources of coffee-based 
credit from local intermediaries. Cluster 1 households generally received only half of 
the amount of short-term credit from Soppexcca as households in cluster 2 and only 
a small fraction of long-term credit from Soppexcca received by households in cluster 
2. This demonstrated the overall difficulty faced by cluster 1 households to intensify 
their coffee production and increase their income flows from noncoffee related 
productive activities (and the related need for selling coffee outside of Soppexcca).   
In general, the results from the Soppexcca households in cluster 1 showed the limited 
potential of value chain development to address chronic rural poverty when overall 
preexisting asset endowments are too low to allow for increased investments in 
market-oriented activities. Development agencies must learn much more about the 
dynamics of assets management, or lack thereof, and the related household 
vulnerabilities as inputs for designing interventions that build the minimum asset base 
required for effective inclusion in value chains.  
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Cluster 2: potential revealed for building assets through value chain development  
Households in cluster 2 were somewhat more likely to have made important 
contributions to their natural capital through expansion of landholdings or area under 
coffee production during the assessment period. Among cluster 2 households, the 
percent change in total landholdings, at 12.6%, exceeded that for households in 
clusters 1 (9.7%) and 3 (7.4%). Similarly, the percent change in area under coffee 
production for cluster 2 households (31%) slightly exceeded that of households from 
cluster 1 (26.3%) and cluster 3 (27.9%). Overall, limited fertilizer usage by cluster 2 
households remained a barrier to improving natural capital: In any given year during 
the assessment period, roughly between roughly 25% and 50% of these households 
did not apply a single bag of synthetic fertilizer. That said, households in cluster 2 
were nearly twice as likely to have applied fertilizer for coffee production as 
households in cluster 1, and evidence suggested that overall usage by cluster 2 
households was increasing. 
Results suggested that many cluster 2 households were low-input producers 
who struggled to improve their skills and capacities for the application of good coffee 
production practices during the assessment period. Roughly 32% of cluster 2 
households were among those with the lowest coffee productivity (annual production 
of parchment coffee between 0 and 999 lbs/manzana). Cluster 2 households also 
suffered considerably more from the effects of anthracnosis in coffee production than 
households in clusters 1 or 3. However, results also showed the potential that existed 
among cluster 2 households to adopt new skills for coffee production, since the lion’s 
share (65%) of low-input producers who did implement improved production 
techniques during the assessment period were in cluster 2. Households in cluster 2 
were likely to have acquired or implemented new skills for improving the quality of 
their coffee, such as improved techniques for harvesting or wet milling.  
Overall changes in social capital among cluster 2 households were positive, 
and, in many cases, significant for increasing the benefits from coffee production. As 
was the case for cluster 1 households, most cluster 2 households sold their coffee to 
only one type of coffee buyer prior to joining Soppexcca—usually a local 
intermediary, and maintained these links after joining Soppexcca. Households from 
cluster 2 were equally as likely to sell their coffee outside of Soppexcca as 
households from other clusters, thus reflecting the need to diversify credit sources for 
meeting acute needs during the year. Most households from cluster 2 did not receive 
credit for agricultural production prior to the assessment period. During the 
assessment period roughly 65% of cluster 2 households reported at least one credit 
source and some 16% reported two sources. Similar to cluster 1, evidence suggested 
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that cluster 2 households benefited from the socially oriented interventions provided 
by Soppexcca, including base cooperative organization and assistance with obtaining 
land titles (Julio Hernandez base cooperative, most of whose members belonged to 
cluster 2).  
Cluster 2 households altogether had mixed results in the building of their 
physical-capital endowments. The mean total investment in physical infrastructure for 
coffee production among cluster 2 households was US$822, which was nearly twice 
that of cluster 1 but roughly half that of cluster 3. However, it is important to note that 
nearly three-quarters of the cluster 2 households were unable to make any cash 
investment in physical capital for coffee production during the assessment period. 
Cluster 2 households invested, on average, US$331 in tools and machinery for 
agricultural production (tool purchased in addition to those used specifically for coffee 
production) during the entire assessment period—clearly not enough to achieving 
meaningful upgrades in technologies for agricultural production. Similar to the 
experiences in cluster 1, few households from cluster 2 had the resources to improve 
their housing infrastructure during the assessment period.  
Relative to households from the other clusters, Cluster 2 households were 
more likely to have achieved meaningful increases in income flows through their 
participation in Soppexcca. Cluster 2 households generally depended less on buyers 
outside of Soppexcca for the sale of their coffee and for access to credit, thus 
allowing them to take better advantage of the relatively higher prices offered by 
Soppexcca. Cluster 2 households generally received about twice the average amount 
of short-term credit from Soppexcca as households from cluster 1; however, they 
tended to receive considerably less than households from cluster 3. A similar 
situation was noted in terms of access to long-term credit for cluster 2 households. 
However, evidence suggested that cluster 2 households, like their cluster 1 
counterparts, struggled to repay long-term credit obligations to Soppexcca, in part 
due to overall low productivity and major variations in production levels.   
In general, the results from cluster 2 households showed the potential of value 
chain development for building assets among the rural poor. It is argued here that 
households from this cluster generally had the minimum capital endowments at the 
beginning of the assessment period, thus allowing them to intensify their coffee 
production in response to favourable marketing conditions and Soppexcca’s 
technical, financial, and marketing support. However, it can also be argued that most 
households from cluster 2 have yet to realize their full potential due to limited asset 
endowments, high risks of coffee production, limited options for on-farm 
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diversification and off-farm employment, and incomplete service offers among other 
factors.  
 
Cluster 3: critical for the survival of Soppexcca and the value chain  
The total net increase in landholders for cluster 3 households was the smallest of the 
three clusters. This reflected that a small number of cluster 3 households sold or 
bequeathed significant extensions of land during the assessment period. On the 
other hand, households in cluster 3 were much more likely to have purchased 
relatively large expansions of land (2+mz) during the assessment period. The change 
in area under coffee production for cluster 3 households was roughly in line with that 
of households from clusters 1 and 2, indicating perhaps that cluster 3 households 
often had more diverse agricultural production systems and were more likely to have 
maintained their coffee plantations during the coffee crisis, and thus generally had 
less interest in the expansion of coffee during the assessment period. In contrast to 
households producing conventional coffee from clusters 1 and 2, the majority of 
cluster 3 households producing conventional coffee applied sufficient amounts of 
synthetic fertilizer during the assessment period to maintain positive nitrogen 
balances. These cluster 3 household were also among the most able to implement 
improved wastewater disposal and harvest practices.  
Few cluster 3 households failed to demonstrate the basic skills and capacities 
for the application of good coffee production practices prior to the assessment period. 
Only 13% of cluster 3 households were among those households with the lowest 
coffee productivity (annual production of parchment coffee between 0 and 999 
lbs/manzana) over the assessment period, compared to 71% and 31% for 
households in clusters 1 and 2, respectively. Most cluster 3 households adopted new 
production techniques for improved quality and environmental performance. While 
single headed households were relatively common in clusters 1 and 2, representing 
24% and 12% of the total cluster membership, respectively, they comprised only 6% 
of the cluster 3 membership. This structural feature has important implications 
regarding asset thresholds and asset building, not least of which is an important 
gender dimension in the design of pro-poor value chain development.  
In contrast to households from clusters 1 and 2, which generally relied on only 
a single buyer (usually a local market buyer) for the marketing of their coffee prior to 
joining Soppexcca, many households in cluster 3 maintained diversified buyer 
options for coffee marketing or had access to preferred buyers, such as direct 
exporters, prior to joining Soppexcca. That said, for most cluster 3 members, 
relations with Soppexcca offered an additional option for accessing credit for coffee 
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production and for obtaining a relatively low-risk option for marketing their coffee in 
the face of unstable international coffee markets. Households from cluster 3 were just 
as likely to sell their coffee outside of Soppexcca as households from other clusters. 
This reflected their need to diversify credit sources for meeting production costs 
throughout the year.  
In response to improved credit access and the overall improved marketing 
conditions for coffee, cluster 3 households altogether showed positive signs of 
physical capital accumulation during the assessment period. The mean total 
investment in physical infrastructure for coffee production among cluster 3 
households was US$1,502, which was nearly twice that of cluster 2 and four times 
that of cluster 1. Cluster 3 households that produced conventional coffee invested, on 
average, US$1,235 in tools and machinery for agricultural production (noncoffee 
specific) during the entire assessment period—which was three times the average 
amount invested by similar cluster 2 households and nearly 10 times that invested by 
similar cluster 1 households. Interestingly, investments in tools and machinery by 
organic producers in cluster 3 were only half those of their conventional counterparts. 
Similar to experiences in clusters 1 and 2, most households from cluster 3 had limited 
resources for investing in new housing infrastructure or improvement to their housing 
infrastructure during the assessment period.  
On average, cluster 3 households that produced conventional and organic 
coffee received an additional US$341 and US$1,356 per year, respectively, through 
their participation with Soppexcca. However, overall income benefits were reduced 
significantly by the need for these households to obtain credit from other sources, 
and thus diversify their market outlets. While this allowed for increased access to 
credit and other services, it reduced their overall income benefits, as Soppexcca 
generally offered higher prices than other local buyers. That said, cluster 3 
households tended to receive greater access to Soppexcca-provided credit than 
households from the other clusters. Cluster 3 households received two to four times 
the average amount of short-term credit from Soppexcca as households in clusters 1 
and 2. A similar situation was noted in terms of access to long-term credit for coffee 
renovation and the upgrading of physical capital—only for the purchase of land were 
average credit disbursements between the clusters roughly equal.   
In summary, cluster 3 households contributed the lion’s share of coffee to 
Soppexcca but required significant amounts of credit and other Soppexcca services. 
Without their participation in Soppexcca, the overall business viability of Soppexcca 
and the value chain as a whole would have been considerably worse. However, the 
use of limited Soppexcca resources, such as credit and technical assistance, in 
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cluster 3 came at a high social cost: a more focused effort on building the assets of 
the asset-poor households in clusters 1 and 2.  
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8 Toward pro-poor value chain development: Summary, 
conclusions and recommendations 
 
8.1 Introduction 
This thesis began by pointing out the urgent need to understand better the 
opportunities for poverty reduction and rural development through the support of 
smallholder agricultural value chain development. The argument hinged on the 
following three points: 1) the concentration of poverty in the rural sector, with many of 
the rural poor being smallholder agriculturists, 2) the limitations of previous 
development approaches to spur rural development, and 3) the renewed interest 
expressed by donors and NGOs in rural development in general and in VCDA in 
particular. Despite the growing importance of VCDA for the public and private 
sectors, however, little information exists on the ability of smallholders and resource-
poor enterprises to contribute to and benefit from VCDA.  
 This research sought to deepen insights into the development of value chains 
and the related poverty implications. Analysis focused on livelihood asset building at 
both the level of household and the collective enterprise. The two-level focus took 
into account 1) the potentially important role of RCEs in facilitating market access and 
the building of assets by their members and 2) the fact that interventions for value 
chain development are usually targeted at both households and enterprises. At the 
enterprise level, data collection considered asset building in response to 
interventions, services from downstream chain partners, and the overall market 
context. At the household level, the data collection considered asset building in 
response to interventions, services from buyers, and the overall market context. The 
framework was applied to the case of the fair-trade certified coffee cooperative 
Soppexcca. The assessment period (2004–2005 to 2008–2009) followed a prolonged 
period of stress related to the coffee crisis, in which many smallholders in Central 
America reduced their investments in coffee production.   
The following section summarises the answers to the three questions that 
guided this research, followed by a reflection on the larger implications of the findings 
for agricultural development, in general, and the design of VCDA in particular, 
including the implications for impact assessment and related learning. The chapter 
concludes with recommendations for Soppexcca, its supporters, and policy makers in 
Nicaragua and beyond.  
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8.2 Summary of responses to research questions  
The first research question was, How do endowments of productive assets change, 
either positively or negatively, in response to a given VCDA at the levels of collective 
enterprise and household?  
The results at the enterprise level were generally encouraging but did 
reflect the major challenges faced by Soppexcca to evolve into a self-sustaining 
enterprise. Within the assessment period, major positive changes were observed in 
physical capital, mainly in response to investments made possible with income from 
coffee sales, NGO-provided donations, and access to credit. The use of income from 
coffee sales for the purchase of the dry-processing plant highlights a dilemma facing 
RCEs: improved physical capital is one of the few options for improving business 
viability, but such investments come at the expense of higher prices for members and 
improved/expanded extension and credit services. Measured and observed changes 
in social and human capitals revealed mixed results. On one hand, social capital with 
coffee buyers expanded and deepened during the period in response to Soppexcca’s 
success in debt repayment and its competent professional management. On the 
other hand, the centralization of decision making in one person and the limited ability 
to build the capacities of other professional staff, base cooperatives, or members for 
participation in governance makes Soppexcca and the value chain as a whole 
vulnerable to collapse. Results for financial capital endowments were also mixed. On 
the one hand, Soppexcca’s ability to offer short-term credit expanded during the 
assessment period, mainly due to cash injections by NGO-backed projects. On the 
other hand, member repayment data suggested that recuperation of credit will take 
longer than expected and no alternative existed to reduce dependence on donor 
funding for meeting technical assistance expenses (or for expanding credit portfolios).    
Results at the household level showed the overall difficulty of households to 
build assets when their endowments are low, livelihood strategies are diversified, and 
risks to external shocks are high.  
• Natural capital: With improved access to credit, some households expanded 
their total land area and/or expanded/rejuvenated their area under coffee 
production. Overall investments in improving soil fertility were limited by low 
financial capital and the high costs of synthetic fertilizers. Where land tenure 
was extremely insecure (e.g., Julio Hernandez and El Esfuerzo base 
cooperatives), investments in coffee production were extremely low.  
• Social capital: Social capital improved across most of the sample with 
access to new services and reduced risk to unfavourable conditions in 
international coffee markets. The building of stronger links to Soppexcca 
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were hindered by limited financial assets (income gaps during the year and 
limited offer of credit by Soppexcca), as well as the increased price 
competition (and improved service provision) of local coffee buyers. 
• Human capital: Results suggested that households faced major challenges 
in accessing training about good production practices for coffee. Evidence 
suggested that approximately one-third of the sample practiced no-
input/low-input coffee production. A major advancement of human capital 
was the development of skills for cocoa production; however, relatively few 
households had the capacity to invest in cocoa.  
• Physical capital: Advances in physical-capital building were achieved when 
households had access to long-term credit from Soppexcca. The most 
common investment was for wet-milling infrastructure, which is important for 
improving coffee quality. Relatively few investments were reported in tools 
or machinery for improving the productivity of coffee or other crops, or for 
adding value to primary production.   
• Financial capital: For most households, income flows increased only 
marginally from participation in the value chain of certified coffee. Low 
productivity was a primary reason. The high percentage of total coffee 
production sold outside Soppexcca also played a strong role. Many 
households reported first-time access to short- and long-term credit, but 
overall credit amounts tended to be too small to allow for major cash 
investments in asset building. Evidence suggested that the ability to repay 
credit was limited by low productivity in coffee and high fluctuations in coffee 
prices. 
The second research question asked was, What factors 
facilitated/constrained asset building at the collective enterprise and household 
levels? At the enterprise level, high levels of preexisting human and social capitals 
played a critical role in asset building. The high levels of human and social capital 
allowed Soppexcca to obtain funds for its credit and technical assistance program 
(and thus compete with local traders for their members’ coffee), expand its 
relationships with buyers of certified coffee, and maintain long-term relationships with 
NGOs and credit providers. The building of Soppexcca’s asset base depended on 
strong interventions by both downstream value chain actors and development NGOs 
in the development of Soppexcca. The private sector played a crucial role in the initial 
building of these capitals, while the NGOs, whose support increased significantly 
during the coffee crisis, provided critical support for building financial and physical 
capitals.  
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The following factors limited asset building at enterprise level during the 
assessment period: 
• Disabling local context for business development: Various events and 
trends limited the ability of Soppexcca to build assets during the period. The 
large financial debt inherited by Soppexcca as a precondition for its 
formation placed a financial strain on the cooperative during most of its 
existence. The coffee crisis reduced income from the sale of conventional 
coffee at a time when access to certified markets was limited. With 
increased access to certified coffee markets came the dramatic increase in 
local competition for coffee due to higher conventional coffee prices relative 
to certified coffee prices.  
• Disabling national context for business development: The near absence of 
the state in the provision of technical and financial assistance for agricultural 
production, land-tenure resolution, subsector or value chain development, or 
improved food security did not facilitate asset building. The government of 
Nicaragua did not contribute to the development of value chains for 
specialty coffee, nor has it attempted to play a coordinating role for NGO 
interventions in the subsector. Deficient rural infrastructure and limited law 
enforcement existed before and during the assessment period. NGOs 
partially filled the void left behind by limited government support; however, 
NGO support was also limited in reach and duration.  
• Delayed learning and innovation: Evidence suggested that limited learning 
about options for improving business performance also hindered 
Soppexcca’s ability to build assets. Up-to-date information on coffee-buying 
relationships and overall financial performance was unavailable to board 
members. Limited human capital by members constrained their ability to use 
such information for oversight and strategy building. The development of 
alternative production technologies and inputs had been carried out through 
trial and error (e.g., implementation of organic coffee production in the early 
2000s). Technical assistance had yet to respond to members’ needs.  
 
The major factor in building assets at the household level was access to 
services provided by coffee buyers, mainly Soppexcca. Examples include the 
increased use of fertilizers (for organically certified and conventional producers), 
changes in coffee production techniques, expansion of wet-milling infrastructure, and 
expansion and rejuvenation of coffee plantations. The recent increase in coffee 
prices most likely contributed to asset building but, in general, coffee production 
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volumes were too low to have spurred significant levels of asset building. With the 
exception of local intermediaries, few buyers or organizations provided the services 
that Soppexcca offered to its members.  
The following factors limited asset building at household level: 
• Insufficient preexisting assets: Lack of assets prior to the assessment period 
limited the building of assets during the period. For a sizable subgroup of 
sampled households, preexisting endowments were constrained across all 
five capital assets. Households most likely to have the lowest levels of 
preexisting endowments were headed by females and faced major land-
tenure problems.  
• Incomplete service offer for asset building: Despite the investments by 
Soppexcca and others in building the assets of its members, major gaps in 
assets remained at the end of the period. These gaps tended to be 
concentrated in human, natural, and financial capitals. Building these assets 
will require improvements in the design, targeting, and implementation of 
technical and credit services provided by Soppexcca as well as services for 
improved food security and the development of other markets for products 
and services produced by (or potentially produced by) member households.  
• Restricted marketing context: The overall context for the marketing of 
agricultural products and services in Nicaragua did not favour asset 
building. The markets for products other than coffee (e.g., corn, bananas, 
citrus) provided low returns for on-farm labour but were essential for food 
security and income generation during the year. It appears that 
diversification of the agricultural economy to spread and reduce risks may 
also have had the effect of limiting the potential to scale up a given 
enterprise. Few households participated in nonagricultural labour markets. 
Improving the wages in agricultural labour markets through government 
decree or through certification systems action could benefit the poorest of 
Soppexcca’s members, many of whom depend more on income from other 
coffee plantations than from their own.   
• Marginalization: The marginalization of the poor from social, economic, and 
political processes was evidenced in various ways: the inability of 
households to obtain titles to their land after years of struggle; the limited 
influence exercised by members on Soppexcca’s governance; and the 
decisions of development agencies to focus on improved quality rather than 
on increased productivity and reduced risk. Thus, social and political 
barriers went hand in hand with economic exclusion. 
224 
 
 
The third research question was, How did differences among rural 
households in terms of preexisting assets and livelihood strategies impact asset 
building at the household level? The answer to this question comes from comparison 
of the household-level results across the three clusters.  
Cluster 1 households, which included those households with limited access to 
land for agricultural production and dependence mainly on off-farm income sources, 
generally did not have sufficient assets prior to the assessment period to build assets 
in a significant manner during the assessment period. That said, these households 
did benefit from participation in the certified-coffee value chain, for example through 
higher incomes from coffee, access to Soppexcca-provided safety nets, and reduced 
vulnerability to external shocks (e.g., through access to short-term and emergency 
credit and the floor price for fair trade coffee). The dependence of these households 
on off-farm income and their limited ability to intensify their agricultural production 
(due to their overall limited asset base and the related trade-offs for diversion of these 
assets to coffee production) meant that they had limited potential to escape poverty 
through value chain development. Any alternative outcome would require extensive 
investments by development agencies to build the asset base of the poor as part of 
the process of linking to a given value chain. The potential for active participation by 
the private sector in these investments would be limited.   
Altogether, evidence suggested that cluster 2 households were more likely to 
have intensified their coffee production through participation in Soppexcca and the 
certified coffee value chain. Evidence showed that many of these households built 
their asset base in terms of natural, social, financial, and physical capitals and, in 
some cases, human capital through a combination of increased income from coffee 
and Soppexcca services (mainly short- and long-term credit). However, evidence did 
not suggest that asset building for cluster 2 households offered sufficiently strong 
positive feedback loops that would have generated additional asset building and 
provided a viable pathway out of rural poverty. Major gaps remained—in the services 
offered by Soppexcca, in complementary assets at the household level, and in the 
overall business environment in Nicaragua—that effectively prevented the 
emergence of such feedback loops; for example, the limited ability of households to 
increase productivity, their high vulnerability to pests and diseases in coffee 
production (and related lack of risk-reducing options), the limited availability of credit 
for strategic investments, and the lack of lucrative options for agricultural production 
outside of coffee. Cluster 2 experiences demonstrated the potential of value chain 
development to address rural poverty and the need for greater accountability and 
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learning in order to improve the design of related interventions, as well as the 
urgency for reforms in the larger business environment.     
Evidence suggested that cluster 3 households benefited extensively from 
access to short- and long-term credit, from Soppexcca-provided technical assistance, 
and from increased prices for their coffee. These households, both conventional and 
organic, were critical for Soppexcca’s ability to obtain sufficient volumes of coffee to 
meet contractual agreements with international coffee buyers. However, these 
households generally sold a significant percentage of their coffee to buyers outside of 
Soppexcca. Any effort to increase their commitment to deliver coffee to Soppexcca 
would require significant increases in their access to short-term credit from 
Soppexcca—which, in turn, would divert resources from Soppexcca’s efforts to 
promote asset building of households in clusters 1 and 2. The relationship between 
Soppexcca and the cluster 3 households highlights another dilemma for achieving 
pro-poor value chain development: Soppexcca could increase its long-term viability 
(and reduce its dependence on NGOs) by dedicating more resources to cluster 3; 
however, such changes would reduce dramatically its ability to facilitate asset 
building by those households with more limited asset endowments.  
 The analysis of asset building by clusters suggests that value chain 
development can achieve different outcomes, including the building of a sustainable 
and more competitive value chain, the building of a more viable collective enterprise, 
and the building of specific assets by the poor. It was shown that all of these 
outcomes were important to achieving a viable value chain in the speciality coffee 
subsector that had potential to provide a pathway out of poverty for many of the 
households linked to it. However, the Soppexcca experience also showed that such 
achievements did not come cheaply; they resulted from years of investments by 
coffee buyers, donors and civil society, Soppexcca, and Soppexcca members. In 
addition, the experiences of households from cluster 1 showed that rural poverty 
goals might best be achieved by helping those households with the smallest asset 
endowments to transition out of agriculture. Unfortunately, discussions in the 
literature on value chains and value chain development have yet to address the 
complexities, challenges, and dilemmas for achieving poverty reduction through value 
chain development. Among these dilemmas is the ethics of targeting development 
efforts toward the not-so-poor, and hence the policies that mediate or encourage the 
migration of the poorest out of farming and into the nonfarm economy—or even out of 
rural areas. The Soppexcca case shows the potential that exists for pro-poor value 
chain development but also the need for deeper discussions about the role of 
different stakeholders in value chain development, the goals of value chain 
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development, and the need for increased coordination and mutual learning as part of 
the development process.  
 
8.3 Contributions of this research  
Do VCDA provide a pathway out of poverty for asset-poor households? Can we 
argue that value chain development has the potential for greater impacts on poverty 
than earlier approaches, such as nontraditional agricultural export promotion? How 
can those genuinely interested in poverty reduction achieve greater impacts through 
value chain approaches? As noted in chapter 2, the literature on value chains and 
value chain development heretofore has focused limited attention on these questions. 
The results of the Soppexcca case study shed light on the potential for VCDA to 
address rural poverty. On one hand, the Soppexcca case has features that facilitate 
poverty reduction (e.g., long-term donor/NGO support, consolidated preexisting 
relationships along the value chain). On the other hand, the findings at the enterprise 
and household levels also reflect the generally unfavourable and high-risk 
environment for producing and marketing coffee prior to the assessment period (e.g., 
coffee crisis, Hurricane Mitch). Such caveats aside, the following conceptual and 
academic advances from the case study can be identified: 
• Role of asset endowments in determining the poverty reduction potential of 
VCDA: The ability of value chain approaches to provide a pathway out of 
poverty depends, in part, on households having sufficient levels of 
preexisting assets to permit increased investment in asset building. The 
results of the Soppexcca case study were mixed, with the existence of a 
relatively large group of households with highly limited asset bases and, 
hence, little asset building over the assessment period. If these households 
are to have any hope of pulling themselves out of poverty, interventions for 
building a minimum asset base among them must be carried out prior to 
linking them with a given value chain. Efforts must address improving 
natural and human capitals as a first priority, which, in an initial stage may 
require targeted subsidies and mechanisms to address production and 
market risks.  
• Limitations of value chains approaches to address asset building: Value 
chain interventions prioritized activities of mutual interest to Soppexcca and 
its buyers, with a strong focus on quality and environmental stewardship. 
Results showed the potential for a marked increase in coffee quality and 
environmental performance at the household level. This may have been 
necessary but it was not sufficient to provide a path out of poverty for the 
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asset poor. Results showed that poverty reduction among asset poor must 
address yield levels, profitability, and efficiency because prices alone for 
certified coffee cannot compensate for low productivity, limited and low-
quality asset endowments, and the related need for risk mitigation. Without 
understanding and addressing the lack of assets by the poor for effective 
value chain participation, VCDA run the risk of excluding the poor from the 
benefits of value chain participation,  
• Critical role of RCEs in asset building: The Soppexcca case demonstrates 
the role that RCEs can play in value chain development and in supporting 
asset building among the poor. Soppexcca offered credit and technical 
assistance services to its members that proved to be critical for building 
physical and natural capitals. The overall high level of social capital between 
Soppexcca and its members facilitated the provision of credit to its members 
(who otherwise would not have taken credit for fear of loss of land title). 
While problems existed with technical assistance, it was also clear that for 
most households Soppexcca was the only source of technical assistance 
ever received. Improved service provision by Soppexcca to its members will 
require addressing such problems as high debt levels, improving the 
effectiveness of technical assistance, and innovation in credit services.  
• Value addition through certification: Fair trade certification not only ensured 
access to a premium market but also facilitated access to finance from 
buyers and specialized lenders, long-term assistance from development 
agencies, and protection for Soppexcca and its members against future 
sustained negative price trends in coffee markets. Organic certification 
provided access to yet higher coffee prices. But these benefits must be 
traded off against the higher production costs and possible lower short-term 
productivity. While organic production may seem more environmentally 
sustainable, productivity may be reduced in the long term if appropriate 
organic fertilizers are unavailable and soil fertility is compromised, thereby 
depleting natural assets.  
• Value chain development may not be sufficient for reducing rural poverty: 
The thesis shows that market-oriented value chain approaches are 
important for rural poverty reduction. However, additional development 
approaches are needed to expand and deepen these contributions. One 
such approach is a household livelihoods approach. This would orient 
interventions toward the needs of supplier households as much as toward 
improved market access and chain efficiencies. Issues such as building 
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minimum asset endowments, reducing trade-offs between subsistence and 
value chain activities, and building resilience through safety nets and 
insurance would take prominence in development interventions. Another 
approach is a broader subsector approach with public sector support. This 
would direct interventions toward improved rural infrastructure; improved 
technical, financial, and business development services; and promotion of 
markets and related linkages for a range of products and services. 
• Need for better designed and targeted value chain interventions: 
Repeatedly this thesis has highlighted the need for faster and deeper 
learning about the realities of the asset poor and the related implications for 
the design of services for pro-poor value chain development. Such learning 
must address critical questions regarding how to facilitate asset building by 
the poor and by their enterprises over the long-term. 
• Better-defined analytical tools for impact assessment: Responding to such 
questions above requires collaboration among enterprises along the value 
chains, smallholders, and service providers, including NGOs and 
government agencies. This, in turn, requires that tools be available to 
facilitate learning by value chain stakeholders. The conceptual and 
methodological framework presented in this thesis was validated through 
this case study and 21 other case studies carried out in collaboration with 
the Ford Foundation. Collectively, the body of research of which this thesis 
is a part shows that other tools are also required: tools that allow for less 
expensive, more frequent monitoring of changes; tools that address intra-
household issues (e.g., gender equity); and tools that address changes 
beyond the household and upstream enterprise, for example at the level of 
a subsector. 
 
Based on the findings from this study, the following recommendations are offered for 
Soppexcca, NGOs, and businesses interested in supporting Soppexcca and for 
development agencies in general that are interested in pro-poor value chain 
development. 
 
Recommendations for Soppexcca 
• Innovation in extension: The redesign of extension will be critical to lift 
productivity levels for coffee and demonstrate increased return for donors’ 
investments. Specific elements to be considered include targeting of 
smallholders based on need and capacity, monitoring of production 
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systems, and access to subsidies or low-cost credit for households in need 
of rapid response to production problems. Innovation would also be required 
in the design of the advance payment and credit programs, including design 
of an incentive program for compliance with short-term credit terms and the 
implementation of an easy-access credit program during the harvest period. 
• Empowerment of members and staff to contribute to business operations: 
Long-term investments in leadership building, business administration, and 
conflict resolution will be required for a critical mass of cooperative 
members with an interest in and the possibility of serving in leadership 
positions. The extent to which base cooperatives can contribute to reducing 
costs and improving services must be identified and implemented, including 
their ability to monitor members’ production, provide rapid response to 
production problems and food insecurity, coordination for input provision 
(e.g., fertilizers), and coordination/evaluation of technical assistance. 
• Building social and human capitals: Soppexcca and supporting NGOs have 
failed to ensure management continuity and succession and member 
participation. Higher levels of investment in social and human capitals are 
needed. Building these capitals will require a long-term commitment to 
building leadership and basic business skills among Soppexcca staff and its 
membership. It will require the development of mechanisms for conflict 
resolution and increased transparency.  
• Expanded service offer: Strengthened relations with members will require 
that Soppexcca strengthen and diversify its service offer. Extension services 
must address options for the increased productivity of conventional and 
organic coffee production. Expanded long-term credit services will be critical 
for investments in natural and physical capitals. Services, whether provided 
by Soppexcca or others, must address how to reduce the risks households 
face, including price and weather-related risks. This also implies that 
Soppexcca collaborate to increase the effectiveness of donor-funded 
interventions and provide increased information on related outcomes.  
 
Recommendations for NGOs working with Soppexcca  
• Value chain development from a livelihoods perspective: External 
assistance will be required for Soppexcca to improve its capacities to 
provide better support to its members. This will require innovation and risk 
taking in the design of extension services and mechanisms for risk reduction 
in coffee production. In addition, there is need for a multi-chain approach to 
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address poverty reduction goals. Such an approach accounts for the 
diversity of coffee-based agroforestry systems and related livelihood 
strategies. The approach capitalizes on market and business opportunities 
for secondary agroforestry products, such as timber, fruits, and ornamental 
plants. This requires a careful mix between an international niche-market 
orientation for coffee and a focus on local and national, often 
undifferentiated, markets for secondary agroforestry-system AFS products. 
• Address the needs of the poor for value chain participation: A major 
challenge for development agencies is the identification of the asset poor 
and the provision of services to build their assets before linking them to 
VCDA. In the case of Soppexcca’s members, support for building assets for 
the poorest would include increased productivity in basic grain production; 
diversification of production in coffee-based agroforestry systems; resolution 
of major land-tenure issues; and introduction of risk reduction and mitigation 
measures (food security). In some cases, the use of targeted subsidies for 
natural capital building (e.g., secure land tenure, soil improvement, 
rejuvenation) may be the only option for generating positive feedback loops 
for asset building (where increased natural capital contributes to increased 
income flows that, over time, leads to increased physical, human, and social 
capitals). Special attention will be required to increase the asset 
endowments for value chain participation by households headed by 
females; human capital, in addition to natural capital, may be especially 
scarce.  
• Support innovation and learning: Repeatedly this study highlighted 
instances where faster and deeper learning by NGOs and Soppexcca would 
have offered the potential for improving Soppexcca’s ability to build its 
assets and its ability to provide more effective services to rural households. 
Such learning may not have taken place due to the limited incentives for 
NGOs to admit failures or limitations in their work (for fear of reducing 
funding opportunities) and a reluctance to alienate Soppexcca (whose 
support is required for access to coffee producers). Achieving such learning 
will require fundamental changes in how interventions are designed, 
implemented, and assessed, including the need for clear performance 
incentives at the upstream and household levels.  
 
Beyond the Soppexcca case: Recommendations for those that promote VCDA and 
that are concerned with poverty reduction  
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• Designing pro-poor value chain development interventions: Where poverty 
reduction is an explicit goal of an intervention for value chain development, 
the use of an asset-based approach for intervention design offers critical 
advantages, in particular the ability to identify those households that require 
investments in asset building before they can be expected to benefit from 
their participation in value chains. While such an approach adds complexity 
to the design and assessment process, the alternative (highly reductionist 
approach) fails to capture the critical issues related to assets and the overall 
context that determines, in part, the ability of the poor to benefit from VCDA.  
• VCDA in combination with a livelihoods approach: The major challenges 
facing Soppexcca’s members are lack of assets, high risks, and incomplete 
service offer. In the case of Soppexcca, these challenges resulted in low 
productivity, restricted ability to participate in the value chain, and limited 
ability to build assets during the assessment period. Understanding these 
challenges and related opportunities requires the application of a livelihoods 
approach in connection with the value chain approach. Application of a 
livelihoods approach will also orientate development interventions toward 
value chain development for products other than coffee and the design of 
mechanisms for managing risk. It is argued that the combination of the two 
approaches provides a useful conceptual basis for addressing rural poverty.    
• VCDA in combination with a subsector approach: This thesis also highlights 
the need for development stakeholders to intervene beyond a single value 
chain in order to achieve increased impact. For Soppexcca, options existed 
for improving its own dry-processing plant or operating its own extension 
program. In these cases, benefits may be derived from collaboration with 
other cooperatives in the purchase and operation of dry-milling services, the 
training of current and future cooperative leaders, and learning that could 
improve technical assistance and credit programs. Such collaboration would 
most likely require a long-term strategy for development of the speciality 
coffee subsector in Nicaragua. In the absence of state support, this strategy 
would most likely need to emerge from coordinated efforts by civil society.  
 
8.4 Limitations of research and future research needs  
This research stood out from other applications of the asset-building approach by 
incorporating an upstream enterprise assessment, the deconstruction and 
specification of livelihood concepts and mechanisms, and the exploration of changes 
in assets over time. The conceptual approach brought to light concepts that 
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heretofore had eluded discussions on the impact of value chain approaches, 
including the existence of asset thresholds; the need for broad-based support from 
both private and public sectors at enterprise and household levels; the need to target 
interventions at household asset constraints; and the interrelationships, synergies, 
and trade-offs related to asset building. The overall methodological approach was 
endorsed in the context of the international and multiorganizational collaboration for 
assessing the poverty impacts of VCDA that included 24 case study applications. 
That said, application of the approach is not for the faint-hearted: it requires asking 
critical questions about the role of VCDA in building assets and a deep appreciation 
of the local context, questions, and appreciations for which practitioners have shown 
limited willingness so far to incorporate into their assessments.   
Important issues related to VCDA and asset building merit further research. A 
better understanding of the trade-offs between subsistence and investments in value 
chains and options for reducing these trade-offs will be critical for achieving pro-poor 
value chain development. A better understanding of the options for mitigating the 
risks of production losses and food insecurity is also urgently needed. The case study 
highlighted that RCEs and smallholders generally lacked effective services (technical, 
business development, and financial) for building their asset endowments. However, 
the literature says little about viable options for improving service quality and 
coverage in the rural sector or for linking these services so that value chain actors 
have access to the range of services required for asset building and improved 
business performance. The analysis of Soppexcca highlighted the dilemmas faced by 
RCEs in their development pathway and the precarious nature of their existence 
even after years of buyer and NGO assistance. Identifying viable options for 
improving the competitiveness of RCEs in less time and with fewer external 
resources will require new thinking about how to organize RCEs, support them over 
the long term, and improve the overall business environment in which they operate. 
Finally, there is need for further work on a theory of change that will relate assets 
changes to livelihood strategies and outcomes—linkages in the livelihoods framework 
that are, as yet, poorly understood. 
Various limitations existed in the implementation of this research. One was 
related to the overall complexity in research design and the related challenges in the 
field. One major operational limitation was the lack of baseline data against which the 
data could have been plotted, with the aim to identify changes in assets over time. 
Similarly, the inability to use comparison groups limited the possibility to gain deeper 
insights into attribution. The only database maintained by Soppexcca was related to 
credit usage. Nor did projects and other recent interventions by NGOs have baseline 
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data on Soppexcca’s members. The use of comparison groups would have provided 
deeper insights into causality of the VCDA-related interventions, but during an early 
stage of fieldwork, it was determined unfeasible to identify a sufficiently large number 
of smallholders in Jinotega that had not participated in value chains for certified or 
specialty coffee markets during the assessment period. Had baseline data on asset 
endowments been available, the accuracy of identifying and attributing changes 
would have improved, including the possibility to track changes over the assessment 
period (rather than simply measuring at the beginning and the end of the period). To 
some extent, these challenges were met with the use of multiple data collection 
methods and through extensive training and supervision of data collection assistants. 
However, future research in this area would benefit from increased information from 
baselines and comparison groups.  
Limitations also became evident as related to the conceptual framework. The 
framework focused on changes in assets, where each asset was analysed in a 
separate manner. This failed to take into account the role of sequencing in asset 
building on determining outcomes or the existence of positive (negative) feedback 
loops and the related driving forces. Increased understanding of the relationship 
between assets merits attention in future research on asset-building approaches. 
Another limitation of the framework relates to the enterprise assessment, which 
applies an asset approach to understand changes in business viability. An asset-
building framework may not be best suited for upstream enterprises that are not rural 
RCEs or do not participate in fair trade markets. For example, analysis of cost 
structures and competitiveness may better assess business viability than asset 
endowments do.63 Also, the methodology will provide insights into how other 
researchers can operationalise the livelihoods asset framework as a basis for 
analysing the impact of interventions. But the asset indicators used here are specific 
to coffee, and other value chains will require other sets of indicators. Fresh produce, 
staple foods and livestock products can be researched in the same way, but care is 
required in identifying the critical indicators.  
                                               
63
 This limitation was brought to light during an international workshop in London (SOAS, April 26–28, 
2011) with development practitioners that implemented the framework in the context of collaboration with 
the Ford Foundation.  
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Annex 1 Household level data collection guide  
Section 1: Basic information  
 
S1–1 Contact information  
Member interviewed: Sex: M  F Base cooperative: 
 
S1–2 Household members  
Member Age Last year of education achieved  
Primary  Secondary  University 
Male hh head     
Female hh head     
 
Household members  Age  Household members Age  
Dependent (   M      F  )  Dependent (   M      F  )  
Dependent (   M      F  )  Dependent (   M      F  )  
 
Number of hh members five years ago (2004):   
 
S1–3 Membership with Soppexcca  
When was the first year that coffee was hold by the household to Soppexcca? ________ 
 
Section 2: Natural resource base  
 
S2–1 Coffee production  
 2008–
2009 
2007–
208 
2006–
2007 
2005–
2006 
2004–
2005 
Total area (mz)      
Productive area       
Production (qq perg.)      
 
Major fluctuations in production levels  
Perceived causes  Yes or 
no 
Details  
Fluctuation 1 (from 20__ to 20__)  
Renovation  Y or N   
Organic conversion (or reconversion to conventional) Y or N  
Climatic event Y or N  
Major new investment in production  Y or N  
Pests/diseases Y or N  
Biannual fluctuation in production  Y or N  
Fluctuation 2 (from 20__ to 20__) 
Renovation  Y or N   
Organic conversion (or reconversion to conventional) Y or N  
Climatic event Y or N  
Major new investment in production  Y or N  
Pests/diseases Y or N  
Bi-annual fluctuation in production  Y or N  
Fluctuation 3 (from 20__ to 20__) 
Renovation  Y or N   
Organic conversion (or reconversion to conventional) Y or N  
Climatic event Y or N  
Major new investment in production  Y or N  
Pests/diseases Y or N  
Biannual fluctuation in production  Y or N  
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Map of the production area(s) now and five years ago (to be drawn with household members) 
  
Now      five years ago (2004) 
 
 
 
S2–2 Land acquisition  
Total area under production (manzana): ______ 
# 
mz  
Year 
obtained  
 
Land use arrangement  
1-owner (property title registered) 
2-Dueño (property title not 
registered) 
3-Dueño (land reform title) 
4-Owner (no title) 
5-Occupied  
How was the land 
acquired? 
1-Purchase 
2-Inheretance 
3-Land reform  
    
    
 
Describe any conflicts over land access or ownership in the past 10 years  
 
 
Access to rented and borrowed land 
Year  Parcel Area  
 
Land usage arrangement  
2008 Parcel 1      Rented                  Borrowed            50-50% 
arrangement 
Parcel 2      Rented                  Borrowed            50-50% 
arrangement 
2007 Parcel 1      Rented                  Borrowed            50-50% 
arrangement 
Parcel 2      Rented                  Borrowed            50-50% 
arrangement 
 
S2–3 Actual land usage of own and rented lands 
Productive activity  Total area  
(# head for 
livestock) 
2008  
(2007/2008 del café) 
2007 
 (2006/2007 del café) 
Total 
production 
Household 
consumption  
Total 
production 
Household 
consumption  
Coffee   XXXXX  XXXXX 
Beans      
Corn      
      
 
S2–4 Land usage in 2004  
Productive activity  Total area (# head for livestock) 
  
  
 
S2–5 Expansion of productive activities since 2004 
New activities or activities in 
expansion  
# manzana 
(head) expanded  
 
¿Qué hizo posible la inversión? 
1-Venta de café 
2-Venta de otros productos 
3-Ahorros 
4Herencia 
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S2–6 Prácticas actuales de producción (convencional)  
General 
practice 
Specific practice  Measure-
ment unit 
Perceptions of 
contributing factors  
1-Limited outside 
influence 
2-Soppexcca 
(credit/technical 
assistance/training) 
3-Crédit/technical 
assistance/training other 
4-Subsidies Soppexcca 
5-Subsidies other 
Solid 
fertilizers  
Compost made onsite  Yes    No   
Other practices (estiércol, 
pulpa, bocashi) 
Yes    No  
Complete fertilizers  qq/mz  
Urea qq/mz  
Liquid 
fertilizers 
Biofertilizer  Yes    No   
Liquid fertilizer (Milagro, 
Baifolan, 20/20) 
Sprays/mz  
Other practices:  
Control of 
pests and 
diseases 
Graniteo Yes    No   
Traps Yes    No   
Herbicide used: Sprays/mz  
Endosulfan  Sprays/mz  
Other practices utilised (biological control):  
Wet milling  Depulping method: dry or wet   
Uso of pulp:   
Disposal/usage of waste water from wet 
milling 
 
Soil 
conservation  
Practices utilised  
 
S2–7 Coffee production in 2004 (or before joining Soppexcca, whichever was first) 
General practice  Specific practice  Measurement unit 
Solid fertilizers  Complete fertilizers  qq/mz 
Urea qq/mz 
 Liquid fertilizer  sprays/mz 
Control of pests and 
diseases 
Herbicide used: sprays/mz 
Endosulfan  sprays/mz 
Wet milling  Depulping method: dry or wet  
Uso of pulp:  
Disposal/usage of waste water from wet milling 
Soil conservation  Practices utilised 
 
 
Section 3: Capacities and capabilities (directed to the female hh head) 
 
S3–1 Participation of women and children in productive activities  
In which new productive activities (on-farm and off-farm) has the female hh head participated 
during the past three years? 
What activities were reduced or abandoned as a result? 
In which new productive activities (on-farm and off-farm) has the hh dependents (8–15 years 
old) participated during the past three years? 
How as their participation in school-related activities changed as a result?  
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S3–2 Access to education  
Which hh 
members studied 
in 2007 or 2008? 
Highest year 
achieved in 
2007 or 2008? 
 
What factors contributed to access to education? 
1-Increased own income          
2-Scholarship  
3-Construction of new schools 
Age: 
Sex: M   F 
Primary: 
Secondary: 
University: 
 
Age: 
Sex: M   F 
Primary: 
Secondary: 
University: 
 
Age: 
Sex: M   F 
Primary: 
Secondary: 
University: 
 
Age: 
Sex: M   F 
Primary: 
Secondary: 
University: 
 
 
S3–3 Weekly expenses in food products (only for household members, no labour providers) 
Food product  Consumption Perception of change in 
consumption amount for the 
household heads now in 
comparison with five years 
ago * 
Lbs rice/week   5 4 3 2 1 
Lbs sugar/week   5 4 3 2 1 
Lbs White cheese during previous month  5 4 3 2 1 
Plates served with beef during previous month  5 4 3 2 1 
Plates served with chicken during pervious month   5 4 3 2 1 
*5=much more, 4=more, 3=same, 2=less, 1=much less  
 
 
Section 4: Financial matters  
 
S4–1 Sources of income in 2007–2008 
Source  Y or N Contribution to 
annual gross 
income*  
Source  Y or N Contribution to 
annual gross 
income*  
Coffee Y N 5 4 3 2 1 citrus Y N 5 4 3 2 1 
Beans Y N 5 4 3 2 1 remittances Y N 5 4 3 2 1 
Corn Y N 5 4 3 2 1 migration Y N 5 4 3 2 1 
banana  Y N 5 4 3 2 1 off farm emp Y N 5 4 3 2 1 
livestock (L)  Y N 5 4 3 2 1 microenterprise  Y N 5 4 3 2 1 
livestock (S)  Y N 5 4 3 2 1 other:___________ Y N 5 4 3 2 1 
*5=very high, 4=high, 3=medium, 2=low, 1=very low 
 
 
S4–2 Source of income in 2003–2004 
Source  Y or N Contribution to 
annual gross 
income*  
Source  Y or N Contribution to 
annual gross 
income*  
coffee Y N 5 4 3 2 1 citrus Y N 5 4 3 2 1 
beans Y N 5 4 3 2 1 remittances Y N 5 4 3 2 1 
corn Y N 5 4 3 2 1 migration Y N 5 4 3 2 1 
banana  Y N 5 4 3 2 1 off-farm emp Y N 5 4 3 2 1 
livestock (L)  Y N 5 4 3 2 1 microenterprise  Y N 5 4 3 2 1 
livestock (S)  Y N 5 4 3 2 1 other:___________ Y N 5 4 3 2 1 
*5=very high, 4=high, 3=medium, 2=low, 1=very low 
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S4–3 Estimated gross household income in 2008 (2007/2008 coffee production year), based 
on five most important sources 
Income from coffee, banana, off-
farm work, and other sources 
(≥3) 
Income 
 
1a) Coffee sold to Soppexcca 
 
sacks: 
price: 
1b) Coffee sold to others 
 
sacks: 
price: 
2) Banana frequency of sale: 
avg volume/sale: 
price of last sale: 
3) 
 
Frequency of sale: 
Average volume/sale: 
Price of last sale: 
4) frequency of sale: 
avg volume/sale: 
price of last sale: 
5) Off-farm work weeks worked: 
pay per week: 
 
S4–4 Coffee sales outsider of Soppexcca  
In 2007, how many sacks of coffee were sold to buyers other than Soppexcca? 
What is your primary reason for selling to buyers outsider of Soppexcca? 
 
S4–5 Access to credit (2004–2008) 
 
Short term credit for agricultural production  
Provider 
 
# credit 
disbursements in last 
five years  
Amount of 
most recent 
credit  
Conditions 
(interest + 
collateral) 
Factors that facilitated 
access to credit 
1-Soppexcca 
2-Project 
     
     
 
Long-term credit for production or consumption  
Provider 
 
Main usage 
1-renovation coffee 
2-land purchase  
3-home 
4-consumption 
(health care, 
education, goods) 
Total amount Conditions 
(interest + 
collateral) 
Factors that facilitated 
access to credit 
1-Soppexcca 
2-Project 
     
     
 
Does the household have any unpaid credit to Soppexcca or others for loans taken out in the 
previous three years? With whom? How much? Why? 
 
S4–6 Access to credit before joining Soppexcca 
Provider Use of the credit 
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Section 5: Relations with buyers  
 
S5–1 Relations with buyers before joining Soppexcca 
Before joining Soppexcca, who purchased your coffee? 
Local buyers    Yes no % (on avg) of coffee purchased: ________ 
Cooperative   Yes  no % (on avg) of coffee purchased: ________ 
Exporter   Yes no  % (on avg) of coffee purchased: ________ 
Otros: ________________   % (on avg) of coffee purchased: ________ 
 
What services were provided by these buyers? 
Local buyer   Cooperative   Exporter 
Transport  si  no Transport si  no  Transport  si  no 
Credit  si  no  Credit  si  no Credit  si  no 
Inputs  si no  Inputs  si no Inputs  si no 
$ /delivery  si  no  $ /delivery si  no $ /delivery si  no 
Tech assist si no  Tech assist si       no Tech assist si no 
 
S5–2 Utilization of services provided by Soppexcca  
Service 2007 2008 Level of satisfaction* 
# visits by Soppexcca extension staff 
(where technical assistance was provided)  
  5 4 3 2 1 
# of training events in which hh members 
participated  
  5 4 3 2 1 
*5=very high, 4=high, 3=medium, 2=low, 1=very low  
 
In general, how has your capacity changed to respond to the recommendations of Soppexcca 
extensionists? 
Very high  high  medium  low  very low  
Why? 
  
S5–3 Difficulties with services received for the production and marketing of coffee  
Difficulties encountered during the 
past two years (2007-2008) 
Details 
Access to credit   
Amount of credit  
Delivery of credit  
Delivery of fertilizer  
Technical assistance  
Payment for coffee delivered  
Transport of coffee and inputs  
Rejection of coffee   
Rented services for depulping and 
wet milling 
 
 
S5–4 Other services received for agricultural production during the past five years  
Project or 
organization  
Services received  
 
Period services 
received 
Level of 
satisfaction with 
services * 
   5 4 3 2 1 
   5 4 3 2 1 
*5=very high, 4=high, 3=medium, 2=low, 1=very low 
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Section 6: Machinary, equipment, and tools 
 
S6–1 Ownership of machinery, equipment, and tools agricultural production (2005–2008) 
Machinery, 
equipment, and 
tools 
Number Year 
purchased 
Cost  Most important factor in acquisition  
1-project 
2-credit Soppexcca 
3-credit other 
4-sale of coffee 
5-sale of other product/service 
6-inheritance  
depulper      
water pump     
wet mill      
motor bump     
grain silo      
chain saw     
truck     
mower / chopper     
beasts     
     
 
 
Section 7: Household consumption patterns 
 
S7–1 Improvements in housing infrastructure  
Housing 
component  
Now Four years 
ago (2005) 
Renovation 
of existing 
material 
Amount 
invested  
Most important 
factor in acquisition  
1-project 
2-credit Soppexcca 
3-credit other 
4-sale of coffee 
5-sale of other 
product/service 
6-inheritance 
Roof zinc 
plastic 
tile 
zinc 
plastic 
tile 
yes   no   
Floor wood 
cement 
earth 
wood 
cement 
earth 
yes   no   
Walls wood 
cement 
zinc 
adobe 
wood 
cement 
zinc 
adobe 
yes   no   
Solar panel yes   no yes   no yes   no   
Generator yes   no yes   no yes   no   
Construction 
of home 
yes   no yes   no yes   no   
Construction 
of shop or 
other structure 
yes   no yes   no yes   no   
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S7–2 Ownership of consumer goods  
Good Purchase in the 
last four years 
Amount 
invested 
Most important factor in 
acquisition  
1-project 
2-credit Soppexcca 
3-credit other 
4-sale of coffee 
5-sale of other product/service 
6-inheritance  
Cellular phone/phone yes   no    
Bike yes   no    
Moto yes   no    
Auto/truck yes   no    
Sewing machine yes   no    
Refrigerator  yes   no    
Stove yes   no    
Audio equipment yes   no    
TV/DVD yes   no    
Second home yes   no    
Furniture yes   no    
House appliances yes   no    
 
¿During the past four years, have you had to sell land, home or other important possession?  
Good sold Year Reason 
   
   
 
 
Section 8: General evaluation  
How satisfied are you with your affiliation with Soppexcca?  
very high          high          medium          low         very low  
Why?  
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Annex 2 Technical aspects of smallholder coffee production  
 
 
Good practices in coffee production include regular and sustained fertilization during 
the various stages of coffee tree development, soil and plant protection (weed 
control, ground cover, shade tree management, windbreaks), regular pruning, and 
timely rejuvenation. Pruning and rejuvenation take into account that after a certain 
period of continuous production, coffee branches become less protective or 
unproductive. Therefore, they need to be cut down and replaced by young ones. 
Pruning should be done every year after harvesting period. Pruning achieves the 
following results: 1) maintains the morphology and balance of the coffee tree to 
facilitate harvesting, 2) eliminates unproductive branches and suckers, 3) encourages 
growth of new stems and fruit-bearing branches, 4) ensures correct ventilation and 
allows sunlight to penetrate throughout the tree (thus reducing the impact of pests 
and disease and encouraging floral induction), 5) avoids overproduction, and 6) 
reduces biennial bearing (see Snoeck and Lambot 2006 for more details). 
Rejuvenation aims to sustain “normal” yields over time by renewing the fruit yielding 
branches of the coffee tree. The renewal of exhausted vertical stems with new shoots 
growing from the stump enables production to return to normal levels. This also 
avoids harvesting difficulties due to the height of the stems. After cutting back the old 
stems, shoots develop at the base of the coffee tree and, after selection, the 
healthiest and better-placed shoots become the replacement stems (ibid.). This 
deprives producers of any return on coffee for one or two consecutive years.  
Coffee plants need the major nutrients nitrogen (N), phosphorus (P) and 
potassium (K), as well as minor nutrients. The amount of fertilization required 
depends on soil quality and the quantity of nutrients removed each year as coffee 
beans. Van der Vossen (2005) estimates that in shade coffee production 53 kg, 85, 
kg, and 150 kg of nitrogen and roughly equal amounts of potassium must be applied 
per hectare to correct the nutrient balance of farms with per hectare coffee production 
of 500kg, 1,500kg, and 2,000 kg, respectively. These calculations, however, assume 
that the coffee pulp is not recycled but taken away from the farm with the coffee 
beans. Roughly one-third of the nutrients removed as coffee berries can be returned 
to the farm by carefully recycling the coffee pulp, the nutrient-rich outer layer of the 
coffee fruit. In Nicaragua, this can be done relatively easily because coffee berries 
are usually depulped on-site instead of being transported far away for processing. 
When coffee pulp is recycled, 27–60 kg of nitrogen per manzana (36–80 kg/ha) need 
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to be supplied from outside the coffee field to replace the nutrients removed with 
shade coffee production of 500–2,000 kg per ha (Valkila 2009). Thus, a rough 
estimate can be made that in order to keep coffee yields at a reasonable level and to 
maintain soil fertility, a minimum of 27 kg of nitrogen per manzana (36 kg/ha) need to 
be supplied annually in addition to recycling coffee pulp and using nitrogen-fixing 
shade trees (ibid.). To reach a given level of nitrogen, greater quantities of organic 
fertilizers are required. For example, to obtain 27 kg of nitrogen, 58 kg of urea (46% 
N) would be required, or 180 kg of complete fertilizer 15-15-15 (15% N) or 
approximately 1,350 kg of either bocachi (about 2% N), compost (about 2% N) or 
Biogreen (about 2%  N) (ibid.). 
There are two basic options available to coffee producers for fertilization: 
inorganic fertilization and organic fertilization. The two most common inorganic 
fertilization options are urea and complete fertilizer. For households producing 
conventional coffee, inorganic fertilizers provide a relatively cheap and effective 
source of nutrients. Conventional producers may also use some forms of organic 
fertilizers. Organic fertilizers, such as compost and recycled coffee pulp, can have 
benefits in addition to improved plant nutrition. They can increase soil organic matter, 
water infiltration and water-holding capacity. It is common that coffee production by 
smallholders in Nicaragua be carried out under shade. Shade tree litter provides an 
additional source of organic matter. In both conventional and organic coffee 
production, part of the nitrogen needed can be provided by nitrogen-fixing shade 
trees. Although all of the observed organic coffee producers had nitrogen-fixing 
shade trees on their farms, farmers with higher yields also applied additional organic 
fertilizers. Organic materials commonly used for fertilization in Nicaragua include: 
• Coffee pulp: Approximately 40% of the wet weight of the nutrient-rich coffee 
fruit is in the form of coffee pulp, which is removed and usually discarded as 
waste by conventional coffee farmers (Sanchez et al. 1999). Pulp is typically 
left to degrade in piles without any treatment, causing odours and nutrient-
loaded leaches. Composting the pulp produces a high-quality fertilizer. It is 
estimated that 45 kg of dried coffee pulp are equivalent, on the basis of its 
chemical composition, to 4.5 kg of an inorganic fertilizer 14-3-37 or to 9 kg 
of 7-1.5-18.5 (de Castro 1960) This reflects the high potassium content of 
coffee pulp. The organic matter of coffee pulp contains more nitrogen and 
potassium than other common fertilizers, and experiments have indicated 
that coffee pulp is a valuable fertilizer particularly for coffee (Brezan 1979).  
• Cattle manure: The nutrient content of cattle manure varies, but a rough 
estimate is that cattle manure contains 0.7% N, 0.2% P and 0.7% K (Ghosh 
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et al. 2004). In Nicaragua, there are areas where both cattle and coffee 
production are common, providing some opportunities for coffee farmers to 
utilize manure originating near their farm. However, the ability of producers 
to supply significant amount of nutrients from manure may be limited, as the 
amounts required are large given the relatively low intensity of cattle farming 
carried out in northern Nicaragua. Transportation costs may prohibit the use 
of cattle manure from other regions where cattle ranching is more extensive.  
• Bocachi and compost: Bocachi is a type of compost with recommendations 
on the mix of materials to be used. Bocachi may contain coffee pulp, 
household organic waste, cattle or poultry manure, ashes, molasses, yeast, 
stems from bean production and other organic waste. When the mix is 
simpler, e.g., contains only coffee pulp, cattle manure and bean stems, it is 
commonly known as compost. The nitrogen content of compost is likely to 
vary between 1% and 3%, depending on the amount of nutrient-rich 
components, such as coffee pulp and chicken manure, in the mixture and 
how well composting is carried out. It is recommended that 3–10 kg of 
compost be applied to each tree per year or every other year (Sosa, 
Escamilla, and Díaz 2004). (Most households reported about 4,000 coffee 
plants per manzana). This would amount to between 8,000 and 40,000 kg of 
compost per year for each manzana under coffee production. The 
production of compost and bocachi has been heavily promoted by 
Soppexcca through technical assistance and training. During the early years 
of organic production, compost and bocachi was the main option available 
for the fertilization of organic coffee plantations.  
• Chicken manure-based solid fertilizer (Biogreen): Biogreen is the trademark 
of the first commercially available, poultry-manure-based organic fertilizer to 
be sold in Nicaragua. It originates from the largest chicken farm in 
Nicaragua. This factory farm has approximately 300,000 hens and its main 
product is eggs. All of the manure-based fertilizer produced by this poultry 
farm is bought by organic coffee producers in Nicaragua. Soppexcca 
purchases Biogreen in bulk and distributes it to households producing 
organic certified coffee. Concern has been raised regarding the use of 
Biogreen as it involves transportation of fertilizers over long distances and 
uses manure that is generated from a factory farm. The use of Biogreen for 
certified organic coffee production is currently approved by one of the two 
major organic certifying agencies in Nicaragua, Biolatina, but not approved 
by the other agency, OCIA.  
